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Abstract
While the reasons why states create international institutions have attracted sustained 
academic interested in international relations for more than three decades, the question 
why states design these institutions in such a variety of ways is only emerging on the 
academic agenda. This study seeks to contribute to the institutional design debate by 
transferring the principles of transaction cost economics theory from the context of in- 
ter-firm  to that of inter-state cooperation. Transaction cost economics shares with other 
functionalist design theories the core assumption that actors adopt the design that best 
addresses the specific hazards a given problem poses to their cooperative undertaking, 
whereby they have to balance the merits and drawbacks associated with individual de­
sign options. Specifically, states face a dilemma between adopting a mode of governance, 
which fosters higher levels of compliance (hard law with high levels of obligation, preci­
sion and delegation) and one, which allows for flexible adjustments to changing circum­
stances (soft law). Which type of design is most appropriate, depends on the underlying 
problem constellation—categorised here based on the three variables asset specificity, 
behavioural uncertainty, and environmental uncertainty. This study hypothesises that 
‘harder’ governance structures are pertinent when the intensity of asset specificity (the 
incentives to shirk and the vulnerability to shirking by others) and behavioural uncer­
tainty (the difficulty involved with detecting non-compliance) are high. In contrast, 
‘softer’ institutions are required as the possibility of unforeseen changes in the under­
standing of the causes, consequences or remedies of a problem increases (environmental 
uncertainty).
Whether form does indeed follow function according to this logic will be tested qualita­
tively on the basis of four international institutions established between 1988 and 2003. 
These institutions have in common that they all seek to tackle problems arising at the 
fuz2y border between crime and war, such as conflict diamonds, the trafficking in nar­
cotic drugs and small arms and light weapons, and money laundering. These institutions
3differ from each other, however, in terms of their design, spanning the full spectrum 
from high to low degrees of legalisation.
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l Introduction
Why did states agree that the international fight against the trafficking in narcotic drugs 
should be led by an international organisation possessing an independent juridical per­
sonality and a considerable budget, whereas no such far-reaching delegation was found 
to be necessary in the combat against the trafficking in small arms and light weapons? 
This question is striking, as the trafficking of narcotic drugs and that of small arms and 
light weapons seem—at first sight—to be very similar public policy issues: They invoke a 
comparable amount of human cost, and both require the coordinated response of a large 
number of production, transhipment and consumption countries. Why does a similar set 
of states decide to design very different types of international institutions for seemingly 
similar problems? This theoretical puzzle forms the core of the inquiry developed in this 
study. While the academic discussion about the macro question why independent states 
choose to facilitate cooperation through the establishment of international institutions 
has largely reached its point of saturation, the more fine-grained inquiry into the factors 
explaining the pronounced variance we can observe in the design of these institutions 
emerged on academic research agendas only recently. The academic understanding of 
the critical dimensions along which international institutions vary and the precise ways 
in which these differences matter is thus still at an early stage of development.
This study seeks to advance our understanding of the factors accounting for the variance 
observed in the design of international institutions by examining how particularities in 
the underlying problem constellation shape states’ design preferences. More fundamen­
tally, the analysis hopes to illuminate some of the basic mechanisms through which the 
design of international institutions reflects a match between form and function. These 
mechanisms are too general to explain the particular design outcome of each and every 
international institution, but may provide a template for thinking about the ways effi­
ciency considerations translate into institutional designs of various cooperative under­
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takings. This introductory chapter1 serves four ends. First, it introduces the substantive 
focus of this study, the policy area lying in the intersection between crime and war. This 
choice of focus is motivated by the increasingly blurred difference we have been witness­
ing over the last few decades between profit-oriented organised crime groups on the one 
hand and ideologically-motivated rebel and terrorist groups on the other, and by the 
particular challenges this trend poses for policymakers. Second, the theoretical inquiry 
of this study will be positioned within the literature on functionalist institutional design 
and central terms will be clarified. Third, the methodology used in this inquiry is pre­
sented so as to allow the reader to better trace the substantiation of this study’s core ar­
gument. Fourth, and finally, an overview of the plan of this study allows the reader to re­
tain the big picture of the various building blocks assembled in the quest for a better un­
derstanding of the institutional design choices policymakers faced when addressing is­
sues related to transnational organised crime and international security.
1.1 Between crim e and war
Traditionally, crime and war have been seen as two separate worlds. The former has 
been conceived as confined to the domestic realm, driven by greedy criminals’ quest for 
profits, and as a problem that is best addressed by law and order measures. This under­
standing of crime is, for instance, reflected in the definition of organised crime formu­
lated by the United States National Security Council, which defines it as a ‘continuing 
and self-perpetuating criminal conspiracy, having an organised structure, fed by fear 
and corruption, and motivated by greed’ (e.g. National Security Council 2000)2. War, in 
contrast, has been assigned to the international sphere, where an anarchic world struc­
1 This study consists of 8 chapters. Chapter are divided—with decreasing order of hierarchy—into numbered sub­
chapters, numbered sections, numbered sub-sections and bulleted paragraphs. Chapters 1 through 3 as a whole are 
also referred to as part one (introduction and theory), chapters 4 through 7 as part two (case studies) and chapter 8 
as part three (conclusion).
2 This definition largely overlaps with the definition provided by article 2 letter a of the UN Transnational Organised 
Crime Convention of 2000, which defines organised criminal groups as a ‘structured group of three or more per­
sons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or of­
fences [...], in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit’. While this definition is 
widely accepted by political scientists, ‘material benefit’ is not a necessary component of the definition of crime for 
legal scholars, as to enable activities such as racially motivated violence or drunk driving to be classified as criminal 
activities.
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ture nourishes the inextinguishable fear that one sovereign nation-state may seek to pro­
ject its power onto another state through organised violence (e.g. Luttwak and Koehl 
1991)—a threat, which can only be averted through military means. In the post-Cold War 
era, this neat distinction is becoming increasingly blurred—maybe more as the result of 
changing perceptions than fundamental changes in real world praxis. The distinction be­
tween crime and war has come under attack from two opposite angles, with one empha­
sising the criminal elements in a number of contemporary wars, and the other depicting 
crime, in particular transnationals organised crime, as a security problem which needs to 
be addressed with military power.
A first attack on the separation between crime and war comes from scholars and policy­
makers who identify a series of aspects of contemporary armed conflicts that set these 
conflicts apart from the political-rationalist theory underlying the classical understand­
ing of war (e.g. Keegan 1993), and, in contrast, make them rather resemble organised 
crime operations. A first factor eroding the difference between crime and war is the pro­
liferation of infra-state as opposed to infer-state wars in the post-Cold War era 
(Wallensteen and Sollenberg 1995). This led to an increasing prominence of non-state 
actors as sources of large-scale organised violence—a function classical war theories as­
sume states to possess the monopoly on. Another facet of the growing importance of vio­
lent non-state actors is the strengthened determination and capacity of terrorist net­
works to cause death and destruction in pursuit of their ideological goals, as demon­
strated most destructively in the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.
Other factors leading to an increasing resemblance of armed conflicts and crime origi­
nate from the evolving nature of internal conflicts of the post-Cold War era. Most impor­
3 The term “transnational organised crime” is preferred here over that of “international organised crime”. Both 
terms are usually used synonymously, but the former is deemed to be better suited to capture the non-statist and 
typically veiy amorphous nature of the phenomenon. Other terms that are sometimes used to describe the same 
phenomenon are ‘global organised crime’ and ‘multinational crime’.
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tantly, ‘new* civil wars differ from ‘old’ civil wars (Kaldor 1999)4 with respect to the 
strategies employed by combatants and by their driving motives. Although often violated 
in practice, the classical concept of war establishes a clear distinction between combat­
ants and civilians, with a duty of the former to spare the latter. In recent civil wars this 
distinction has often been ignored or even turned on its head, with civilians not only be­
ing unintentionally injured and killed in the course of military operations—as referred to 
under the problematic term ‘collateral damage’—but in many cases being specifically 
targeted by rebel groups and militias. The 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the massacres 
committed in the violent break-up of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, in particular in Bos­
nia and Herzegovina, are just two of the most infamous examples of this trend. Also in 
terms of their driving motives, these are new types of civil wars seen as differing from 
old civil wars, whereby the latter is associated with the desire to bring about political 
change for the benefit of a collective and the former, in contrast, with a predatory enter­
prise in the form of, among others activities, looting of natural resources and the extor­
tion of ransoms, undertaken for personal gain. Although armed conflicts may not have 
been initially triggered by economic greed, one can find many examples in Colombia, 
parts of Africa, and the Balkans where during the course of conflict political motives be­
came subordinate to the pursuit of financial and other material benefit (Apter 1997). The 
continuation of wide-spread violence then serves a rational economic purpose, as it con­
fers ‘legitimacy on actions that in peacetime would be punishable as crime’ (Keen 
1998b). Rebellion becomes a ‘quasi-criminal activity’ (Collier 2000). In policy circles, 
this view has been adopted most prominently by the secretary general of the United Na­
tions (UN), Kofi Annan, who stated that the pursuit of diamonds, drugs, timber, conces­
sions and other valuable commodities drives a number of today’s internal conflicts. In 
some countries the capacity of the State to extract resources from society and to allocate 
patronage is the prize to be fought over’ (Annan 1999). All these elements—the non-state 
nature of many fighting groups, the erosion of the distinction between combatants and
4 Although such a categorical distinction between ‘new* and ‘old’ civil wars is overdrawing the real differences, it still 
helps to shed light on important tendencies. See for a critical discussion of this distinction Berdal (2003) and 
Kalyvas (2001).
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civilians, and the prominence of economic motivations fuelling many armed conflicts— 
all make many contemporary wars resemble more organised crime operations than clas­
sical wars.
Simultaneously to these moves towards greater emphasis on the criminal aspects of con­
temporary wars, there has been the inverse push towards the securitisation of crime with 
the equation of transnational organised crime as the ‘new evil empire’ (Raine and Cil- 
luffo 1994), or as the ‘the new communism, the new monolithic threat’ (quoted in Hor- 
vitz 1994).
One central element of national security is a society’s ability to defend its core values 
against any attempts by internal or external groups to challenge these values outside the 
legitimate political process. Transnational organised crime groups can pose a threat to 
national security, as they seek to effectuate at least the connivance of their ongoing defi­
ance of societal values. For this end they serve themselves largely of two illegitimate 
channels: corruption and violence.
Corruption is the classical non-violent criminal instrument to gain influence over politics 
and policy decision makers. In several countries, criminals have learned to use their il­
licit profits effectively to create a political environment favourable or at least not detri­
mental to their operations. The alleged US$3.7 to 6 million contribution of the Cali cartel 
to the presidential campaign of the later winner Ernesto Samper in 1994 is just one point 
in case. Given the tremendous impact such practices can have, the pursuing corruption 
of government officials is therefore often seen as a defining characteristic of transna­
tional organised crime (e.g. National Security Council 2000).
While non-violent criminal instruments may affect certain aspects of national security, it 
is rather violent means that are of even greater importance in this context. Above a cer­
tain threshold, such crime-related violence can shift from a matter of human security to 
one of national security, threatening the very viability of the state especially when tar­
geted against government officials. In some cases, organised crime groups reach such a
20
dominant position in society that it suffices for them to threaten the instigation of wide­
spread violence and chaos in order to coerce a government into a certain behaviour.
The United States has been at the forefront in this re-evaluation of transnational crime 
from being just an issue of law enforcement to being a national security problem. In 
1995, then president Bill Clinton issued the Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 42 in 
which he officially declared organised crime as a threat to national security (Godson
2003). This directive echoed the concerns aired one year earlier by James Woosley, then 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), who maintained that ‘...when interna­
tional organised crime can threaten the stability of regions and the very viability of na­
tions, the issues are far from being exclusively in the realm of law enforcement; they also 
become a matter of national security’ (quoted in Galeotti 2001, 2isf.). This push towards 
a securitisation of crime can only be partially attributed to real changes in the nature and 
dimension of transnational organised crime (Edwards and Gill 2003). At least equally 
important in this respect are the successful communications strategies deployed by Cold 
War security agencies, which sought to defend their organisational interests through the 
creation of a new mandate (Friman and Andreas 1999, 2; Lee 1999,3; Naylor 1995a).
It has become commonplace to assert that organised crime, and in particular transna­
tional organised crime, experienced a ‘phenomenal increase in scope, power and effec­
tiveness’ in the twentieth century (Galeotti 2001, 203). This claim is rarely substantiated 
by empirical figures—which is partially understandable given the clandestine nature of 
the business—, but with reference to a number of factors, which are believed to have fos­
tered such a development. Most importantly, organised crime has been able to expand 
its operational activities and geographical scope by embracing economic globalisation 
veiy much the same way as the licit business sector has. The increasing speed and sig­
nificant drop in costs of communication and transportation combined with a drastic re­
duction of barriers to trade and financial flows allow legitimate businesses—but also or­
ganised crime groups—to shift to production networks that are organised globally rather 
than nationally (Evans 1997b). This, in turn, allows both businesses and transnational
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criminal organisations to select different states as home base and as operational fields. 
Criminal organisations thereby choose the former guided by considerations to minimise 
the risk of detection and prosecution, while their choice of the latter is based on the po­
tential reward a successful criminal enterprise is expected to generate. For instance, sev­
eral Nigeria-based criminal organisations have become specialised in advance fee fraud 
schemes, whereby the fraudsters approach residents of richer Western states by mail, fax 
or email with a request to help them move large sums of money with the promise of a 
substantial share of the cash in return (Metropolitan Police 2005). In their search for a 
‘safe haven’ criminal organisations and terrorist groups can thereby exploit asymmetries 
in national legal and regulatory regimes as well as in the capacity to implement such 
policies.
Economic globalisation has not only contributed to an internationalisation of the pro­
duction and distribution networks of illicit products and services but also to the inter­
linking of formerly separated black markets for recreational drugs, counterfeit credit 
cards, fake designer watches and stolen diamonds—leading to the emergence of what 
Friman and Andreas called the ‘illicit global economy’ (1999). According to Naylor, this 
illicit economy is supported by its own systems of information, its own sources of supply, 
its own distribution networks, and its own modes of financing (1995b, 48). This illicit 
global economy is estimated to account for 5 per cent of world gross domestic product, 
which corresponds to US$2 trillion when taking the year 2004 as a baseline. Other esti­
mates put the ‘gross criminal product’ generated by organised crime groups in 1996 to 
approximately US$1 trillion (Friman and Andreas 1999).
The globalisation of criminal activities is closely linked to the term ‘illicit flows’, which 
stands for the international movement of three types of goods and services. First, most 
obviously, it covers goods that are by themselves illicit, such as narcotics. Second, flows 
of licit goods may still be illicit, if these goods have been obtained or processed in illicit 
ways (e.g. conflict diamonds, money laundering). Finally, illicit flows also encompass the 
movement of licit goods obtained in licit ways but intended to be used for illicit purposes
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(terrorist financing, precursors for narcotics). Typically illicit flows involve states from 
where the goods and services originate, one or more states serving as transhipment cen­
tres and states where the illicit good or service is consumed. Illicit flows do not necessar­
ily create public policy problems at all points along this chain. For example, in the case 
of conflict diamonds, it is primarily the states where diamonds are mined, that suffer 
most from the illicit diamond trade, rather than the states which process or consume 
diamonds. Quite differently, in the case of small arms and light weapons (SALW), it is 
the countries amassing such weapons, rather than producing countries, which are at risk 
of these weapons being turned against them.
The international dimension of these flows necessitates an internationally coordinated 
response. However, as illicit flows affect countries very differently and with varying de­
grees of intensity, international cooperation does not follow automatically. Cooperation 
in law enforcement and national security matters is further impeded by the fact that po­
lice and judicial powers as well as national security are generally seen as defining feature 
of national independence and sovereignty (Farer 2000,; Smith 1992). Despite these ob­
stacles, a number of international initiatives were launched in the late 1990s seeking to 
curb illicit flows and mitigate their negative effects.
The cases presented in this study are all situated in this blurred borderland between 
crime and war. The first case study is dedicated to the trafficking in illicit drugs, a multi­
billion dollar business which is often associated not only with criminal organisations but 
also with insurgent groups and terrorist networks who seek to finance their arms pro­
curements through profits generated in drug-related activities. Money laundering, the 
second of the case studies presented here, is directly linked to drugs trafficking, as inter­
national control efforts to curb money laundering were first inspired as a tool to support 
the global war on drugs from the financial front. Diamonds, even more so than illicit 
drugs, have attracted international concern because of their exploitation not just by 
criminals but also by rebel groups and terrorist networks. The trafficking in small arms 
and light weapons, the subject of the fourth and final case study, is an obvious and in­
dispensable component of every criminal as well insurgent operation.
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1.2 Explaining institutional design
The growing concerns about transnational security threats emanating from the border 
between war and crime led to the launch of a number of international counter-initiatives 
in the past decades. These initiatives resulted in the establishment of a great number of 
international institutions, which differ considerably from one another with respect to 
their design. Whereas some of these international institutions are based on legally bind­
ing treaties and heavily rely on international organisations vested with far-reaching 
competencies, other institutions amount to little more than lofty declarations of intent. 
The theoretical puzzle this study addresses is to explain this variance—to explain why 
states endow international institutions tackling policy problems located in the same is­
sue area with so very different designs. Before embarking on this task, a few definitional 
clarifications are deemed indispensable.
This study adopts Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal’s understanding of international insti­
tutions, who define them as ‘explicit arrangements, negotiated among international ac­
tors, that prescribe, proscribe, and/or authorise behaviour’ (2001, 762). As the following 
paragraphs will show, this understanding of international institutions is closely related 
to—but not congruent with—the concept of international organisations, international 
agreements, and international regimes.
The definition of international institutions as referred to in this study is broader than 
that of international organisations. International organisations are characterised by a 
membership base constituted of predominantly states but also of other intergovernmen­
tal organisations, by a separate international legal personality, and by the existence of 
permanent organs with a will autonomous of that of the members (Schermers and Blok- 
ker 1995, §§32ff.). All international organisations are part of an international institution 
according to the definition employed here, in as much as they help to shape states’ be­
haviour. However, not all international institutions rely on international organisations 
to facilitate their cooperative objective. For instance, the global anti-money laundering 
efforts facilitated by the intergovernmental Financial Action Task Force (FATF) repre­
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sent an international institution according to the definition employed here despite the 
fact that the FATF lacks two central attributes of an international organisation, namely, 
an international legal personality as well as an autonomous will. Rather than equating 
international institutions with international organisations, this study seeks to explain 
why a particular international institution relies or does not rely on a pre-existing or 
newly created international organisation as part of its overall design.
International institutions as defined here are also broader than international agree­
ments. Although international institutions are per definition based upon international 
agreements, understood as written authoritative documents (Ikle 1964), they encompass 
also the practice that evolves around such agreements. In this sense, this study’s under­
standing of international institutions also covers ‘interstitial law*, i.e. the implicit rules 
operating in and around explicit normative frameworks (Finnemore and Toope 2001), 
and is comparable to a judicial interpretation which covers both de lege lata (codifica­
tion of existing law) and de lege ferenda (progressive development of law) (Malanczuk 
1997,35). Such a broadening is justified by the fact that in many cases important regula­
tory practices are not directly established by a core agreement but are evolving later 
without any explicit codification. For instance, the international initiative to curb the il­
licit trade in conflict diamonds, the so-called Kimberley Process (KP), now encompasses 
elaborated monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms, which are, however, not provided 
for in the KP’s founding document, the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) 
as adopted by the Interlaken Declaration of November 2002.
The definition of international institutions as employed here is both wider and narrower 
in scope than common definitions of international regimes. It borrows heavily from 
Robert Keohane’s definition of international regimes as ‘institutions with specific rules, 
agreed upon by governments, that pertain to particular sets of issues in international 
politics’ (1989a, 4), which are created to ‘prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, 
and shape expectations’ (1989b, 3). This study’s definition of international institutions is 
broader than Keohane’s definition by its inclusion of non-state actors, such as inter­
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governmental organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), professional as­
sociations, or multinational corporations. Such a widening of the definitional scope is 
deemed necessary in the face of the increasing role non-state actors play in the various 
stages of what Koh refers to as the ‘transnational legal processes’ (1996,; see also Shel­
ton 2000). This study’s definition is on the other hand narrower than another common 
definition, which has been formulated by Stephen Krasner, who describes regimes as 
‘implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around 
which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations’ (Krasner 
1983, 2). This study’s definition of international institutions focuses on explicit— 
although not necessarily written—arrangements at the expense of inexplicit norms and 
beliefs. This limitation is motivated by mounting evidence that suggests that explicit 
rules differ from norms both in their origins and in their impact on state behaviour 
(Slaughter 2004a, 41), thereby rendering it little useful to lump the two together.
Whereas the question about the reasons for the creation of international institutions (or 
regimes) has attracted a great deal of scholarly interest from the 1980s onwards (e.g. 
Keohane 1982,; 1984,; Krasner 1983,; Young 1983), the question why institutions were 
endowed with different institutional design arrangements has been addressed only re­
cently (e.g. Goldstein et al. 2000,; Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001). Design refers 
hereby to ‘the creation of an actionable form to promote valued outcomes in a particular 
context’ (Bobrow and Dryzek 1987, 201). Although not necessary implied by this defini­
tion, this study focuses on design seen as the result of intentional activities, without de­
nying that under certain circumstances institutional design may be the result of acci­
dents and (undirected) evolutions (Goodin 1996), as suggested by historical and socio­
logical institutionalists.
Recent interest in the design of international institutions has led to a proliferation of de­
sign classifications. One that has attracted the greatest scholarly interest is the concept
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of legalisation (Abbott et al. 2000)5. This concept arrays international institutions on a 
spectrum ranging from soft law (low levels of legalisation) to hard law (high levels of le­
galisation) based on the three criteria obligation, precision and delegation. Moving along 
this continuum from soft to hard law involves a trade-off between flexibility, found at the 
lower end of the spectrum, and compliance, which, in contrast, is facilitated by high de­
grees of legalisation. The central tenet of this study’s inquiry is that international actors 
design institutions in ways that best help them achieve the desired outcome of their co­
operative undertaking. Adopting a functionalist logic6, it is argued here that the optimal 
design is largely determined by the particular constellation underlying the problem on 
which international actors seek to cooperate. This study contributes to the functionalist 
strand of the institutional design debate by transferring the principles of transaction cost 
economics theory—specifically its independent variables asset specificity, behavioural 
uncertainty, and environmental uncertainty—from the context of inter-firm to that of in­
ter-state cooperation.
The explanatory hypotheses developed and tested here conjecture that international ac­
tors chose harder’ governance structures when the intensity of asset specificity (actions 
which are required from states by an international institution, but which states would 
not take otherwise) and behavioural uncertainty (the difficulty involved with detecting 
non-compliance of other states) are high. In contrast, ‘softer’ institutions are preferred 
when the possibility of unforeseen changes in the understanding of the causes, conse­
quences or remedies of a problem is high (environmental uncertainty).
1.3 M ethodology
The central theoretical puzzle of this study—the variance observed in the design of inter­
national institutions established to tackle policy problems in the same issue area—is in­
fluenced by a large number of different factors, many of which are of idiosyncratic na­
5 Other approaches to describe international institutions will be discussed below in chapter 2.
6 Competing design theories will be presented and assessed in chapter 3.
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ture. In order to distinguish the systematic from the non-systematic components of the 
phenomenon, this study engages in the ‘structured, focused comparison’ of qualitative 
data (George and McKeown 1985) by adopting a case-oriented approach. This methodo­
logical approach presents itself as the most pertinent for three major reasons. First, the 
investigator’s inability to control the actual behavioural event, here the design of inter­
national institutions, precludes the utilisation of experimental methods (Yin 1994). Sec­
ond, the number of observable cases contrasts sharply with the multiplicity of contextual 
factors and possible explanations, thus confronting the researcher with the ‘many vari­
ables, few cases’ dilemma and the problem of overdetermination (Lijphart 1971). Third, 
and most importantly, the utilisation of quantitative methods is hampered by the fact 
that institutional design theories are still underdeveloped, thus, requiring the thick con­
ceptualisation of the context and central characteristics as offered by the case study 
method (Ragin, Berg-Schlosser, and de Meur 1998). In fact, the explanation of institu­
tional design is still in a very early stage of theory building, with the pioneering scholars 
calling their explanatory attempts ‘conjectures’ rather than ‘theories’ (Koremenos, 
Lipson, and Snidal 2001). The contribution of this study therefore cannot be to subject 
these conjectures to statistical tests and to reach any definite conclusion on the validity 
of rational design approaches. Rather, it seeks to reveal promising directions for the fur­
ther development of such approaches towards a full theory by synthesising existing hy­
potheses and to subject predicted design outcomes to a rigorous comparison with the 
observed designs of actual international institutions. The qualitative hypothesis testing 
undertaken here is seen as part of an iterative process that interacts with theory devel­
opment (Munck 2004).
In contrast to ‘large-n’ observational tests, the case study method does not build upon 
random samples but rather on cases that were intentionally selected based on theoretical 
considerations. One inherent danger of this approach is a potential omitted variable 
bias. This study seeks to control the potential impact of omitted variables by directing its 
case selection based on two fundamental considerations. First, cases were selected so as 
to maximise the uniformity in their background conditions. For this reason, only institu­
tions were included which are based on multilateral (not bilateral) agreements, which
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deal with problems located in the same issue area (transnational security threats), and 
which fall within the limited timeframe of two decades (or more precisely: between 1988 
and 2003). Second, cases were selected so that they represent the complete relevant data 
base (van Evera 1997), ranging from international institutions with very high levels of 
legalisation (UN Drug Convention) to institutions which rely on soft law alone (UN Pro­
gramme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons), with two intermediary cases 
(KPCS, FATF). Thus, the case selection strategy used here follows Przeworski and Te- 
une’s ‘most different systems’ design (1970,34ff). Although not without its specific cave­
ats (see King, Keohane, and Verba 1994,141), this selection method based on the varia­
tion of the observed outcome is deemed justified here, given the early exploratory stage 
of institutional design theories where the most urgent challenge is to eliminate irrelevant 
systemic factors—a task Przeworski and Teune’s most different systems design is best 
capable of tackling.
The inquiry undertaken here proceeds in three stages. First, for each of the four cases 
the problem constellation is analysed based on the three variables derived from transac­
tion cost economics theory—namely asset specificity, behavioural uncertainty and envi­
ronmental uncertainty. In conjunction with the hypotheses presented in the previous 
sub-chapter, this analysis allows for the formulation of certain expectations regarding 
the optimal design of international institutions created to deal with the problem in ques­
tion. In a second stage, the institutions’ actual design is scrutinised along the three di­
mensions developed in Abbott et al’s (2000) concept of legalisation—namely obligation, 
precision and delegation. Finally, the design expectations raised in stage one are com­
pared with the actual institutional design as assessed in stage two. This comparison pre­
sents the actual test of this study’s design hypotheses. This same test will be carried out 
for all four cases selected for this study. Although not allowing for any law-like generali­
sation, these tests still generate valuable insights into the empirical plausibility of the 
causal inference derived from the adaptation of transaction cost economics theory to the 
context of institutional design in international affairs.
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Throughout this investigative process explicit and codified assessment methods are used 
so as to make the inquiry as transparent as possible. A detailed framework in the form of 
a checklist will be developed to make the measurement of the levels not only of each 
problem constellation’s transaction cost economics variables but also of the discussed 
international institutions’ level of legalisation transparent. In general, the measurement 
of all variables will be made on a scale with the three levels ‘low’, ‘moderate’ and ‘high’. 
As neither the problem constellation nor the degree of legalisation are amenable to any 
precise quantitative measurement, the operationalisation of the independent and de­
pendent variables in the above mentioned unambiguous terms is indispensable to enable 
the reader to replicate the process of inquiry and to form his or her own judgment about 
the reliability of the insights generated by this study (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 8). 
Furthermore, this operationalisation renders this study’s explanatory hypotheses falsifi- 
able. The hypotheses developed and tested here offer the advantage of being parsimoni­
ous with respect to the number and complexity of variables used (Eckstein 1975, 89). 
However, this parsimony comes at the price of not being able to explain every potential 
outcome. Such a failure to accurately predict the design of an international institution 
can also result from the fact that this line of inquiry is based on a probabilistic rather 
than deterministic mode of causation (Munck 2004) and that the number of case studies 
presented here is too small to allow for any definite assessment of the explanatory power 
of the model.
While this study focuses on cases dealing with policy problems located in the intersec­
tion between crime and war, nothing of the theoretical framework developed here neces­
sarily prevents it from being used for the analysis of international institutions dealing 
with problems related to other issue areas. In fact, transaction cost economics theory has 
already been successfully applied to international cooperative arrangements in other 
policy fields such as trade (e.g.Yarbrough and Yarbrough 1992) and military security 
(e.g.Lake 1999). Also, this study’s dependent variable—the concept of legalisation—has 
been applied to policy areas ranging from human rights, security to environmental pro­
tection. Such transferability is important as we are witnessing a proliferation of interna­
tional institutions and an ever increasing density of the global regulatory web (Slaughter
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1 9 9 7 * ; Slaughter 2004b). It is therefore of central importance to understand how these 
institutions are to be designed in order to best cater for the specific contractual problems 
arising from certain constellations. However, any transfer into other policy areas and 
beyond the contemporary setting chosen for this study needs to follow careful proce­
dures of concept adaptation in order to avoid conceptual stretching (Munck 2004,113).
This study draws its empirical evidence from a wide range of sources in order to prevent 
reproducing any potential bias from an individual source. The problem constellation is 
analysed based on evidence gathered from academic and semi-academic writings, news­
paper reports, and public records of individual governments and of intergovernmental 
organisations. Interviews with government officials, staff of international organisations, 
of non-governmental organisations and of affected businesses complemented these writ­
ten sources and allowed to update the evidence used in all four cases. Furthermore, 
these interviews provided a valuable ‘reality check’ of the written sources that had been 
previously consulted. Interviewees were identified and selected based on written sources 
such as lists of participants to relevant conferences and hearings and on cross-referrals 
by other interview partners. The number of interviews conducted for each of the four 
case studies varied inversely with the availability of reliable written sources—with the il­
licit trafficking in conflict diamonds requiring the greatest number of interviews, and the 
narcotic drugs the smallest. In total, 34 interviews were conducted between January 
2004 and September 2005. The interviews followed a semi-structured format in order to 
allow both for comparison between sources and cases and for flexibility to capture the 
individual perspective of the interview partner. The interviews were undertaken face-to- 
face and over the telephone and transcribed based on interview notes. In order to guar­
antee accuracy, transcripts were sent to interviewees for authorisation. Interview mate­
rial used in this study is not attributed, but appendix 1 lists the professional affiliation of 
the various interview partners as well as the date of the interview.
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1.4 Outline
This study consists of three parts. Part one lays out the theoretical foundations and the 
operationalisation of both the dependent and the independent variable. The second part 
applies this theory to the four case studies, while part three provides a summary and the 
conclusions.
The chapter immediately following this introduction addresses the question of how best 
to conceptualise the observed variance in the design of international institutions and, 
thus, of this study’s dependent variable. It provides an overview and critical discussion 
of the relevant theoretical literature. It introduces the distinction between hard law and 
soft law as descriptive categories and shows how the design of international institutions 
arrayed along this continuum presents unique combinations of advantages and disad­
vantages in the form of greater or lesser degrees of flexibility and of credibility, respec­
tively. This chapter concludes with the presentation of the three design dimensions sug­
gested by the concept of legalisation, namely obligation, precision and delegation, fol­
lowed by the development of a list of operationalised criteria which will guide the as­
sessment of the international institutions examined in the case studies presented in the 
second part of this study.
The argument presented in the third chapter follows a similar structure but now with re­
spect to this study’s independent variables, i.e. the characteristics based upon which 
problem constellations are described and compared. First, competing theories on insti­
tutional design are discussed and their relative explanatory power compared before the 
focus shifts to the functionalist strand within the debate. The functionalist theory 
adopted here is derived from transaction cost economics theoiy, which has found strong 
empirical support for a causal relationship between institutional arrangements and three 
attributes underlying these institutional arrangements—namely asset specificity, behav­
ioural uncertainty and environmental uncertainty. These three independent variables 
are again operationalised so as to maximise transparency in the assessment of the prob­
lem constellation underlying each of the four case studies. These two theoretical chap­
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ters provide the grounds for the formulation of this study’s prime hypothesis, which con­
jectures that international actors will establish institutions with high degrees of legalisa­
tion when dealing with problems characterised by high levels of asset specificity and be­
havioural uncertainty combined with low levels of environmental uncertainty. Inversely, 
low degrees of legalisation are chosen for policy problems with little asset specificity, be­
havioural uncertainty and considerable environmental uncertainty.
This hypothesis (and its inverse) will be qualitatively tested on the bases of four case 
studies presented in the second part of this study. The four case studies are presented in 
the order of their decreasing degree of legalisation. Chapter four is dedicated to the 1988 
United Nations Convention against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances, which was selected as an example of an international institution based on 
comparably hard law. Chapter five scrutinises the Forty Recommendations of the Finan­
cial Action Task Force (FATF) of 2003, which establish an international institution 
against money laundering. Chapter six discusses the Kimberley Process Certification 
Scheme of 2002, an international initiative to curb the illicit trade in so-called conflict 
diamonds. Chapter seven concludes the empirical part with the analysis of the United 
Nations Program of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons of 2001, which represents 
an international institution with a low degree of legalisation. Each of these case study 
chapters begins with an overview of the context of the case, establishing how the policy 
issue emerged on the international agenda, and how it has been addressed through vari­
ous international agreements. The main part of each empirical chapter is dedicated to 
the comparison of the predicted and the actual design outcome for the international in­
stitution created to tackle the specific policy problem.
Finally, chapter eight synthesises the findings of the four preceding empirical chapters 
and assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the design hypotheses formulated in the 
first part of the study. It seeks to broaden the debate by suggesting promising areas for 
future research.
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2 The concept of legalisation
By definition, illicit flows are a transnational problem, as they involve economic activi­
ties across borders that are criminalised by either the importing or the exporting state, 
or by both (Friman and Andreas 1999). They present particular challenges to interna­
tional cooperation, as they affect states in very different ways, depending on the type of 
the illicit good or the service involved and on whether the country is the place of origin of 
the flow, a transhipment centre, or the country of destination. Matters are complicated 
further by the fact that, in many cases, the curbing of illicit flows requires the coopera­
tion of states that do not feel any negative consequences of these flows and of states that 
may even benefit from them. Given this absence of harmony of interests, international 
cooperation does not emerge quasi automatically. Rather, strong international institu­
tions need to be established that help to overcome the obstacles to cooperation arising 
from heterogeneous interests. It is thus little surprising that the increasing number and 
severity of illicit flows has led to an expansion of the number and scope of international 
institutions created to tackle this problem. This proliferation of international institutions 
has been accompanied by a growing diversity in terms of the governance structures they 
incorporate. In the last decade, international relations scholars have become increas­
ingly interested in this observable variety of institutional designs and have developed 
several concepts to describe it. Some scholars adopt dichotomous design concepts (e.g. 
formal versus informal agreements (Lipson 1991, ; Morrow 2000), or the inclusion or 
absence of escape clauses (Rosendorff and Milner 2001)), while others include multiple 
aspects into their analysis (e.g. scope, membership, centralisation, control and flexibil­
ity) (Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001). The aspects that have attracted the greatest 
academic attention relate to the differences between international institutions in terms 
of their capacity to bind signatories in legal terms (obligation); to their ability to convey 
clear-cut objectives and action plans (precision); and to whether they commission a 
third party to perform certain tasks on behalf of the signatories (delegation). Taken to­
gether, these three characteristics—obligation, precision and delegation—constitute the
34
core elements of what has become known as the concept of legalisation (Abbott et al. 
2000).
In this understanding, legalisation refers to ‘a particular form of institutionalisation, 
[which] represents the decision in different issue-areas to impose international legal 
constraints on governments’ (Goldstein et al. 2000, 386). This concept conceives legali­
sation as a continuum that stretches from soft law to hard law, where the soft end is 
characterised by low levels of obligation, precision and delegation and, conversely, the 
hard end by high levels of these three variables. When states chose a certain degree of le­
galisation to facilitate cooperation in a certain issue-area, they face a fundamental trade­
off, as hard law enhances the credibility of the signatories’ commitment, while soft law 
offers greater flexibility (Goldstein and Martin 2000, ; Koremenos 2001, ; Rosendorff 
and Milner 2001).
This institutional design dilemma will be subject of a detailed discussion presented here 
in the first sub-chapter. From this foundation, the discussion moves on to develop the 
three dimensions of legalisation—obligation, precision, and delegation—in more detail 
and to suggest ways how to operationalise these explanatory variables for the context of 
this study. This chapter builds upon two bodies of literature developed in distinct sub­
fields of political science, namely government studies—largely concerned with the study 
of relations between the executive and the legislative—and international relations. Both 
bodies of literature address the credibility problem of the state and discuss the relevance 
of obligation, precision and delegation with respect to institutions created to overcome 
this problem. However, until very recently, little awareness existed among scientists of 
both camps about the relevant insights the other sub-discipline had to offer. This chap­
ter, thus, attempts to demonstrate the potential of such ‘cross-fertilisation’.
2.1 Credibility versus flexibility
This first sub-chapter addresses a fundamental dilemma that is inherent in every design 
option for international institutions: the trade-off between the credibility associated with
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hard legalisation, on the one hand, and the flexibility offered by institutions with only 
low levels of legalisation, on the other. The first section explains why credibility is of 
paramount importance for states in dealing both with their domestic audiences and with 
each other. The discussion then moves on to show why a gain in credibility necessarily 
comes at the expense of flexibility, and why and under which circumstances this matters. 
The third and final section connects the two by arguing that the choice between high lev­
els of credibility and flexibility is not binomial but rather continuous, that states can es­
tablish institutions that take on any position on the soft-hard legalisation continuum and 
that this position often shifts during the course of an institution’s existence.
2.1.1 Credibility: A central problem of the state
International cooperation involves an ‘exchange of conditional promises, by which each 
party declares that it will act in a certain way on condition that the other parties act in 
accordance with their promises’ (Ikle 1964, 7). In that respect, cooperation between 
states is very much comparable to transactions between private parties. Both cases in­
volve a sacrifice of the parties in exchange for a promised good the receiving party values 
at least as much, typically higher, than the sacrifice it has to make. In both cases the wel­
fare enhancing outcome will only be achieved if all parties involved in the transaction 
believe that the other party will live up to its promises and this expectation materialises. 
In a key aspect, though, the private and the public sphere differ from each other. Prom­
ises made by private parties in private contracts gain considerable credibility through 
the existence of a juridical system, independent of the parties involved and vested with 
the authority and capacity to effectively enforce property rights and contractual obliga­
tions. The provision of such a juridical system is usually considered as one of the core 
functions of the state. When, however, the state itself becomes party to a contract the en­
forcement of contractual obligations is no longer ensured, as the juridical system is part 
of the state itself. This results in a lack of credibility for the promises made by states, un­
dermining the state’s ability to conclude agreements with either private parties or other 
states. Both scholars within government studies and within international relations have
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taken a strong interest in this problematique. The former have typically focused on the 
credibility of states’ commitment vis-a-vis private parties such as interest groups (e.g. 
Horn 1995, ; Moe 1990a), capital owners (Root 1994), or business communities (Levy 
and Spiller 1996) whereas the latter examined the credibility of promises exchanged be­
tween states. Both bodies of literature emphasise the importance of a state’s ability to 
lend credibility to its commitments by binding itself through ‘some voluntary but irre­
versible sacrifice of freedom of choice’ (Schelling i960, 22).
• Government science literature
The government science literature provides a rich discussion of the credibility problem a 
state faces and of several formal mechanisms through which a state can seek to over­
come them. Promises made by a government are plagued with fundamental uncertainty 
as ‘whatever policies and structures ... [an incumbent government] put[s] in place today 
may be subject to the authoritative discretion of other actors tomorrow, actors with very 
different interests who could undermine or destroy ... [the incumbent government’s] 
hard-won achievements’ (Moe 1990b, 124). This uncertainty affects a government’s in­
teraction with various stake holders. Moe (1990b), Horn and Shepsle (1989) and Horn 
(1995) demonstrate how this wanting credibility of a government’s promises undermines 
interest groups’ willingness to offer an incumbent government their full support, as they 
fear that the benefits they reach from a certain policy enacted by the government may 
only be of temporary nature. Root (1994) illustrates in his study of royal fiscal policy 
during absolutism in France the problems a government faces from political uncertainty 
when trying to borrow money from private capital owners. He argues that the king had 
to pay higher interest rates than private individuals because he had a reputation for re­
neging on his financial commitments and because the lenders were unable to hold him 
accountable for his non-compliance. Root calls this phenomenon the ‘irony of absolut­
ism’ and notes that, ‘because the king claimed full discretion, he had less power. Claim­
ing to be above the law in fiscal matters made it more difficult for him to find business 
partners. The use of discretion reduced his payoffs in equilibrium because invoking ab­
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solute power destroyed royal credibility’ (1994, 177). In the contemporary context of 
telecommunications, Levy and Spiller (1996) demonstrate the importance of a govern­
ment’s ability to lend credibility to its regulatory policies so as to attract domestic or in­
ternational investors; Gilardi (2002) expands this point to other business sectors. 
Henisz (2000) presents a related argument in his article on multinational investments 
where he describes investors’ reluctance to invest in countries where government poli­
cies can easily be reversed. North and Weingast (1989) broaden the argument and dem­
onstrate how a government’s capacity to make credible commitments forms the indis­
pensable underpinning of economic growth and sustainability. It is therefore of central 
importance that a government finds ways to overcome the ‘irony of absolutism’ Roots re­
ferred to, which applies to democracies with equal force. This requires mechanisms that 
allow a government to signal its intensions in a trustworthy way and to tie its own hands 
by insulating an enacted policy from the discretion of tomorrow’s political decision­
makers (Moe 1990b, 125; North and Weingast 1989).
The government science literature discusses several formal mechanisms a state can em­
ploy to enhance the credibility of its commitment. Most attention has been given to the 
separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers (Gely and Spiller 1990, ; Landes 
and Posner 1975,; McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987,; 1989). Attention has also been 
paid to whether effective checks and balances can be established and maintained by hav­
ing two different voting rules to elect two legislative houses, by the separation of politics 
from administration (Moe 1990b), by minority parities and by federal, decentralised 
structures (Ferejohn and Weingast 1997). Recent literature has taken a particular inter­
est in the relationship between the legislative and the bureaucracy and the role delega­
tion plays in this equation (Epstein and O'Halloran 1999,; Horn 1995,; Huber and Shi- 
pan 2002,; Miller 2000). This literature demonstrates how the legislature can increase 
the value of a certain legislation in the eyes of the beneficiaries by passing detailed stat­
utes imposing rigid constraints (Moe 1990b, 136) and by entrusting the execution of the 
policy to a permanent body removed from political oversight (Moe 1990b, 137). These 
mechanisms generate a ‘lock-in’ effect, as they insulate current policy beneficiaries from
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future change by increasing ‘the costs that future legislators must face if they attempt to 
undermine the original deal at the administrative level’ (Horn 1995,18).
• International relations literature
The task of achieving credibility when a state commits itself vis-a-vis another state is 
even more acute than in private-public transactions, as states have so far been more suc­
cessful in creating credibility enhancing institutions on the domestic than on the inter­
national level. First steps have been undertaken in the direction of a credibility- 
enhancing separation of powers with the creation of international courts such as the In­
ternational Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court. However, these at­
tempts are still confined to an embryonic stage?. States typically retain the discretion to 
decide on a case-by-case basis whether they want to acknowledge the competence of an 
international court. Furthermore, it is left to the states to follow or disregard the court’s 
ruling, as international courts cannot call upon a law enforcement body comparable to 
the police in the domestic context. In brief, international law rests largely on the consent 
of states (Bierley 1963, 7-16; S.S. Lotus (France vs. Turkey) PCIJ 1927). Many interna­
tional relations scholars, in particular those associated with the realist camp, have ques­
tioned whether international law is law at all, emphasising the anarchic nature of world 
affairs, i.e. the absence of any central authority above states and vested with the author­
ity and capability to effectively enforce pledges made by states (Mearsheimer 1994-1995, 
; Morgenthau 1953, 296-7). This anarchic structure of global politics undermines the 
credibility of the pledges made by states. How severe this problem is, mainly depends on 
how strong the incentives are for states to shirk (Snidal 1985, 936-939; Stein 1983,127- 
132). In cases of mere co-ordination, anarchy does not cause any problems, as no state 
has an incentive to shirk once it has agreed upon a common standard (Krasner 1991). All 
parties are better off living up to their promises independent of the other parties’ action. 
Problems arise, however, in problem structures that resemble a prisoner's dilemma
i The European Court of Justice presents an important exception in this respect.
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(Lipson 1984, ; Stein 1983). Under such constellations, states can only reach the full 
benefits from participating in a cooperative undertaking when all other parties honour 
their obligations as well. If, however, other parties do not comply with the agreement, a 
state may lose out from participating in an international co-operation arrangement 
compared to the option of staying away from it or to the option of shirking. It is there­
fore crucial for the success of a cooperative project that all participants believe in the 
promises given by the other parties. Given the absence of a pre-existing body that 
strengthens the credibility of these promises by threatening to enforce them in case of 
non-compliance, states need to create their own international institutions that specify 
‘illegitimate behaviour’ and define ‘procedures to discourage cheating’ (Hasenclever, 
Mayer, and Rittberger 1996,188). Such institutions are even more important in some of 
the cases examined in this study, which require the cooperation of states which do not 
directly benefit—at least not in material terms—from a successful outcome of the coop­
erative undertaking.
Similar to the domestic situation, states try to overcome their credibility deficit by estab­
lishing international institutions, which can limit their discretion and thus enhance the 
credibility of their commitments. The central mechanism through which international 
institutions achieve this goal is by raising the relative costs of revoking or defying a pre­
viously made commitment (Morrow 2000). They mainly do so by conveying signals that 
allow states to infer the true interests and likely future action of the parties to the institu­
tion (Morrow 2000, 68). International institutions can signal credible commitment 
when they make these signals costly, i.e. when they ensure that the act of sending a sig­
nal ‘incurs or creates some cost that the sender would be disinclined to incur or create if 
he or she were in fact not willing’ to honour the promises made under an international 
institution (Fearon 1997, 69). Fearon (1997) distinguishes two types of costly signals: 
sunk-costs signals and tying-hands signals. The former refer to financially costly actions 
undertaken by a party ex ante, such as the mobilisation of troops. The latter refer to in­
ternational institutions’ ability to create costs a state will incur in case it does not comply 
with the agreement. The most important form of this second type of costs is audience or
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reputational costs. When a state makes formal promises and declares itself bound by an 
international institution but then does not live up to its obligations its reputation suffers 
on two levels. First, reneging from an international institution spoils a state’s interna­
tional reputation, making it more difficult for the state to enter international agreements 
in the future (Keohane 1984, 105L; but also Morgenthau 1953,313). The long-term nega­
tive effects on reputation may therefore outweigh the immediate benefits from non- 
compliance, thus creating a strong incentive for honouring the obligations signed up for 
(Lipson 1991, ; Morrow 2000). Second, a non-complying government’s reputation also 
suffers on the domestic level. Bueno de Mesquita et al (1999), argue that those with the 
power to remove a current leader—either the mass electorate in democracies or a clique 
of oligarchs—care about their state’s international standing and will sanction the leader 
in case he or she spoils it (see also Morrow 2000,; Smith 1998).
The size of international and domestic audience costs, which a state incurs from non- 
compliance, depends on the extent to which an international agreement puts a state’s 
reputation at stake. The audience costs are higher, when, firstly, a state makes an official 
declaration to consider itself legally bound by an international agreement (Lipson 1991), 
secondly, when the provisions of this agreement are specific enough to allow for a clear 
distinction between compliance and breach and, finally, when an independent agency is 
commissioned to monitor and to expose (non)compliance—in brief, when the agreement 
incorporate a high level of legalisation.
2.1.2 The downside of high levels of legalisation
Since obligation, precision and delegation seem to boost the credibility of an interna­
tional institution, one could expect states to favour higher levels of legalisation, i.e. hard 
law, over lower levels of legalisation, i.e. soft law. This assumption is, however, not sup­
ported by evidence as demonstrated by the great and increasing number of international 
institutions with only soft legalisation (Shelton 2000). Scholars of international rela­
tions and international law discuss various reasons for why states may favour soft law 
over hard law under certain circumstances (Abbott and Snidal 2000, ; Guzman 2003, ;
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Lipson 1991,; Reinicke and Witte 2000,; Rosendorff and Milner 2001,; Shelton 2000). 
The aspect most widely discussed in the literature is the decreasing flexibility of harder 
forms of law. Levy and Spiller are right in pointing out that there exists a fundamental 
trade-off between the credibility and flexibility of an international agreement ‘since the 
same mechanisms that make it difficult to impose arbitrary changes in the rules may 
make it difficult to enact sensible rules in the first place or to adapt the rules as circum­
stances change’ (1996, 5). Hard law is associated with at least four different types of ri­
gidities. First, the establishment of hard law usually entails a slow and costly process. It 
requires lengthy negotiations between top-level representatives of national executives 
and—after closure—a ratification process typically involving the approval of parliament 
or maybe even public approval in a referendum. Second, given the reputational stakes 
associated with hard law, states are very reluctant to enter an agreement with an ambi­
tious agenda. For this reason, many hard laws represent little more than the lowest 
common denominator (Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1996). If an issue is contentious, 
‘anything other than non-binding agreements would deter states and non-state actors 
from participating, precluding the possibility of informal and formal cooperation’ 
(Reinicke and Witte 2000, 94). Third, the high levels of credibility of hard law come at 
the expense of a flexible adaptation of the provisions to changing circumstances. The 
complex interaction of many policy issues with a fast changing and technology driven 
environment necessitates adaptive and responsive policy instruments (Reinicke and 
Witte 2000, 95). But as adaptations of existing hard law agreements usually require the 
consent of all parties, this process can be almost as cumbersome as was drafting the 
agreement in the first place. Fourth and finally, hard law is very rigid towards the inclu­
sion of non-state actors, as the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) only 
recognises sovereign states as negotiators and signatories of treaties. It has become 
common place to note the important roles various types of non-state actors assume 
throughout all stages of the international policy making process, but only soft law allows 
for an official participation of non-state actors in the development and implementation 
of international rules (Shelton 2000,13).
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For these reasons, Johnston concludes that soft law arrangements may enjoy increasing 
popularity, perhaps ‘motivated by the need to circumvent the political constraints, eco­
nomic costs, and legal rigidities that often are associated with formal and legally binding 
treaties’ (1997).
2.1.3 Hard or soft legalisation: a difficult trade-off
As the above discussion highlighted, international institutions endowed with low and 
high legalisation, respectively, both present certain advantages and drawbacks. Interna­
tional actors therefore face a difficult trade-off between flexibility and credibility when 
designing an international institution (Goldstein and Martin 2000, 605; Koremenos 
2001,; Rosendorff and Milner 2001).
Traditionally, scholars of international law made a clear-cut distinction between legally 
binding treaties and softer forms of international arrangements, dismissing the latter as 
non-law (Weil 1983), or as a mere second-best solution (c.f. Schachter 1977, 304). But 
over the last decade or so, scholars in both camps have increasingly recognised the grow­
ing importance of soft law. Koh argues that we are witnessing the emergence of a ‘brave 
new world of international law’ where ‘transnational actors, sources of law, allocation of 
decision function and modes of regulation have all mutated into fascinating hybrid 
forms. International law now comprises a complex blend of customary, positive, declara­
tive and soft law* (1995, ix). Adopting Koh’s perspective on the nature of today’s interna­
tional law, this study perceives hard and soft legalisation not as mutually exclusive insti­
tutional designs, but as arrayed along a continuum ranging from arrangements that im­
pose strong constraints on behaviour to arrangements that allow for almost complete 
freedom of action (Abbott et al. 2000,; Reinicke and Witte 2000,; Shelton 2000,4).
The distinction between hard and soft law is far from clear-cut as many legally binding 
treaties ‘soften’ their degree of obligation through vague formulations and/or weak en­
forcement mechanisms, while non-binding arrangements may provide for supervisory 
mechanisms traditionally associated with hard law (Shelton 2000, 10). Furthermore,
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hard law and soft law often assume complementary roles. Shelton (2000,10) notes that 
soft law can rarely be found in isolation, but is usually part of a complex regime consist­
ing of hard law and soft law arrangements both seeking to regulate the same issue area. 
Soft law agreements often assume the function of authoritatively resolving a treaty’s am­
biguities or of filling in gaps and omissions. The separation between hard and soft law is 
also not static. Soft law is often the first step on the path towards legally binding agree­
ments (Abbott and Snidal 2004). Especially when an issue is of highly contentious na­
ture, soft law presents the only arrangement that diverging parties can agree upon. Re­
inicke and Witte (2000) point out how informal and formal cooperation based on soft 
law can lead to a convergence of perceived interests of states, thus promoting closer co­
operation. However, as Kal Raustiala (2004, 9) points out, there is no automatism lead­
ing to the hardening of soft law over time. Although, many examples exist in support of 
the assumption that institutions tend to harden over time, there are also cases which 
remained permanently on the soft end of the spectrum or where even a reversion took 
place.
Despite of this blurred boundary between soft law and hard law, this study embarks on 
categorising international agreements according to their level of legalisation. Three 
broad categories—low, moderate and high levels of legalisation—will be used, and the 
assignment to either of these categories will be based upon the three criteria, obligation, 
precision and delegation, discussed in detail below.
2.2 The three dimensions o f the concept of legalisation
The concept of legalisation as developed by Abbott et al (2000) distinguishes three di­
mensions—obligation, precision and delegation—along which the relative position of an 
international institution on the flexibility-credibility spectrum can be localised. An in­
ternational institution is assumed to present a case of hard legalisation, when states un­
ambiguously commit themselves to comply with an agreement (obligation), when the 
provisions of the agreement are precise enough to allow for a clear distinction between 
compliance and non-compliance (precision), and when substantive power is transferred
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to a third party vested with some degree of independence (delegation). These three as­
pects of legalisation and their importance for the credibihty-flexibility trade-off will be 
explained below. Assessing the levels of obligation, precision and delegation incorpo­
rated in an international institution is necessarily of approximate nature. Two measures 
are adopted here in order to allow for the greatest possible degree of intersubjectivity. 
First, the discussion below details which observable elements of an international institu­
tion are considered to present indicators for soft and hard legalisation respectively. 
These indicators will be compiled into a checklist, which will guide the assessment of in­
ternational institutions in the second part of this study. Second, given the impossibility 
to generate any meaningful and precise quantitative measurements for the three ex­
planatory variables, this study contents itself with discerning three qualitative levels 
Qow, moderate, high) of obligation, precision and delegation. Not only the three major 
components of legalisation—obligation, precision and delegation—will be given one of 
these values, but also the indicators mentioned above will be assigned a value on this 
three-step scale in part two of this study.
2.2.1 Obligation
‘Sovereignty’ is a fundamental principle of classical international law. It establishes that 
every state is equal in terms of its legal rights and that a state’s right, including the right 
to organise and conduct its internal affairs at its own discretion, which must not be cir­
cumscribed by any international institution unless the state has given its explicit consent 
to this institution. Against this background, obligation refers to the extent to which a 
state considers an international institution to create legally binding rules and formally 
commits itself to comply with these rules (Schachter 1977). By declaring an international 
agreement as legally binding, states accept it to become part of the legal system governed 
by customary law and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Most importantly, 
the legal principle of pacta sunt servanda enshrined in article 26 of the VCLT applies, 
which obliges states to implement the rules of the institution in good faith. If they fail to 
do so, they become legally responsible and parties injured by this breach may claim
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reparations—either in form of material compensation or an official apology (Abbott et al. 
2000). A high degree of obligation increases the reputational stakes and thus enhances 
the credibility of an agreement.
The assessment of the degree to which an international institution is obliging states to a 
certain type of behaviour involves three interrelated elements: legal bindingness, the use 
of provisions attenuating the degree of obligation—such as escape clauses, withdrawal 
provisions, reservations—, and finally, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms.
• Legal bindingness
As a first step to assess the degree of obligation enshrined in an international institution 
we can establish whether or not the underlying international agreement is of legally 
binding nature. In order to do so, one needs to refer to the ‘intention by the parties to 
create legal rights and obligations or to establish relations governed by international law’ 
(Schachter 1977, 296). This intention is, however, not always clearly stated in an interna­
tional agreement, as states are sometimes reluctant to declare explicitly that an agree­
ment lacks legal power. Therefore, the true intention has to be inferred from the ‘lan­
guage of the instrument and the attendant circumstances of its conclusion and adoption’ 
(Schachter 1977, 297). The language in which an international agreement is phrased can 
indeed often serve as a good auxiliary indicator for the parties’ intention. It has become 
common practice to use certain formulations in agreements that are meant to be legally 
binding. One can typically find phrases such as ‘The Parties to this Convention, ...., 
hereby agree as follows’ in the preamble of legally binding treaties such as the UN Drugs 
Convention of 1988. Non-binding agreements, in contrast, prefer formulations such as 
‘participants ...recommend the following provisions’ (see for example the Interlaken 
Declaration of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme). Other terms typically found 
in legally binding but not in non-binding agreements include ‘obligations’, ‘shall’ and 
‘should’. An agreement’s legal bindingness can, secondly, be deduced from the inclusion 
of certain procedural provisions it involves.
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Legally binding agreements typically contain provisions on procedural issues such as 
accession, entry into force, safeguards and denunciations (more on the latter two below) 
which are all absent in legally non-binding agreements. Also, ratification process 
through which an international agreement is adopted can help to interpret parties’ in­
tention. States usually envisage different domestic procedures for the adaptation of in­
ternational agreements depending on the agreement’s bindingness. Typically, interna­
tional agreements that are legally binding involve stronger forms of legislative scrutiny 
than non-binding agreements. The US constitution, for example, requires the ‘advice 
and consent’ of two thirds of the Senate for the ratification of an international treaty (ar­
ticle II, section 2, clause 2 of the US Constitution); in Switzerland, some binding interna­
tional agreements even require the consent of the majority of the people (Constitution of 
the Swiss Federation, article 141).
A third auxiliary indicator for states’ intention suggested by Schachter is the registration 
of an international agreement under article 102 of the UN Charter. This article stipulates 
that ‘every treaty or international agreement, whatever its form and descriptive name, 
entered into by one or more members of the United Nations’ has to be registered with 
the UN secretariat and be published in the United Nations Treaty Series. However, as 
both legally binding and non-binding agreements are required to be filed with the UN, 
the registration of an agreement is a very weak indicator for an agreement’s legal bind­
ingness. Some exceptions, most prominently the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, exist where 
the parties of the agreement explicitly decided against the registration with the UN se­
cretariat. Such a non-registration bears the importance consequence that parties forfeit 
the right to invoke the agreement before any organ of the United Nations (article 102 
paragraph 2). Therefore, a non-registration can be seen as a strong indicator for the par­
ties’ intention to underline the non-binding status of the agreement, whereas registra­
tion does not in itself indicate its bindingness. However, using the non-listing of an 
agreement in the United Nations Treaty Series as an indicator for the soft law character 
of an agreement, is problematic for the practical reason that the Treaty Series currently
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runs a back log of around ten years (Max Planck Institute 2004). This third auxiliary in­
dicator of legal bindingness is therefore omitted in this study.
• Attenuation
Legal bindingness is an important first indicator for a high level of obligation of an 
agreement. However, it alone does not suffice, as the obligation created by a legally 
binding institution can be attenuated in three major ways: reservations, escape clauses 
and withdrawal.
As already noted, international agreements typically do not posses direct effect but need 
to be converted into domestic law before becoming enforceable. This transposition 
opens the door for states to adapt the terms of the agreement in their favour, either 
through definitional changes or through explicit reservations. Most legally binding in­
ternational agreements allow for such reservations, which the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties defines as ‘unilateral statements], however phrased or named, made by 
a State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, where, ... 
[they] purport to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty 
in their application to the State’ (article 2 letter d). Reservations can undermine the 
credibility of an agreement and void it of its content. For this reason, the Vienna Con­
vention tries to safeguard the integrity of the treaty by limiting the application of reser­
vations. Article 19 letter c specifies that a state may not submit a reservation which is ‘in­
compatible with the object and purpose of the treaty’. As this provision is vague and 
leaves plenty of room for interpretation, some international agreements explicate which 
of its provisions are open for reservations and which cannot be unilaterally modified. 
For instance, article 42 of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (CETS 185 
of 23 November 2001) explicitly lists the provisions of which a party can modify the legal 
effect and interdicts reservations relating to any other provisions. An agreement which 
limits the application of reservations more rigidly is considered to have a higher degree 
of obligation than one that does not impose any constraints on reservations. In this
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sense, provisions on reservations can serve as a second criterion to assess the degree of 
obligation exerted by an international institution.
Many international agreements—and virtually all agreements on trade (Milner, Rosen- 
dorff, and Mansfield 2004)—soften their legal bindingness by including safeguards and 
escape mechanisms. Such provisions explicate the conditions under which a state may 
temporarily suspend the fulfilment of its treaty obligations (Hoekman and Kostecki 
2001, 303). Escape clauses weaken the credibility of states’ commitment as states may 
misuse these clauses to whitewash their failures to live up to promises whenever they 
face growing domestic pressure (Rosendorff and Milner 2001). In order to prevent such 
a vitiation of an agreement’s credibility, parties need to include provisions that impose 
some costs upon every country that invokes escape clauses. Under GATT, this is 
achieved by requiring that countries temporarily erecting trade barriers with reference 
to an escape clause must negotiate compensations with the affected exporters or lower 
barriers in another area (Milner, Rosendorff, and Mansfield 2004). The number, the 
scope and the constraints of escape clauses incorporated in an international agreement 
can therefore serve as a second criterion to assess the degree of obligation enshrined in 
an international institution.
Mindful that at some point the temporary suspension of some specific obligations may 
not suffice, states endow most legally binding agreements with provisions on with­
drawal. These allow states to renounce their previously made commitments all together. 
Obviously, the credibility-weakening effect of the withdrawal option is even more severe 
than the escape option. In order to balance states’ reluctance to sign on to obligations 
they cannot renounce at a later stage and the need for credibility, almost all legally bind­
ing international agreements allow for withdrawal8 but specify procedures that constrain 
the exercise of this option. International agreements vary, however, with respect to the 
constraints they impose on withdrawal. The aforementioned Council of Europe Conven­
8 A notable exception is again the EU, the founding treaties of which do not contain any clauses on withdrawal.
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tion on Cybercrime of 2001, for example, specifies that a denunciation of the convention 
by any party becomes effective three months after the secretary general of the Council of 
Europe has been notified (article 47). The United Nations Convention against the Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988, in contrast, requires the 
elapse of one year after notification until the denunciation takes effect for the party con­
cerned (article 30). The ‘height’ of the hurdles an international agreement erects to pre­
vent easy withdrawal affects the degree of obligation imposed by an international insti­
tution and can therefore serve as a third criterion for the extent to which obligation is at­
tenuated through procedural provisions.
• Monitoring and enforcement
Third and finally, the degree of obligation created by an international agreement that is 
legally binding and that restricts the use of reservations, escape and withdrawal may still 
not be very high when breach remains undetected and without significant consequences. 
Agreements which specify procedures to monitor compliance and to mend breaches of 
commitments are therefore considered to have a higher level of obligation than those 
that lack such provisions. Such monitoring and enforcement mechanisms include ‘sun­
shine provisions’ that enhance transparency (Weiss 2004 ,146f.), the imposition of sanc­
tions (e.g. the suspension of trade in species with a non-complying state under the Con­
vention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) or in rough diamonds 
under the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme), membership sanctions, the authori­
sation of reciprocal measures (e.g. WTO), and procedures of ‘naming and shaming’ (e.g. 
‘blacklist’ of the Financial Action Task Force on money laundering, or Country Resolu­
tions by the UN Commission on Human Rights?). In many cases, the consequences of 
non-compliance are not spelled out in an international agreement. Particularly in the 
case of in legally non-binding agreements, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms are
9 The Commission on Human Rights is empowered to adopt resolutions criticising a UN member state in “situations 
which reveal a consistent pattern of violations of human rights”, according to resolution 1235(XIJI) passed by the 
UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) on 6 June 1967.
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developed in practice often without being enshrined in any official document. It is for 
this very reason, this study focuses on international institutions (as defined in the intro­
duction) rather than just the international agreements around which the institutions 
evolved.
Monitoring and enforcement instruments vary again with respect to the costs they im­
pose for non-compliance and, thus, to the extent to which they constrain state action. 
The analysis of whether at all—and if so which kind of—procedures are established by an 
international institution to deal with non-compliance can serve as a final criterion that 
guides the assessment of the degree of obligation of an international institution.
* * * * *
In sum, the assessment of an international institution’s degree of obligation can be 
based on its formal legal status, the extent to which it constrains reservations, escapes 
and withdrawal, and on the monitoring and enforcement mechanisms it envisages.
2.2.2 Precision
The above assessment of the degree of obligation enshrined in an international institu­
tion is an important, yet insufficient, first step to locate the institution on the soft law- 
hard law continuum. A second dimension of institutional design has attracted consider­
able interest among both IR and IL scholars: precision. The degree of precision can only 
be assessed based on a written document, as this concept refers to the openness of for­
mulations. For this reason, we cannot directly assess the precision of an international in­
stitution, but only of the international agreement or agreements that form the institu­
tion’s very core. The practice that evolved around these texts is, in contrast, not suscep­
tible for such an assessment.
Whereas some scholars name lack of precision as one major reason for non-compliance 
(Chayes and Handler Chayes 1993, ; 1995, ; Hirsch 2004, ; Shannon 2000), this study
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takes a contrasting perspective on this issue. It argues that the primary problem with 
vague rules is not that they increase non-compliance but rather that they make non- 
compliance logically impossible (see with respect to human rights Simma 1988). The 
most fundamental consequence of vague rules is that they allow for multiple interpreta­
tions, thus rendering it impossible to distinguish clearly between acceptable and unac­
ceptable behaviour. Low levels of precision can therefore undermine the credibility cre­
ated by high levels of obligation. On the domestic level, many examples can been found 
where courts have refused to rule on the grounds that the laws they were meant to use 
were too imprecise10, thus rendering a (binding) law practically ineffective. With respect 
to international law, Chinkin notes that ‘the conclusion of an agreement in treaty form 
does not ensure that a hard obligation has been incurred. Treaties with imprecise, sub­
jective, or indeterminate language... fuse legal form with soft obligations’ (2003,25Q. In 
a very similar vein, Schachter points out that ‘statements of general aims and broad dec­
larations of principles are considered too indefinite to create enforceable obligations and 
therefore agreements which do not go beyond that should be presumed to be nonbind­
ing’ (1977, 297). Morgenthau deplores the prevalent imprecision of international law 
and sees in it a ‘ready-made tool [used by governments] for furthering their ends. They 
have done so by advancing unsupported claims to legal rights and by distorting the 
meaning of generally recognised rules of international law’ (1953, 299)11. Abbott and 
Snidal refer to this phenomenon as ‘self-serving auto-interpretation’ (2000, 427). Such a 
deliberate manipulation is not surprising as ambiguity and openness of international 
rules and standards often result from profound disagreement among the negotiating 
parties in the first place (Ikle 1964,12; Shelton 2000,14). When an issue is highly con­
tentious it is considerably harder to reach an agreement among the parties, and thus in­
10 E.g. for the United States: Sun Ray Drive—In Dairy, Inc. v. Oregon Liquor Control Com., Court of Appeals of 
Oregon, 16 Ore. App. 63; 517 P.2d 289; 1973 Ore. App. LEXIS 672, November 26,1973, Argued, December 24,1973; 
Soglin v. KauffmanNo. 17427, United States Court of Appeal for the Seventh Circuit, 418 F.2d 163; 1969 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 10315, October 24,1969; both cases mentioned in Diver (1983).
11 Similar views—though not with the same negative connotation—were also expressed by legal realists (e.g. Jerome 
Frank) with respect not just to international law but to law in general. In their views, the belief that there could be 
anything such as a firm content to legal and constitutional rules was an artifact. Rather, judges changed the law 
according to what was felt “convenient” at the time.
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creasing the duration and the costs of negotiation process. Negotiating parties may 
therefore choose to phrase an agreement in ambiguous terms which plaster their sub­
stantive differences. Horn’s (1995) analysis of legislative decision-making in the domes­
tic context confirms such a relationship between the level of conflict and the degree of 
vagueness of a law that is being passed (see also Huber and Shipan 2002).
Precision helps to strengthen compliance (Franck 1990) with an international institu­
tion, and thus its credibility, in two major ways. First, as already noted, they help to nar­
row the scope of permissible interpretation (Franck 1990), thus facilitating convergence 
of state behaviour. Second, by formulating rules that are precise enough to allow for a 
clear-cut distinction between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour, states increase the 
reputational stakes of non-compliance. Only if a certain type of behaviour can clearly be 
discerned as in breach with the agreement, can it become the basis for ‘naming and 
shaming’ strategies or other sanctions. In this sense, precision can serve as a screening 
device to discern states that more sincere with living up to their pledges from states that 
are less.
Although there exists a wide-spread agreement that precision matters, few scholars have 
so far tried to specify the term in ways that would allow for a systematic comparison and 
assessment of the degree of precision found in different agreements. The ‘precision’ 
variable still remains under-developed compared with ‘obligation’ and ‘delegation’. Ab­
bott et al (2000) have undertaken a first step towards levelling this discrepancy between 
the three variables. They specify that ‘[p]recise sets of rules are often, though by no 
means always, highly elaborated or dense, detailing conditions of application, spelling 
out required or proscribed behaviour in numerous situations’ (2000, 413). These au­
thors also suggest to assess the degree of precision enshrined in an international agree­
ment based on the precision in which the individual provisions contained in an interna­
tional agreement are formulated (determinacy) as well as of the precision of the agree­
ment in its entirety (coherence) (Abbott et al. 2000).
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• Determinacy
Franck (1990) uses the notion of ‘determinacy12 to describe rules’ ability to specify 
‘clearly and unambiguously what is expected of a state or other actor [...] in a particular 
set of circumstances’ (Abbott et al. 2000, 412). Precision can be achieved either through 
relatively precise ‘rules’ or through more general ‘standards’. The former refers to provi­
sions such as ‘no person may pilot a commercial airplane after his sixtieth birthday (ex­
ample taken from (Diver 1983)), that use words with ‘well-defined and universally ac­
cepted meanings’ (Diver 1983, 67). Such rules are ‘transparent’ in Divert’s notion. They 
increase the ‘accuracy of prediction’ (Franck 1990,118-119) of how the provision will be 
applied, as the enactors of the provision determine ex ante which behaviour is deemed 
acceptable (Abbott et al. 2000). The wording of standard-like provisions, on the other 
hand, is more general, opening room for an ex post interpretation in order to allow for 
greater ‘congruence’, i.e. to foster ‘the law’s substantive moral aims by promoting out­
comes in individual cases consistent with those aims’ (Diver 1983, 71 emphasis added). 
In analogy to the example presented cited above, a standard-like provision sounds like 
‘no person may pilot a commercial airplane if he poses an unreasonable risk of an acci­
dent’ (example again taken from Diver 1983). The formulation ‘unreasonable risk of ac­
cident’ is obviously susceptible to widely varying interpretations. Standard-like formula­
tions commonly used in international agreements include ‘as appropriate’, ‘to the great­
est extent possible’, and ‘as may be necessary. The actual range of diverging interpreta­
tions of such formulations depends on who is entrusted with the task of interpreting and 
applying a standard-like provision and on the ‘thickness’ of the institutional context sur­
rounding such provisions. Domestic legal systems, usually entrust the interpretation of 
standard-like prescriptions onto independent courts. These courts interpret the open 
term with reference to precedents and the special meaning the term might have acquired 
through previous cases (Diver 1983). The assessment of a provision’s determinacy thus 
requires an examination of its interpretative context (Smith 1995). If the competent
12 See also Dworkin’s use of the term in his book Taking Rights Seriously.
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court is independent and following professional standards and if a sufficient number of 
precedents exist, the predictability of a given standard-like provision can become almost 
as high as that of a rule-like provision. It is, for example, possible that through a number 
of precedents the term ‘unreasonable risk of accident’ has developed the special meaning 
of ‘older than 60’ among the intended audience of that provision (Diver 1983). On the 
international level, however, we face the problem that the authoritative interpretation of 
disputed provisions of an agreement requires the consent of the states concerned. When 
no independent juridical body exists vested with the authority to impose its interpreta­
tion of standard like prescriptions, there exist no constraints to prevent states from tak­
ing refuge in self-serving interpretations. In the case of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, standard-like provisions are not as problematic, as the European Court 
of Human Rights can make binding decisions and impose material sanctions. However, 
the degree of independence and authority enjoyed by this court presents a rare exception 
in world politics^. It remains that in the absence of such delegation, precision can only 
be achieved through rule-like provisions. Standard-like provisions, in contrast, have to 
be seen as an indicator for low levels of precision. This study therefore assesses an inter­
national institution’s precision based on the relative number of standard-like provisions 
contained in its core agreement. The greater the relative number of standard-like provi­
sions, the lower is the degree of precision.
• Coherence
The second element of the assessment of an international agreement’s precision— 
coherence—refers to the relation amongst the individual provisions contained in an 
agreement and to the relation between these provisions on the one hand and the legal 
system in which they are embedded on the other hand. Referring to Dworkin (1986), 
Franck (1990) uses this term to describe a situation in which the provisions of an agree­
ment do not contradict each other and fit with other principles and rules of the intema-
« Similar: the International Criminal Court as established by A/CONF. 183/9 bi 1999.
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tional legal system in a non-contradictory way. The central idea behind the coherence 
requirement is that legal uncertainty arises when provisions within the legal system con­
tradict each other and when it is not clear which one is to prevail. This legal uncertainty 
in turn threatens to undermine the credibility of an international agreement and of the 
system as a whole. The desirability of a coherent legal system is apparent, but, as Geor- 
giev (1993) argues, it is very difficult to achieve in practice. This is mainly due to the fact 
that international law, as the product of human beings, necessarily reflects their conflict­
ing interests and that many situations require a very delicate balancing of two incom­
patible but equally desirable values. The text on self-determination in the UN Declara­
tion of Principles concerning Friendly Relations among States of 1970 (A/8028) pro­
vides a good illustration. The declaration upholds, on the one hand, the virtue of the 
principle of self-determination of all peoples and, on the other hand, equally forcefully, 
the principle of territorial integrity and political unity of sovereign and independent 
states. Contradictory provisions are not unfamiliar to the domestic legal system either. 
Jurists of both domestic and international law have developed several principles on how 
to resolve such contradictions, such as lex posterior derogat priori, lexspecialis derogat 
generali, and lex superior derogat lex inferior. In international law, an example of the 
last principle is the superior status assigned to ius cogens from which it follows that ius 
cogens cannot be abrogated by contractual stipulations between states. These juridical 
rules of interpretation enhance the predictability of a necessarily contradictory legal sys­
tem. However, this enhanced predictability can only be achieved when conflicting norms 
are indeed submitted to a body which seeks to resolve contradictions according to juridi­
cal professional standards. Similar to the first dimension of precision, i.e. determinacy, 
the predictability of an international agreement which is either self-contradictory or 
which is in conflict with other provisions of the wider legal system can only be saved 
when the settling of interpretative disagreements is delegated to an independent judicial 
body. In the absence of such a delegation, the resolution of norm conflicts is left to the 
unpredictable haggling between the politically motivated actors who created the agree­
ment. Incoherence therefore undermines the predictability of an international agree­
56
ment and the credibility of the enacting coalitions’ commitment—a fortiori in the ab­
sence of high levels of delegation.
To some extent, determinacy and coherence are interdependent, as coherence can only 
be assessed when an international agreement possesses at least a minimum level of de­
terminacy. When an international agreement is formulated in highly ambiguous terms, 
no contradiction between individual provisions or between the agreement and other 
rules of international law can be clearly established as these vague formulations allow 
for multiple interpretations, some of which may or may not be contradictory. In sum, an 
international agreement, and by extension the international institution of which it forms 
its core, is considered highly precise when the ratio of standard-like provisions to the to­
tal number of provisions is low and when, in cases where coherence can be assessed, an 
agreement’s provisions do not contradict existing rules and principles of international 
law.
2.2.3 Delegation
The third dimension of legalisation—delegation—refers to the ‘extent to which states and 
other actors delegate authority to designated third parties [...] to implement agreements’ 
(Abbott et al. 2000, 415). Delegation in this sense is granted on a conditional basis and 
empowers the party to which authority is delegated (the agent) to act on behalf of the en­
tity from which the authority emanated (the principal) (Hawkins et al. 2004, 5). States 
typically create and/or serve themselves of entities such as administrative organisations, 
expert panels, courts, or other states to act as their agents.
Recent literature on delegation focuses on three factors that motivate states to delegate 
certain tasks to third parties: efficiency gains through specialisation, blame-shirking in 
the face of potentially unpopular policy-decisions (Fiorina 1982), and credibility en­
hancement. This study focuses on the last aspect, which has attracted great interest 
among scholars studying the phenomenon in both the domestic (Bawn 1995, ; Diver 
1983,; Epstein and O'Halloran 1999,; Horn 1995,; McCubbins and Page 1993, ; Miller
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2000, ; Moe 1990b) and in the international context (Hawkins et al. 2004, ; Lake and 
McCubbins 2004,; Martin 1993,; Stone 2002). Majone, for example, posits that ‘politi­
cal sovereigns are willing to delegate important powers to independent... [bodies] in or­
der to increase the credibility of their policy commitments’ (1997,139-140). Delegation 
to an independent agent increases credibility because it implies that governments re­
nounce their discretion and bind themselves to more or less rigid rules, the implementa­
tion of which is beyond their immediate control. This is an effective tool to ‘tie a gov­
ernment’s hands’, as the entrusted agencies ideally operate according to incentive struc­
tures that do not encourage the short time-horizon and volatility associated with elected 
and democratically accountable bodies (Dixit 1996,; Shepsle 1991). Delegation is thus an 
important component of the ‘lock-in’ effect already mentioned above as it insulates cur­
rent policy beneficiaries from future change (McNollgast 1987).
In the domestic context, we find such delegation in its most fundamental form in the 
separation of powers, and in particular in the independence of the judiciary. Other ex­
amples include the delegation of monetary policy to independent central banks (Barro 
and Gordon 1983,; Keefer and Stasavage 1998), and the delegation to independent regu­
latory agencies of regulatory policies in policy fields such as telecom, electricity, railways 
(Gilardi 2002,; Thatcher 2002). In international context, delegation is often seen as the 
aspect of legalisation that states are most reluctant to establish and to commit to. This 
results from the fact that delegation impinges directly on national sovereignty, i.e. the 
authority of states to organise and conduct their internal affairs according to their own 
discretion. As Andrew Moravcsik notes, ‘governments often refuse to assume the politi­
cal risk of delegation, preferring instead imperfect enforcement and inefficient decision­
making, to the surrender of sovereignty’ (1993, 509). Given the centrality of national 
sovereignty to the concept of statehood the many instances of delegation that do exist on 
the international level, thus present an intriguing theoretical puzzle. The most far- 
reaching example of delegation presents the European Union, where member states 
delegated substantive rule-making and implementation power to the supranational 
European Commission and judicial power to the largely autonomous European Court of
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Justice (Alter 1998a, ; Tallberg 2002). Andrew Moravcsik (2000) explains the creation 
of the European Court of Human Rights and the far-reaching delegation of authority 
states agreed to in this field with reference to the desire of then unstable democracies to 
‘lock in’ the protection of human rights against potential autocratic regimes that might 
re-impose themselves at some point in the future. In contrast, much more limited in 
scope is the delegation of powers to the World Postal Union, the secretariat of the Con­
vention on International Trade in Endangered Species, or the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission, to mention just a few examples.
The notion of delegation refers to two dimensions (Abbott and Snidal 1998): independ­
ence and centralisation. The degree of delegation increases the broader the scope of the 
tasks delegated to an agent (centralisation) and the greater the agent’s decision making 
abilities (independence).
• Independence
The second aspect of delegation, independence, refers to a body’s ‘authority to act with a 
degree of autonomy, and often with neutrality, in defined spheres’ (Abbott and Snidal 
1998, 9). An agency’s independence is assessed based on the extent to which it can take 
decisions that are not predetermined in advance by the principal (Bawn 1995, 62). Three 
aspects seem particularly important constituents of agency independence: human re­
sources, financial resources and decision-making procedures.
In terms of human resources, an agency’s independence is undermined, if the persons 
constituting the agency are representatives of and directly accountable to the delegating 
parties, as it is the case with the Council of the European Union. An agency’s independ­
ence is increased when is has a permanent body of employees; with long terms of office. 
The ability of delegating parties to either dismiss or renew the contract of an agency’s 
decision makers, in contrast, decreases the independency of the agency (Gilardi 2002).
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An agency can be assumed to be more autonomous when it possesses a source of income 
which is independent of the parties on the behalf of which it is to take decisions or to 
implement certain acts. For instance, in order to strengthen the independence of the 
European Community vis-a-vis the member states, the funding system was changed in 
the first half of the 1970s from one based on national contributions to one based on ‘own 
resources’, such as common customs tariff duties, agricultural levies, and a proportion of 
the Value Added Tax. Also the World Bank and regional development banks largely rely 
on own resources. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in 
contrast, relies almost exclusively on voluntary contributions, thus, constraining its in­
dependence considerably. Intermediary forms of financial independence are found in in­
ternational organisations which rely on mandatory contributions, the level of which is 
predetermined either as a fix sum equal for all member states—as in the case of the Or­
ganisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)—or, more commonly, based on 
certain criteria such as member states’ GDP (Klein 1997).
Finally, the level of delegation also depends on the shape of decision-making proce­
dures. If binding decisions require unanimity, as is for example the case under the Kim­
berley Process Certification Scheme and in the Financial Action Task Force, parties re­
tain full sovereignty, as no act can be imposed on them against their will, and delegation 
is low. This is particularly the case, if all delegating parties are allowed to have a repre­
sentative in the decision making body. Other bodies take decisions based on simple or 
qualified majority votes, as for example the International Narcotics Control Board which 
requires a two-third majority for decisions to be adopted (article 22). The smaller the re­
quired quorum, the higher the degree of delegation.
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• Centralisation
The second element of delegation, centralisation, refers to the range of activities a prin­
cipal delegates to an agent (Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001, 771). Centralisation 
matters, however, only when a certain minimum level of independence as defined above 
is achieved. If, in contrast, an agreement assigns an extensive range of functions to a 
plenary the overall level of delegation remains low, because the plenary typically enjoys 
no notable independence. In international affairs, either of three distinct collective ac­
tivities or a combination thereof are delegated (McCall Smith 2000): rule making (in­
cluding facilitating negotiations of agreements), implementation (including operational 
activities like providing technical assistance and monitoring, information collection and 
analysis) and dispute resolution and enforcement. The degree of centralisation varies in 
any of these three functions.
With respect to rulemaking, the agency to which certain functions are delegated may, 
for example, be limited to a supporting role for negotiations. Levy, for example, notes 
that the capacity of the five-head strong secretariat for the Convention on Long-Range 
Transboundary Air Pollution was fully utilised with doing little else *but keep the meet­
ings running smoothly’ (1993, 84). In other cases, the agent is granted the right to come 
up with its own initiatives which might even develop into legally binding decisions. The 
paramount example provides again the European Commission as it is vested with the 
authority not only to draft extensive policies but also to claim direct effect of these poli­
cies.
A central aspect of credibility-enhancing delegation in the implementation stage is 
monitoring. International institutions provide a wide range of monitoring provisions, 
which vary considerably in their ability to overcome commitment problems. The weakest 
form of monitoring contents itself with occasional and informal statements of states on 
their own behaviour or, somewhat stronger, more formal self-reporting requirements. In 
both cases delegation is zero with respect to information-collection, but a third party 
may still play a role as a ‘fire alarm’ by publicly denouncing behaviour it finds wanting
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based on analysis of information submitted by the states (Raustiala 2002)14. More far- 
reaching centralisation, and thus delegation, is found when a third party is entrusted to 
conduct formal inspections of state behaviour and compliance, in which case, the princi­
pal acts as a ‘police patrol’ (Raustiala 2002).
Dispute resolution and enforcement are probably the functions that have attracted the 
greatest interest in IR literature. A considerable degree of variation exists in terms of 
how far-reaching the delegation to third parties goes with respect to these two functions. 
The role of third parties in dispute settlement may be limited to the offering of ‘good of­
fices’, i.e. to act as channels of communication between protagonists and to encourage 
them to seek peaceful means in settling their differences. An example of this weak form 
of delegation presents the Conciliation and Good Offices Commission which was created 
to settle any future disputes between parties to the Convention against Discrimination in 
Education (429 UNTS 93) of i960. Third parties may also, in contrast, be vested with the 
authority to pass decisions which the protagonists accept ex ante as legally binding, as in 
the case of arbitration or court ruling. The commitment of states can be seen as particu­
larly credible when they extend the circle of legitimate plaintiffs to include non-state ac­
tors and individuals, as it is the case with the European Court of Human Rights (Heifer 
and Slaughter 1997,; Keohane, Moravcsik, and Slaughter 2000,; McCall Smith 2000,; 
Rittberger and Zangl 2004). Intermediary forms delegation with respect to dispute reso­
lution are found in binding and non-binding arbitration arrangements or mediation.
* * * * *
This chapter has introduced the explanandum of this study, namely the varying degrees 
of legalisation enshrined in international institutions. It has been argued that policy­
makers are confronted with a fundamental dilemma when designing international 
agreements as strong credibility associated with high levels of legalisation comes ineluc­
*4 Raustiala adopts here a distinction introduced by McCubbins and Schwartz (1984).
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tably at the expense of flexibility, which agreements with low levels of legalisation typi­
cally provide. The discussion above has furthermore laid out ways how the core ele­
ments of legalisation—obligation, precision, and delegation—can be measured and, thus, 
how the level of legalisation of individual agreements can be assessed. This framework of 
analysis is presented in Table 2.1.
From this basis, the discussion moves on in the next chapter to explore the variables 
transaction cost economics suggests as possessing considerable power in explaining the 
vaiying levels of legalisations enshrined in international institutions.
Indicator Low level o f legalisation High level o f  legalisation
1. Obligation
A. Legal bindingness ■ Intention of signatories was merely to 
recommend or to state a fact
■ Intention of signatories was to create le­
gal rights and obligations
a. Language ■ Agreement is named ‘recommendation’, 
‘programme’, ‘declaration’, etc.
■ Participating states are referred to as 
‘participants’, ‘countries’, etc.
■ Obligations formulating using ‘should’
■ Agreement is named ‘convention’, 
‘treaty’, etc.
■ Participating states are referred to as 
‘member states’, ‘parties’, ‘signatories’, 
etc.
■ Obligations are called ‘obligations’ and 
are formulated using ‘shall’
b. Procedural pro­
visions
■ Agreement contains no provisions on 
procedural issues such as entry into 
force, accession, amendments
■ On the domestic level: agreement effec­
tive with adoption, no formal signing 
and ratification process
■ Agreement contains such procedural 
provisions
■ Agreement becomes effective after going 
through domestic ratification process 
typically involving the approval of the 
legislative
B. Tenacity of obliga­
tion
■ Agreement does not limit use of reserva­
tions, and is significantly attenuated 
through reservations registered by signa­
tories
■ Parties can evade obligations through lax 
escape mechanisms
■ Parties can withdraw from the agree­
ment on short notice
■ Agreement strictly limits the scope of 
reservations
■ Agreement contains no escape mecha­
nisms
■ Signatories cannot withdraw from the 
agreement
C. Non-compliance 
a. Monitoring ■ No provisions on monitoring or only oc­
casional self-reporting
■ Independent monitoring on regular ba­
sis
b. Enforcement ■ Consequences for non-compliance are 
not spelled out in the agreement nor de­
veloped in practice
■ Institution establishes procedures and 
remedies for breaches of commitments, 
such as:
■ Membership sanctions
■ Authorisation of reciprocal measures
■ Procedures for ‘naming and shaming’
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2. Precision
A. Determinacy ■ Definitions of the rights and obligations 
in the agreement allow for multiple in­
terpretations
■ Impossibility to distinguish between ac­
ceptable and unacceptable behaviour
■ Agreement contains statements of gen­
eral aims, standard-like provisions and 
broad declarations of principles
■ No independent judicial body and 
precedents exists to help the interpreta­
tion of the agreement
■ Provisions do not leave room for inter­
pretation by states
■ Acceptable behaviour can be clearly dis­
cerned from non-acceptable behaviour
■ Provisions relate to one another in a 
non-contradictoiy way
■ Provisions are tailored to clearly circum­
scribed situations
■ Precedents exist to clarify vague provi­
sions
B. Coherence ■ Clauses within the agreement contradict 
each other
■ Clauses of the agreement contradicts 
other principles and rules of the interna­
tional legal system
■ Clauses within the agreement do not 
contradict each other
■ Agreement fits with other principles and 
rules of the international legal system
3. Delegation
A. Independence 
a. Human re­
sources
■ No permanent staff
■ Agency’s personnel is appointed and 
dismissed by delegating parties
■ Agency’s decision makers directly ac­
countable to delegating parties
■ Short-term of office
■ Permanent staff
■ Agency’s personnel cannot be dismissed 
at delegating parties’ discretion
■ Decision makers have long terms of of­
fice and cannot be dismissed by princi­
pal
b. Financial re­
sources
■ Agency relies entirely on voluntary con­
tributions from principal
■ Agency possesses its own sources of fi­
nancing (e.g. from taxation or tariff's)
c. Decision mak­
ing
■ Unanimous decision making
■ Decision making body encompasses rep­
resentatives from all delegating parties
■ Majority rule
■ Decision making body is smaller than 
the number of delegating parties
B. Centralisation 
a. Rule making ■ Agency’s functions are limited to support 
roles, no right to own initiatives
■ Agency sets its own agenda
■ Agency’s makes rules without interfer­
ence from delegating parties
b. Implementation ■ Agency’s role limited to the compilation 
and dissemination of information
■ Agency active in data collection
■ Agency involved in service provision 
(e.g. legal assistance)
c. Dispute resolu­
tion and en­
forcement
■ Agency’s function limited to offering 
‘good offices’
■ Agency passes decisions which the dele­
gating parties accept ex ante as legally 
binding
■ Circle of legitimate plaintiffs include
non-state actors and individuals
Table 2.1 Overview of indicators o f the level o f legalisation.
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3 Problem constellation
The concept of legalisation as presented in the previous chapter provides a heuristic tool 
for capturing essential differences in the design of international institutions. Although a 
number of scholars have applied this concept in their theoretical and empirical studies, 
explanations for the so-categorised variance in the design of international institutions 
have been much less systematic. Those studies that do make a first step in this direction 
do so from different theoretical perspectives, which fall broadly within the three major 
theoretical strands of International Political Economy (IPE)—namely power-based or 
realist, functionalist and domestic politics-based theories. These three different schools 
of thought will be briefly introduced in the first sub-chapter. This discussion suggests 
functionalism as the best developed and most promising to explain legalisation, in par­
ticular with regard to international institutions addressing illicit flows. From this basis, 
the second sub-chapter introduces transaction cost economics theory in greater detail. 
The core tenet of transaction cost economics is the assumption that actors design the 
structure of cooperative efforts in ways that maximise the efficiency of their transactions 
dependent on the specific constellation of the problem they seek to solve through their 
cooperative efforts. The theoretical and empirical literature on transaction cost econom­
ics identifies three variables as possessing the greatest explanatory power, namely asset 
specificity, behavioural uncertainty and environmental uncertainty. The third and final 
sub-chapter is dedicated to translating these three variables from the world of inter-firm 
to that of inter-state relations.
3. l  Competing theories on institutional design
From the 1970s onwards, international relations scholars have addressed the question 
why states create international institutions or regimes to facilitate their cooperation. 
This inquiry has led to an abundant body of literature15. The question of how  these insti­
15 See for a comprehensive overview Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger (1997).
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tutions are designed and why states design international institutions in different ways 
has, in contrast, caught scholarly interest only very recently and presents by and large a 
still underdeveloped field within IR. Abbott and Snidal forcefully deplored that ‘regime 
theory deals with institutions at such a general level that it has little to say about the par­
ticular institutional arrangements that organise international politics’ (1998, 6). It was 
not until the year 2000 that—with the concept of legalisation—a first attempt was under­
taken to tackle this issue and to disaggregate and systematise differences in the design of 
international institutions. As discussed in the previous chapter, this concept introduced 
a helpful heuristic tool in comparing different institutions with respect to their structural 
arrangements, however, without attempting to establish a single, coherent theory to ex­
plain these differences. Rather, each scholar using the concept of legalisation has been 
approaching the design question from his or her own theoretical perspective—namely 
power-based or realist, domestic politics-based, and functionalist theories. Each of these 
approaches captures a different aspect of a complex reality and none of these three ap­
proaches are theoretically ‘pure’ in the sense that they all blend in elements of the other 
two in order to at least partially off-set their own specific deficiencies. The differences in 
the explanations given by the three approaches for the variance in legalisation result di­
rectly from the theories’ diverging views on the emergence and on the role of interna­
tional institutions. For this reason, the separate discussion of each of the three design 
theories will be preceded by a brief account of each theory’s perspective on the emer­
gence of international institutions. As the following discussion will show, these three de­
sign theories have attracted unequal scholarly interest, with the functionalist approach 
being the most developed of all three. This study seeks to contribute to the further devel­
opment of the functionalist strand by subjecting some of its core hypotheses to a system­
atic test and providing some tentative suggestions on how its specific limitations can 
best be addressed.
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3-1.1 Power-based theories on institutional design
Classical realists were highly sceptical about the relevance of international law and—by 
extension—international institutions. Stanley Hoffmann, for example, concludes that ‘in 
the clash between inadequate law and supreme political interests, law bows—and law­
yers are reduced to serve either as a chorus of lamenters with their fists raised at the sky 
and state or as a clique of national justifiers in the most sophisticatedly subservient or 
sinuous fashion’ (1968, 31). In a very similar vain, Hans Morgenthau argues that 
‘[g]ovemments [...] are always anxious to shake off restraining influence which interna­
tional law might have upon their international politics’ (1953, 214). Other realists do not 
necessarily deny the relevance of international institutions but see them primarily as a 
tool of which powerful states may avail themselves to further their state power and ego­
istic self-interest (e.g.Carr 1946). Neo-realist scholars adopt a similar perspective on the 
emergence of international institutions or regimes. Stephen Krasner (1985), for instance, 
explains the United States’ decision to create and work through multilateral institutions 
such as the United Nations or the World Bank—rather than relying entirely on pure uni­
lateralism—as a strategy chosen in order to confer legitimacy to and thus to strengthen 
the United States’ post-war supremacy. The self-interest of a powerful state in a particu­
lar policy area may or may not be in harmony with the interest of other states, but given 
its power, it can make other states endorse an international institution even when it does 
not generate joint cooperative gains and Pareto improvements associated with mixed- 
motive games, but produces clear winners and losers as it is the case with zero-sum 
games and may even establish a Pareto sub-optimal solution (Krasner 1991, 364). Pow­
erful states can impose regimes (Krasner 1993,140; Young 1983,100) through the use of 
coercion, and their ability to make side payments or by changing the overall regulatory 
environment in such ways that states, which had originally be reluctant to join an inter­
national institution because of its negative consequences, opt to join in order to avoid an 
even larger backlash (Gruber 2000).
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National interests and the distribution of power do not only influence the creation of in­
ternational institutions but also their design. A handful of scholars have so far embarked 
on this line of inquiry—namely Miles Kahler (2000), James McCall Smith (2000) and 
Beth Simmons (2002). Their realist design theories all assume that states’ design prefer­
ences vary with their relative power. These theories all agree that great asymmetries in 
power lead to lower levels of legalisation, but they differ considerably in the causal 
mechanism they provide to explain varying design preferences. These differences result 
in part from the different ways these studies employ to measure a state’s relative power. 
The majority of realist design theories conceptualise power in terms of resources or size 
as measured in terms of GDP, military capacities or population. These studies maintain 
that weaker states favour higher degrees of legalisation—especially with respect to dele­
gation to third parties in dispute resolution—as a means to constrain the behaviour of 
more powerful parties (Alter 1998b,; McCall Smith 2000). However, if one follows Miles 
Kahler’s (2000) example and conceptualises power in terms of legal resources, a very 
different picture emerges. In his study of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
forum, Kahler shows how developing states with poorly developed legal systems and re­
sources are often sceptical or even hostile to high degrees of legalisation as they fear to 
be outmanoeuvred by states with much more abundant and sophisticated legal re­
sources. Strong states may also favour higher degrees of legalisation if they assume that 
the so-designed international institution will primarily serve their interests—an assump­
tion, which at times has proven unwarranted. For instance, the United States advocated 
binding WTO dispute settlement procedures assuming that the dispute settlement body 
would never find US trade policies to be in beach with WTO rules. In sum, power-based 
theories on institutional design are still far from presenting a coherent picture of the 
relevant explanatory variables and the causal mechanisms linking them to different lev­
els of legalisation. Furthermore, these theories are ill-suited to explain the design of in­
ternational institutions when the creation of these institutions cannot primarily be at­
tributed to the self-interested assertion of a powerful state but may be better attributed 
to the emergence of a shared norm, or of a ‘principled and shared understanding of de­
sirable forms of social behaviour’ (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986, 764). Of the cases dis­
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cussed in part two of this study, the one on conflict diamonds presents the most compel­
ling example where none of the powerful states had an immediate self-interest in the 
creation of an international institution designed to tackle this problem, but still pro­
moted the creation of the Kimberley Process (see below chapter 6).
3.1.2 Domestic politics-based theories of institutional design
In contrast to realist and functionalist approaches, domestic politics-based theories do 
not conceive the state as a unitary actor. Rather, they disaggregate the state into compet­
ing interest groups and vote-maximising politicians. From this perspective, international 
institutions are created when they serve the interest of a number of influential domestic 
groups in various countries, as does, for instance, the World Trade Organisation for 
competitive export industries. In terms of institutional design, domestic-politics ap­
proaches stipulate that interest groups, who benefit from a certain international institu­
tion, will lobby for higher degrees of legalisation, as more legalised institutions insure 
them against a policy reversal under a less inclined future government. Only when these 
international institutions are designed in ways that insulate them from tomorrow’s exer­
cise of authority can they continue to generate benefits for the domestic interest groups 
that pressed for their creation (Moe 1990b, 124). In this respect, international institu­
tions with high levels of legalisation serve as a mechanism to reduce political uncertainty 
as it allows governments to tie their hands, thus, increasing the credibility of their com­
mitment vis-a-vis their domestic audience. To what extent a government follows this 
logic depends heavily on whether one assumes a government to be loyal to its enacting 
constituency or not. If one adopts the assumption that vote-maximising governments 
fare best when they continue throughout their tenure to serve the interest of the con­
stituency that brought them to power it follows that governments will prefer high de­
grees of legalisation for international institutions that are in the interest of their domes­
tic enacting constituency. This line of argument was first developed by political scientists 
with respect to domestic institutions (Horn 1995,; Levy and Spiller 1996,; Moe 1990b,;
1991), but has been later adopted by international relations scholars as well—often by
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substituting the term ‘political uncertainty’ with ‘domestic uncertainty’. Judith Gold­
stein (1996) describes in her study of the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement how the US 
executive sought to insulate this pro-free trade agreement from protectionist forces 
within the US Congress by endowing the agreement with binding arbitration arrange­
ments. Frederick Abbott (2000) makes a similar case with respect to the North Ameri­
can Free Trade Association (NAFTA). He argues that the high levels of legalisation 
adopted in this agreement were primarily motivated by governments’ desire to signal 
their sincere and irreversible commitment to free trade vis-a-vis investors. Not only in 
trade but also in human rights agreements have governments preferred high levels of le­
galisation in order to enhance the credibility of their commitment in the eyes of their 
domestic constituencies (Lutz and Sikkink 2000). In contrast, other international rela­
tions scholars adopt a different understanding of political uncertainty and consequently 
reach very different conclusions regarding its influence on the formation of design pref­
erences. They assume that a vote-maximising government seeks to serve whichever do­
mestic interest group holds the upper hand, and not necessarily the one that elected the 
incumbent government to power. This perspective is primarily concerned about the loss 
of sovereignty associated with highly legalised international institutions hindering gov­
ernments to adapt to changing external circumstances which may tip the ‘balance of 
power’ among domestic interest groups. Rosendorff and Milner (2001) show how states 
seek to reduce the level of a so-defined political uncertainty by including escape clauses 
in trade agreements which allow them to adjust their policy in case of exogenous and 
unanticipated change, such as price shocks, which significantly affect the domestic level 
of support for an international institution.
In the context of international institutions in the area of illicit flows the domestic politics 
approach encounters some particular—though not insurmountable—challenges, which 
are resulting from the fundamental assumptions of this approach. This approach pre­
supposes the existence of organised interest groups lobbying for their competing inter­
ests through established political channels—an assumption which is only partly valid in 
the context of illicit flows. Most important in that respect is the weak degree of organisa­
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tion of many victims of illicit flows, which prevents them from lobbying forcefully for 
their interests. In the case of human trafficking, for instance, victims find it difficult to 
lobby for their interests due to language barriers, their severely constrained financial re­
sources, and their uncertain legal status in the country to which they were trafficked. 
However, important differences exist between the victims of different types of illicit 
flows. For instance, victims of cyber crime, in contrast, tend to be companies with con­
siderable financial and legal resources at their disposal and thus considerable lobbying 
power. Lobbying typically also lacks on the side of criminals. Those targeted by a certain 
policy might be better organised than many of their victims, but they lack the legitimacy 
to defend their interests through the same channels as do, for instance, trade unions and 
environmental groups. However, also here important differences need to be taken into 
account, as many policies seek to curb illicit flows not primarily by targeting illicit or­
ganisations directly but by imposing tighter regulations on licit industry sectors, which 
have access to regular lobbying channels.
3.1.3 Functionalist theories of institutional design
The functionalist or neo-liberal strand within international relations and the realist ap­
proach have in common that they both assume states to be rational egoists. In contrast 
to the latter, the former is conceived as being primarily concerned about maximising 
their relative rather than absolute gains, which opens greater scope for cooperation. 
States create international institutions if they share a common interest—be it of identical 
or complementary nature—which can only be attained through international coopera­
tion (Keohane 1984, 6; 1989b, 2). Only under these conditions can international institu­
tions facilitate a Pareto efficient outcome which leaves none of the participating states 
worse off. In this sense, the existence of international institutions is explained as serving 
the function of increasing overall efficiency gains. This same logic is also adopted by 
scholars who seek to explain not so much the emergence but the design of international 
institutions. They maintain that each design option presents certain costs and benefits. 
Which design option helps to generate the greatest net benefits depends primarily on the
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specificities of the policy problem states seek to solve through an international institu­
tion. Form follows function is the overriding idea shared by functionalist design theo­
rists. A first step along this argumentative route was undertaken by Charles Lipson 
(1991), Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal (1998) and later by James Morrow (2000) 
who explore under which conditions states favour informal versus formal arrangements 
to govern their cooperation. Directly related to the concept of legalisation is Abbot and 
Snidal’s article of 2000. In this article, they show how international institutions with 
high degrees of legalisation, on the one hand, require more time and resources in the ne­
gotiations phase (ex ante transaction costs) but, on the other hand, have the positive ef­
fect of increasing the credibility of a government’s commitment in the eyes of other par­
ties and of reducing the implementation costs (ex post transaction costs) associated with 
an agreement (in a similar vein Keohane, Moravcsik, and Slaughter 2000). Thus, states 
face certain trade-offs when deciding what kind of institutional design they want to 
adopt. Which design is optimal depends mainly on the dynamics of the policy field, in 
which states seek to institutionalise cooperation. Institutions with high levels of legalisa­
tion have been found to be best suited for problems that require cooperation over an ex­
tended period of time and where time-inconsistency is an issue. When, in contrast, the 
policy issue is plagued with considerable environmental uncertainty, the optimal institu­
tional design requires lower levels of legalisation in order to be able to adapt quickly to 
changed circumstances (Abbott and Snidal 2000). Closely related is the rational design 
theory developed by Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal (2001), which shares the assump­
tion that international institutions are purposefully designed by rational actors in order 
to best deal with the policy problem these actors face. Although they do not directly 
adopt the dependent variables used by legalisation scholars—obligation, precision and 
delegation—Koremenos et al’s own five variables—membership, scope, centralisation, 
control, and flexibility—show a considerable overlap with the former. Also their inde­
pendent variables—distribution problems, enforcement problems, number of actors, and 
uncertainty—fall squarely within the functionalist tradition. Overall, the functionalist 
approach to institutional design has attracted the greatest attention from IR scholars
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and has seen a more coherent development than power-based and domestic politics- 
based design theories.
* * * * *
Both the power-based and the domestic politics approach to institutional design are rais­
ing interesting questions. However, at the current stage, both approaches are still strug­
gling with producing a consistent interpretation of their key variable—power in the case 
of the former and political uncertainty in the case of the latter—with the consequence 
that scholars associated with one and the same approach reach very different conclu­
sions regarding the causal mechanisms at work or deduce mutually contradicting hy­
potheses. While not denying the potentials of these two approaches, this study seeks to 
contribute less to the early stage of theory development and rather to the stage of theory 
refinement by testing the institutional design theory that has so far developed the most 
coherent set of hypotheses—the functionalist strand of institutional design theory. As 
will become clear throughout the remainder of this study, despite its strong bracing in 
the functionalist line of reasoning considerations raised by the other two approaches are 
always lurking around the comer. For instance, in the functionalist explanation ques­
tions about varying levels of domestic opposition to different international initiatives 
emerge as ‘indirect costs’ in the concept of asset specificity—as will be introduced in de­
tail below. State power is not directly included as a variable in this study’s theoretical 
framework, but this question will be taken up in the concluding part of this study and 
proposed as a promising explanation for those cases where the explanatory power of the 
functionalist framework adopted here proved to be little satisfying.
The remainder of this study focuses on best developed approach within the camp of 
functionalist design theories—namely transaction cost economics (TCE) or relational 
contracting theory. As will be elaborated in the next subchapter, TCE shares the func­
tionalist assumption that the nature of the problem on which cooperation is sought af­
fects the design of institutions and erects upon this assumption a theory to explain the 
variance found in structural arrangements to facilitate inter-firm cooperation. The term
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‘transaction cost’ has enjoyed great popularity among international relations scholars— 
especially within the neo-liberal camp—right from the beginning when economists 
coined this term as a key explanation for the existence of firms (Williamson 1975, ; 
1985). Robert Keohane, for example, famously referred to transaction costs as one of the 
reasons why states create international institutions and why these institutions endure 
(1984, loif.). The term has been no less popular among scholars who focus specifically 
on the design of international institutions (e.g. Abbott and Snidal 2000). However, most 
IR scholars content themselves with using the term ‘transaction costs’ without engaging 
fully in the theory behind it. This study, in contrast, seeks to explore the explanatory 
power that can be derived from transposing the integral theory associated with transac­
tion costs from the world of inter-firm to that of inter-state16 cooperation. It does so, by 
building upon the pioneering work undertaken by a handful of IR scholars—first and 
foremost David Lake (1996, ; 1999, ; 2000) and Beth and Robert Yarborough (1990, ;
1992), but also Michael Lipson (2004) and Katja Weber (1997, ; 2000)—who have all 
engaged in such a transfer beforehand, although in different contexts and with varying 
degrees of adherence to the original TCE theory.
3.2 The transaction cost econom ics approach
With the publication of his seminal book Markets and Hierarchies (1975) Oliver E. Wil­
liamson established the conceptual foundations of what became known as transaction 
cost economics, an influential and still growing branch of new institutional economics. 
Williamson took up the question originally introduced by Coase (1937) of why certain 
transactions are not carried out in the market—as neo-classical economics would sug­
gest—but rather under the hierarchical structure of firms. The market versus hierarchy 
dichotomy was later complemented by studies which conceptualised governance struc­
tures as arrayed along a continuum with market and hierarchy forming the two ex­
16 Although focusing primarily on states as main actors, this study does not deny the important role a variety of non­
state actors play in the creation and implementation of international agreements. See discussion on this point under
1.3.
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tremes. This concept allowed the inclusion of a variety of intermediary modes of govern­
ance such as franchise agreements, joint-ventures, reciprocal trading and other forms of 
relational and long-term contracts. When choosing an institutional arrangement to gov­
ern their transaction, parties face a trade-off between reducing the risk of cheating, 
which is high in the market place, and avoiding the bureaucratic inflexibility plaguing 
hierarchies. Transaction cost economics seeks to explain this institutional choice with 
reference to specific constellations of the transaction at hand.
The first section of this sub-chapter will introduce the core tenets and assumptions of 
transaction costs economics. The second and third section will shed more light on how 
transaction cost economists characterise governance structures and transactions.
3.2.1 Core tenets and assumptions
The core tenet of the classical TCE model states that firms adopt for each transaction a 
governance structure that helps them minimise the transaction costs resulting from the 
specific contractual problems caused by the transaction at hand. These costs are exacer­
bated by the innate imperfection of human nature.
3.2.1.1 Transaction cost minimisation
The basic unit of analysis of Williamson’s model is the individual transaction defined as 
a good or service that is being transferred from one economic actor to another. Associ­
ated with every transaction is the ‘transfer, capture and protection of rights’ (Barzel 
1997, 4), which involves certain costs—transaction costs. Williamson distinguishes be­
tween ex ante and ex post transaction costs (Williamson 1986,139). Ex ante costs cover 
the partner selection process and the negotiation and writing of contracts. Ex post costs 
include the costs of executing and policing contracts, the re-negotiation of contracts as a 
result of gaps, errors, omissions, and unanticipated disturbances, and finally the costs of 
settling contractual disputes.
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The assumption of transaction cost minimisation has attracted criticism for various rea­
sons. Some scholars object to this assumption because transaction costs are difficult to 
observe and to measure (Masten, Meehan, and Snyder 1991). Most importantly, they are 
generally interdependent with the usually much higher production costs and cannot 
logically be distinguished from each other (Milgrom and Roberts 1992, 34). Sub-optimal 
governance structures not only cause high transaction costs but also make transacting 
partners reluctant to undertake efficiency increasing investments, thus foregoing a po­
tential saving in production costs (Dyer 1996). Only if all parties are ensured that the 
governance structure protects their investments from ex post expropriation from other 
parties are they willing to invest in a co-operative project1?. In this sense, Dietrich (1993) 
is right in pointing out that transactions do not only produce costs but also revenues and 
that both are affected by the governance structure adopted. TCE is thus not exclusively 
about the minimisation of transaction costs, in a narrow sense, but about choosing a 
governance mode to achieve a broader objective, like profit maximisation for a firm or 
social welfare maximisation for a national economy (Rao 2003, 23).
This study builds upon this broader understanding of transaction costs by assuming that 
states seek to design international institutions in such ways that the problem for which 
they want to establish international cooperation is solved in the most efficient and effec­
tive way.
3.2.1.2 Imperfection o f human beings
The second assumption of the TCE model relates to the innate imperfection of human 
beings. Williamson considers two forms of human fallibility to be of central importance: 
cognitive limitations or ‘bounded rationality’ and opportunism. The first concept refers 
to Chester Barnard’s (1938) and Herbert Simon’s (1976) analysis of human decision­
making which ascribes it to the middle ground between passion, feelings and instincts
l? An often cited example of an efficiency enhancing cooperative project that failed to materialize due to parties’ 
inability to agree on appropriate governance structures is the Fisher Body case (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian 1978).
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on the one hand and reason and calculation on the other. Simon posits that humans in­
tend to behave rationally yet that the ‘capacity of the human mind for formulating and 
solving complex problems is very small compared with the size of the problems whose 
solution is required for objectively rational behaviour in the real word—or even for a rea­
sonable approximation to such objective rationality’ (Simon 1957, 198). Opportunism, 
the second of Williamson’s behavioural concepts, is understood as ‘self-interest seeking 
with guile’ (Williamson 1985, 47), which includes ‘the incomplete or distorted disclosure 
of information, especially calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate or 
otherwise confuse’ (Williamson 1998, 703).
Bounded rationality and opportunism form the background of various forms of contrac­
tual hazards—namely incomplete contracts which can be exploited by opportunistic par­
ties. Transacting parties seek to design organisational arrangements in ways that miti­
gate these hazards and by doing so maximise the efficiency of their transaction 
(Williamson 1996,5).
3.2.2 The spectrum of governance structures
Just as scholars of international relations characterise international institutions on the 
spectrum ranging from soft to hard law, so do transaction cost economists range trans­
actions on a continuum between markets and hierarchies.
Markets are an ‘arena in which autonomous parties engage in exchange’ (Williamson 
1996,378). All agents are driven by strong incentives as complete contracts allow all par­
ties to reliably appropriate the (positive or negative) net receipts resulting from their ef­
forts and decisions. In spot markets the exchange happens instantaneously and prices 
serve as perfect statistics. All parties adapt individually and immediately to this signal in 
a process which is ‘automatic, elastic and responsive’ (Coase 1937, 387). There is often 
no need for written contracts as such exchanges typically involve well-specified com­
modities. Parties retain full autonomy and their interests are fully independent of those
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of their transacting partners. The risk of cheating is mitigated through fully specified 
oral or written contracts and their enforcement by an independent third party—courts.
In contrast, hierarchies, or formal organisations, are characterised by governance struc­
tures that seek to mitigate opportunism and cheating through mechanisms where the in­
terests of the transacting parties are pooled. Within a single firm, this is achieved by en­
suring that ‘the parties to an internal exchange are less able to appropriate subgroup 
gains at the expense of the overall organisation’ (Williamson 1975, 29). This strengthens 
parties’ common interest in the long-term success of their cooperative undertaking but 
does so at the expense of incentive intensity of the individual party. Insufficient incen­
tive intensity is compensated by administrative fiat. Since the authoritative control of a 
firm over its divisions would be undermined if parties to an internal exchange could ap­
peal to an external body this possibility is usually ruled out, and internal mechanisms or 
dispute settlement are created.
Each design option along the market-hierarchy spectrum thus presents its specific mix 
of ‘costs and competencies’ (Williamson 1991, 79). Which particular governance struc­
ture is to be chosen depends on the specific hazards posed by the transaction at hand.
3.2.3 Transaction characteristics
In his earlier works, Williamson categorised transactions along three principal dimen­
sions: asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency (Williamson 1975,; Williamson 1985). 
During the last thirty years, a great number of economists have built upon this founda­
tion, tested and redefined the explanatory variables. The third variable, frequency- 
understood as the number of transactions parties exchange over time (Williamson 1985, 
60)—has attracted the least attention. Williamson himself often neglects this variable in 
his empirical and theoretical studies. The few empirical studies that do analyse fre­
quency as an independent variable reach inconclusive findings (Anderson and Schmit- 
tlein 1984,; John and Weitz 1988,; Klein, Frazer, and Roth 1990,; Maltz 1993). Boerner 
and Marcher (2001) therefore conclude that this variable is both theoretically and em­
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pirically underdeveloped. For this reason, frequency will be omitted as an explanatory 
variable from this study.
The second variable, uncertainty, has been included in the research of most TCE schol­
ars. However, the influence of uncertainty on governance structures has again been 
found to be inconclusive in empirical studies. Shelanski and Klein (1995) argue convinc­
ingly that this inconsistency can mainly be attributed to the fact that these studies con­
ceptualised uncertainty in veiy different ways, leading to opposite effects on the desir­
able level of integration. The findings become more consistent when we distinguish be­
tween two kinds of uncertainty—behavioural and environmental uncertainty—which of­
ten occur in conjunction.
The first independent variable, asset specificity (Williamson 1975) or relation-specific 
investments (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian 1978), has enjoyed the widest attention and 
strongest confirmation in theoretical and empirical studies on TCE. These three explana­
tory variables, asset specificity, behavioural and environmental uncertainty, will be ex­
plained in more detail in the following sub-sections.
3.2.3.1 Asset specificity
Asset specificity refers to transactions involving ‘a specialised investment that cannot be 
redeployed to alternative uses or by alternative users except at a loss of productive value’ 
(Williamson 1996, 377). Asset specificity can be seen as a relationship-specific invest­
ment that usually affects both contracting parties giving both of them an incentive to 
continue the relationship until the transaction has reached its due completion. There are 
two components of relation specific costs: one-time sunk costs (e.g. investment into pro­
ductive equipment) and costs for foregone opportunities caused by the premature ter­
mination of a longer-term transaction (e.g. an annual supply contract).
Transaction specific costs—once-off investments and opportunity costs—are not neces­
sarily identical for two contracting parties. In many typical business transactions only
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one party faces them. This is for example the case when a supplier A makes an invest­
ment into a new plant, in order to satisfy new requirements by a particular customer B. 
In this case, A faces an investment, which needs to repay over a potentially long time, 
whereas B does not face any investment. Transaction costs economics argues that in 
these situations, the optimal governance structure is the one, which fits the party facing 
the highest asset specific costs.
Even if parties face the same level of transaction specific investments, they might attach 
different levels of significance to them. This is most obvious when organisations of dif­
ferent sizes transact, and an investment of an amount X is negligible for party A but sub­
stantial for party B. In analogy to the case of unequal transaction specific costs, the op­
timal governance structure is the one, which fits the party attaching the highest signifi­
cance to these investments.
Opportunity costs occur if a longer-term contract is terminated prematurely and are 
subject to the ex post bargaining process. The size and distribution of the ex ante in­
vestments and the ex post net-benefits influence the bargaining position of parties dur­
ing in contract negotiations and during its lifetime. The bargaining power of actors can 
also be understood as their propensity to shirk from their contractual obligations. Actors 
with little to lose from the cooperation have a higher incentive to shirk and potentially 
exert additional benefits from their counterparts. The relative power in the ex post bar­
gaining process favours the party with the smaller investments and/or smaller ongoing 
net benefits from the transaction. The outcome of this ex post bargaining process is un­
certain and plagued by opportunism (Eggertsson 1990,172).
Scholars associated with new institutional economics have demonstrated that the pres­
ence of uncertainty and transaction specific costs and consequently the prospect of an 
uncertain ex post bargaining over the quasi-rents generated in the relation affect the ex 
ante incentives of the actors (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian 1978,; Zingales 1998). These 
ex ante incentive effects are likely to frustrate the closing of a contract between two par­
ties unless strong governance structures are created to overcome the problems related
8o
with asset specificity. In the presence of moderate degrees of asset specificity, long-term 
contracts and reciprocal trading arrangements may suffice as additional safeguards. If, 
however, asset specificity is high parties may only be willing to undertake the necessary 
investments if they are unified under a common roof of ownership, i.e. in a formal or­
ganisation. This association between high degrees of asset specificity and higher levels of 
integration has been confirmed by a large body of empirical literature (e.g. Anderson 
and Schmittlein 1984, ; Masten, Meehan, and Snyder 1991, ; Monteverde and Teece 
1982).
3.2.3.2 Behavioural uncertainty
One form of uncertainty that TCE studies have found to impact the choice of governance 
structures is behavioural uncertainty. Whereas asset specificity determines the propen­
sity of actors to shirk, this second TCE variable refers to the opportunities they have to 
do so. Behavioural uncertainty largely depends on how easy it is for one party to monitor 
the performance of the other. While it might be relatively easy for a firm to monitor the 
performance of its sales force, it faces much greater difficulties in doing so with respect 
to its public relations division, because the number and tone of articles written about a 
company is affected by many more intervening variables and because of the often large 
time-lag between public relations work and the appearance of press clippings. Appealing 
to courts does not remedy this problem, as it is most likely that courts face the same dif­
ficulties in assessing the performance level of the party accused of shirking. More effi­
cient solutions are achieved when parties include secondary rules regarding monitoring 
and dispute settlement procedures. In the presence of very high levels of behavioural 
uncertainty, the parties may even settle for a solution that incorporates the function in 
question, e.g. public relations, under the roof of one and the same company, as internal 
monitoring and auditing is more effective and information asymmetries can be better 
equalised. TCE therefore predicts a move towards hierarchical governance structures in 
the presence of high levels of behavioural uncertainty. Empirical studies on the influence 
of environmental uncertainty on integration find supporting evidence for this hypothe­
sis, especially in conjuncture with asset specificity of non-trivial degrees (Anderson and
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Schmitdein 1984, ; Gulati and Singh 1998, ; Morrill and Morrill 2003, ; Widener and 
Selto 1999).
3.2.S.S Environmental uncertainty
The concept of environmental uncertainty refers to situations where both the range of 
possible outcomes and/or their probability distribution are unknown (c.f. Knight 1921,; 
Williamson 1975, 31). Both human infallibility and force majeure are at the source of 
uncertainty in transactions. Given bounded rationality, parties are unable to foresee all 
contingencies and thus to include provisions on how to react to each of them. This 
bounded rationality assumption is, however, not indispensable for the TCE model. Even 
if we dropped the bounded rationality assumption, contracts related to complex transac­
tions will most likely still be plagued by omissions. This results from the fact that an ex­
tensive search for information and the inclusion of provisions for every contingency in 
the contract is costly. These costs can easily exceed the expected value of the damage 
caused by an occurrence the initial contract did not foresee. For this reason, even fully 
rational actors would still not necessarily draft complete contracts.
High levels of uncertainty increase the need for flexibility and expeditious, decentralised 
decision-making, something the market is more apt to provide than hierarchies. Empiri­
cal studies examining this type of uncertainty typically found a negative relationship be­
tween environmental uncertainty, such as technological change, and tighter integration 
(Balakrishnan and Wemerfelt 1986,; Walker and Weber 1984).
3.3 Transferring transaction cost econom ics from  inter-firm  to inter­
state cooperation
This study employs the explanatory variables with the strongest support by the abundant 
body of empirical studies on transaction cost economics in micro-economic settings— 
asset specificity, behavioural uncertainty and environmental uncertainty. As will be dis­
cussed below, these variables are no strangers to the world of international relations—at 
least in spirit if not always in terminology. The goal of this concluding subchapter is to
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show how these three core independent variables of the TCE model have appeared in IR 
literature and how they can be operationalised to assess international policy problems in 
the area of illicit flows. This discussion will result in an analytical framework in the form 
of a checklist that will later be used for the assessment of the problem constellations un­
derlying the four cases studies in greater detail in part two of this study. Before evaluat­
ing the three core variables, the first section of this sub-chapter compares the world of 
inter-firm  to that of inter-state relations.
3.3.1 Similarities and differences between micro-economic settings and international 
affairs
After the brief overview in the second sub-chapter of the origins and key concepts of 
transaction cost economics, this section explores the potentials and limits of transferring 
TCE from the world of inter-firm to that of inter-state cooperation. Such a transfer can 
only yield valuable insights if the two worlds are found to be similar enough in the as­
pects relevant to the theory. This study argues that this is indeed the case but that im­
portant differences do exist and need to be catered for.
3.3.1.1 Similarities between micro-economic settings and international affairs
In several important aspects, cooperation between states is comparable to transfers be­
tween firms. In both cases, resources and efforts are purposefully pooled in pursuit of a 
joint goal (Lake 1999,5), which can be of identical or complementary nature. This is very 
close to Helen Milner’s definition of international cooperation as a ‘goal-directed behav­
iour that seeks to create mutual gains through policy adjustment’ (1997, 8, emphasis in 
original). In both cases, transacting parties establish governance structures that facilitate 
their cooperation and maximise the overall value of the transaction. For this reason, Ko- 
remenos argues that international institutions are ‘essentially contracts between states’ 
(Koremenos 2001, 291).
83
The rationality of states can be assumed to be equally bounded as the rationality of firms 
(Alhson and Zebkow 1999,; Hart, Stem, and Sundelius 1997,; Janis 1983,; Jervis 1975, 
; Steinbruner 1974, ; Vertzberger 1990). Even so-called rational actor models within IR 
do not assume that parties possess complete information and can foresee all eventuali­
ties (Keohane 1984, 110-116). As the bounded rationality assumption of TCE does not 
imply any systematic misperception or bias, it is fully compatible with rational and func­
tionalist theories on the design of international institutions (Lake 1999, 41). The as­
sumption of opportunistic behaviour is not a stranger to IR either. One does not need to 
buy into the classical realist assumption that human nature—and by extension also a 
state—is ‘wicked and ... [as always giving] vent to the malignity that is in their minds 
when opportunity offers’(Machiavelli 1970). Also neo-liberal institutionalists acknowl­
edge that states may yield to moral hazard, when self-interested incentives are struc­
tured in ways that induce states to actions which detract from the efficiency of the coop­
erative undertaking. It is for this very reason, that scholars associated with the function­
alist school of thought emphasise the importance of institutions which are capable of re­
shaping incentive structures so as to align the self-interest of each participating state 
with a common goal.
The core tenet of TCE, that transacting parties align governance structures to problem 
constellations, resonates directly with the logic developed by functionalist theories on 
institutional design. There exists also a strong overlap between the set of explanatory 
variables developed in TCE and those used in functionalist design theories, both in those 
that refer directly to TCE (e.g. Lake 1996,; Lake 1999, ; Weber 1997) and those that do 
not. This aspect will be discussed in greater detail in the following sub-sections.
3.3.1.2 Differences between micro-economic settings and international affairs
This discussion of similarities between inter-firm and inter-state cooperation should not 
conceal that important differences exist as well. Two aspects related to the dependent 
variables seem most relevant: the range of viable design options and the reliance on ex­
ternal dispute settlement and enforcement bodies.
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First, the full range of design options can be widely observed in the micro-economic set­
tings, whereas in international affairs, the distribution of realised institutional designs is 
heavily biased towards the lower end of the spectrum. In international affairs, we can 
observe many transactions which are equivalent to spot market transactions such as the 
forging of informal ad-hoc coalitions in the run-up to a vote in the United Nations Gen­
eral Assembly. In this case, states retain full sovereignty over their decision, and the coa­
lition dissolves the moment the vote is cast. This situation captures the essence of IR’s 
understanding of anarchy, where no central authority exists and no party ‘is entitled to 
command; none is required to obey’ (Waltz 1979, 88).
The perfect IR analogy to hierarchies or internal organisations as found in the business 
world would be the confederation or fusion of two or more states or the occupation or 
annexation of one state by another is, however, very rarely observed. For this reason, 
Lake (1996,; 1999) defines a less far-reaching form of integration, empires, as the upper 
end of his anarchy-hierarchy spectrum. In the case of empires, one state ‘cedes substan­
tial rights of residual control directly to the other’ (Lake 1996,8), however without losing 
its autonomy altogether. This limitation of the range of realised design options is only of 
gradual not fundamental nature, and should therefore not prevent the application of 
TCE in the context of international affairs.
A second important difference between the micro-economic setting and the context of 
international affairs resides in the fact that in the case of the former a court order exists 
which provides at least a minimum of legal certainty. The court order plays an important 
role in solving inter-firm disputes as it provides access to a ‘forum external of the origi­
nal setting of the dispute [and that] remedies will be provided as prescribed in some 
body of authoritative learning’ (Galanter 1981, 1). In international affairs, no direct 
equivalent to such a court order exists. However, this difference is again more relative 
than absolute. For one, the absence of a central entity vested with the authority and ca­
pability to enforce decisions comparable to that of courts and the police in domestic set­
tings, does not imply a complete absence of enforcement structures. States can specify
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how potential disputes are to be resolved, for example by calling upon a pre-existing 
court or dispute settlement body, as many treaties do with respect to the International 
Court of Justice. Alternatively, they may establish a new body or mechanism specifically 
for the settling of potential disputes arising in the context of the transaction at hand, as 
it was for example the case with the Dispute Settlement Body created in the Uruguay 
Round of the World Trade Organisation. These strategies do not solve the problem of 
enforcement altogether, but mitigate it through the provision of ‘penalties’ in the form of 
authorised tit-for-tat measures or reputational costs.
The difference between micro-economic settings and international affairs in enforce­
ment matters is also for a second reason not absolute. As critics of classical contract law 
have pointed out, even in the intra-firm world the court order can fail in important re­
spects (Galanter 1981, ; Llewellyn 1931,; Williamson 1996). First, in many countries of 
the developing world an efficient court order is inexistent, thus requiring economic ac­
tors to develop their own substitute mechanisms (e.g.McMillan and Woodruff 1999). 
Second, even when a well functioning court order does exist, taking a case to court might 
be too expensive compared to the damage caused by the breach of contract. Third, court 
ruling might be considered too unpredictable in complex transactions that necessarily 
involve incomplete contracts. For these reasons, economic actors may opt for self­
created enforcement mechanisms outside the legal framework provided by domestic 
courts and police. In sum, also with respect to enforcement mechanisms do differences 
between inter-firm and inter-state cooperation not present an insurmountable obstacle 
to the gainful transfer of TCE to international affairs.
3.3.2 Asset specificity
3.3.2.1 Asset specificity in international relations
Only a handful of international relations scholars incorporate the concept of asset speci­
ficity explicitly in their studies. In security affairs, Lake (1996,; 1999) and Weber (1997,; 
2000) refer to asset specificity as investments in specialised military equipment or
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know-how, or in strategically important locations undertaken in a security cooperation 
framework. Once state X has, for example, adopted a certain technology in order to in­
crease its troops’ interoperability with troops of state Y its dependence on the success of 
the cooperation increases significantly as this investment would lose most of its value in 
the case of a breakdown of the coalition with Y. Beth and Robert Yarbrough adapt the 
concept of asset specificity to the context of international trade and find that investment 
in trade relations can alter ‘the pattern of production and investment in the participating 
economies’ (1992, 25). One example of relationship-specific investments is the Soviet- 
European gas pipelines built in the 1970s and 1980s. The Europeans invested in building 
this pipeline in exchange for a promise by the Soviets to provide them with natural gas 
under pre-defined conditions. Once completed, the pipeline became susceptible for So­
viet opportunism as the Soviets possessed the power to reduce the value of the European 
investment in the pipeline by reducing the export volume of gas.
Many other IR scholars do not adopt the term ‘asset specificity’ but its essence. For ex­
ample, Downs, Rocke and Barsoom’s understanding of the cooperative depth of an 
agreement, defined as the ‘extent to which [an agreement] requires states to depart from 
what they would have done in its absence’ (1996, 383), captures the central idea of rela­
tionship-specific investments. This notion of ‘depth’ is very close to Raustiala’s notion of 
‘substance’, which he defines as ‘the degree of deviation from the status quo ante that an 
agreement generally demands’ (2004, 1). By definition, all measures that states adopt 
only in reaction to an international agreement lose substantially in value if other states 
do not comply with the agreement or when the agreement fails altogether. These in­
vestments can come in the form of physical investments like investments in certain types 
of interoperable weapon systems, in the renunciation of certain actions, like nuclear 
tests, but also in the form of aligning national legislation with the provisions of an inter­
national agreement and enforcing these provisions domestically. These costs represent 
investments insofar as they are undertaken in view of certain benefits the international 
agreement is expected to generate. These benefits can only be generated, and thus the 
investments be justified, when all other parties, or at least the major ones, honoured the
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obligations they subscribed to with the agreement. If, for example, the Netherlands re­
duce their carbon dioxide emissions as prescribed by the Kyoto Protocol in the hope of a 
reduced risk of flooding but other parties fail to do so, it cannot reap the expected bene­
fits from its action and its investments in the Protocol are in vain.
As is the case with asset-specific investments in business settings, so can in international 
affairs implementation costs and benefits generated by an agreement be distributed 
asymmetrically. For example, in the case of international measures to counter narcotics 
trafficking, Afghanistan faces significant costs in terms of a loss of opium as an impor­
tant foreign exchange earner, while for Bolivia the predominant costs arise from unset­
tling a delicate political balance between coca growing peasants and the urban middle- 
class. Yet another group of countries with no domestic narcotics production may incur 
only minor costs when implementing the proposed solution but reap considerable bene­
fits in terms of a reduction in drug addiction rates and in incidents of drug-related 
crime. This example also demonstrates that costs and benefits can be asymmetrically 
distributed between states, with some countries reaping net-benefits and others incur­
ring net-costs. Mitchell and Keilbach (2001) refer to the former countries as ‘down­
stream’ states, as these states primarily suffer under the negative externalities created by 
the behaviour of other states. A second group of states may see the benefit they derive 
from an institution equalised by the costs they incur from implementing the require­
ments imposed by the institution. Finally, for some states the implementation costs may 
outweigh the benefits these states derive from an international institution, making them 
end up with net costs. This third group of states correspond with Mitchell and Keilbach’s 
(2001) ‘upstream’ state.
In the presence of such an asymmetric distribution of costs and benefits the questions 
arises why a state would join an international institution if it incurred higher costs than 
benefits from doing so. Lloyd Gruber argues convincingly in his Ruling the World 
(2000) that—in contrast to neo-liberal assumptions—states do not only join an interna­
tional institution because this institution helps them achieve a solution that presents an
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efficiency improvement compared to the status quo. In other circumstances, states may 
rather feel compelled to join because the enacting coalition that created the international 
institution may possess what he calls ‘go-it-alone power’, i.e. the power to alter— 
intentionally or not—the status quo of non-parties in ways that make them worse off 
than before the institution was created. Even if, for example, a country like Luxembourg, 
had preferred to maintain the pre-1988 status quo where money laundering was not ta­
bled on the international political agenda, it still preferred to join the Financial Action 
Task Force that was created to deal with this issue matter in an attempt to minimise the 
damage international cooperation on this important issue matter might have for its 
economy. Although the country faces higher costs in living up to its international obliga­
tions on money laundering than it derives direct benefits from this undertaking it still 
decided it was in the country’s best interest to sign up for these efforts. States may also 
be coerced or incentivised to join an international collaborative project which is against 
their immediate interests through coercion, issue-linkages or side-payments (Keck
1 9 9 3 ).
As upstream states have no genuine interest in the success of the cooperative project, it 
can be assumed that they will seize every opportunity to shirk from their obligations as 
long as such a behaviour is not detected and punished (Mitchell and Keilbach 2001). 
Under circumstances, where asset specificity is in this way asymmetrically distributed 
among the parties, the enacting coalition (i.e. the winners in the new institution) will 
seek to establish more elaborated supranational institutions so as to limit the losers’ 
ability to defect at the first available opportunity (Gruber 2000, 82). We can therefore 
expect such an insistence on higher levels of legalisation—ceteris paribus—to be 
stronger, the greater both the absolute levels of asset-specific investments required by an 
agreement and the greater the asymmetry in the distribution of these investments.
3 .3.2.2 Asset specificity in the context o f international cooperation on illicit flows
For the purposes of the empirical part of this study, the asset specificity of an interna­
tional policy problem will be assessed on an ordinal scale with the three levels ‘low’,
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‘moderate’ and ‘high’. In order to arrive at such an assessment, two factors need to be 
taken into consideration—the level of losses resulting from a potential collapse of a co­
operative problem solution and the propensity of participating states to shirk from their 
obligations, thereby causing such a collapse.
• Potential loss
The asset specificity of a problem is positively correlated with the loss a state suffers if 
the agreed problem solution falls apart after that state fulfilled all its obligations. This 
loss consists of two components. For one, a country sees all the direct and indirect im­
plementation costs it incurred in association with a given international institution 
turned into futile expenses. Additionally, a state may face opportunity costs as a result of 
the foregone benefits the collaborative project was meant to generate. This interplay be­
tween costs and benefits will be discussed in more detail based on the stylised cost- 
benefit structure depicted in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1 displays the relative distribution of costs and benefits among three states that 
an imaginary policy solution generates. Countries A and B both reap moderate benefits 
from an effective solution of the problem. However, country B faces moderate costs, 
while country A only bears a low level of costs. Since country B has to contribute more to 
solve the problem than does country A, country B will be more dissatisfied if the prob­
lem is not solved at the end despite its investments. Consequently, the potential loss re­
sulting from a collapse of the created institution is higher for country B than for country 
A.
The solution of the problem generates higher benefits for country C than for country A, 
even though their costs are the same. For this reason, the potential loss in terms of op­
portunity costs is higher for country C than it is for country A. Depending on how differ­
ent countries value the non-realisation of benefits relative to the expense of futile in­
vestments, countries B and C might associate an identical level of loss with the break­
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down of an establish policy solution18. However, even in this case, their common as­
sessment of their loss will be higher than that of country A.
The falling line Li connecting country C and B suggests that all countries lying on this 
path may attribute the same level of loss to a potential ex post collapse of the problem 
solution. The falling line La going through country A also depicts the possible locations 
of countries that share the same level of loss, but their potential loss is lower than that of 
countries located on line Li.
o>
Moderate HighLow Costs
Figure 3.1 The loss from  the breakdown o f an international collaboration  
for three different countries as a function o f costs and benefits 
associated with the problem  solution.
18 Public choice literature suggests that it is most plausible to assume that states are risk-averse, i.e. that they attach 
greater importance to the loss of value of an investment they have made than to the non-realisation of an expected 
benefit, even if the two types of losses are the same in monetary terms (Olson 1971).
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For the purposes of assessing the costs and benefits associated with the solution of an in­
ternational policy problem, it is important to note that costs are not necessarily mone­
tary. In many cases, international cooperation on illicit flows requires a state to crimi­
nalise a type of behaviour which it would not have criminalised or not prosecuted seri­
ously in the absence of an international institution addressing this issue matter. This in­
vokes ideological costs or those inflicted by a local electorate which opposes a change in 
values. There are various reasons, located in the societal, political and economic domain, 
why a state has not criminalised certain types of behaviour, which others have. First, the 
international institution may address a certain type of behaviour that is deemed accept­
able or at least tolerable in some countries but criminalised in others, as for example 
capital punishment.1? Second, and closely related to the first point, even when states do 
share a common understanding that a certain type of behaviour is socially undesirable, it 
does not automatically follow that they frame the problem in the same way. Policy prob­
lems can typically be understood in very different terms, which directly influences the 
choice of policy measures deemed as most appropriate for dealing with the issue at hand 
(Barry et al 1996,; Burchell et al 1991,; Smandych 1999). Whereas the United States has 
a long history of perceiving drug addiction primarily from through a criminal justice 
prism, the United Kingdom and many other European countries have long viewed it 
primarily as a medical problem rather than a crime (Nadelmann 1990, ; Walker 1992, 
270). Third, even when states agree that a certain type of behaviour is both socially un­
desirable and best tackled with criminal law enforcement instruments, they may still dif­
fer in the priority they attach to solving this problem. It is commonly agreed that scarce 
policing resources should be targeted against criminal activities that cause the greatest 
social harm, but the selection of these targets is inevitably of political rather than techni­
cal nature (Sheptycki 2003, 53). Difficult trade-offs are also involved when the crimi- 
nalisation and prosecution of a certain type of behaviour negatively affects the country’s
l9 Despite the current popularity of the universal value debate (e.g. Nussbaum and Sen 1993) it should not be forgot­
ten that most types of behaviour have been subject to very different societal attitudes across time and societies (e.g. 
Baker 2003). As has been pointed out elsewhere, the concept of ‘crime’ lacks objective reality, and must primarily be 
seen as a construct of criminal law.
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economy or directly the government’s revenue base. The former scenario may occur 
when an international institution bans certain services or products which present an im­
portant underpinning of a country’s economy or when it imposes tightened administra­
tive requirements on a key industry, thus damaging its competitive advantage when 
other states do not follow suit and adopt the same standards. A historic example of the 
latter scenario is provided by McCoy (1992) who reports that the colonial government of 
British Malaya derived 53 percent of total tax income from taxes on opium sales at the 
end of the nineteenth century. If the economic effects are strong enough they might also 
have political repercussions—shaking up a government, in the milder case, or even de­
stabilising a country in the worse scenario.
• Propensity to shirk
An international problem solution is thought to fall apart when a sufficient number of 
countries shirk from their obligations. This takes us to the second element of asset speci­
ficity: the propensity of participating states to shirk from their obligations under a given 
international institution. This depends again on the cost-benefit constellation a given so­
lution creates.
Shirking is, ceteris paribus, the more attractive the greater the contribution an individ­
ual state has to make towards a certain international policy solution, i.e. the greater its 
direct and indirect implementation costs. Concurrently, shirking is the less attractive the 
higher the benefits a country expects to gain from an effective problem solution. This as­
sumption is justified even if we assume states to be egoist utility maximisers and the pol­
icy solution to establish pure public goods. As long as we do not perceive states as neces­
sarily short sighted, we can assume that—keeping costs constant—states’ propensity to 
shirk decreases with increasing benefits because they are aware that their own non- 
compliance aggravates the risk of collapse of the collaborative solution and consequently 
their opportunity costs. Figure 3.2 illustrates this argument, again depicting the relative 
distribution of costs and benefits a certain policy solution creates for the three countries 
A, B and C.
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Country A faces a moderate level of costs, while benefiting little from an international 
institution. Country B reaps the same low level of benefits as country A, but it contrib­
utes less to the common solution. In this constellation, country A is more likely to shirk 
from its obligations than country B, as the costs it incurs are more likely to outweigh the 
benefits it can reap. Its incentive to shirk is also larger than that of country C, which 
bears also a moderate amount of costs, but gains moderately in return. Depending on 
how B and C value potentially foregone benefits relative to potentially futile investments, 
their propensity to shirk from their obligations may be the same20. In any event, the 
propensity to shirk of both B and C is lower than that of country A. This relationship is 
demonstrated by line Si connecting countries B and C and line S2 going through country 
A.
O)
Low Moderate High Costs
Figure 3.2 Propensity to shirk for three different countries as a function o f 
costs and benefits associated with a problem  solution.
20 The risk aversion assumption mentioned in the previous footnote is equally valid with respect to states’ 
considerations on whether or not to shirk.
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In sum, each country ascribes a particular level of asset specificity to a policy problem, 
based on the size of the potential loss it incurs in case of a breakdown of an established 
problem solution and based on the propensity of other participating states to shirk from 
their obligations. Based on the TCE framework, this study hypothesises that a match be­
tween an international institution’s substantive elements and its design is only achieved 
when the adopted degree of legalisation is high enough to cater for the highest level of 
asset specificity a participating state faces.
m
Low Moderate High Low Moderate HighCosts Costs
Figure 3.3 A scenario o f a cost-benefits distribution for six countries, where 
the propensity to shirk is low  overall and countries face a low  po­
tential lo ss in case o f an ex post term ination o f d ie agreement; 
and a scenario o f a cost-benefit distribution for six countries, 
w here one country faces high potential losses and others a high 
propensity to shirk.
From this hypothesis, we can derive the following two extreme scenarios. Figure Figure
3.3 (a) depicts a situation where no participating state faces a significant incentive to 
shirk; nor is any of these states strongly concerned about protecting the collaborative 
project from a breakdown, as this institution does not generate any substantial benefits. 
Given the low level of asset specificity we can expect the participating states to endow
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the international institution with only weak legalisation. The other extreme is repre­
sented in Figure 3.3 (b). In this constellation, state A would incur high losses from an ex 
post breakdown of an international institution it invested in. Given all other states’ 
strong incentive to shirk from their obligations, country A will insist on high levels of le­
galisation in order protect the institution from collapse.
3.3.3 Behavioural uncertainty
The second explanatory variable of the TCE model, behavioural uncertainty, refers to 
parties’ ability to shirk surreptitiously from their contractual obligations. The first sub­
section shows how international relations scholars have so far incorporated this variable 
in their research. In the second sub-chapter, this variable will be operationalised in the 
context of international cooperation on illicit flows to enable the assessment of particu­
lar public policy problems in part two of this thesis.
3.3.3.1 Behavioural uncertainty in international relations
This second variable of the transaction cost economics model, behavioural uncertainty, 
is no stranger to IR either. Some scholars even use the same term (e.g. Koremenos, 
Lipson, and Snidal 2001), while others refer to the concept under different terms, as for 
example ‘actor uncertainty’ (Abbott and Snidal 2004, 6sf.) or simply ‘uncertainty’ 
(Weber 1997, 33if.). The central issue here is the question of the observability of behav­
iour. Detecting non-compliance is considerably easier in some issues (e.g. nuclear test 
ban) than in others (e.g. development of biological weapons), because of the availability 
of certain technologies that facilitate detection. In other issue areas like human rights or 
dumping in international trade, monitoring is facilitated by the fact that individuals or 
firms are directly affected by a state’s behaviour. In these cases, states can rely on civil 
society groups like non-governmental organisations or private interest groups and firms 
to serve as ‘fire alarms’ (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984,; but also Raustiala 2000) i.e. to 
sound the alarm when a state’s behaviour is in breach of international obligations it has 
endorsed formally.
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Behavioural uncertainty is of particular importance in the presence of moderate to high 
levels of asset specificity. When a state has made major investments in the provision of 
an international public good or it expects high benefits from the agreement, it will be 
particularly concerned about the possibility that others might be cheating and conse­
quently undermining the agreement. It will therefore be keener on establishing institu­
tions that are strong enough to detect and to discourage shirking. We could expect that, 
when asset specificity is of a nontrivial degree, states favour higher levels of legalisation 
when behavioural uncertainty is high. This expectation largely corresponds with Kore- 
menos et al’s (2001) conjecture 1, which states that centralisation, i.e. the delegation of 
functions to an international institution, increases with this type of uncertainty. A simi­
lar logic, however, with a slightly different twist, is presented by Abbott and Snidal 
(2004, 65ff.). They argue that highly legalised institutions are not only good in counter­
ing hazards arising from behavioural uncertainty because they provide for monitoring 
and punishment mechanisms, but also because they serve as screening devices. A state 
can assume that when another state is willing to accept a ‘substantively meaningful and 
highly legalised agreement’ it is indeed sincere in its commitment to cooperate (Abbott 
and Snidal 2004, 65).
When it is more difficult or costly for one state to monitor the performance of another, 
behavioural uncertainty may not affect both parties to the same extent. Williamson re­
fers to this situation as a case of ‘information impactedness’ (Williamson 1975, 31). In 
analogy to the asymmetry in asset-specific investments discussed above, we can expect, 
ceteris paribus, those states which face greater difficulties in obtaining information 
about other parties’ behaviour to favour higher degrees of legalisation compared to those 
states which can easily monitor the performance of others.
3.3.3.2 Behavioural uncertainty in the context o f international institutions on illicit 
flows
International law enforcement agreements typically require the criminalisation and 
prosecution of a certain type of behaviour. Certain elements of the associated obligations
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are easier to observe than others. Many international institutions on illicit flows necessi­
tate an amendment of the domestic penal code or of other laws, such as the commercial 
code. A state’s legislative adaptations can therefore serve as a first indicator for compli­
ance. As laws are publicly available, it appears almost trivial for states to determine 
whether other parties have brought their laws in line with an international law enforce­
ment agreement. However, as Andrew Ashwood puts it, ‘it would be foolish to think that 
the criminal law as stated in the statutes and the textbooks reflects the way in which it is 
enforced in actual social situations’ (2003, 12). The passing of legislation does not en­
sure that the targeted type of crime is effectively prosecuted, as not all legislation is 
equally thoroughly implemented. Three elements are of particular importance when as­
sessing the seriousness of a state’s efforts to honour its commitments.
First, insufficient implementation may result from a country’s poor policing and prose­
cuting capabilities. This study refers to this first element of behavioural uncertainty as 
‘government incapacity’ thereby assuming that the more the solution of an international 
policy problem requires the meticulous cooperation of states with weak domestic law en­
forcement institutions the greater the behavioural uncertainty associated with the coop­
erative undertaking.
The level of behavioural uncertainty can be mitigated by societal groups with strong in­
terests in the implementation of an international agreement. As mentioned above, in 
certain cases these groups are well positioned to monitor state behaviour tightly and to 
alert other signatories to the non-compliance of certain parties. Societal groups, how­
ever, can only assume this function effectively if they are well organised and operating 
within the law. Typically, international agreements which generate sizeable benefits for 
multinational companies have a lower level of uncertainty than agreements which affect 
weakly-organised individuals, such as drug addicts, or illegal organisations such as 
criminal gangs. The willingness of victims to report non-compliance to law enforcement 
authorities also varies depending on the social stigmatisation associated with their be­
haviour and the risk of harassment by authorities. This second element of behavioural
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uncertainty is capture with the term ‘reliance on governmental monitoring\  It is hy­
pothesised here that the greater the relative reliance on governmental monitoring, i.e. 
the weaker the monitoring performed by non-state actors, the greater the degree of be­
havioural uncertainty.
The overall transparency of the affected industry is a third indicator for the behavioural 
uncertainty associated with a policy area. Important differences exist between institu­
tions which target primarily an illicit sector (e.g. trafficking in narcotic drugs) and insti­
tutions which impose certain standards on a licit sector (e.g. banking) The former, by its 
very nature, seeks to maintain the highest possible degree of opacity. But also within the 
licit sector, industries differ in their degrees of transparency. In industries where busi­
ness is conducted on the basis of a handshake and little written documentation is stored 
(e.g. diamond trade), the actions of regulated subjects are much more difficult to track 
than in strongly regulated industries where a tradition of accurate written reporting ex­
ists (e.g. financial services). This third element of behavioural uncertainty will be re­
ferred to under the term ‘industry opacity’, whereby it is hypothesised that behavioural 
uncertainty associated with a certain international institution increases the greater the 
opacity of the targeted industry.
In each of the four case studies presented in the second part of this study, the degree of 
behavioural uncertainty will thus be assessed based on the three elements government 
incapacity, reliance on governmental monitoring, and industry opacity.
3.3.4 Environmental uncertainty
The discussion of the third and final explanatory variable of the TCE model, environ­
mental uncertainty, follows the same structure already used with respect to the first two. 
It will thus first give a quick overview of how IR scholars have employed this variable in 
their field of study. Finally, the section concludes with positioning environmental uncer­
tainty in the context of illicit flows.
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3 -3 -4-1 Environmental uncertainty in international relations
This third TCE variable has also received considerable attention from IR scholars inter­
ested in institutional design. Koremenos, Iipson and Snidal (2001, 778) refer to this 
variable as ‘uncertainty about the state of the world’. Also Abbott and Snidal’s ‘technical 
uncertainty’ captures the same idea, as they define it as ‘doubts or partial ignorance of 
the existence and nature of a problem, as well as appropriate solutions’ (2004, 63). 
Again other scholars discuss essentially the same ideas under the term ‘scientific uncer­
tainty’ (Rosendorff and Milner 2001,; Shelton 2000).
As mentioned in the previous sub-chapter, economic empirical studies have found a 
negative relationship between environmental uncertainty, such as technological change, 
and tighter integration. They explain this correlation arguing that high levels of envi­
ronmental uncertainty increase the need for flexibility and expeditious, decentralised 
decision-making, which can only be attained at low levels of legalisation. A similar ar­
gument is also presented in the literature on international institutions. When dealing 
with complex problems, such as global warming for example, cause-effect relationships 
may be poorly understood, making it difficult to forecast the effectiveness of certain pol­
icy measures. Under these circumstances, policymakers may prefer international agree­
ments that are flexible enough to allow for renegotiation and adaptation when new evi­
dence suggests more effective ways of dealing with the problem (Abbott and Snidal 
2000, 442). Shelton, for example, maintains that ‘[fiegally binding norms may be inap­
propriate when the issue or the effective response is not yet clearly identified, due to sci­
entific uncertainty or other causes, but there is an urgent requirement to take some ac­
tion’ (2000, 13). This same idea is echoed almost verbally by Rosendorff and Milner 
(2001, 832). Two of Koremenos et al’s (2001) conjectures point in the same direction. 
They hypothesise that states are keener to retain autonomy and flexibility in their deci­
sion-making, i.e. are more reluctant to be bound by highly legalised institutions, with in­
creasing environmental uncertainty. Abbott and Snidal (2000), finally, argue with direct 
reference to the concept of legalisation that weakly legalised international institutions 
present an optimal design for dealing with issues plagued with high levels of environ­
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mental uncertainty. This study adopts the same line of reasoning and hypothesises that, 
ceteris paribus, problems characterised by high levels of environmental uncertainty re­
quire international institutions the design of which remains at the lower end of the le­
galisation spectrum.
3.3.42 Environmental uncertainty in the context o f international institutions on illicit 
flows
In the context of international law enforcement, environmental uncertainty can arise 
from two major sources. First, environmental uncertainty is high when states have little 
previous experience in tackling the targeted type of problem through international coop­
eration. They may therefore feel unsure about the relative effectiveness of various possi­
ble instruments and prefer first to gain some experience prior to enshrining a particular 
approach in hard law. By first designing an institution with only soft legalisation, states 
offer themselves an opportunity for individual and collective learning with respect to 
dealing with a poorly-understood policy problem (Koremenos 2001). This first element 
of environmental uncertainty is referred to as ‘novelty o f policy issue’, whereby it is hy­
pothesised that, ceteris paribus, the greater the novelty of a policy issue, the greater the 
environmental uncertainty associated with that issue, and the lower the expected level of 
legalisation enshrined in the international institutions created to tackle this problem.
Second, environmental uncertainty in the context of international law enforcement de­
pends on the process innovativeness associated with the targeted type of crime. Innova­
tion may either relate to the development of new types of criminal activities, such as 
hacking into hank accounts, or to process-related adaptations, such as the dissemination 
of child pornography over the internet instead of or in addition to video tapes. Another 
type of process innovation relates to the displacement of criminal activities either to less 
tightly-regulated sectors or to states with lax legislation and/or law enforcement capaci­
ties. Both forms of innovativeness—product innovation and process innovation—are hy­
pothesised to be positively correlated with environmental uncertainty and consequently 
associated with soft legalisation.
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In sum, a vast body of literature both directly on transaction cost economics and on in­
stitutional design in international relations provides solid evidence that high levels of as­
set specificity and behavioural uncertainty lead to harder legalisation as an attempt to 
reduce moral hazard whereas high levels of environmental uncertainty induce cooperat­
ing parties to prefer institutions with softer legalisation. Table 3.1 summarises the crite­
ria for the assessment of the constellation of public policy problems in the area of illicit 
flows.
Problem attribute Low High
1. Asset specificity
A. Potential loss ■ Problem solution requires negligible fi­
nancial or human investments (direct 
costs).
■ Problem solution has negligible or even 
positive unintended consequences for 
the country's socio-economic and po­
litical stability (indirect costs).
■ The net benefits of the problem solu­
tion are low.
■ Problem solution requires the country to 
invest significant amounts of financial or 
human resources.
■ Problem solution has significant negative 
unintended consequences for the coun­
try’s socio-economic stability.
■ The solution of the problem generates 
high net benefits.
B. Propensity to 
shirk
■ All cooperating countries face the same 
and low potential losses caused by the 
breakdown of a collaborative problem 
solution.
■ The problem solution causes high negative 
net benefits for some states, while others 
face substantial potential losses in case of 
the breakdown of the collaborative prob­
lem solution
2. Behavioural un­
certainty
A. Governance inca­
pacity
■ Countries to be observed have proven 
that they can manage comparable tasks 
without difficulty.
■ Affected countries are weak and are likely 
to be overwhelmed by problem solution.
■ Countries have a track record of low accu­
racy in their reporting.
B. Reliance on gov­
ernmental moni­
toring
■ Problem and its solution affects certain 
organised non-governmental actors 
significantly which can serve as fire 
alarms
■ Affected groups are well organised.
■ Problem and its solution do not affect any 
single societal group significantly.
■ Affected groups not well organised.
■ Affected groups have no societal legiti­
macy
C. Industry opacity ■ Industry transactions are well docu­
mented.
■ Industry transactions are historically 
tracked by government agencies.
■ Industry transactions are conducted on 
the basis of a handshake.
■ Industry transactions have not historically 
been tracked by government agencies.
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3. Environmental 
uncertainty
A. Novelty of policy 
issue
■ The cause and effect relationship of the 
problem and potential solutions are 
well understood.
■ Countries have a long and solid track 
record in regulating or cooperating in 
the concerning problem area.
■ Well proven strategies exist to deal with 
unexpected natural factors.
■ The future development of consump­
tion patterns and technology can be 
forecasted accurately.
■ The cause and effect relationship of the 
problem and potential solutions are not 
well understood.
■ Countries have little experience in regulat­
ing or cooperating in the concerning prob­
lem area.
■ Problem solution is affected by uncontrol­
lable natural factors.
■ Problem solution seeks to regulate goods 
or services the demand for which is prone 
to swings to technological progress, or 
changes in taste or fashion.
B. Innovativeness 
a. Product inno­
vation
■ Problem solution seeks to regulate 
goods or services the alternatives to 
which cannot be developed without 
significant investment and delay.
■ Problem solution seeks to regulate 
goods or services the potential alterna­
tives to which would not need to be 
regulated in a similar fashion.
■ Problem solution seeks to regulate goods 
or services to which alternatives can be 
developed in short time and without high 
costs.
■ Problem solution seeks to regulate goods 
or services the potential alternatives to 
which would require regulation in a simi­
lar fashion.
b. Process innova­
tion
■ Problem solution seeks to regulate 
goods or services which cannot be pro­
duced, shipped and sold in locations or 
channels, which are not already in use, 
or a switch between which cannot occur 
without significant investment and de­
lay.
■ Problem solution seeks to regulate goods 
or services which are produced, shipped 
and sold in locations or channels, which 
can be switched in short time and without 
high costs.
■
Table 3.1 Overview o f the criteria for the assessm ent o f the constellation of 
public policy problem s in  the area o f illicit flow s.
1 0 3
4 Narcotic drugs: The UN Convention against the Il­
licit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances
The world market for illicit drugs21 is a substantial part of the world economy. According 
to the UN International Drug Control Programme, it was worth around US$400 billion 
in 1996, or 8 percent of world trade (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000, 366). The produc­
tion and consumption of narcotic drugs is not a new phenomenon, however. Narcotic 
drugs have been consumed for curative, religious and recreational purposes throughout 
history (UNODC 2004b, 25). This continuity contrasts sharply with the changing socie­
tal attitudes towards the consumption of such psychoactive substances. Whereas drugs 
were fully legal in some societies and at some times in history, in other societies and at 
other times they were subject to various forms of state control, ranging from the taxation 
of the trading in narcotics to the imposition of the death penalty for the consumption of 
such substances. This first of the four cases studied here presents the emergence of what 
Ethan Nadelmann (1990) called the ‘global drug prohibition regime’ with a special focus 
on the latest of its three main pillars: the United Nations Convention against the Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 (1988 UN Convention or 
Vienna Convention). The first sub-chapter provides an overview of the nature and scope 
of the narcotic phenomenon, and the major multilateral agreements concluded to tackle 
the problems arising from it. After having prepared the grounds in this way, the discus­
sion will move on in the second sub-chapter to the analysis of the constellation of the 
problem underlying the Vienna Convention. This analysis is guided by the three transac­
21 The terms ‘narcotic drugs’ and ‘narcotics’ and ‘illicit drugs’ will here be used interchangeably as generic terms for 
substances, natural or synthetic, which are included in Schedules I and II of the Single Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs of 1961 and the 1972 Protocol Amending the Single Convention. This definition is based on article 1 litera n of 
the 1988 Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. The assignment of a drug 
to one of the four Schedules defined by the Single Convention is based on scientific criteria related to a substance’s 
dependence-producing nature and negative health impact. However, Boaz (1991) is right in pointing out that this 
logic is not followed through, as otherwise also alcohol and tobacco would have to be included in the definition of 
drugs.
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tion cost economics variables introduced in the previous chapter, namely asset specific­
ity, behavioural uncertainty and environmental uncertainty. This analysis suggests a 
high level of legalisation as the optimal design for an institution created to tackle a so- 
disposed problem. The third sub-chapter assesses the institutional design of the 1988 
UN Convention along the three dimensions introduced by the concept of legalisation. 
Finally, the actual design outcome is compared with the design expectations formulated 
in the preceding sub-chapter. With the Vienna Convention reaching high degrees of ob­
ligation, precision and delegation, this comparison finds a close match between the ex­
pected and the real design and thus supporting evidence for the explanatory power of 
the transaction cost economics framework tested in this study.
4.1 Narcotic drugs as an international policy problem
This first section provides an overview of the nature and scope of the production, distri­
bution and consumption of narcotics and establishes why it is seen by policymakers as a 
problem that requires international responses. The most important multilateral agree­
ments seeking to mitigate the narcotics problem are presented in a cursory way in a sec­
ond section. This overview is followed by a more detailed presentation of the United Na­
tions Convention against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Sub­
stances of 1988, upon which the remainder of this chapter will focus.
4.1.1 Scope and nature of the international policy problem
Narcotics present a very challenging policy field for international cooperation, as it is a 
uniquely multifaceted problem that affects different states in very different ways and to 
different extents. As it will be argued below, the problems associated with the existence 
of narcotic substances can be looked at from three main perspectives: health, crime and 
security. Depending on which dimension of the problem the policy-maker focuses on, 
different policy instruments present themselves as the most appropriate one to tackle 
the problem. Furthermore, policy-makers have divergent perspectives on the issue de­
pending on whether their country is primarily a drug producing, transit or consuming
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country22, on the prevalence of the problem in their society and on the type of drug that 
presents the greatest problem. This section seeks to shed light on the major dimensions 
of the problem and on the global consumption and production patterns underlying it.
4.1.1.1 Narcotics—a policy problem with many dimensions
The production and consumption of narcotic drugs give rise to a number of problems 
that can be categorised along three23 dimensions: health, crime and security, which will 
be discussed in turn  in the following paragraph.
• Health
The use of narcotics can be traced back to the early history of mankind (Inglis 1975, ; 
Whitaker 1987). The chewing of dried coca leaves in South America dates back over 
2,000 years (Connor 1991), and archaeological testimonies also demonstrate the many 
century old tradition of cannabis sativa (Indian Hemp) and papaver somniferum  (white 
poppy) consumption. Technological advances in the field of chemistry and pharmacol­
ogy exacerbated the health hazards associated with the consumption of these substances 
considerably. Though not without its own problems, the consumption of unrefined plant 
material still presents a minor health risk as the concentration of the active agents in 
these plants is generally low, thus making overdosing physically difficult. This changed 
dramatically, when in the 19th century pharmaceutical companies developed procedures 
to isolate the psychoactive substances of opium poppy (morphine) and coca (alkaloids) 
and to process them  to heroin and cocaine on a commercial basis (Braithwaite and Dra- 
hos 2000, 36if.). The administration of heroin with the newly developed hypodermic sy­
ringe further increased the risk of addiction. Further advances in pharmacology facili­
tated the development of synthetic drugs such as amphetamines, barbiturates and lyser­
22 However, this distinction between drug consuming, trafficking and producing countries is becoming increasingly 
blurred, as will be discussed later.
23 The environmental dimension, though important, will not be subject of a detailed discussion here. On this topic 
see Bentham (1998) and Thoumi (2003).
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gic acid diethylamide (LSD) in the mid- and late 20th century. The World Health Organi­
sation estimates that approximately 200,000 people died as a consequence of drug 
abuse in 2002, equivalent to 0.4 percent of all deaths worldwide (UNODC 2004b). In 
the United States alone, approximately 20,000 people die annually of causes related to 
drug abuse (Fuller 1996). When measured in terms of disability-adjusted life years (DA- 
LYs), drug abuse accounts for the loss of 11.2 million years of healthy life (UNODC 
2004b). Of particular concern is the risk of HIV infections resulting from the use of con­
taminated injection equipment to which the approximately 13 million injecting drug us­
ers are exposed. Such drug-related health problems can strain public health care and 
lead to a loss of productivity of the affected country’s work force. According to figures 
provided by the US Executive Office of the President (2001), the United States spent 
US$14.9 billion on drug-related health care in 2000 and incurred a drug-related produc­
tivity loss of US$110.5 billion that year.
Central to the health dimension of narcotics is the notion of addiction, as the very occa­
sional consumption of these drugs does not lead to any significant medical problems. 
The term addiction is, however, problematic as no established consensus exists on its 
precise meaning. Disagreement primarily relates to whether the term should be limited 
to physical dependence2* only or be broadened so as to include psychic dependence^, as 
well. This disagreement is of lesser relevance with respect to heroin and cocaine (in par­
ticular in the form of crack cocaine), since it is not disputed that the chronic consump­
tion of these substances is addictive. The lack of scientific consensus is most pronounced 
with respect to the use of cannabis (Bentham 1998, 203). Upon the recommendation of 
the World Health Organisation (WHO) and despite the lack of evidence for its physical 
dependence-producing effects, cannabis was assigned to the same category of substance 
as heroin in Schedule IV of the 1961 Single Convention.
24 Defined by Bentham as “an alteration of the central nervous system that results in painful symptoms when the 
drug is withdrawn” (1998,21).
25 Defined as the “emotional desire, craving or compulsion to obtain and take the drug” (Bentham 1998,21).
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• Crime
Also the second dimension, drug-related crime, is surrounded by a considerable degree 
of controversy. It is generally noted that widespread drug consumption causes social 
harm in the form of high levels of crime, either as crime committed, first, under the in­
fluence of drugs or, second, in order to finance the addiction (UNODC 2004b). High lev­
els of violent crime can result from clashes between different drug producer and traf­
ficker gangs, as well as between such gangs and law enforcement agents. Corruption pre­
sents an important secondary form of crime related to the drug industry, whereby gangs 
involved in the business use parts of their massive profits to influence the political estab­
lishment.
However, especially accounts of the first mentioned form of drug-related crime were of­
ten manipulated and instrumentalised by groups lobbying for a criminalisation of drugs 
(Nadelmann 1990). In the United States of the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen­
tury, for example, the call for cocaine restriction was bolstered up with widely publicised 
accounts of ‘coke-crazed negros raping white women’ (Eddy, Sabogal, and Walden 1988, 
46) and other ‘sensationalist, albeit largely unsubstantiated, reports of the horrid crimes 
ostensibly committed under the influence of a particular drug’ (Nadelmann 1990, 507). 
The association between drugs and crime is much more robust when looking at the sec­
ond aspect—criminal acts to procure finances to purchase drugs. Narcotic drugs are re­
ported to play a role in more than half of all cases of street crime committed in the 
United States (Perl 1992, 68). In the United Kingdom, about fifty percent of all cases of 
theft and burglary are driven by the need of addicts to finance their expensive addiction, 
which is estimated to cost a hard drug addict an average of approximately £33,000 an­
nually (Clutterbuck 1995, 3). This association between drugs and crime is also reflected 
in law enforcement statistics. According to Barry McCaffrey, the then director of the 
White House Office of National Drug Control Policy, drug-related offences account for 
two thirds of the 100,000 people in the federal prison system, while a total of 250,000 
US Americans are serving time for drug law violations (Fuller 1996). These crimes may
io8
however not be so much the result of narcotic drugs themselves but rather of their illegal 
status. The Swiss experience with the controlled administration of regular doses of her­
oin to chronic addicts supports this view, as the crime rates among the participants of 
this scheme fell by 60 percent (Joyce 1999,104).
Another type of crime—corruption—affects in contrast not just drug consuming, but also 
drug producing and trafficking countries—with drug producing countries being hit hard­
est. A strong association between drugs and high levels of corruption exist, even if a clear 
causal relationship is difficult to establish (Thoumi 2003 ,170ff.). As the revenues gener­
ated by the illicit drugs industry26 are disproportionally large compared with the salaries 
of public officials of all levels, the industry often succeeds in buying the latter’s toleration 
of their operations. Peter Smith, for instance, compares the income of Mexican cocaine 
traffickers with the financial capacities of the judiciary and concludes that ‘Mexico’s 
nouveaux riches traffickers can afford to spend a s much as US$500 million per year on 
bribery—more than twice the total budget of the attorney general’s office’ (Smith 1999b, 
204). This has far-reaching consequences. Colombia’s criminal justice system in the 
1980s, for example, was reported to be undermined by corruption to such a point that it 
was virtually incapable of enforcing any serious constraints on the drug industiy 
(Bentham 1998, 32). Rensselaer W. Lee III noted in the mid-1980s that ‘[djrug barons 
today are a major political force in countries such as Bolivia, Colombia and Peru, carving 
out states within states in coca-producing regions’ (1985/86,142L). The drug cartels di­
rected their corruptive power or seduction not just towards government officials but at 
times also towards the general public in an effort to ‘win their hearts and minds’ and in 
some cases even their vote27. For instance, Pablo Escobar, the head of the Medellin drug 
cartel, is reported to have constructed more public housing in Medellin than the gov­
ernment (Bentham 1998, 34; Thoumi 1999, 130). In 1995, it was revealed that the Cali
26 The Keriy Commission Report of 1989 estimated that the Colombian drug cartels generated incomes of US$ 8 bil­
lion annually (Bentham 1998).
27 Pablo Escobar, the head of the Medellin cartel’s production operations ran successfully for Congress in 1984, and 
the cartel’s co-founder, Carlos Lehder, created a less successful political movement with strong nationalistic 
overtones (Thoumi 1999).
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cartel had supported the previous year’s presidential campaign of the winner, Ernesto 
Samper, with a contribution of US$6 million (Guaqueta 2003, 77). Also, in the 1980s the 
government of Laos was considered to be heavily involved in the production and export 
of opium, or at least to condone it (Bentham 1998).
• Security
The narcotics industry is a good example for how the definitions of crime and security 
threats overlap. The drugs industry often complements its ‘carrot policy’ (bribes) to­
wards public officials with a Tbig stick’ in the form of targeted assassination of public fig­
ures who oppose the drug trade and the killing of police and military personnel deployed 
in the fight against drugs. In 1984, for example, the Medellin cartel killed Rodrigo Lara 
Bonilla, the Colombian justice minister and many other public figures, including elected 
politicians, presidential candidates28, cabinet ministers, judges and journalists (Thoumi 
1 9 9 9 >; 2003). The Medellin cartel also offered a bounty for the head of each policemen 
(Thoumi 1999,134), which contributed to over 3,000 military and police personnel be­
ing killed or wounded during the second half of the 1980s (Bagley 1988, ; Office of the 
President of the Republic 1989). Simultaneously, the drug industry has sometimes pur­
sued the strategy of creating general chaos through the detonation of bombs in police 
headquarters, but also at random public places—a strategy that became associated with 
the label narco-terrorism. This notion also refers to the links that often emerged between 
the drug industry on the one hand and paramilitary groups and guerrillas on the other. 
From the 1980s onwards, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), 
one of the two leftwing guerrilla groups operating in Colombia, embraced the drug in­
dustry as an important source of income. The FARC first started to raise funds by taxing 
coca growers and drug traffickers operating in the region controlled by them (King 1997, 
68). The guerrilla group later—especially after the conflict with the Colombian govern­
ment intensified in the 1990s—expanded its activities in this field and began to acquire
28 The 1989 presidential campaign established a sad record with three candidates being assassinated (Thoumi 1999).
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plots, process coca leaf into cocaine, and develop contacts of its own with regional mafia 
networks (Guaqueta 2003, 80). Estimates on how much revenue FARC has been able to 
generate this way vary considerably. King (1997, 68) reports that FARC’s drug-related 
income mounted to an estimated US$269m in 1994, Becker (2004) puts the number at 
an annual total of approximately US$470m, and Guaqueta (2003, 81) at approximately 
US$53om. According to Guaqueta, these drug revenues accounted for approximately 48 
percent of FARC’s total income. The illegal rightwing paramilitary Autodefensas Unidas 
de Colombia (AUC) relies even more extensively on the drug business, which covers ap­
proximately 70 percent of its income (Guaqueta 2003, 82), although the absolute num­
bers on net drug-income put forward by other sources vary between US$20m-200m. In 
May 2005 alone, the Colombian police seized eleven tons of cocaine, with an estimated 
street market value of €6som, that the AUC allegedly tried to ship to the United States 
or to Europe (NZZ 2005a). In her study on Colombia and Peru, Felbab-Brown (2004) 
finds conclusive evidence that drug-related income strengthened the position of the 
guerrilla groups and paramilitaries in both countries, which in turn led to an intensifica­
tion of the militarised intrastate conflicts. This sometimes almost symbiotic relation be­
tween the drug industry and guerrilla groups has generated some speculations about the 
ideological and political motives of these groups compared to their economic incentives. 
The Colombian government has also at times been eager to exploit this link for its own 
purposes, depicting the fighters as driven by material self-enrichment alone. This strat­
egy has proven a successful tool to de-legitimise these groups in the view of Colombian 
population as well as the international community2? and to mobilise US American sup­
port for its fight against narco-terrorism.
These conflicts often had and still have important repercussions on the international 
level, leading to a securitisation of the drug problem also in countries that are not di­
rectly affected by this form of drug-related violence. At the height of the Colombian drug
29 The FARC, ELN and the paramilitary AUC were classified as international terrorist groups in 2002 (Guaqueta 
2003,81).
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cartels’ power and at the apex of the Cold War, Charles Range, chairman of the US 
House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, expressed his concerns that 
just as America was fearing a domino effect in the spread of communism, the takeover of 
drug barons of one South American state might spark a domino effect of other states fal­
ling into criminal hands. He stated that ‘[if Colombia falls [to the drug cartels], the other, 
smaller, less stable nations in the region would become targets. It is conceivable that we 
would one day find ourselves an island of democracy in a sea of narcopolitical rule, a 
prospect as bad as being surrounded by communist regimes’ (quoted in Andreas and 
Bertram 1992,170). In a similar vein, William J. Bennett, then head of the Office of Na­
tional Drug Control Policy, declared in 1989 that ‘[t]he source of the most dangerous 
drugs threatening our nation is principally international. Few foreign threats are more 
costly to the US economy. None does more damage to our national values and institu­
tions and destroys more American lives. While most international threats are potential, 
the damage and violence caused by the drug trade are actual and pervasive. Drugs are a 
major threat to our national security’ (quoted in Bentham 1998,35).
* * * * *
International negotiations on narcotics-related issues have traditionally been hampered 
by the fact that countries differ from each other with respect to the relative emphasis 
they put on the health, crime and security dimension of the problem and, consequently, 
the policy instruments they consider most appropriate.
do not approach the fight against illegal drugs from the same dimension. Policy instru­
ments proposed and advocated by countries depend on which dimension they consider 
most important. For instance, the Colombian government, although heavily dependent 
on US support, repeatedly stressed the point that their fight was primarily targeted 
against narco-terrorism, in which it saw the ‘principal threat against [our] democracy’ 
rather than against drug trafficking itself (Bagley 1992,; President Cesar Gaviria of Co­
lombia quoted in Block 1992, 40). This view is in a sharp contrast to some European 
countries, first and foremost Switzerland and the Netherlands, which shifted the focus
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away from predominant crime and security concerns associated with the ‘war on drugs’ 
and towards more health-oriented policies.
4.1.1.2 Patterns and trends in consumption, production and trafficking
Differences in countries’ preferred anti-drug policies largely result from the fact that 
they vary considerably with respect to their exposure to drugs production, trafficking 
and consumption. It is therefore important to understand the global pattern of drug con­
sumption, production and trafficking, which will be illustrated below.
• Consumption
The history of drug consumption is marked by great fluctuations both in terms of sub­
stances consumed and levels of consumption, with important geographical differences. 
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime estimates that approximately 185 million 
people, i.e. 4.7 percent of the global population between the age of 15 and 64, consume 
drugs (UNODC 2004b). More than eighty percent of drug users consume cannabis, fol­
lowed by amphetamine-type stimulants, opiates (including heroin) and finally cocaine. 
In terms of health impact, the proportions shift considerably. Cannabis dominates the 
demand for treatment services only in Africa. On the global level, opiates remain the 
most serious problem drug, requiring most attention in Asia, Europe and Oceania. In 
South-East Asia, methamphetamine has overtaken opiates in the last decade as the main 
problem drug. The Americas are still marked by a strong prevalence of cocaine, but in 
the United States heroin now accounts for more drug treatment than does cocaine 
(UNODC 2004b, 32). This regional consumption patterns are depicted in Figure 4.1.
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The number of drug users increased in the last few years by less then three percent 
(UNODC 2003), but growth rates of different types of narcotics vary significantly across 
world regions. The global trend within the two most important problem drugs is slightly 
positive, with the consumption of heroin largely stabilised and that of cocaine declining. 
In contrast, the consumption of the most widely used narcotic, cannabis, is still on the 
rise, and amphetamines and ecstasy both experienced strong growth rates. The trend 
towards a convergence in the levels of drug consumption is continuing, with many de­
veloping countries reporting rising levels of consumption in contrast to stabilised or 
even declining consumption in many developed countries. A second converging trend 
also exists with respect to the type of drugs consumed in the Americas and in Western 
Europe, with opiates growing in popularity in the Americas and cocaine becoming more 
commonly used in Western Europe.
• Production
Most of the drugs are not produced in the country of end-consumption. The global pro­
duction of illicit opium has remained largely stable since the early 1990s. However,
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shifts did occur with respect to the distribution of cultivation, leading to a growing con­
centration of opium production in Afghanistan. This mountainous, poor country ac­
counts now for 75 percent of the global opium production (UNODC 2004b, 31); followed 
by Myanmar (17 percent) and Laos (2.5 percent). These three countries together cover 
95 percent of the world supply in opium poppy. Although large-scale opium production 
is a rather recent phenomenon in Latin America, it has now reached a level where Mex­
ico and Colombia can cover most of the US demand in this drug. In 2003, Mexico was 
the fourth largest opium producer, with a share of 1.7 percent of the total world produc­
tion. Low levels of illicit opium poppy cultivation take place in many regions and coun­
tries, such as Vietnam, Russia, Ukraine, Central Asia, Caucasus region, Egypt, Peru and 
Thailand (UNODC 2004b, 59, 61).
The illicit cultivation of coca has been in decline since it peaked in 1999 (UNODC 2004b, 
17). The geographical concentration in the production of coca leaf is also very high but 
shows a slightly different pattern than in the case of opium—in two respects. First, 
unlike opium poppy, coca is only grown in one region of the world—in the Andes, spe­
cifically in Bolivia, Colombia and Peru. Second the distribution among these three coun­
tries is less skewed than in the case of opium. Colombia produces approximately 67 per­
cent of the global cocaine output, whereas Peru covers 24 percent and Bolivia 9 percent 
(UNODC 2004b, 95).
The production of cannabis displays a veiy different pattern, as the plant is grown 
throughout the world. In the decade between 1992 and 2002, the United Nations Drug 
and Crime Office identified 142 countries as cultivating cannabis. The importance of 
domestic supply is considerably greater with respect to cannabis herb than with any 
other drug. All cannabis herb seized in Canada in 2004, for example, originated from 
domestic sources (UNODC 2005c). The United States, the world’s largest cannabis mar­
ket, relies to two thirds on domestically produced cannabis herbs, with the rest being 
imported from Mexico and Canada (UNODC 2004b, 125). Also in Europe, cannabis is 
grown to meet domestic demand but still needs to be complemented with imports
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mainly from Albania. Production of cannabis resin, in contrast, is slightly more concen­
trated. In Western Europe, the world's largest cannabis resin market, about 80 percent 
of the cannabis resin that was seized is estimated to originate in Morocco (UNODC 
2004b, 125). The second and third most cited source of cannabis resin were Pakistan 
and Afghanistan, respectively. Other important suppliers of cannabis resin are India, 
Lebanon, Albania, the Central Asian countries (notably Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan), 
Nepal, a number of African countries and the Russian Federation. Jamaica is the only 
country in the Americas that is a significant supplier of this derivative from the cannabis 
plant.
The global production of amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) has increased over the 
last decade. Production is dominated by methamphetamine (with 410 tons per annum), 
followed by ecstasy (113 tons) and amphetamine (UNODC 2004b, 159). Laboratories 
based in European countries dominate the production of amphetamines, whereby a 
marked shift of production from Western to Eastern Europe occurred in the mid-1990s. 
The United States are by far the leading producer of metamphetamines, as can be ex­
trapolated from the number of reported methamphetamine laboratory detections in 
2002. Canada, China, Mexico, Myanmar and the Philippines followed far behind.
• Trafficking
A third type of countries play an important role in international drug trading by being 
transhipment points between producer and consumer countries. For instance, non-drug 
producing Ecuador funnels a third of Colombia’s cocaine, especially through its port of 
Guayaquil (The Economist 2005). A large part of that continues to Mexico, which is the 
immediate origin of about 70 percent of all US drug imports (Fuller 1996).
Seventy to eighty percent of the heroin consumed in Western Europe in 1990 was esti­
mated to reach its destination via the Balkan route, through Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, 
and ex-Yugoslavia (Bentham 1998). Nordic countries, notably Finland are supplied with 
central Asian opiates through St. Petersburg and the Baltic countries. Minor quantities
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are trafficked via Russia and Belarus to Poland for shipment to Germany (UNODC 
2004b, 71).
In Africa, Nigeria emerged in the 1980s as a major transhipment centre for heroin from 
Southwest and Southeast Asia to Europe (MacDonald and Zagaris 1992, 10). However, 
several other African countries, including Togo, Ghana, Gambia, the Republic of South 
Africa, Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda, reported that South Ameri­
can cocaine was being transhipped via their territory to Europe. Between 1992 and 
2002, 52 African countries reported seizures of cocaine, up from 24 countries in the ten 
years between 1980 and 1990. South Africa and Nigeria were the largest transhipment 
centres, as measured by the amount of cocaine seized, with Nigeria building up an ever 
increasing lead in front of South Africa.
*■***•#•
As the discussion above demonstrates, most drugs are not produced domestically but 
imported often from distant places. We see a strong movement from East to West with 
respect to heroin (Afghanistan to Europe), from South to North (cocaine) and a move­
ment from North to South (synthetic drugs) (Bassiouni and Thony 1999, 911). Especially 
with the rise of synthetic drugs, the division between the drug consuming developed and 
the drug producing developing world is becoming increasingly blurred. International 
trafficking constitutes the crucial link between the drug producing and drug consuming 
countries. Given the globally highly mobile nature of illicit drugs trade, ‘some states have 
long since lost the ability to respond to drug use within their society on a purely unilat­
eral basis’ (Bassiouni and Thony 1999, 923). For this reason, states started to search for 
cooperative solution to a commonly shared problem. Out of this need for cooperation, a 
number of international agreements were reached, as will be discussed in detail in the 
next section.
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4-1.2 International initiatives
Given the global dimension of the narcotics problem, states realised at a very early stage 
the importance of international cooperation. Before embarking on detailed discussion of 
the most recent global agreement on drugs, i.e. the Vienna Convention of 1988, it is im­
portant to understand the institutional history upon which this convention was able to 
build. This paragraph therefore provides a broad overview of the most important global 
international anti-drug initiatives that predated the Vienna Convention. The discussion 
of these international agreements proceeds in chronological order.
The first international attempt to address narcotics was undertaken at an international 
conference held in Shanghai in 1909, where thirteen powers concerned with the Far East 
discussed measures to curb opium addiction, which had reached alarming levels espe­
cially in China (Senate Special Committee on Illegal Drugs 2003,446). It is believed that 
at its apex dependency on opium smoking affected 25 million Chinese—a level never 
reached by any country ever before or since (UNODC 2004b, 26). This epidemic level of 
addiction was largely the result of a successful market expansion of the British East In­
dia Company that begun to export opium on a large scale from British India to China in 
the 19th century. Chinese attempts to prohibit the importation and consumption of 
opium contributed to the outbreak of the so-called Opium Wars (1839-42 and 1856- 
1858). For the British, who considered opium as a legitimate international commodity 
and an integral part of international trade, the prohibition of opium imports represented 
an unacceptable move against their free-trade interests. Strengthened by the two victo­
ries over China, the British imposed their demand for unrestricted opium imports to the 
Middle Kingdom. However, under growing domestic pressure from anti-opium activists 
the position of the British government slowly started to shift at the wake of the 20th cen­
tury. With the strong support of the United States, the Shanghai Opium Conference was 
summoned and concluded with a call on all governments to ban opium smoking and to 
ban or carefully regulate opium use in other ways.
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The Shanghai Conference prepared the grounds for the Hague Convention of 1912. This 
convention regulated the trade in, and abuse of, opium, cocaine and morphine. It repre­
sents the first truly multilateral agreement on drug control (Bassiouni and Thony 1999, 
913) and the beginning of a global coordination or tentative homogenisation of domestic 
drug control policies on the basis of multilateral treaties and international obligations. 
The scope of international drug control was expanded in the 1925 Geneva Convention of 
the League of Nations. It covered a wider range of drugs, including for the first time can­
nabis, and attempted to move beyond the Hague Convention’s focus on domestic con­
trols toward transnational control mechanisms. For this purpose, the Geneva Conven­
tion established an eight-member Permanent Central Opium Board (PCOB) in charge of 
monitoring an import certification system created by the same convention to control the 
international drug trade by limiting the amount each country could legally import. The 
last anti-drug treaty to be concluded under the auspices of the League of Nation was the 
1936 Convention for the Suppression of Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs (198 LNTS 
229). This convention established drugs trafficking for the first time as a criminal of­
fence, calling upon governments to punish people involved in this activity regardless of 
their nationality and of the country where they committed this crime.
The post World War II international drug control framework rests predominantly upon 
three United Nations Conventions, which are mutually supportive and complementary. 
They enjoy almost universal support, and form the legal basis of what Nadelmann called 
the ‘global drug prohibition regime’ (1990,503).
The first pillar, the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 30 March 1961 (the Single 
Convention, henceforth), primarily sought to consolidate in a single treaty the drug trea­
ties and protocols that the UN had taken over from the League of Nations. It entered 
into force on 13 December 1964, and, by June 2005,180 states had become party to the 
convention. The Single Convention continued the earlier treaties’ focus on the supply of 
narcotic drugs, and seeks to establish mechanisms that limit world production of plant- 
based narcotics exclusively to the amount needed for medical and scientific purposes
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(Bassiouni and Thony 1999,920). The Single Convention has been criticised for ignoring 
the demand side of the problem, i.e. the drug addicts. This weakness was partly rectified 
with the 1972 Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (hereafter 
the 1972 Protocol), which not only sought to strengthen efforts to prevent illicit produc­
tion but also highlighted the need for treatment and rehabilitation of drug addicts 
(Bassiouni and Thony 1999,921).
The second pillar of the UN drugs treaty framework is the Convention on Psychotropic 
Substances. This convention mainly expands the goals and strategies set up in the 1961 
Convention to cover thirty-two synthetic substances with psychoactive effect, such as 
amphetamine-type stimulants, sedative-hypnotics, tranquilisers, and hallucinogens. 
This expansion was a reaction to the growing abuse of this type of substances in the 
1960s, most prominently of LSD. 175 States have become party to the Convention on 
Psychotropic Substances after its adoption in 1971.
The third and final cornerstone of the UN’s anti-drug policy is the Convention against 
the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Vienna Convention or 
1988 Drug Convention) of 1988. This convention will be discussed in greater detail be­
low.
In addition to the multilateral agreements of the UN a great number of regional and bi­
lateral agreements have been set up to strengthen international drug control. Because of 
this tight net of drug control policies this issue area has been described as the ‘flagship of 
transnational law enforcement’ (Bewley-Taylor 1999,; Rolley 1992).
4.1.3 The 1988 UN Convention against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psy­
chotropic Substances
The third and most recently established pillar of the UN drug control regime is the Con­
vention against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. It was 
adopted on 19 December 1988 in Vienna and signed by forty-four states on the following
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day. Since the opening for signature, a total of 170 states have ratified the Vienna Con­
vention, with Laos to become the most recent party to the convention in December 2004 
(UNODC 2005a). With 170 parties as of June 2005, the convention is among the inter­
national treaties with the most extended membership base.
As the name of this convention suggest, it is primarily focused on trafficking. The Vienna 
convention presents a first corrective step away from the UN’s traditional emphasise on 
the supply side of the problem and follows a General Assembly call for greater attention 
to the ‘various aspects of the [drug] problem as a whole, and in particular, those not en­
visaged in existing international instruments’ (A/RES/39/141 of 14 December 1984). 
Robin Rolley notes that the Vienna convention presents a ‘significant improvement over 
previous treaties’ (1992, 4i8f.), resulting from its broader perspective, from the level of 
support the convention received during its drafting stage and from the strengthening of 
enforcement measures. The convention seeks to enhance international cooperation 
against illicit drug trafficking in three ways. The Vienna Convention seeks first to har­
monise the definition and scope of drug offences; second to improve and strengthen in­
ternational cooperation and coordination among the relevant authorities, such as cus­
toms and police agencies, and judicial bodies; and finally to provide the relevant authori­
ties with the legal means effectively to interdict illicit trafficking (Bassiouni and Thony 
1999, 922). The substantively most important articles of the 34 article-long treaty, are 
articles 3 and 5, 6, and 7, which regard the following four legal matters: offence and 
sanctions, confiscation, extradition, and mutual legal assistance (Rolley 1992).
Article 3 of the Vienna Convention obliges signatories to criminalise under their domes­
tic law a list of offences, should these offences be committed internationally. These of­
fences include the production, transport, delivery and sale of narcotic drugs and psycho­
tropic substances contrary to the Single Convention and its amending protocol and the 
1971 Drug Convention. Article 3 also lists a number of offences that are to be criminal­
ised but subject to the signatory’s constitutional principles and basic concepts of its legal 
system. These offences include the possession of equipment or materials or substances
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that are to be used for the illicit production of narcotic drugs (paragraph l letter c ii) and 
the possession of narcotic drugs for personal consumption (paragraph 2). Article 3 also 
requires parties to make anybody who commits any of the listed offences liable to sanc­
tions, whereby treatment and rehabilitation measures may be adopted as alternatives to 
conviction and punishment in relation to certain offences. The overall goal of article 3 is 
thus to level out existing differences between legal systems. This is of great importance, 
as extradition usually requires that the offence for which a state asks another state to ex­
tradite a suspected person also constitutes an offence under the law of the state under 
the jurisdiction of which that person is at the time of that request.
The confiscation measures spelled out in article 5 of the Vienna Convention are path- 
breaking, as they present the first steps towards the logic of ‘taking profits out of drug- 
related crimes’ and thus towards the establishment of an international anti-money laun­
dering regime. These provisions will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.
Article 6 of the 1988 Drugs Convention seeks to establish all offences listed under article 
3 as extraditable offences, while article 7 asks signatories to provide one another with the 
‘widest measure of mutual legal assistance in investigations, prosecutions and judicial 
proceedings in  relation to criminal offences established in’ the treaty.
Several commentators have compared the 1988 Drug Convention with other interna­
tional agreements and reached the conclusion that the Vienna Convention imposes ‘rela­
tively extensive obligations to provide mutual legal assistance’ (Donnelly 1992, 291), 
‘contains the most comprehensive provisions for international penal cooperation’ 
(Bassiouni and Thony 1999, 927), and represents ‘significant progress in establishing an 
international system of control over narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances’ (Rolley 
1992,425)-
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4*2 Problem constellation
The above discussion introduced the drug phenomenon and how it affects different 
states in veiy different ways. It the also provided a brief overview of international initia­
tives launched to tackle the problems associated with illicit drugs, and a more detailed 
account of the 1988 Drugs Convention. The grounds are now prepared to move to the fo­
cused analysis of the specific hazards international cooperation against the trafficking in 
illicit drugs is confronted with. This second subchapter examines the underlying prob­
lem constellation based on the three transaction cost economics variables introduced in 
chapter 3—namely asset specificity, behavioural uncertainty and environmental uncer­
tainty. This assessment will find high levels of both asset specificity and behavioural un­
certainty and only low levels of environmental uncertainty being associated with inter­
national anti-drugs cooperation. Consequently, an international institution established 
to deal with this problem can be expected to be best equipped to cater for the specific co­
operative hazards when incorporating high levels of legalisation.
4.2.1 Asset specificity
As developed above, asset specificity refers to investments parties make into a coopera­
tive undertaking but which substantially lose their value in case the cooperation breaks 
down. In the context of international relations, asset specificity involves two elements: 
first, the likelihood that a cooperative project collapses due to widespread shirking, and 
second, the damage such a breakdown causes to cooperating parties. Both elements de­
pend on the costs and benefits that result for states from a given cooperative project,
here the 1988 Drugs Convention, whereby both costs and benefits can differ from state
to state. The qualitative analysis of the asset specificity resulting from the implementa­
tion of the Vienna Convention takes as a baseline the costs and benefits that would occur 
if all parties implemented the Convention full-heartedly. The examination of the first 
TCE variable starts with an analysis of the costs followed by one of the benefits, and con­
cludes by combining the two in order to assess the risk of shirking and the potential 
damage such behaviour would cause to other participating states.
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4.2.1.1 Costs
The following cost analysis distinguishes between costs that arise for states directly from 
implementing the requirements spelled out in the Vienna Convention and indirect costs 
of economic or political nature, which can be seen as unintended side-effects of those 
policy measures.
• Direct costs
The Vienna Convention was largely compatible with pre-existing legal systems in North 
America and Western Europe, thus requiring only minor changes in the legislation of 
these countries (Bentham 1998, ; Donnelly 1992). But for a number of other countries 
the convention meant that they had to adjust their narcotics policies to the higher stan­
dards prevailing in such states as the United States (Bewley-Taylor 1999). One aspect of 
these Tngher standards’ is the amount of government revenues assigned for law en­
forcement. The US government, for example, dedicates approximately 0.22 percent of 
the country’s GDP (European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction 2003) 
for its war on drugs, which is considerably more than any other state does. Almost ten 
percent of the total US anti-drug budget is spent on international programmes, first and 
foremost on interdiction in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia (Fuller 1996). Not surprisingly 
given the high level of public spending of the US on anti-drugs policies, one of the main 
motives behind the United States’ strong promotion of the Vienna Convention was 
therefore to ease its own regulatory burden by urging other states, in particular raw- 
material producing and transhipment countries, to increase their efforts to combat ille­
gal drugs (McAllister 2000). In some countries, like Colombia, the adoption of the Vi­
enna Convention was indeed followed by a significant increase in public anti-drug ex­
penditures after the adoption of the convention. Lopez estimates that Colombia’s anti­
drug expenditures rose from 0.6 percent of total public expenditures in the 1980s to 1.5 
percent in 1993 (cited in Thoumi 2003, 195). Levels of public spending on anti-drug 
policies remain, however, disparate, with the average EU country spending approxi­
mately 0.05 percent of its GDP on drug-related policies—relative to its GDP less than a
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fourth of the US expenditures (European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addic­
tion 2003).
• Indirect costs
The through implementation of the Vienna Convention also resulted in indirect costs, 
mainly of social, economic, and political nature. As the following discussion will show, 
these costs can be considerable—especially for drug-producing countries.
Social costs can arise from the prohibitionist orientation of the Vienna Convention. The 
prohibition on personal drug use as stipulated in article 3 paragraph 2 clashed with the 
traditional socio-cultural use of opium in countries like Laos, Myanmar and India, of 
coca in Andean region and of cannabis in the Horn of Africa and other parts of the world 
(McAllister 2000). In these countries, the consumption of drugs was not seen as a prob­
lem but is part of the normal social life people enjoy, comparable to the public attitude 
towards the moderate consumption of alcohol in Western countries. For instance, a pub­
lic opinion survey conducted in Bolivia in 1994 indicated that 72.6 percent of the popula­
tion were in favour of a depenalisation of coca (Atkins 1997). However, the social costs 
resulting from diverging attitudes towards the consumption of plant-based drugs was 
slightly mitigated by the recognition that some traditional forms of consumption might 
be licit in countries where there is historic evidence of such use (article 14).
More important than the social costs are the economic costs some countries face from 
prosecuting the cultivation opium poppy, coca bush or cannabis plant as demanded by 
article 3 paragraph 1 (a i). In a handful of countries the illicit drug sector provides an 
important source of income and employment, in particular to its socially marginalised 
segments. These economic benefits are derived from the double fact that the cultivation 
of narcotic plants is possible in very unfavourable conditions and that no other crop is
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financially as rewarding3°. According to Bewley-Taylor (1999), the gross income gener­
ated by a coca grower in Peru’s Upper Huallaga Valley exceeded the income of a coffee 
producer by a factor of ten and that of a rice farmer even by a factor of 21. Several stud­
ies have assessed the profitability of coca farming in Bolivia’s Chopare region and esti­
mated that it is between four to nineteen times more profitable than the next most prof­
itable crop (Atkins 1997). For some poor countries, like Afghanistan and Bolivia, the cul­
tivation of opium poppies and coca bushes respectively presents one of the rare cases 
where they enjoy an absolute competitive advantage in the world market. The opium 
yields are more than three times higher in Afghanistan than in South-East Asia (UNODC 
2004b) (45 kg/ha compared to 14 kg/ha), and nowhere is the concentration of the psy­
choactive substance alkaloid higher than in coca grown in the Chapare (Clutterbuck 
1 9 9 5 )- Consequently, opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan and coca cultivation in Bo­
livia form strong pillars of the national economy. According to the UNODC World Drug 
Report of 2005, almost ten percent of the Afghan population are believed to have been 
involved in the cultivation of opium poppy in 2004—a sector that is estimated to have 
generated an aggregate income of approximately US$600 million in 2004, or an equiva­
lent of 13 percent of the country’s GDP (down from 22 percent in 2003). According to es­
timates of the National Crime Intelligence Service of the United Kingdom (cited in Kopp 
2003), the production and trafficking of coca accounted for 6 to 19 percent of Bolivia’s 
gross domestic product in the peak years of the early 1980s, and still around 2 percent of 
its GDP in 2003 (UNODC 2004b). At the same time, the drug industry also employed 
between 6.7 and 13.5 percent of the country’s work force (Thoumi 2003,154) and gener­
ated half of the country’s inflow of foreign exchange. In Colombia, the drug industry 
generated 7 percent of the country’s GDP at the industry’s apex in the mid-1980s and 
still accounts for 2.5 percent of GDP (UNODC 2004b). In Morocco, the cultivation of 
cannabis herb and extraction of cannabis resin presents an important source of liveli­
hood for almost 100,000 farm households (UNODC 2005c). The rigorous implementa­
tion of the 1988 Drug Convention’s call to eradicate the cultivation of opium poppy, coca
3° Although a significant share of the profit margin results from the illicit status of the product.
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bush and cannabis herb and to prosecute those involved in the production and traffick­
ing of the derived drugs would therefore result in severe economic consequences in these 
countries.
The undermining of this important economic pillar could have important political con­
sequences, either in the form of foregone benefits or direct negative consequences. For 
instance, Bolivia’s most senior drug lord, Roberto Suarez Gomez, reportedly offered the 
government to pay off two-thirds of the country’s foreign debts of approximately US$3 
billion at the time in exchange for legal impunity (Malamud-Goti 1992)—an offer the Bo­
livian government under heavy pressure from the United States had to decline. Fur­
thermore, the implementation of a highly effective eradication campaign in the late 
1990s contributed to an economic slowdown in Bolivia and fermented social discontent, 
which culminated in the overthrow of the country’s pro-American president Gonzalo 
Sanchez de Lozada in 2003 (Felbab-Brown 2004, ; The Economist 2005). It is feared 
that a full-fletched eradication programme could have a similarly destabilising effect in 
Afghanistan. For instance, John Walsh, of the Washington Office on Latin America, a 
think-tank, concludes that ‘[i]f the Karzai government leads with a punitive approach 
like eradication before there are alternative livelihoods in place, that is a political disas­
ter’ (quoted in Webb-Vidal 2005,10).
Finally, some states feared that international anti-drugs cooperation as envisaged by the 
Vienna Convention would result in significant political costs in the form of a loss in sov­
ereignty. Especially Latin American states were wary that the US would misuse the Con­
vention as a legitimisation of its interference in their domestic political life. This scepti­
cism was based on the long and—as many Latin Americans would argue—infamous his­
tory the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and—to a lesser extent—the Cen­
tral Intelligence Agency (CIA) have in the unilateral extraterritorial enforcement of US 
drug laws. One such incidence was the kidnapping of the Mexican national Dr Humberto 
Alvarez Machain on Mexican soil by the DEA in 1990s, an act which was motivated by 
US suspicion that Alvarez Machain was implicated in the murder of a DEA agent in 1988
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(Smith 1995). Against this background, Maria Celia Toro argues that, from a Latin 
American perspective, the encroachment of US law enforcement agents ‘represents as 
important a threat as losing the war against the traffickers themselves. It represents the 
loss of state control’ (quoted in Smith 1992,248).
To conclude, the indirect economic and political costs major drug producing states face 
as a result of the 1988 Convention can be assessed to be very significant and of greater 
importance than the direct costs of implementation.
4.2.1.2 Benefits
The benefits a country can derive from an effective global anti-drug regime depends on 
the degree to which it suffers under negative consequences of drug abuse and under 
drug-related violence, both of which vary significantly across countries.
Among the states with the highest prevalence of drug addiction—measured as the per­
centage of the population aged 15-64 abusing either opiates or cocaine—are the United 
States (3.1 percent), Spain (3.1 percent), Ireland (3.0), United Kingdom (2.8) and Iran 
(2.8) (UNODC 2004b). In contrast, low prevalence rates in cocaine and opiates are 
found in many African countries (e.g. Kenya, Namibia, Chad all around 0.2 percent), and 
some micro-states in West Europe (e.g. Liechtenstein (0.13 percent), San Marino (0.06 
percent), Monaco (0.11 percent)). States with high prevalence rates place great hopes in 
international anti-drug cooperation as promoted by the Vienna Convention, since meas­
ures targeted against production and trafficking are expected to translate into a reduc­
tion in consumption.
Also the extent to which states suffer under drug-related violence varies considerably. 
The Colombian drug industry plays an important role in the ongoing conflict between 
the government, FARC and AUC—both in terms of providing funding and motivation for 
the rebel group and the paramilitaries (Felbab-Brown 2004). In contrast, the drug sector
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in Bolivia, Afghanistan, Laos and Morocco is not found to be major source of conflict and 
violence.
4.2.1.3 Comparison o f costs and benefits
This discussion of the cost and benefit structure allows for a distinction of four catego­
ries of countries.
Countries where the benefits of an effective global anti-drug regime outweigh the costs 
they incur from implementing the Convention form a first category. The United States, 
Spain and Irelands1 can be seen as examples of this category, as these countries are all 
culturally opposed t  the use of narcotic drugs, and all experience a high prevalence rate 
of problem drug users. At the same time, they do not derive a significant portion of their 
domestic product from the production and trafficking of illicit drugs. For these states, it 
is particularly important that compliance with the Vienna Convention is as high as pos­
sible since this allows them to shift part of their burden to drug-producing countries.
In contrast to this first category of states, countries like Afghanistan, Bolivia, Myanmar 
and Morocco form a second group, which faces high costs—mainly indirectly in the form 
of a loss in income and employment—from a rigours implementation of the 1988 Drug 
Convention. These costs are not offset by benefits they can expect to derive from the 
Convention, as they do not suffer under widespread drug abuse nor under drug-related 
violence.
The two remaining group of states take the middle ground, as the costs from implement­
ing the Vienna Convention roughly equal the benefits they derive from a functioning 
agreement. Category three comprises states like Finland, which enjoy low rates of nar­
cotic drug abuse and which have no economic stakes in the production or trafficking of 
these drugs. The final category is formed by states which suffer severely under drug
31 In all of these three countries, the prevalence of opiates and cocaine abuse among the population aged 15-64 years 
of age is over three percent (see also estimates in the same range presented in Thoumi 2003, i53f.)-
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abuse or drug-related crime but simultaneously benefit economically from the drug in­
dustry, as it is the case with Colombia and Mexico.
Figure 4.2 illustrates the position of these four categories of states in the cost-benefit 
diagram.
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*****
The above argumentation shows that the trade in illicit drugs affects different countries 
in very different ways. The distribution of the effects is very asymmetric, as some coun­
tries benefit from an effective international anti-drug institution, while others bear high 
costs. This creates strong incentives for the latter to shirk from the obligations created by 
the Vienna Convention, while the former are eager to prevent shirking as this would un­
dermine the important benefits they expect to derive from a thorough implementation of
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the Convention. As argued in chapter 3, this type of constellation calls for international 
agreements with a high level of legalisation, as only hard law can reduce the risk of 
shirking and thereby preserve the benefits some states expect to derive from the coop­
eration.
4.2.2 Behavioural uncertainty
The above discussion of asset specificity addressed the extent to which some states may 
have incentives to shirk from their obligations under the Vienna Convention and the 
damage such shirking would cause to others. The second transaction cost economics 
variable, behavioural uncertainty, examines in contrast the extent to which states have 
the opportunity to shirk from their treaty obligations without being detected. As dis­
cussed in chapter 3, this second TCE variable can be broken down in three aspects: gov­
ernance incapacity, relative reliance on governmental monitoring and industry opacity. 
The following analysis will show that in the context of drug trafficking all three compo­
nents contribute to a high level of behavioural uncertainty associated with international 
anti-drugs cooperation.
• Governance incapacity
This first element of behavioural uncertainty refers to the extent to which the success of 
an international agreement depends on the full cooperation of states with only weak 
governance capacities. The focus is hereby on inadvertent non-compliance rather than 
wilful non-compliance, which was already covered above.
Based on the World Bank’s governance indicators dataset, we find that many of the key 
producers of narcotic drugs have difficulties in establishing the rule of law throughout 
their jurisdiction. All of the key states with respect to the production and trafficking in 
heroin and cocaine are below the median in terms of the perceived effectiveness and 
predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. Bolivia, Colombia,
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Mexico, Pakistan and Peru all fall within the third best—or second worst—quartile of the 
distribution. Afghanistan, Myanmar and Laos even belong to the bottom decile.
This inability to impose the rule of law in general also affects these states’ ability to effec­
tively implement anti-drug policies. Consequently, the behavioural uncertainty stem­
ming from governance incapacity can be considered as high in the case of international 
anti-drugs cooperation.
• Relative reliance on governmental monitoring
An important element in revealing states’ insufficient compliance with an international 
agreement is the independent monitoring by private actors—either as individuals or as 
collectives. For instance, complaints by victims have proven to be a powerful tool in ex­
posing human rights violations by states. In the case of drugs, this mechanism is much 
less effective, as the primary victims, i.e. the drug addicts, have no immediate incentives 
to expose their state’s lax attitude towards the implementation of anti-drug policies. On 
the contrary, they benefit from less harassment by law enforcement bodies and lower 
street-level prices of drugs. Non-governmental organisations have established effective 
mechanisms to detect and expose non-compliance with international agreements cover­
ing a wide range of issues, as for instance Greenpeace on illicit whaling. With respect to 
narcotic drugs, NGOs are playing a much smaller role in the monitoring of compliance 
with the relevant agreements. This relatively weak role of NGOs maybe attributed to the 
fact many NGOs are critical of the criminalisation approach enshrined by the UN anti­
drugs regime, therefore not keen on denouncing one state’s incomplete compliance with 
a convention. While the export industry has a strong incentive to monitor the compli­
ance of other states with their free-trade obligations under the WTO and to lobby their 
governments to take actions against a non-complying state, the illicit drugs industry has 
no incentive to expose non-compliance as it only benefits from a state’s laxity in anti­
drugs matters. As private actors play a negligible role in the monitoring of states’ anti­
drug efforts, international cooperation on this issue has to rely strongly on self-reporting
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by states, which increases the risk of surreptitious shirking and thus of behavioural un­
certainty.
• Industry opacity
The third and final component of behavioural uncertainty is industry opacity, or the ex­
tent to which the industry that is to be regulated—here the production and trafficking in 
narcotic drugs—is based on well-documented, transparent procedures. Unlike the case 
of money laundering which will be examined in the next chapter where the key sector— 
i.e. banks—are legal and subject to heavy government regulation and supervision, the 
production of and trafficking in narcotic drugs is largely illegal. As a consequence, it can 
only exist thanks to a high degree of opacity and invisibility it has learned to develop. In­
dustry opacity and consequently the behavioural uncertainty stemming from it is high 
with respect to narcotic drugs.
In sum, this analysis has revealed that it is relatively easy for states to disguise the fact 
that they are taking insufficient action against the production, trafficking and consump­
tion of drugs. Consequently, states that would benefit from a well-functioning interna­
tional anti-drugs institution will therefore want to endow this institution with high levels 
of legalisation, in particular with well-developed monitoring mechanisms, in order to 
expose and sanction non-compliance.
4.2.3 Environmental uncertainty
Environmental uncertainty as defined in chapter 3 refers to two separate aspects: first, 
the experience policy-makers can build upon when drafting a new international agree­
ment and, second, the dynamism in and the innovativeness of the targeted criminal ac­
tivity. These two aspects will be analysed in the following with respect to the 1988 Drugs 
Convention. In sum, the argument will show that the environmental uncertainty with in­
ternational efforts to fight the illicit drug trade is low, as the novelty of the policy issue 
and the innovativeness of the problem are both relatively low.
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4-2.3-1 Novelty o f policy issue
Policy makers faced low levels of environmental uncertainty stemming from the first 
source when drafting the 1988 Drug Convention. As elaborated above, the international 
community had started to gain experience with international drug control from as early 
on as 1909, when the Shanghai Conference launched a century of ever-expanding and in­
tensifying international cooperation in this field. In particular, the 1988 Drug Conven­
tion built directly on the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, the 1972 Protocol 
amending the Single Convention, the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and 
the Comprehensive Multidisciplinary Outline of 1987. The environmental uncertainty 
stemming from insufficient experience in dealing with the problem was thus very low for 
the drafters of the Vienna Convention.
4.2.3.2 Innovativeness o f criminal field
Environmental uncertainty can also result from innovativeness in the targeted criminal 
activity and can come in the form of product innovation and process innovation. 
Whereas the former remains rather low in the case of narcotic drugs, the latter reaches 
moderate levels. Taken together, these subcomponents lead to an overall low degree of 
environmental uncertainty associated with global anti-drugs policies.
• Product innovation
At least for the time being, product innovation—the first component of innovativeness— 
does not appear to be an acute problem with respect to narcotics, since all major drugs 
consumed at the time of the drafting of the Vienna Convention (and still today) had been 
developed several decades ago. Cocaine and heroin were both developed in the 19th cen­
tury (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000,362), while LSD was discovered in 1938, and today’s 
‘party drug’ ecstasy (Methylenedioxymethamphetamine or MDMA) in the 1960s (Clut- 
terbuck 1995, 94). One other form of product innovation often referred to is the breeding 
of cannabis varieties with significantly increased potency resulting from higher concen­
trations of the plant’s psychoactive substance THC (terahydrocannabinol). For instance,
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John Walters (2002), the head of the US Office of National Drug Control Policy, warned 
parents against the marijuana misuse of their children, claiming that ‘today's marijuana 
is different from that of a generation ago, with potency levels 10 to 20 times stronger 
than the marijuana with which they were familiar’. The UNODC confirms this trend to­
wards a higher THC content both for the US, Canada and the Netherlands, although not 
to the extent Walters was referring to (UNODC 2005c). According to figures compiled by 
the University of Mississippi under the Cannabis Potency Monitoring Project Report, the 
average THC content rose from less than 2 percent in the 1970s to 6.3 percent in 2003 
(referred to in UNODC 2005c).
Overall, it is, however, not so much the types of illicit drugs that have changed over time 
but rather their relative popularity among consumers. For instance, whereas the abuse 
of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) was quite popular in the 1960s, especially in the 
United States, the consumption of this hallucinogen is now stabilised at a very low level. 
Overall, product innovation can be considered to be low.
• Process innovation
Process innovation, the second component of innovativeness, relates to the measures 
undertaken by drug criminals in order to avoid the detection and disruption of their 
business. The drug industry is characterised by six types of process innovation: (1) diver­
sification into other narcotics, (2) strategies to conceal cultivation, (3) diversion into new 
places of cultivation and processing, (4) diversion of trafficking routes, (5) development 
of new smuggling techniques, and (6) establishment of novel distribution channels.
In addition to the development of new types of psychoactive substances discussed above, 
drug producers may also seek to diversify their ‘portfolio’ by taking onboard established 
narcotics but which they have not themselves produced before. Such a development has 
been witnessed in Colombia, where the cultivation of opium has mainly been a reaction 
to massive US-led coca eradication programmes. The viability of this strategy is, how­
ever, curtailed by the climatic conditions certain plant-based drugs (in particular coca
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bushes, to a lesser extent opium poppy) require. Coca plants are only grown in tropical 
climates, and the concentration of cocaine alkaloid—a substance found in some coca 
species from which cocaine is derived—is found to increase with the altitude at which 
coca plants are grown (US Department of Justice 1993), thus limiting the coca cultiva­
tion to a handful of Andean countries. Furthermore, coca plants cultivated from seed 
generally require between 12 and 24 months to reach a stage where their leaves can be 
harvested (US Department of Justice 1993), thus imposing a time-lag on a diversifica­
tion strategy.
Narcotics farmers also take refuge in a second type of process innovation: concealment 
of cultivation. It has been reported, for example, that a growing number of coca growers 
seek to conceal coca cultivation by interspersing other crop such as maize. This strategy 
is effective against air surveillance, but not against ground surveys.
Geographic displacement of cultivation areas is a third element of process innovation in 
illicit narcotics. The underlying idea is that whenever some states intensify their anti­
drug policies, the production of illicit drugs simply moves to states less committed to 
combating drugs. Bewley-Taylor (1999), for instance, establishes a link between the ef­
fective ban on opium cultivation by the Turkish government in 1972 and the increase in 
illegal poppy cultivation in Mexico. However, this so-called ‘balloon effect’ is not undis­
puted (Weitzman 2005). For example, the success of a recent eradication programme in 
Colombia was only partly offset by a moderate increase in Bolivia’s coca cultivation, with 
outputs there still remaining far below the peak reached a decade ago (The Economist 
2005). The displacement effect for the production of plant-based drugs is, like the diver­
sification strategy mentioned above, limited by climate requirements and time-lags.
A fourth element of process innovation is the development of new trafficking routes. 
McCoy and Block (1992) report, for instance, how the crack-down on the traditional traf­
ficking route Turkey-Marseilles-New York led to its break-up into more segments with 
an increased number of transhipment centres, thus making it more difficult to establish 
the link between the place of origin and the end-destination. Large scale drug trafficking
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can however only be diverted to places that possess sufficient transport infrastructure 
and sufficient legitimate interaction (tourism or trade) with the end-destination, as a 
strong increase in shipments would otherwise arise suspicion.
Fifth, process innovation occurs related to the smuggling methods employed, both with 
respect to the mode of transport chosen by the smugglers and the way they seek to con­
ceal illicit drugs. Whereas small private airplanes were the favoured mode of coca smug­
gling into the United States in the 1970s and 1980s, this strategy was largely abandoned 
following the implementation of the United States National Air Interdiction Strategy in 
1988 and substituted with ground transport via Mexico and shipping by sea (Block 
1992). One innovation in recent decades with respect to smuggling techniques has been 
the concealment of narcotics inside the body of the smuggler whereby he or she swallows 
the tightly sealed-off narcotics (Bentham 1998). Also with respect to maritime cargo 
concealment, drug traffickers have displayed a great deal of inventiveness. The Econo­
mist (2005) reported, for instance, a case in Peru where the police found 700kg of co­
caine stuffed inside frozen giant squid that was ready for export. In other cases drugs 
were concealed in legal exports of a variety of products, such as planks of weed, carrots 
and even votive candles.
A final source of process innovation lays in the misuse of technological advances for fa­
cilitating the trafficking of narcotics. The International Narcotics Control Board, for ex­
ample, warned that ‘there is a real danger that the benefits of new technologies might be 
seriously undermined by criminals for illicit gain’ (quoted in Capdevila 2002). The 
internet, in particular, seems to be prone to such misuse. British law enforcement au­
thorities have identified more than 1,000 websites set up to sell various types of narcot­
ics, including ecstasy, marijuana, cocaine, and heroin (Capdevila 2002).
Thus, producers face considerable difficulty diversifying into alternative types of narcot­
ics, concealing cultivation, or dislocating to new places of cultivation and processing, 
while traffickers are more innovative in choosing trafficking routes, in developing of new
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smuggling techniques, and in establishing novel distribution channels. In sum, process 
innovation is moderate.
* * * * *
Combining both sources of environmental uncertainty—policy experience and innova­
tiveness in the targeted criminal activity—we can reach the conclusion that this variable 
only attains low levels in the case of narcotic drugs. It is thus not a determining factor of 
the design deemed most appropriate in dealing with the problems arising from illicit 
drugs. Consequently, the level of environmental uncertainty associated with drug traf­
ficking does not require a ‘softening’ of the hard law suggested by the high levels of asset 
specificity and behavioural uncertainty as the optimal design solution.
4.2.4 In sum: institutional preferences based on problem structure
Summarising the above analysis of this study’s three explanatory variables—asset speci­
ficity, behavioural and environmental uncertainty—with respect to narcotic drugs, we 
find the first two to be of high degrees whereas the latter remains on a low level. Table
4.1 provides a summary of the assessment of the variables. The need for credibility 
therefore outweighs the need for flexibility, thus suggesting the adoption of hard law 
measures. The objective of the next sub-chapter is to assess the actual level of legalisa­
tion found in the 1988 Drug Convention and to compare it with the design expectations 
derived from the analysis presented in this chapter.
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Problem  attribute Level Argument
1. Asset specificity High
A. Potential loss High ■ Countries with high prevalence rate of drug abuse and/or drug-related 
violence hope that international institution will lead to tougher actions 
against production and trafficking by other states and will thereby re­
duce their own burden.
■ Countries suffering under high levels of drug-related violence that inter­
national institution will lead to tougher actions against production and 
trafficking by other states will reduce their burden.
B. Propensity to shirk High ■ Consumption of some banned drugs is a well established and socially ac­
cepted tradition in some countries.
■ Cultivation of plant-based narcotics is an important economic factor in 
some countries (income, employment, foreign exchange).
■ Thorough eradication programmes could lead to political upheaval 
and/or undermine peace negotiations with rebel groups linked to the 
drugs industry.
2. Behavioural un­
certainty
High
A. Governance inca­
pacity
High ■ Many key states in narcotics production and trafficking have only weak 
governance capacities and are unable make the rule of law prevail 
throughout their jurisdiction.
B. Relative reliance 
on governmental 
monitoring
High ■ Societal groups suffering from countries’ failure to properly implement 
an agreement to fight illicit drugs (i.e. drug addicts) are weakly organ­
ised and do not have direct incentives to serve as effective fire alarms.
■ NGOs play no important role in data collection and analysis.
C. Industry opacity High ■ Nature of the drugs industry requires clandestine operations and maxi­
mum opacity.
3. Environmental 
uncertainty
Low
A. Experience Low ■ The negative effects of the drugs trade on public health and crime rates 
are well accepted and understood.
■ Countries have been fighting illicit drugs for many centuries and have a 
good understanding of production, trafficking and distribution.
■ International cooperation in this area dates back to the wake of the 20th 
century.
B. Innovativeness 
a. Product innova­
tion
Low ■ The range of substances classified as illicit drugs has been known for 
several decades.
b. Process innova­
tion
Moderate ■ Drug producers cannot easily diversify into alternative types of narcot­
ics, conceal cultivation, or dislocate to new places of cultivation and 
processing.
■ Traffickers have a moderate degree of flexibility in choosing trafficking 
routes, in developing of new smuggling techniques, and in establishing 
novel distribution channels.
Table 4.1 Summary o f the assessm ent o f the constellation o f the problem  o f 
international illicit drugs production and trafficking.
4.3 Degree o f legalisation
The above application of transaction cost economics to the problem of illicit drugs trade 
allowed us to formulate expectations about the degree of legalisation of the Vienna Con­
vention, considered as best suited to cater for the specific contractual problems arising 
from this problem constellation. This final subchapter assesses the extent to which the 
actual design of the 1988 Drug Convention matches these design expectations. For this
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purpose, it analyses the convention based on its letter and practice. This analysis is 
guided by the three dimensions of legalisation—obligation, precision, and delegation- 
introduced in chapter 2. Each of these dimensions will be analysed in turn before the 
concluding part compares the expected with the actual design of the Vienna Convention.
4.3.1 Obligation
As elaborated in sub-chapter 2.2.1, the extent to which an international institution im­
poses obligations on states is determined by three criteria. Firstly, the degree of obliga­
tion created depends on whether the core agreement of the institution is legally or only 
politically binding. Secondly, the level of obligation of an international institution can be 
attenuated through provisions that allow states officially to modify and sidestep the obli­
gations they signed up for. Thirdly and finally, an international institution is considered 
to be more binding when it provides for procedures and remedies to deal with non- 
compliance. These three criteria will be analysed in greater detail with respect to the 
1988 Drug Convention. It will be shown that the level of obligation enshrined in the Vi­
enna Convention can be considered as high, as its legal bindingness and the tenacity of 
its obligations are high, while it features moderate compliance mechanisms.
4.3.1.1 Legal bindingness
Whether or not signatories intended to make an international agreement legally binding 
can be assessed based on two indicators: the language in which the agreement is formu­
lated and the procedural provisions that are or are not included in the agreement (entry 
into force, accession, withdrawal, etc.) and that are followed domestically for the agree­
ment to become effective.
The Vienna Convention was explicitly established to give legal force to the illicit traffick­
ing recommendations which had been formulated in the Comprehensive Multidiscipli­
nary Outline of Future Activities in Drug Abused Control (CMO) adopted at the Interna­
tional Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking held in Vienna in June 1987
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(Bentham 1998). It displays all the formal characteristics of a legally binding treaty. It 
uses language that suggests a legally binding character, exemplified by words such as 
‘shall’ and ‘obligations’. It incorporates provisions on accession, entry into force, proce­
dures for amending the convention, and denunciations which are absent in agreements 
that are not legally binding. Also the process through which signatories ratified the Con­
vention indicates their intent to enter into a legally binding treaty. In the United States, 
this meant to obtain the advice and consent of the Senate, which was granted on 22 No­
vember 1989. The 1988 Drug Convention has also been registered with the UN secre­
tariat and been published in the UN Treaty Series32. The convention thus displays all 
characteristics of a legally binding treaty.
4.3.1.2 Tenacity o f  obligation
Legally binding international agreements often incorporate provisions allowing parties 
to modify and weaken their commitments. Three such mechanisms exist: reservations, 
safeguard and escape clauses and withdrawal. All three instruments are relevant with re­
spect to the Vienna Convention but, as will be argued, on balance, they do not weaken 
substantially the high level of tenacity enshrined in the Vienna Convention.
• Reservations
Unlike other legally binding conventions, the 1988 Drug Convention does not specify 
any provisions limiting the submission of reservations. This means that the rather un­
specific article 19 letter c of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties applies, which 
stipulates that ‘a State may not submit a reservation which is incompatible with the ob­
ject and purpose of the treaty’. In contrast, several articles of the convention contain 
provisions that explicitly permit parties to declare their intention not to be bound by 
some provisions. For instance, article 32 regarding the settlement of disputes between 
parties stipulates in paragraph 2 that any dispute that parties fail to solve peacefully on
32 The Vienna Convention was filed as Treaty Doc. No. 101-4 (1989).
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their own shall be referred to the International Court of Justice. Paragraph 4 of that 
same article hollows out this obligation by explicitly allowing states to declare them­
selves not to be bound by article 32 paragraph 2. 34 of the total 172 parties have availed 
themselves of this opt-out. Such a disclaimer of the ICJ’s authority is, however, common 
practice and found in most international treaties. Also the United States negated the 
ICJ’s authority with a declaration presented with its ratification. Furthermore, the US 
deposited three reservations with respect to the Vienna Convention. In a first reservation 
the US emphasised the superiority of its constitution over the convention. In a second 
reservation the US avails itself of the option granted in article 6 paragraph 3 to make ex­
tradition to another party conditional on the existence of a bilateral extradition treaty in 
force with that party. Finally, the United States also emphasises its right under article 7 
to deny extradition requests which prejudice the country’s essential interests. Bolivia, for 
instance, formulated more far-reaching reservations when it declared ‘the inapplicability 
to Bolivia of those provisions of [article 3 paragraph 2] which could be interpreted as es­
tablishing as a criminal offence the use, consumption, possession, purchase or cultiva­
tion of the coca leaf for personal consumption’. In its reservations the country empha­
sises the long-standing traditional use of coca leaf in wide parts of the Bolivian society.
• Safeguard and escape clauses
Three articles of the Vienna Convention contain specific safeguard provisions, which re- 
lativise the degree of obligation established by these articles. Article 2 paragraph 2 stipu­
lates the inviolability of state sovereignty, and article 3 paragraph 2 letter c, article 3 
paragraph 1 letter c, paragraph 2 and paragraph 10 the primacy national legal systems. 
Also, article 7 paragraph 15 limits the degree of obligation of its mutual legal assistance 
provisions by allowing parties to refuse such assistance ‘if the requested Party considers 
that execution of the request is likely to prejudice its sovereignty, security, order public 
or other essential interests’. These safeguards are overall less far-reaching than found in 
most treaties.
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• Withdrawal
Finally, as an option of last resort, parties can withdraw from international agreements 
and demonstrate this way that they no longer consider themselves to be bound by the 
obligations spelled out in that agreement. Also the Vienna Convention allows for denun­
ciation but imposes heavier constraints on this option than do most international trea­
ties. The convention requires under article 30 the elapse of one year, a period much 
longer than stipulated by most other conventions, before the denunciation submitted by 
a party takes effect.
4.3.1.3 Compliance mechanisms
With respect to the final aspect of obligation—the procedures and remedies for non- 
compliance—two aspects stand out as particularly relevant. First, international agree­
ments that ensure that parties’ behaviour is closely monitored are considered to have a 
higher level of obligation than those that do not. Second, non-compliance needs not only 
to be detected but also to entail consequences for the fallible party. It will be shown that 
the Vienna Convention possesses moderately strong compliance mechanisms.
• Monitoring
The monitoring mechanism enshrined in the Vienna Convention is one based on states’ 
self-reporting. Article 20 paragraph 1 asks parties to provide the Commission on Nar­
cotic Drugs of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (Commission) in­
formation on the working of the Convention in their territories. In particular, states have 
to provide the Commission with the texts of laws and regulations promulgated in order 
to give effect to the convention and also with particulars of cases of illicit traffic within 
their jurisdiction, which they consider important because of new trends disclosed, the 
quantities involved, the sources from which the substances are obtained, or the methods 
employed by persons so engaged. Paragraph 2 gives the Commission the authority to
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outline the modalities of the provision of such information. This aspect will be discussed 
further under 4.3.3.
Thus, the Vienna Convention does establish a mechanism to monitor parties’ compliance 
with the convention. This mechanism is not particularly strong, as it relies exclusively on 
self-reporting.
• Sanctions
Brewley-Taylor (1999) notes that the 1988 Drug Convention strengthened the enforce­
ment mechanism established by the previous conventions. Article 22 of the Vienna Con­
vention authorises the independent International Narcotics Control Board to suggest 
remedial measures against non-compliance. However, it does not specify what such re­
medial measures could be and what the consequences are in case these measures are not 
adopted. The most likely consequence is that the Board may recommend other parties to 
cease their (legal) drug exports to the non-complying state.
More important than material sanctions are in the context of the Vienna Convention the 
reputational cost associated with non-compliance. Bewley-Taylor argues that the reputa­
tional costs are particularly high in this policy area as the UN drug-control bodies enjoy 
the ‘image of a benevolent movement whose mission it is to safeguard the well-being of 
all humankind’ (1999, 172 emphasis in original), thus conferring upon them and their 
decisions and recommendations ‘substantial moral influence and suasion’. In this re­
spect, the UN anti-narcotics framework as established by the Vienna Convention repre­
sents what Donnelly (1992) referred to as a ‘promotional regime’. However, the UN bod­
ies’ role in enforcing the international drug control regime goes beyond the promotion of 
international norms through public information, at least in an indirect, yet important, 
way.
In addition—and not established by the Vienna Convention—non-compliance with it 
gives rise to unilateral sanctions imposed by the United States. Pursuant to the Anti-
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Drug Abuse Act of 1988, the US president is required to certify whether the world's ma­
jor drug-producing and -transit countries are cooperating fully with the United States, or 
taking adequate steps on their own, to meet the goals and objectives established by in 
the 1988 Drug Convention. If a country is found wanting in its anti-drug efforts and ‘de­
certified’, it sees half of the assistance it receives from the US government being with­
held until it meets the conditions necessary to be re-certified. Furthermore, decertifica­
tion provokes the veto of the US representatives to international financial institutions 
against any loans the declassified country requests (Atkins 1997), and the cessation of 
previously agreed preferential tariff treatment (Perl 1992). This policy has provoked 
widespread international criticism not at least because the (de)certification decision is 
based as much on technical as on political considerations, whereby the latter come pri­
marily in the form of an often invoked national interest waiver.
For this reason Brewley-Taylor reaches the conclusion that given ‘[t]he moral volunta­
rism of the UN ... combined with the unilateral pressure exerted by the Washington ..., 
the international regime becomes more coercive than promotional’ (1999,172).
*****
In sum, the Vienna Convention is of a legally binding nature, uses obligation-attenuating 
provisions only scarcely and establishes considerable mechanisms to detect and sanc­
tions non-compliance. It thus establishes a comparably high degree of obligation.
4.3.2 Precision
The second design dimension, precision, refers to two aspects: the determinacy and the 
coherence of an international agreement. In the following, these two elements will be 
analysed for the 1988 Drug Convention. This assessment reaches the conclusion that the 
degree of precision enshrined in the Vienna Convention is moderate, with both determi­
nacy and coherence being moderate.
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• Determinacy
Most of the Convention’s articles are formulated as ‘standard-like’ provisions (Abbott 
and Snidal 2000). While spelling out which acts should be criminalised and punished 
under domestic law, it grants states the discretion to determine the exact level of pun­
ishment for these offences. The Vienna Convention contains a number of ambiguous ex­
pressions such as ‘as it deems appropriate’ (article 21 letter d) but the overwhelming ma­
jority of articles are specific enough to distinguish clearly between compliance and non- 
compliance.
The term ‘appropriate’ is mentioned 30 times in the 95 paragraphs of the agreement ex­
cluding the preamble. For example, article 3 paragraph 4 letter c allows for exceptions 
‘in appropriate cases of a minor nature’, and article 12 calls upon states to ‘take the 
measures they deem appropriate to prevent diversion of substances’. In article 3 para­
graph 6, the Convention uses the form ‘shall endeavour to ensure’ instead of ‘shall en­
sure’, which gives the impression that signatories were not all too serious about creating 
clear-cut obligations. In article 11 paragraph 1 the Convention asks states to take meas­
ures ‘within their possibilities’, which indicates that different standards exist for differ­
ent countries, without specifying objective criteria to assess the capabilities of different 
signatories.
It will be of great relevance for the following section of this thesis that article 21 contains 
several unspecific terms. This article describes functions of the Commission, which ‘is 
authorised to consider all matters pertaining to the aims of this Convention...’. Letter c 
posits that the Commission ‘may call the attention of the Board to any matters which 
may be relevant to the functions of the Board’, while the Convention does not specify 
under which circumstances such a referral is deemed justified or desirable. According to 
letter d, ‘the Commission shall, on any matter referred to it by the Board under article 
22, paragraph 1 b), take such actions as it deems appropriate’, whereas the term appro­
priate is not further explained. Similar indeterminacies exist in article 22 which deals 
with the functions of the Board. Paragraph 1 letter a posits that ‘i f .... the Board has rea­
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son to believe that the aims of this Convention in matters related to its competence are 
not being met, the Board may invite a Party or parties to furnish any relevant informa­
tion’, or in letter b the Board ... may call upon the Party concerned to adopt such re­
medial measures as shall seem under the circumstances to be necessary for the execu­
tion of the provisions of article 12,13 and 16’.
However, the ambiguity of some parts of the agreement must not be over-emphasised. 
The 21 key terms used in the Convention are meticulously defined in article 1 and many 
articles spell out very precise obligations. For example, article 11 paragraph 10 letter a 
prescribes the type of information to be exchanged between states prior to the legal traf­
ficking of narcotic substances. Bassiouni and Thony highlight that ‘the 1988 Drug Con­
vention contains the most comprehensive provisions for international penal coopera­
tion. More particularly its provisions on extradition, mutual legal assistance, and money 
laundering are the most detailed of any other international criminal law convention’ 
(1999, 927). Bentham argues that ‘the legal definitions of drugs on the controlled sub­
stances list are often very narrow, both in order to enhance the strength of cases brought 
in the legal system, and in order not to unduly inhibit or discourage legitimate chemical 
and pharmacological research’ (1998,47).
• Coherence
Furthermore, the Convention in its entirety fulfils Franck’s (1990) criterion for coher­
ence, as its provisions relate to one another in a non-contradictory way, allowing for a 
coherent interpretation of an indefinite number of cases. The Convention, nonetheless, 
contains a few inconsistencies the cause of which is the desire of different states to in­
corporate their own interpretation of narcotics into the agreement. In article 3 para­
graph 4, for example, letter a asks for punishment of drug offenders, whereas letter c al­
lows for treatment and education. Letter a represents the view of those countries, which 
primarily view the criminal dimension of drug consumption, whereas letter c represent 
the view of certain European countries, which emphasise the public health side of the 
drugs problem.
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4 -3-3  Delegation
The overall degree of delegation incorporated in the 1988 Drug Convention is high. It 
does not create a new organisation to which it delegates tasks, but builds upon several 
anti-drug bodies that had previously been established within the UN framework, namely 
the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND), the UN Office for Drug Control and 
Crime Prevention (today called the Office on Drugs and Crime)33 and the International 
Narcotics Control Board. The Convention explicitly reaffirms the UN’s competence in 
the field of control of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances in its preamble and in­
creases the ‘administrative’ and ‘pohcy’ powers of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs 
and of International Narcotics Control Board, to an extent that they are now providing a 
‘basis for an eventual direct control system’ (Bassiouni and Thony 1999, 917). One im­
portant source of independence of the UN drug control bodies lies in their success in 
shaping its image as neutral and benevolent bodies safeguarding mankind from the dan­
ger posed by drugs (Bewley-Taylor 1999). Donnelly (1992) notes how the UN drug con­
trol bodies have managed to establish themselves as the core of a global ‘promotional re­
gime’ that promotes the globalisation of anti-drugs norms, thereby working quietly to­
wards the expansion of its own narcotic drug control programme. Delegation to UN drug 
control bodies delivers a good illustration of the ‘policy-bias’ creating effect of delegation 
mentioned in chapter 2, as it ‘played an important role in creating and perpetuating a 
US-style international drug control regime’ (Bewley-Taylor 1999, 170), which is pre­
dominantly prohibitionist in its orientation.
A general feature of the delegation within the UN anti-drugs regime is that, while sub­
stantial issue areas are delegated to the drugs control bodies, the exact competencies of 
these bodies are not precisely formulated in the relevant international agreements. This
33 The name was changed on 1 October 2002. The UNODC also incorporates the UN International Drug Control 
Programme (UNDCP) and administers the Fund of the UNDCP. To avoid unnecessary confusion this, study uses the 
current name of this administrative body.
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opens the door to a high level of delegation, as imprecise formulations give much room 
to these agencies to set their own agendas.
In the following, the degree of delegation to the three UN drug control bodies will be 
analysed, thereby distinguishing between centralisation, i.e. the scope of the activities 
delegated to each of these three bodies, and independence, i.e. these bodies’ autonomy in 
decision-making. It will be shown that, in sum, the UN bodies enjoy a high degree of in­
dependence and centralisation, and consequently the degree of delegation can be as­
sessed to be high.
• CND
The United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) was established as a func­
tional commission by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in 1946. It assumes 
the role of the legislative body (Bassiouni and Thony 1999) within the UN’s Drug Control 
framework which ‘analyses the world drug situation and develops proposals to 
strengthen the international drug control system to combat the world drug problem’ 
(UNODC 2004a). Article 21 of the Vienna Convention assigns the CND an important 
status, as it is not only mandated ‘to review the operation of this Convention’ Getter a) 
but also to ‘make suggestions and general recommendations’ Getter b). The CND’s inde­
pendence from the member states is not, however, full-fledged. On the one hand, the 
CND is a permanent institution and its fifty-three members are elected by the ECOSOC 
to serve in their personal capacity and not directly appointed by the member states as 
their representatives, which strengthens the CND’s independence. Furthermore, mem­
bers are appointed for a four-year term, a period long enough to allow for the emergence 
of an esprit de corp. On the other hand, the fact that members have to be selected so as 
to allow for an equitable geographical distribution among the major regions weakens the 
body’s independence, as it reduces the probability that the interests of specific regions 
are overruled. Also, the independence-enhancing aspect of a reasonably long term of of­
fice is mitigated by the fact that CND members meet only once a year.
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• UNODC
The Vienna-based Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) assumes the executive 
(Bassiouni and Thony 1999) function of the UN drug control system. Its mission is 
threefold. First, it strengthens the UN’s and the member states’ understanding of the 
drug problem through the compilation and analysis of statistics. It sends out reporting 
questionnaires to all parties and analyses and compiles their responses in the World 
Drug Report, which is published annually. Second, as part of its Legal Advisory Pro­
gramme, the UNODC assists states in the drafting of anti-drugs legislation and in the 
training of judicial officials. Finally, through its 21 field offices the UNODC provides 
field-based technical support to member states for projects such as alternative crop de­
velopment or illicit crop monitoring.
The UNODC enjoys a considerable degree of independence from member states. It pos­
sesses a permanent body of staff, comprising approximately 500 members worldwide, 
who are not delegated by member states but recruited through the UN. The UNODC also 
operates under the sole direction of a UN under-secretary general. The UNODC’s inde­
pendence is however potentially circumscribed by its direct reliance on voluntary finan­
cial contributions from governments, which account for approximately 90 per cent of its 
budget (UNODC 2004b, 3). The extent to which the UNODC’s independence is in prac­
tice limited through this financing mechanism depends on the relative importance of in­
dividual states’ contributions and on the extent to which large contributors use the 
threat of withholding their contributions as a tool for influencing the UNODC. The 
United States once reportedly threatened to avail itself of this tool, although not with re­
spect to the UNODC but the WHO’s Programme on Substance Abuse of the early 1990s. 
This programme commissioned the largest global study on cocaine ever conducted, 
which produced the controversial findings that the traditional consumption of coca leaf 
by the Andean population might serve positive functions. Following the release of this 
study, rumours circulated that the US had threatened to withdraw funding from this 
programme. No such incidents are, however, known with respect to the UNODC’s work.
150
• INCB
The most far-reaching delegation is found in the International Narcotics Control Board 
(INCB or Board). The INCB is a permanent and quasi-judicial control organ responsible 
for promoting government compliance with the UN drug conventions. It was established 
by the Single Convention in 1968, but already had predecessors under the LoN anti-drug 
conventions. The Vienna Convention reaffirms and expands the Board’s competences in 
articles 22 and 23. The Board plays a role both in the regulation of the licit manufacture 
and sale of drugs and in the fight against the illicit manufacturing and trafficking. With 
regard to the licit drugs industry, the Board endeavours to ensure that adequate supplies 
are available for medical and scientific uses, and that leakages from licit sources to illicit 
traffic do not occur. To this end, it administers an estimates system for narcotic drugs 
and a voluntary assessment system for psychotropic substances. In addition, the Board 
monitors international trade in drugs through the statistical returns system.
With respect to illicit manufacture and trafficking of drugs, the Board identifies where 
weaknesses in the national and international control systems exist and contributes to 
correcting the situation. Further, the Board is responsible for assessing chemicals used 
illicitly to manufacture drugs for possible international control. The Board also monitors 
government control over chemicals used in the illicit manufacture of drugs and assists 
them in preventing diversion of these chemicals into illicit traffic.
In this function, it is vested by article 22 of the Vienna Convention with the authority to 
invite parties, who are believed to reach insufficient compliance levels, to furnish addi­
tional information. Furthermore, it ‘may call upon the Party concerned to adopt such 
remedial measures as shall seem under the circumstances to be necessary’ (article 22 let­
ter b).
The Board enjoys an unusually high level of independence from member states. As in the 
case of the CND, the thirteen members of the INCB are elected by the ECOSOC. Unlike 
the CND members, all INCB members serve in their personal capacity and are elected in
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a secret ballot on the basis of their competence (Bassiouni and Thony 1999). The Board 
members are often recruited from academic and diplomatic circles. Three members are 
elected from a list of candidates put forward by the World Health Organisation and the 
remaining ten from a list nominated by governments. The INCB’s independence from 
member states was, for example, demonstrated in May 2001, when the most powerful 
party, the US, was voted off the Board. Also, the term of INCB members is one year 
longer than that of CND members. The independence of the Board is further strength­
ened through its financial independence from member states—it is funded by the UN 
budget—and its decision-making procedures, which only require a two-thirds majority 
(article 22 paragraph 4) and not consensus.
*****
Overall, the international anti-drug institution based on the Vienna Convention reaches 
comparably high levels of delegation, as the three UN bodies assigned with the imple­
mentation and further development of the drug control framework assume significant 
functions and enjoy considerable independence.
4.3.4 In sum: institutional design
The above discussion has shown the Vienna Convention as an example of hard law. The 
Convention’s level of obligation and delegation are high, while the level of precision is 
moderate. Table 4.2 summarises the key features of the Vienna Convention.
Indicator Level Argument
1. Obligation High
A. Legal bindingness
a. Language
b. Procedural provi­
sions
High
High
■ Agreement text uses language that suggests a legally binding charac­
ter, featuring forms such as ‘shall’ and ‘obligations’.
■ Agreement is registered under article 102 of the UN charter.
■ Agreement was subjected to domestic ratification procedures.
B. Tenacity of obliga­
tion
High ■ Agreement contains a moderate number of reservations, most of 
which are of moderate scope.
■ Agreement contains fewer escape clauses than comparable interna­
tional agreements.
■ Parties can withdraw from the agreement one year after denuncia­
tion.
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C. Compliance mecha­
nisms
a. Monitoring
b. Enforcement
Moderate
Moderate
■ States have to provide data requested by the Commission.
■ No third party monitoring enshrined in agreement.
■ Consequences for non-compliance are not spelled out in the agree­
ment.
■ High reputational costs can result from non-compliance.
■ Unilateral third party sanctioning not enshrined in text of the 
agreement but of great importance.
2. Precision Moderate
A. Determinacy Moderate ■ A moderate proportion of provisions leave room for interpretation, 
e.g. 30 out or 95 paragraphs contain the term ‘appropriate’.
■ Determinacy high compared to other international agreements.
B. Coherence High ■ Provisions relate to one another in a non-contradictory way.
■ Provisions do not contradict other principles or rules of interna­
tional law.
3. Delegation High
A. Independence
a. Human resources
b. Financial re­
sources
c. Decision making
High
Moderate
High
■ CND members elected by ECOSOC, not directly appointed by mem­
ber states, serving a four year term
■ UNODC staff recruited through the UN
■ Members of the INCB are experts, serving in their personal capacity 
and are elected by ECOSOC
■ UNODC relies on voluntary contributions of member states
■ INBC funded through UN budget
■ INBC decision-making procedures require a two-thirds majority, no 
member possesses veto power
■ Not all members represented in decision making bodies (CND 53 
members, INBC 13 members)
B. Centralisation
a. Rule making
b. Implementation
c. Dispute resolution 
and enforcement
High
High
Moderate
■ CND analyses the world drug situation and develops proposals for 
further development
■ Delegation of competency to anti-drug agencies substantial and not 
precisely formulated, providing room for agencies to set their own 
agenda
■ UODC provides field-based technical support to member states for 
projects such as alternative crop development or illicit crop moni­
toring
■ UNODC provides training and legal advise for states drafting anti­
drugs legislation
■ INCB invites parties, who are believed to reach insufficient compli­
ance levels, to furnish additional information.
■ INCB calls upon non-complying parties to adopt remedial meas­
ures, which it recommends
Table 4.2 Summary o f the assessm ent o f the degree o f legalisation o f the 
1988 Vienna Convention.
4 .4  Comparing expectations and reality
Sub-chapter 2 argued that the problems evolving around the production, trafficking and 
consumption of illicit drugs required an international policy response with high levels of 
legalisation in order to cater for the hazards arising from high levels of asset specificity 
and behavioural uncertainty. Some states are found to benefit significantly from an ef­
fective international anti-drugs institution while others have strong incentives to shirk 
from their obligation and many ways to conceal their non-compliance. The environ­
mental uncertainty of the problem is assessed to be low, as countries possess a great
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wealth of expertise in combating drugs, while the narcotics industry as a whole is not 
particularly innovative. Therefore, flexibility is not a major consideration so that the op­
timal design remains hard law as suggested by the first two TCE variables.
The actual institutional design incorporated in Vienna Convention matches this expecta­
tion we derived from the analysis of the underlying problem constellation. The agree­
ment shows a high level of obligation, which is obvious from the intentions of the signa­
tories reflected in the treaty’s language and the ratification procedure. The convention 
was also registered under article 102 of the UN Charter. Signatories have only limited 
opportunities to evade from the obligations imposed by the agreement, as few escape 
clauses exist and withdrawal is lengthy. While no sanctions are outlined in the agree­
ment itself, non-compliance is costly due to reputational costs and unilateral sanctions 
by the USA. Furthermore, the Vienna Convention has also a high level of precision and a 
high level of delegation. The convention draws upon three existing UN agencies to en­
sure compliance. These agencies have different, though in sum high level of centralisa­
tion and independence.
Thus, in case of the Vienna Convention, there is a strong match between the expected 
and the actual institutional design.
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5 Money Laundering: The Financial Action Task 
Force and its Forty Recommendations
This chapter engages with a phenomenon that first gained prominence primarily as a re­
sult of spreading disillusionment with the international war on drugs: money launder­
ing. Unknown as a legal concept until the 1980s, money laundering developed from ‘one 
of the buzz phrases of crime in the 1990s’ (Gold and Levi 1994, 7) into a veritable ‘roar’ 
in the 2000s (Beare 2001). The rise of money laundering reflects academics’ and poli­
cymakers’ growing interest in the financial factors motivating and facilitating crime and 
armed conflict (see next chapter). Great hope was raised that combating money launder­
ing could serve as an effective and possibly self-financing tool to tackle the trafficking in 
illicit drugs and other forms of serious crime. Given the transnational dimension of 
money laundering activities, policymakers soon realised that they could only succeed in 
combating this phenomenon when coordinating their efforts, resulting in an ever in­
creasing number of international agreements. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), 
which was specifically created for this purpose, has become the core player in what has 
developed into a global anti-money laundering regime. This chapter seeks to explain the 
institutional design of the Forty Recommendations issued by the FATF, based on the 
particular constellation underlying the money laundering phenomenon. As in the pre­
ceding case study, this analysis of the problem constellation will be guided by the three 
transaction cost economics variables: asset specificity, behavioural uncertainty and envi­
ronmental uncertainty. This analysis should allow us to generate expectations about the 
optimal institutional design to be enshrined in an international agreement established to 
tackle money laundering. However, the analysis of the problem constellation underlying 
money laundering presents us with an intriguing theoretical puzzle, as the two func­
tional attributes that are found to be the central drivers, namely asset specificity and en­
vironmental uncertainty, give rise to contradictory expectations. On the one hand, the 
high level of asset specificity associated with anti-money laundering cooperation re­
quires an agreement with strong credibility, and thus with high levels of legalisation. On
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the other hand, the many significant environmental uncertainties with which efforts to 
combat money laundering are plagued suggest highly flexible agreements with low levels 
of legalisation as the optimal solution. The scrutiny of the actual design of the Forty Rec­
ommendations as published by the Financial Action Task Force in 2003 allows us to see 
how policy makers have dealt with this contradiction. Before embarking on the analysis 
of the problem constellation and the Forty Recommendations, a brief tour d’horizon es­
tablishing the reasons why policymakers perceived money laundering as a problem that 
needed to be tackled and presenting the major international initiatives they launched for 
this purpose seems indispensable in order to position the theoretical analysis in its wider 
context. This task will be tackled in the next sub-chapter.
5.1 M oney laundering as an international policy problem
Prior to scrutinising money laundering from the functionalist perspective developed 
above, it is essential to understand the wider phenomenon. A first section therefore ad­
dresses the question why money laundering has been seen as a problem requiring and 
deserving international cooperation. The subsequent section provides an overview of the 
major international agreements that have been adopted for this purpose. The third sec­
tion finally introduces the FATF’s Forty Recommendations of 2003, which will be the fo­
cal point of the reminder of this chapter.
5.1.1 What is money laundering and why is it a problem?
Increasing professionalisation and diversification of organised crime over the last couple 
of decades has led to a surge in illicitly-acquired profits. As Stessens (2000) points out, 
the profits now exceed the levels necessary for reinvestment in criminal activities by far, 
thereby necessitating active financial management very much comparable to that of 
firms operating legally. Given the sheer volume of profits generated by the provision of 
illegal goods and services, organised crime groups find it increasingly difficult to use le­
gal savings and investment instruments without attracting the interest and suspicion of 
law enforcement agencies. For this reason, they developed mechanisms to convert illicit
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cash into other assets, whereby concealing the true ownership or source of the illegally 
acquired proceeds and creating the perception of legitimacy of source and ownership. 
These three elements—conversion, concealment and false legitimacy—form the quintes­
sence of money laundering (Beare and Schneider 1990, ; FATF 2003a, ; President's 
Commission on Organized Crime 2001). This transformation of dirty money into clean 
money necessitates the co-operation of third persons associated with licit business sec­
tors. The criminalisation of money laundering targets particularly this ‘soft belly’ of the 
laundering process (Sheptycki 2000,150) as it aims at ‘disrupting the co-operation pro­
vided by third persons in hiding the proceeds from crime and giving those proceeds a le­
gitimate appearance’3* (Stessens 2000, 6).
Estimates on the volume of money being laundered around the globe vary considerably. 
The number most commonly referred to is the one given by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) (Camdessus 1998). According to this source, aggregated money laundering 
flows account for two to five percent of the world’s gross domestic product, thus ranging 
between US$600 billion to US$1.5 trillion per year. The lower end of the estimates cir­
culating in the academic press and policy circles is US$500 billion (Schroeder 2001) 
whereas US$2.8 trillion per year mark the upper limit (Walker 1999). Two main reasons 
explain why these estimates span such a wide range. First, the clandestine nature of 
money laundering defies any systematic estimation of size (Reuter and Petrie 1999). 
Second, as will be discussed in greater detail below, the list of predicate35 offences asso­
ciated with the legal definition of money laundering is ever expanding, with the result 
that the distinction between licit and illicit finance, between organised crime, corporate 
crime and ordinary business (Sheptycki 2000,136) is increasingly blurred. The US gov­
ernment estimates that approximately two thirds of the laundered proceeds are related 
to drugs trafficking.
34 See also definition by Interpol (Interpol 2005).
as The Forty Recommendations apply to the laundering of the proceeds of a number of criminal activities, which are 
listed in the glossary of the Forty Recommendations. These criminal activities are called predicate offences.
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The monitoring of money laundering is becoming increasingly difficult. With the liber­
alisation of exchange controls in most advanced economies and growing economic inte­
gration, the world has witnessed an unprecedented surge in international capital flows. 
Capital outflows from the thirteen leading industrialised economies rose from US$52 
billion in the late 1970s to approximately US$677 billion in 1995, which equals an in­
crease of more than 1,200 percent. The explosion in foreign exchange transaction was 
similar, with an increase from US$600 billion per day in April 1989 to US$1.5 trillion 
per day in April 1998 (Council of Economic Advisors 2000, 205). This development has 
certainly been beneficial in terms of global economic growth. Simultaneously, however, 
it considerably impedes the monitoring of financial flows, as an increase in the overall 
volume of international transactions provides more opportunities for launderers to dis­
guise illegal funds (Quirk 1996,223f.).
Money launderers usually seek to conceal the true origin of the proceeds through a 
three-stage process (FATF 2003a, ; Zagaris 1992). During the first stage, the so-called 
placement stage, illicit cash proceeds are physically deposited into a bank account. Lar­
ger amounts of cash are often broken up into less conspicuous smaller sums. The pur­
pose of the subsequent layering stage is to disassociate the ‘dirty’ money from its source. 
Money launderers seek to achieve this through a complex series of financial transactions 
such as the wiring of funds through a globally scattered network of bank accounts or the 
purchasing and selling of investment instruments. Finally, the launderer integrates the 
processed funds and inserts them into the legitimate economy in the form of, for exam­
ple, investments in real estates, business ventures or luxury assets.
Money laundering is a transnational phenomenon, as dirty money is usually transferred 
across several borders throughout the three stages (FATF 2003a). The placement of the 
dirty money typically takes place in the same country where the illicit profits were gen­
erated. For the layering of the money, countries are selected that provide an adequate fi­
nancial infrastructure and great stability. The integration of the money may involve still 
another set of countries deemed to provide attractive investment opportunities in a sta­
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ble economic environment. This transnational dimension of money laundering is con­
firmed by law enforcement agencies which found that 80 percent of the money launder­
ing operations detected in Canada (Beare and Schneider 1990, 304) and 90 percent of 
those detected in Belgium (Stessens 2000, 90) transcended the national border. The 
most prominent case of money laundering, the now infamous Bank of Commerce and 
Credit International (BCCI) involved no less than thirty-two countries, including the Ba­
hamas and Cayman Islands, Canada, Colombia, Luxembourg, Nigeria the United Arab 
Emirates, the United States and the United Kingdom, in some money laundering opera­
tions (Robinson 1994, 276-290). The Antigua-based European Union Bank provides an­
other illustrative example in case. This shell bank was founded by two Russians and al­
legedly involved in the laundering of illicit proceeds of Russian organised crime groups. 
Misleadingly carrying the name of the European Union, the bank was officially licensed 
by the government of Antigua, but had no physical presence in that country. The bank 
mainly consisted of a computer server, which was located in Washington DC, and an op­
erator who was based in Canada (Blum et al. 1998). This single case involved no less 
than four countries, thus raising the difficult question of which jurisdiction is entitled to 
investigate and prosecute it.
The main goals governments seek to achieve with anti-laundering policies are twofold 
(Savona 1996). First, they consider the fight against money laundering as a strategy to 
combat crime by systematically confiscating its illicit proceeds and thus decreasing the 
financial incentives for engaging in criminal activities in the first place while also elimi­
nating the financial means necessary to launch new criminal operations. Furthermore, 
law enforcement agencies hope to increase the detection rate of criminal organisations 
by tracing back the mpney trail. Given the very questionable success of the global ‘war on 
drugs’, this hope was particularly high with respect to the narcotics trafficking business. 
It was also hoped that by seizing the proceeds of crime this form of law enforcement 
could eventually become self-financing.
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Second, governments seek to defend the transparency and integrity of the economic and 
financial system through anti-money laundering legislation. Legitimate money and in­
vestments cannot compete with the illicit sector, as the second is not subject to taxes and 
other forms of state control. Criminal money thus ‘pollutes and infects’ domestic and in­
ternational financial systems, ‘altering competition in the market place’ (Savona 1996, 
218). The particular challenge policymakers faced in their efforts to curb money launder­
ing was to pursue this goal without hampering the free capital flows which are seen as 
essential to international economic growth (Helleiner 2002). Some authors, however, 
question the importance of this second argument. Simmons (2000), for example, points 
out that financial institutions do not derive any immediate economic benefits from the 
implementation of tough anti-money laundering measures while incurring substantial 
costs from doing so.
Given the increasingly transnational nature of money laundering, governments soon re­
alised that they could only curb money laundering effectively through intensive interna­
tional cooperation, which led to the adoption of a number of international agreements 
dealing with this issue. The next section provides a brief overview of the most important 
international initiatives launched to ‘take profit out of crime’.
5.1.2 International initiatives dealing with money laundering
Money laundering is a rather recent legal concept, whose internationalisation is largely 
the result of a strong US-led campaign seeking to enlist law enforcement agencies from 
around the world for this new front against the narcotics industry (Sheptycki 2000, ; 
Simmons 2000,; Zagaris 1992). It was only in 1982, that money laundering was for the 
first time officially referred to in a court ruling on the confiscation of laundered Colom­
bian drug proceeds in the United States36 (see Stessens 2000, 83). First legal attempts to 
curb money laundering were undertaken in 1986 with the passage of the Money Laun­
36 United States v $4,255,625.39 (1982) 551F Supp 314.
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dering Control Act, which criminalised the knowing participation in the laundering of 
money. The Money Laundering Prosecution Improvement Act of 1988 intensified and 
internationalised the US government’s anti-money laundering efforts. Several provisions 
included on a last-minute basis at the behest of Senator John F. Kerry required the US 
government to undertake international negotiations aimed at expanding the access to in­
formation on cash transactions in US dollars wherever such transactions occurred 
worldwide. The Kerry Amendment provided the US president with the power to sanction 
recalcitrant and non-complying foreign banks by denying them access to the US finan­
cial market. However, this unilateral attempt to impose US currency transaction laws on 
foreign governments and to isolate those who were not complying was crowned with lit­
tle success (Simmons 2000, 249; Zagaris 1992, 22). Zagaris (1992, 22) reports that the 
unenthusiastic Department of Treasury only managed to finalise a transaction reporting 
agreement with Venezuela. But this threat to use extraterritorial legal authority worked 
as an effective ‘stick’ compelling other states into supporting the multilateral anti-money 
laundering initiatives launched by the US.
A first such US initiative as the inclusion of anti-money laundering provisions in the 
United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances of 1988, which has been discussed in length in the previous chapter. This 
Convention constituted the first binding multilateral agreement to criminalise money 
laundering and the knowing participation of third parties in such activities (article 3 
paragraph 1). The Vienna Convention addresses explicitly banking secrecy and stipulates 
that the reference to this principle should not justify a party’s refusal to trace, identify, 
seize, and freeze criminal proceeds upon request by another party (article 5 and 6). The 
Convention’s emphasis on law enforcement contrasts with the Basel Statement of Prin­
ciples for the Prevention of Criminal Use of the Banking System for the Purpose of 
Money Laundering3?, which was adopted only a few days prior to the Vienna Conven­
37 Reprinted in Gilmore (2005).
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tion, on 12 December 1988 by the then 12 members38 of the Basel Committee on Bank­
ing Regulations and Supervisory Practices. The primary concern of this statement was to 
minimise the negative consequences for banks, for example in the form of a sudden loss 
of public confidence (Stessens 2000, 16), potentially resulting from an infiltration with 
dirty money (Sheptycki 2000,150). The statement was deliberately formulated as a non­
binding agreement spelling out the ‘minimum standards for the quality of assets held in 
investment portfolios’ (Sheptycki 2000,150). It was drafted by representatives from the 
US Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Comptroller of 
the Currency upon the request of the Basel Committee (Zagaris 1992, 35T). The state­
ment is based upon four key principles: customer identification (‘know your customer’), 
compliance with domestic legislation, cooperation with law enforcement agencies, and 
information and training of banking staff so as to enable them to detect potential money 
laundering attempts. A special emphasis was later given to the first principle, which fi­
nally led to the adoption of a separate statement on Customer Due Diligence for Banks 
adopted in October 2001. The Basel Statement presents the first recognition by major 
banks worldwide of their responsibility in countering money laundering. It has also been 
endorsed by banking groups which are not members of the Basel Committee, such as the 
Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors, which consists of 19 members including major 
financial centres such as Hong Kong and Singapore, and other offshore financial centres 
such as Jersey, the Cayman Islands and Cyprus (Evans 1997a).
The negotiations in the run-up to the UN Drug Convention gave rise to the determina­
tion among some negotiators to go beyond the anti-money laundering measures stipu­
lated in the Vienna Convention (Zagaris 1992). The binding Council of Europe Conven­
tion on Laundering, Search, Seizure, and Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime of 1990 
(CoE Money Laundering Convention, CETS No. 141) is one such manifestation. The CoE 
Money Laundering Convention constitutes the first international binding agreement 
that focuses exclusively on money laundering (Stessens 2000, 23). It is also the first in-
38 G-7 plus Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland.
162
temational legal instrument to extend the crime of money laundering beyond drug- 
related cases and to include the proceeds of all ‘serious crime’ (Preamble) (Sheptycki 
2000, 150). Like the Vienna Convention, the CoE Money Laundering Convention con­
tains both substantive criminal law provisions, and mechanisms for international co­
operation in transnational cases of money laundering (Stessens 2000). In addition to the 
then 23 CoE member states, also Australia, Canada, Colombia and the United States par­
ticipated in the elaboration of this Convention. The Convention entered into force on 
September 1,1993, and has been ratified by a total of 47 states39 by October 2005. It was 
complemented by the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure, 
and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism (CETS 
No. 198), which was adopted on 16 May 2005 but has not entered into force at the time 
of writing.
The European Community also became active with respect to money laundering as it 
feared that money launderers could misuse the creation of a single financial market for 
their own purposes (Savona 1999). For this reason, the Council adopted the European 
Community Directive for the Prevention of the Use of the Financial System to Launder 
Suspect Funds (91/308/EEC) on June 10 1991. This Directive pursues three broad objec­
tives. First, it seeks to criminalise money laundering throughout the European Commu­
nity (article 2). It targets only proceeds derived from drug-related offences (as does the 
Vienna Convention), but encourages member states in the Preamble and in article 1 to 
extend the definition of money laundering offences so as to include the proceeds from 
other criminal activities. Second, articles 3 to 11 spell out a list of obligations of credit 
and financial institutions such as the Tmow your customer’-maxim, reporting of suspi­
cious transactions, and co-operation with law enforcement authorities. Third, the re­
maining articles (12-15) grant member states the right to amend the preceding provi­
sions in accordance with their domestic circumstances. The directive was amended and
39 Despite participating in the drafting of the Convention, Canada, Colombia and the US have not yet ratified the 
Convention.
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updated for a first time by directive 2001/97/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 4 December 2001. It has been revised one more time since, and on 7 June 
2005 the EU council of finance ministers reached an agreement on the text of a third 
anti-money laundering directive.
In the same year the Vienna Drug Convention was finalised, i.e. in 1988, the leaders of 
the G-7 (now G-8) countries put money laundering on the agenda of their summer 
summit in Toronto where they issued a statement of interest to cooperate in the fight 
against money laundering. One year later, this statement of intent led to the establish­
ment of an institutionalised platform for international cooperation on money launder­
ing—the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The FATF was officially mandated ‘to as­
sess the results of co-operation already undertaken in order to prevent the utilisation of 
the banking system and financial institutions for the purpose of money laundering, and 
to consider additional preventative efforts in this field, including the adoption of legal 
and regulatory systems so as to enhance multilateral judicial assistance’ (cite in Gilmore 
1992, 3). This task force comprised originally representatives from all G-7 member states 
and from eight other interested countries40. To date, the FATF comprises a total of 30 
member states41 from every continent, plus Hong Kong and two regional organisations, 
namely the European Community and the Co-operation Council for the Arab States of 
the Gulf42. In January 2005, China was granted observer status and is working towards 
full membership. Also a potential future membership of India is currently under consid­
eration (FATF 2005b). The FATF is an intergovernmental body whose secretariat is 
nested in the headquarters of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Develop­
ment (OECD) in Paris, but it remains fully independent of the OECD and any other in­
ternational organisation. The FATF published a first set of Recommendations on April 
23,1990 on how governments and financial institutions can contain and combat money
4° Australia, Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland.
41 Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Russian 
Federation, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and the United States.
42 Representing Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
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laundering. In 1996, the FATF released an updated and expanded version of the original 
Forty Recommendations. The revision did not result in any drastic changes but was 
deemed necessary in order to adjust to changes in money laundering practices, the 
broadened membership base of the FATF, and potential future threats. A second process 
of reviewing and updating the Recommendations was finalised on 10 June 2003. This 
latest version also addresses explicitly terrorist financing43, an issue that was included 
into the FATF’s mandate following the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington 
DC in September 2001.
The rest of this chapter focuses on the FATF’s Forty Recommendations of 2003, as they 
enjoy widespread international endorsement and have been recognised by the Interna­
tional Monetary Fund and by the World Bank as the international standards for combat­
ing money laundering (FATF 2003c, iii). Joseph Myers, acting deputy assistant secretary 
of the US Department of Treasury reports that ‘130 jurisdictions—representing about 85 
percent of world population and about 90 to 95 percent of global economic output—have 
made political commitments to implementing the Forty Recommendations’ (2001, 9). 
The FATF Recommendations have furthermore exerted significant influence on other 
anti-money laundering initiatives. For instance, the European Council directive 
91/308/EEC mentioned above adopted no less than fifteen of the Forty FATF Recom­
mendations of 1990 (Stessens 2000,18). In addition, based on the FATF model and with 
direct support from the FATF, eight so-called FATF-Style Regional Bodies (FSRBs) have 
been established: the Asia/Pacific Group Against Money Laundering (APG), the Carib­
bean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), the Eastern and Southern African Anti- 
Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG), the GAFISUD (covering South America), the In­
ter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering (GIABA) (covering West Af­
rica), Moneyval (covering Central and Eastern Europe); and most recently, the Eurasian
43 The FATF formulated eight Recommendations which are entirely focused on terrorist financing and which are 
complementaiy to the Forty Recommendations (Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing of 31 October 
2001). On 22 October, 2004 the FATF adopted a ninth Recommendation on terrorist financing addressing the 
smuggling of bulk cash (Cassella 2004).
165
Group (EAG) in Central Asia and the Financial Action Task Force for the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENAFATF) (FATF 2005b).
5.1.3 Overview of the Forty Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force
The Forty Recommendations of the FATF of 2003 seeks to strengthen governments’ re­
solve and ability to crack down on money laundering activities in two major ways. First, 
they encourage international harmonisation of domestic anti-money laundering laws 
and practices. Second, the Recommendations call upon states to share information 
among each other and to cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of money laun­
dering offences. As the FATF Recommendations of 2003 form the basis of the analysis 
undertaken in the reminder of this chapter, a brief overview over their core provisions 
seems indispensable. The following paragraphs briefly present the major provisions of 
each of the four parts in which the Forty Recommendations are structured.
• Legal Systems
The first set of Recommendations calls for a strengthening of legislative and enforce­
ment techniques in line with the Vienna Convention and the UN Convention against 
Transnational Organised Crime of 2000 (Palermo Convention). Unlike the Vienna Con­
vention, the FATF recommends the criminalisation of money laundering related to ‘the 
widest range of predicate offences’ (Recommendation 1, paragraph 2), and not just to 
drug related crime. The term ‘predicate offences’ refers to the fact that in most states 
with anti-money laundering legislation evidence of a previous serious crime is required 
before anti-money laundering provisions become applicable. Recommendation 1 spells 
out how states may define this range of predicate offences on a procedural basis but 
without dictating which substantive crimes have to be included in the definition. Consis­
tent with the Vienna and the Palermo Convention, Recommendation 2 calls for a crimi­
nalisation of the participation in money laundering activities when the party involved 
knew or ought to have known that the money was the fruit of crime. The parly’s in­
volvement in the predicate offence itself in not necessary to constitute a money launder­
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ing offence. This provision departs from the mens rea principle, i.e. the requirement of 
intent, recklessness, or wilful blindness by an accused to be guilty of a crime, which his­
torically formed the cornerstone of international law enforcement. Instead, mere reck­
lessness or negligence on the part of the person or organisation involved in a financial 
transaction are considered a sufficient legal basis for a money laundering offence. Rec­
ommendation 3 spells out provisional measures and confiscation similar to those set 
forth in the Vienna and the Palermo Conventions.
• Financial Institutions and Non-Financial Businesses and Professions
Unlike the UN Drug Convention and the CoE Money Laundering Convention, the Forty 
Recommendations do not rely on criminal law alone. The primary addressee of the Rec­
ommendations laid out in part B is not the legislator but the private sector. By making 
the private sector a primary agent in the surveillance of money movement, the anti­
money laundering regime presents a prototypical example of ‘governance by distance’ 
(Garland 1999). These provisions are inspired by a strategy of ‘responsibilisation’ 
(Sheptycki 2000), which seeks to shift the main responsibility for depriving criminals of 
the enjoyment of their illicit proceeds to the private financial sector. Through regulatory 
requirements such as ‘customer due diligence’ and record-keeping (Recommendation 5- 
12), as well as the reporting of suspicious transactions (Recommendation 13-16), the leg­
islator imposes liability on the financial sector for cases where criminal liability seems 
neither possible nor desirable (Cuellar 2004). The latest version of the Forty Recom­
mendations extends the scope of addressees to non-financial businesses and professions 
such as casinos (Recommendation 12 letter a and Recommendation 24 letter a), real es­
tate agents (Recommendation 12 letter b), dealers in precious metals and stones (Rec­
ommendation 12 letter c), lawyers, and notaries (Recommendation 12 letter d) and 
trusts and company service providers (Recommendation 12 letter e). This extension is a 
direct response to an increasing displacement of money laundering activities away from 
the banking sector into other financial and near-financial sectors (more on this under 
5 .2 .3 )-
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The Forty Recommendations of 2003 also pay for the first time special attention to the 
problem of capital flight by politically exposed persons. Recommendation 6 urges finan­
cial institutions to tighten due diligence measures in relation to this type of customers. 
Recommendation 6 targets primarily politically exposed persons of foreign countries, 
but the Interpretative Notes encourage countries to ‘extend the requirements of Rec­
ommendation 6 to individuals who hold prominent public functions in their own coun­
try5.
• Institutional and other measures necessary to combat money laundering and 
terrorist financing
Recommendations 26 to 32 spell out the powers and resources authorities charged with 
the domestic enforcement of anti-money laundering provisions should be vested with. 
Recommendation 26 calls upon states to establish Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) as 
national centres receiving and authorised to request, analyse and disseminate suspicious 
transaction reports (STR). In Europe, such FIUs were already established in response to 
the European Council directive 91/308/EEC. However, states have chosen different legal 
structures for these FIUs. Thony (1996) distinguishes between three different models of 
FIUs: police-centred (as the UK5s Economic Crime Unit nested within the National 
Criminal Intelligence Service), juridical (as for example in Switzerland and Luxembourg) 
and administrative models (as the US Treasury Department's Financial Crimes En­
forcement Network). The FATF Recommendations do not prescribe any particular 
model for FIUs. Thony (1996) suggests that the current diversity among FIUs may pre­
sent an obstacle for effective cooperation. To overcome this risk, the European FIUs es­
tablished a platform for cooperation, the so-called Egmont Group, in June 1995. The 
membership base of the Egmont Group has expended over the ten years of its existence 
and comprises now a total of 84 national FIUs. Recommendations 33 and 34 focus on 
measures to enhance the transparency of legal persons and arrangements. The inclusion 
of these provisions reflects the FATF's concern about an ‘increasing use of legal persons 
to disguise the true ownership and control of illegal proceeds5 (FATF 2003c, iii).
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• International Cooperation
Recommendations 35 to 40 address the issues of mutual legal assistance and extradition 
and other forms of international co-operation. Recommendation 35 calls upon states to 
ratify and fully implement both the Vienna and the Palermo Convention, as the Recom­
mendations of this fourth part strongly build upon the international law enforcement 
provisions of these two other conventions. Recommendation 35 also endorses other 
relevant international conventions such as the CoE Convention on Money Laundering of 
1990 and the Inter-American Convention against Terrorism of 2002.
5.2 Problem constellation
After having established money laundering in its international politics context, the dis­
cussion will now move on to the analysis of the problem constellation underlying coop­
erative efforts to combat this problem. The argument will be based on the three transac­
tion cost economics variables—asset specificity, behavioural uncertainty and environ­
mental uncertainty—already introduced in chapter 3. This analysis will provide insights 
into the specific challenges faced by international agreements aimed at containing 
money laundering and their implications for the design of these international agree­
ments. This analysis will find that the solution of the policy problems associated with 
money laundering is characterised by a high level of asset specificity, a moderate level of 
behavioural uncertainty and a high level of environmental uncertainty.
5.2.1 Asset specificity
In the context of international cooperation, asset specificity is best understood as the 
amount of sunk costs and benefits associated with the solution of an international policy 
problem, combined with the probability of participants shirking from their obligation 
and—by doing so—causing the failure of the cooperative effort. Consequently, the as­
sessment of the level of asset specificity associated with anti-money laundering policies 
requires a discussion of the both the costs and benefits resulting for a country from the
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implementation of the Forty Recommendations. We will find that the distribution of 
costs and benefits is markedly asymmetric. This creates strong incentives for some states 
to shirk from their obligations, which in turn inflicts substantial damage to other states 
who expected to derive substantial benefits from international cooperation in this issue 
area. In brief, the level of asset specificity associated with anti-money laundering efforts 
is high.
5.2.1.1 Costs
Two types of costs associated with the adoption and implementation of anti-money 
laundering measures can be discerned. First, the combat of money laundering results in 
the direct costs of law enforcement, part of which is borne by the government and part 
by the financial sector. Second, anti-money laundering measures may also involve indi­
rect costs, most importantly in the form of a redirection of international financial flows 
with negative economic consequences for financial institutions and potentially of a coun­
try’s overall economy. It will be shown that at least part of the countries involved in 
global anti-money laundering efforts face high direct and/or indirect costs.
• Direct costs
The direct costs associated with the Forty Recommendations are considerable. First, leg­
islative costs arise as new laws need to be passed in order to create the domestic legal 
basis for the implantation of the provisions spelled out by the FATF. As already men­
tioned above, each revision of the Forty Recommendation led to a wave of amendments 
of national anti-money laundering legislation. For instance, the third EU money laun­
dering directive is a direct response to the changes adopted in the Forty Recommenda­
tions of 2003. Second, and more importantly, the Forty Recommendations impose sig­
nificant implementation costs that have to be covered by public agencies and the private 
sector. For instance, the British Treasury estimated that a medium sized non-financial 
firm (such as casinos, accountants, lawyers) might incur annual costs of approximately 
£17,600 as a result of meeting anti-money laundering requirements (H.M. Treasury
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2003). The legal and accounting sector as a whole has to burden a total of £6o-i20m per 
year. Another source finds that the filing and handling of suspicious activity reports as 
stipulated by Recommendation 5,13,16 results in annual costs of £11 million for the UK 
government and £90 million for the private sector (Financial Times 2005). Recommen­
dation 19 suggests that states should establish a system where ‘banks and other financial 
institutions and intermediaries would report all domestic and international currency 
transactions above a fixed amount, to a national central agency*. This Recommendation 
echoes the stringent currency transaction reporting requirements of the United States 
(31USC §5313), which have proven to involve significant costs for the private sector. Be­
tween 1970 and 1993, more than 50 million such Cash Transaction Reports (CTR) were 
filed in the US, with an exponentially increasing tendency (Wray 1994). In 1997 alone, 
over 12 million reports were submitted to the US Department of the Treasury’s Financial 
Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) for scrutiny (FinCEN 1998). The FATF Report 
of 1990 estimates that each CTR entails US$17 in costs for the financial institutions, re­
sulting in annual total costs of more than US$200 million from this particular anti­
money laundering provision alone (FATF 1990,14).
In context, the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) concluded that the sheer 
volume of filings made analysis difficult, expensive, and time-consuming (Wray 1994). 
Levi goes further and describes US currency-reporting requirements as an example of an 
‘over-trumpeted intelligence methodology* (1991,35). He argues that the system has nei­
ther the capacity to input the data rapidly (within six months of receipt) nor the capacity 
of putting the information to sound operational use, except in a targeted investigation.
For states with less developed financial centres the implementation costs are also non- 
negligible. For instance, the head of the Ukrainian State Financial Monitoring Depart­
ment, Serhiy Hurzhiy, estimated that the establishment of a national anti-money laun­
dering system in line with the FATF Recommendations cost his government ‘tens of mil­
lions of hryvnas’ (i.e. several million British Pounds Sterling) (Kuksa 2004).
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As these examples indicate, it can be assumed that the direct costs of implementing anti­
money laundering measures increase with the number of financial transaction taking 
place within a jurisdiction. Thus, major financial centres such as London and New York 
can be expected to incur higher direct costs in implementing anti-money laundering 
measures than countries where the international financial sector is of minor or moderate 
importance, such as Bulgaria or Spain.
• Indirect costs
Even more important than the direct implementation costs associated with FATF Rec­
ommendations are the potential indirect costs, which may result from a redirection of 
international financial flows and loss in business for a country’s financial sector with po­
tentially severe repercussions on a country’s economy as a whole.
Part of such a decline in the demand for banking services is frilly indented by money 
laundering regulators, as the goal is specifically to eliminate ‘d ir t /  money from the legal 
financial sector. If achieved properly, this goal alone would already have a strong impact 
on some financial centres. The US government estimates that approximately half of the 
global money laundering volume runs through US banks at one point or another 
(Schroeder 2001), and a total of £25 billion in illegal cash per year is believed to be laun­
dered through British accounts (Severin 2004).
Although the redirection of assets of this magnitude would be felt by the financial indus­
try of the affected countries, of still greater importance is the potential redirection of 
‘clean’ money, which may for perfectly legal reasons seek out other centres with less 
cumbersome and costly administrative procedures. Given the high mobility of today’s in­
ternational capital flows, governments therefore fear that the unilateral adoption of 
tough anti-money laundering efforts may decrease the relative attractiveness of their 
country’s financial centre for foreign capital. For example, the United Kingdom feared 
that its anti-money laundering legislation may threaten London’s role as one of the 
world’s largest financial centres (Zagaris 1992, 30). These indirect costs are difficult to
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estimate, in particular for countries, which at present do not rely extensively on foreign 
capital but which seek to develop their financial sector to become an important pillar of 
their national economy. These countries may see their efforts to attract foreign capital 
hampered by the existing anti-money laundering regime, as it forces them to forgo one 
of their few competitive advantages: lower and more flexible regulatory standards. One 
illustrative example is the Seychelles. This archipelago drafted an Economic Develop­
ment Act, which would have provided for immunity from criminal proceedings to for­
eign investors who placed more than US$10 million (Stessens 2000, 92). This plan was 
only withdrawn under heavy diplomatic pressure coordinated by the FATF (FATF 1996), 
barring the country from a potentially lucrative source of income. Other countries have 
seen an already existing pillar of their economy being attacked by international anti­
money laundering efforts. For Nauru, a small island in the Indian Ocean, the registration 
of offshore banks and companies represented until very recently the only source of in­
come other than phosphate mining from deposits which are now almost entirely ex­
hausted (CIA 2004). Around 400 banks (U.S. Department of State 2001) were attracted 
to register in the only 21 square kilometre republic, thanks to the passage of financial se­
crecy laws which protected Nauruvian banks and companies against investigations and 
inquiries conducted by foreign law enforcement agencies. The country soon earned a 
reputation as a money laundering paradise, and its offshore banks were accused of hav­
ing laundered about US$70 billion for Russian criminals. Consequently, Nauru came 
under increasing international pressure and, from December 2001 until October 2004, 
faced countermeasures imposed by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF 2005b). In 
2004, Nauru yielded to this international pressure, abandoned its contested banking 
laws and withdrew the licenses of all banks but the country’s central bank. However, this 
single remaining bank did not survive the massive macro-economic shock this legislative 
change created and collapsed only a few weeks later—leaving Nauru without any bank at 
all and close to bankruptcy (Mellor 2004).
A study by Deloitte Research Financial Services (2003) predicts a decline in offshore in­
vestments from European countries by 13.8 percent between 2001 and 2007 as a result
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of tightening anti-money laundering and tax evasion legislation. One expected benefici­
ary of this backflow of money is the United Kingdom, which is already now the interna­
tionally leading financial centre in terms of its banks’ external assets, not at least thanks 
to the City of London’s status as a ‘spontaneous offshore centre’ (Palan 2003, 33). Over­
all, it can be expected that the global anti-money laundering system as erected by the 
FATF favours states with developed financial centres by favouring financial movements 
to or through these centres in order not to raise any suspicion.
5.2.1.2 Benefits
The process of money laundering itself does not create major public policy problems. 
Problems are created by the criminal activity that generates the funds to be laundered. 
Thus, the benefits a country can reach from an effective anti-money laundering regime 
depend primarily on the extent to which it suffers from predicate crimes covered by the 
Forty Recommendations. As mentioned above, the list of these crimes has been ex­
panded with every new edition of the Forty Recommendations. While the FATF Recom­
mendations of 1990 focused exclusively on proceeds generated through illicit drug traf­
ficking, the 1996 Recommendations opened the scope by including all ‘serious offences 
and/or on all offences that generate a significant amount of proceeds’ as stated in the in­
terpretative notes for Recommendation 4 of 1996. These offences were later specified in 
the glossary of the Recommendations of 2003. The categories of designated offences 
listed in this glossary range from illicit arms trafficking, to piracy and environmental 
crime. The scope of benefits resulting from the implementation of the Forty Recommen­
dations expanded accordingly. Whereas the first version of the FATF Recommendations 
(1990) generated benefits mainly for Western countries which suffered under high levels 
of drug-related violence and drug abuse, the inclusion of corruption and bribery in the 
list of predicate offences in the 2003 Recommendations, as well as the special considera­
tions given to ‘politically exposed persons’ (Recommendation 6 of 2003) helped to make 
anti-money laundering efforts also relevant to offences that were of particular concern to 
developing countries. The main beneficiaries of the Forty Recommendations are thus all
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those states, which suffer considerably under any of the crimes listed under the desig­
nated categories of offences in the document’s glossary.
Benefits for the financial institutions, although discussed in the academic literature (e.g. 
Savona 1996, ; Stessens 2000) and in policy circles (e.g. Gilmore 1999, 83 citing a for­
mer FATF President; McDowell 2001), should not be overestimated as ‘it is not neces­
sarily in the direct financial interest of financial institutions to adopt anti-money laun­
dering behaviour’ (Quirk 1996, 24). As will be discussed in the next paragraph, the im­
plementation of such measures involves considerable costs without providing any im­
mediate economic benefit for financial institutions.
5.2.1.3 Comparison o f costs and benefits
The above discussion of cost and benefit structures allows the grouping of countries into 
three categories. A first category comprises states which suffer considerably under or­
ganised crime and which do not have financial centres of international standing. A pro­
totypical example of this category is Colombia. For countries of this category, joining in­
ternational agreements aimed at combating money laundering results in only low asset- 
specific costs. Countries which perceive organised crime as a moderate to high threat 
and in which the financial sector is of some but not of dominant economic importance 
form a second category. France, Germany, and the United States of America are repre­
sentatives of this second category. The members of this category face moderate asset- 
specific costs, while facing the potential benefit of funds being transferred from off-shore 
to more mainstream financial centres. Finally, jurisdictions such as the Cayman Islands, 
the Bahamas, Switzerland and Luxembourg can be grouped together as examples of 
countries where the concern about the negative impact on anti-money laundering meas­
ures on their strong financial sector outweigh the perceived national value of a reduction 
in global crime. For these countries, joining the global fight against money laundering 
involves high relationship-specific costs. Figure 5.1 depicts these three groups of coun­
tries are depicted in the schematic cost-benefit diagram introduced in chapter 3.
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Figure 5.1 The distribution o f costs and benefits among FATF member 
states and countries affected by the Forty Recom m endations.
Figure 5.1 shows a strong asymmetry in the asset-specific costs countries face when sub­
scribing to international efforts to combat money laundering. Since off-shore financial 
centres bear a high burden for fighting money laundering, while benefiting little, they 
have a high propensity to shirk from any obligations imposed by the Forty Recommen­
dations. On the other hand, countries plagued by organised crime have a lot to lose if the 
anti-money laundering framework collapses due to excessive shirking by financial cen­
tres. Hence, these countries attach a very high asset-specificity to the problem of money 
laundering and will call for a legal framework that imposes precise and enforceable obli­
gations on financial centres, so as to prevent shirking.
5.2.2 Behavioural uncertainty
Behavioural uncertainty refers to the extent to which states can detect when other par­
ties shirk from obligations previously officially accepted. This second dimension of the
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problem constellation is expected to be positively correlated with the degree of hardness 
policymakers enshrine in an international agreement as they seek to counterbalance 
their uncertainty about the behaviour of other parties with strong monitoring mecha­
nisms.
As any typical international law enforcement agreement, the Forty Recommendations 
seek to pursue three main goals: first, the criminalisation of a particular type of behav­
iour—here money laundering—second, the prosecution of this behaviour and third, in­
ternational cooperation among law enforcement agencies prosecuting this offence when 
it involves transnational elements. As legislation is publicly available, the first require­
ment is easy to observe for other states. There exist even publicly available databases 
that compile the relevant legislation of almost all states^. The passing of legislation, 
however, does not ensure that money laundering is effectively prosecuted. In order to 
better assess a country’s sincerity with respect to combating money laundering, parties 
will have to take into account other action undertaken by a jurisdiction.
Behavioural uncertainty will again be operationalised along the three dimensions al­
ready introduced: first, the administrative incapacity of the key states involved, second, 
the relative reliance on governmental monitoring and self-reporting, and third, the level 
of the targeted industry’s opacity. It will be argued that in the area of money laundering 
the monitoring of compliance by non-governmental organisations is low, just is industry 
opacity. The administrative capacities of countries to regulate the financial industry are 
varying, but with all major financial centres being very effective in maintaining the rule 
of law. Taken together, this subcomponents provide a mixed picture but, in sum, behav­
ioural uncertainty associated with anti-money laundering measures can be judged to be 
of moderate degree.
44 E.g. UN International Money Laundering Information Network (IMoLin).
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• Governance incapacity
The first dimension of behavioural uncertainty refers to states’ capacity to implement 
the policies they have signed up for in an international agreement. It thus refers to inad­
vertent non-compliance in contrast to wilful non-compliance which is driven by high 
levels of asset-specific costs. The success of the international fight against money laun­
dering rests on the proper implementation of international agreements by countries with 
important financial centres. Most of these centres are located in countries that rank very 
high in the World Bank’s 2004 rule of law index. Luxembourg and Switzerland share the 
top 99 percentile rank, while the UK achieves a percentile rank of 93.7 and the US of 
92.3. This strong concentration of the world’s prime banking centres in countries with a 
strong rule of law record is not a coincidence. When entrusting money to a bank, indi­
viduals or organisations want to be assures that the financial institution will honour its 
contractual obligations and that they can appeal to an effective and predictable judiciary 
in case the bank fails to do so. This same preference for banking with stable financial in­
stitutions in trustworthy jurisdictions also applies to criminal individuals and organisa­
tions. Even if the trail of illicit proceeds often starts in countries with weak law enforce­
ment capacities, criminals typically seek to their money to established financial centres 
in countries with greater governance capacities (CIA 2005b). Consequently, behavioural 
uncertainty stemming from governance incapacity is insignificant.
• Relative reliance on governmental monitoring
The extent to which international anti-money laundering efforts can rely on private ac­
tors as watchdogs is limited. The best-organised interests are those of banks, and other 
financial and non-financial institutions. However, they have little direct incentive to im­
plement strict anti-money laundering policies, as such measures involve considerable 
costs without providing any immediate economic avail to them (Quirk 1996). Financial 
institutions may, however, be motivated to denounce complacent anti-money laundering 
efforts by their competitors. In reality, this peer pressure is not a major factor, as all ma­
jor financial institutions share the understanding that their industry as a whole is to lose
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from too rigid anti-money laundering legislation and too much public attention to this 
problem. This cooperative spirit is demonstrated in the efforts to ward off constraining 
legislation through the establishment of self-regulatory policies, such as the Wolfsberg 
Anti-Money Laundering Principles for Private Banking. These principles were adopted 
in October 2000 by twelve leading banks45 as a proactive move towards self-regulation 
in order to avert possibly tougher governmental regulation and to reduce the legal un­
certainty created by sometimes incongruent and ambiguous national anti-money laun­
dering acts. In January 2002, the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) fol­
lowed this example and released its own anti-money laundering paper, addressing the 
profession’s role and ethical obligations in the fight against money laundering.
All the leading banks are almost equally vulnerable to money laundering, whereby the 
extensive net of correspondence banking relations presents one major gateway. The Mi­
nority Staff of the Permanent Subcommitte on Investigations of the US Senate scruti­
nised this practice and found that three fourths of the banks surveyed had over one 
thousand correspondent banking relationships; and virtually all had accounts with off­
shore banks.
Those who benefit from an effective fight against money laundering are, in contrast, 
much less organised. This insufficient degree of organisation on the part of the benefici­
aries can be attributed to their heterogeneity—ranging from people suffering under 
drug-related violence to those affected by environmental crime—and by the fact that the 
link between the negative consequences they feel and money laundering is obscure, 
complicated and often geographically far apart. Non-governmental organisations have 
so far played a negligible role in supervising private actors’ and states’ compliance with 
anti-money laundering rules. The sole exception is Transparency International (TI), an 
international non-governmental organisation devoted to combating corruption. This 
NGO was involved in the development of the Wolfsberg Principles mentioned above.
45 ABNB AMRO Bank, Santander Central Hispano, Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Barclays, Citigroup, Credit Suisse 
Group, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, JP Morgan Chase, Society Gen&rale and UBS.
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However, TI’s interest in the issue is only a rather recent phenomenon and not very sus­
tained, which may be explained by the fact that corruption—Transparency Interna­
tional’s core concern—was included in the list of predicate offences for money launder­
ing only in the 2003 Recommendations. In any event, TI’s role in the global move 
against money laundering is significantly weaker than that of NGOs working in other 
fields such as Global Witness and Partnership Africa Canada on conflict diamonds (see 
chapter 6), the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) on the trafficking 
in small arms and light weapons (see chapter 7) or End Child Prostitution in Asian Tour­
ism (ECPAT) and the Global Survival Network (GSN) on the trafficking in women and 
children for the commercial sex trade (Williams 2001).
• Industry opacity
Opacity in the core industries targeted by anti-money laundering measures, i.e. in finan­
cial institutions, is very low, since banks require a license before being allowed to open 
for business. The granting of such licenses is preconditioned upon a number of criteria 
such as minimum capital requirements, requirements regarding the education and ex­
perience of staff, record keeping etc. All these requirements reduce the opacity of the fi­
nancial sector and enhance the regulator’s ability to monitor banks’ compliance with 
anti-money laundering provisions. However, as already mentioned, over the course of its 
existence, the FATF has expanded the scope of the industry targeted by the Forty Rec­
ommendations with eveiy new revision of the Recommendations. The Forty Recom­
mendations of 2003 explicitly cover ‘designated non-financial businesses and profes­
sions’, such as casinos, arts dealers, real estate agents, and lawyers. Some of these non- 
financial businesses and professions have been traditionally subject to regulatory over­
sight comparable to that found in the banking sector, as instance lawyers, while others— 
e.g. arts dealers—conduct their business with less transparency. The expansion of the 
targeted industry has led to an increase of industry opacity, but as the lion share of 
money laundering still occurs in the highly regulated and transparent financial sector
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the overall degree of industry opacity associated with money laundering remains on a 
low level.
*****
As the above discussion highlighted, the three indicators of behavioural uncertainty 
point into different directions. One the one hand, the governance incapacity of states 
with important financial centres and industry opacity are both low, thereby leading to a 
low level of behavioural uncertainty. On the other hand, monitoring of compliance by in­
terest groups is weak, which increases behavioural uncertainty. As an aggregate, the de­
gree of behavioural uncertainty associated with international anti-money laundering 
measures can be described as moderate.
5.2.3 Environmental uncertainty
The concept of environmental uncertainty refers to both the novelty of the policy issue 
and the innovativeness of the field that an international institution seeks to regulate. The 
following section argues that in the case of money laundering, environmental uncer­
tainty is high, with the novelty of the policy issue being moderate and the innovativeness 
of the industry high.
5.2.3.1 Novelty o f policy issue
The first component of environmental uncertainty, i.e. the novelty of the policy issue, 
has only a moderate degree. When the latest version of the Forty Recommendations was 
released in 2003, the FATF could build upon over a decade-long history of combating 
money laundering and upon the experience gained with two previously published Forty 
Recommendations (of 1990 and 1996). However, the Forty Recommendations of 2003 
addressed many new issues not covered or only partly covered in the two previous Forty 
Recommendations, as was already discussed under 5.1.3. The Recommendations of 
2003 introduced significant change with respect to the predicate offences associated 
with money laundering. Whereas the first set of Recommendations limited the crimi-
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nalisation to drug-related crime, Recommendation 4 of the 1996 edition asked states to 
‘extend the offence of drug money laundering to one based on serious crime’. The 2003 
Recommendations expanded the scope of the criminalisation of money laundering even 
further by including a list of ‘designated categories of offences’ in its glossary. Also, as 
discussed in the preceding section, the Forty Recommendations of 2003 expanded the 
scope of the businesses to be regulated in response to the diversion of money laundering 
activities into less regulated sectors (Savona 1996). Another novelty of the latest version 
of the Forty Recommendation was the inclusion of a provision which imposes counter­
measures against non-complying states (Recommendation 21, to be discussed under 
5.3.1), and—in the aftermath of several financial scandals involving of the laundering of 
fortunes amassed by corrupt heads of state such as the former Nigerian leader Sani 
Abacha—provisions on the special diligence financial institutions must incorporate when 
dealing with ‘politically exposed persons’ (Recommendation 6). Most importantly, the 
2003 Recommendations address the problem of terrorist financing, which was com­
pletely absent in the 1990 and 1996 Recommendations. The latest edition of the FATF 
Recommendations refers to this problem no less than 22 times, despite the fact that the 
FATF also adopted a separate set of nine (formerly eight) Recommendations on terrorist 
financing. All these changes in the Forty Recommendations of 2003 decrease the rele­
vance of the policy experience gained with the previous versions of the Forty Recom­
mendations, and thus increase the novelty of the so-expanded fight against money laun­
dering and leading to an overall moderate degree of environmental uncertainty stem­
ming from the novelty of the policy issue.
5 .2 .S .2  Innovativeness o f criminal field
Environmental uncertainty related to the innovativeness of the criminal field is high, 
mostly resulting from the unlimited fungibility of money. Criminal organisations de­
velop many creative ways to bypass any advances by law enforcement agencies against 
money laundering. Some of these techniques are very simple, whereas others are more 
sophisticated and take advantage of technological progress. The five most important 
forms of process innovativeness will be briefly described in the following paragraphs.
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A first diversion strategy employed by criminal networks is to switch to countries with 
lax regulation or limited law enforcement capacities. Given the mobility of electronic 
money, such a geographic displacement of the laundering activity to remote offshore 
places like Nauru can be undertaken almost instantaneously and at no cost.
A second effective and low cost evasion strategy is the so-called ‘smurfing’ process 
(Molander, Mussington, and Wilson 1998,; Savona 1996). In this case, a larger transac­
tion is broken up into several smaller amounts which fall below the stipulated threshold 
of US$10,000—in the case of the USA—above which special reporting requirements 
would apply.
A third strategy to circumvent anti-money laundering measures that has gained recent 
popularity is the transfer of bulk cash (U.S. Department of State 2005, 14). Criminals 
who are engaged in cash-intensive activities in a country with strict anti-money launder­
ing measures seek to smuggle cash in large quantities out of that country and into one 
where financial institutions are less likely to inquire about the money’s origin. In re­
sponse to this trend, the FATF issued a new standard that targets specifically physical 
cross-border transportations of currency or other monetary instruments (Special Rec­
ommendation 9).
A fourth strategy employed by criminals and terrorists to circumvent anti-money laun­
dering measures is the utilisation of alternative remittance systems (ARS) (U.S. Depart­
ment of State 2005). Such systems are traditionally rooted in Asia, particularly China, 
and the Middle East (Cao 2004), and are known by a variety of names, the most com­
mon of which is hawala or hundi. ARS involve a network of local ethnic ‘bankers’, who 
enjoy the trust of their local population. What makes the ARS system intransparent is 
that typically there is no financial transaction for each and every transaction between re­
cipient clients and sender clients. The sender client provides cash to his or her ethnic 
banker, which informs his or her corresponding ethnic banker that a recipient will seek 
to obtain cash from him or her. No money flows between the two ethnic bankers as out­
standing balances are settled by future transactions. ARS play a particularly important
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role in countries with large immigrant populations, as they offer them a cost-effective 
and fast method for transferring funds to relatives in their countries of origin. Transfers 
through ARS are very flexible and involve little administrative paper work or are com­
pletely based on hand-shake agreements. Trust is the central component of alternative 
remittance systems, which is why they are typically confined to members of a common 
ethnic community. In many cases, the transfer through ARS does not involve the actual 
transfer of money but only the value of money (Cao 2004), which is recovered through 
subsequent arrangements, making it even harder to detect the misuse of these systems 
for money laundering purposes. Concerned about this form of AML circumvention, the 
FATF dedicated a considerable part of its most recent typologies exercise to the study of 
this phenomenon.
Other strategies to evade anti-money laundering measures involve the utilisation of 
technological advances, which presents a fifth source of environmental uncertainties in 
dealing with money laundering. Progress in information and communication technolo­
gies has allowed the creation of instantaneous payment systems. Zagaris and Ehlers re­
port that within the United States, ‘more than 465,000 wire transfers—valued at more 
than US$2 trillion—are handled daily (2001, 2). The development of international com­
puterised information processing networks, such as the Clearing House for International 
Payments System (CHIPS) or the World Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial 
Telecommunication (Swift), has facilitated and fastened the cross-border transfer of 
money stemming from licit as well as illicit sources. Under US regulation, banks are re­
quired to identify both the originator and the beneficiary of a wire transfer, but this iden­
tification trail is interrupted when money is wired through foreign banks which are not 
subject to such information requirements.
Regulators’ efforts to curb money laundering are lagging behind even further with re­
spect to cyberpayments (Porteous 2000, 184). Cyberpayments are an emerging new 
class of instruments and payment systems that facilitate the electronic transfer of finan­
cial value (Molander, Mussington, and Wilson 1998,1). Such transactions may occur via
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networks, such as the Internet, or via the use of stored value-type smart cards (e.g. 
MONDEX). Some cyberpayments systems use both techniques (Steel 2004). These new 
payment products are developed to replace cash for many retail and consumer-level 
transactions by providing transacting parties immediate, convenient, secure and poten­
tially anonymous means by which to transfer financial value. These technological devel­
opments pose a substantial challenge for anti-money laundering agencies, as technology 
is now available ‘which could permit these systems to combine the speed of the present 
bank-based wire transfer systems with the anonymity of currency' (Molander, Mussing­
ton, and Wilson 1998,1). In particular the internet has been described as one of the big­
gest opportunities for money laundering because it is very difficult to trace web-based 
transactions and because they are increasingly secure thanks to advances in encryption 
software (Morris-Cotterill 2000).
*****
In sum, the environmental uncertainty associated with the fight against money launder­
ing is high. On the one hand, the novelty of the policy field is moderate, as the scope of 
criminal activities associated with money laundering are expanding, albeit building on 
existing and well understood foundations. On the other hand, the scope for process in­
novation by money launderers is very extensive.
5.2.4 In sum: institutional preferences based on problem structure
Table 5.1 presents the summary of the assessment of the problem constellation underly­
ing international anti-money laundering efforts. The high level of asset specificity found 
to be associated with money laundering and the moderate level of behavioural uncer­
tainty suggest the adoption of international agreements with a high level of legalisation. 
This expectation is in direct conflict with the expectation derived from the third func­
tional variable, environmental uncertainty. The high level of environmental uncertainty 
is best dealt with a flexible agreement with low levels of legalisation. Thus, the above­
presented functionalist analysis of international cooperation on anti-money laundering
185
policy yields a contradictory solution for the design of an international institution deal­
ing with this problem. It will be interesting to study how policymakers handled this di­
lemma when they established the Financial Action Task Force and drafted the Forty 
Recommendations. To what extent did they recognise this trade-off, and how did they 
seek to reconcile the need for credibility with the simultaneous need for flexibility? 
Shedding light on these questions will be the task of the following sub-chapter.
Problem attribute Level Argument
1. Asset specificity High
A  Potential loss High ■ Tough global money laundering policies can help countries affected by 
high levels of organised crime to fight criminal activities, while bearing 
little of the associated costs.
■ Large financial centres may benefit from a universal anti money laun­
dering regime, as funds are expected to abandon smaller off-shore fi­
nancial centres.
B. Propensity to shirk High ■ Off-shore financial centres face high costs (reporting requirement and 
loss of income due to funds being shifted away to major financial cen­
tres), while gaining hardly any direct benefit from anti-money launder­
ing measures.
2. Behavioural un­
certainty
Moderate
A. Governance inca­
pacity
Low ■ The most important financial centres are located in countries with 
strong governance capacity.
B. Relative reliance 
on governmental 
monitoring
High ■ Banks affected by anti-money laundering regulation do not directly 
benefit from reporting non-compliance.
■ The groups affected by criminal transactions underlying money laun­
dering are insufficiently organised to monitor compliance with anti­
money laundering provisions.
■ NGOs less active in the area of money laundering than in the area of 
e.g. child trafficking, conflict diamonds or small arms trade.
C. Industry opacity Low ■ Record keeping requirements in the financial services industry are 
high.
■ Expansion of the scope of targeted industries includes some non- 
finandal professions with lower levels of transparency, but Hon share 
of money laundering still occurs in relatively transparent sectors.
3. Environmental 
uncertainty
High
A  Novelty Moderate ■ The scope of the most recent version of the Forty Recommendations 
has been substantially expanded, thereby increasing the novelty of the 
issue. However, this expansion builds directly upon the experience 
gained with previous versions of the Forty Recommendations.
B. Innovativeness
a. Product innova­
tion
b. Process innova­
tion
High
High
■ Criminals switch money as a carrier of value and rely on precious met­
als, gems or novel forms of wealth such as electronic money.
■ Criminal can switch between financial centres quickly and with mini­
mal costs
■ Criminals develop new ways of international money transfers (ARS).
Table 5.1 Summary o f the assessm ent o f the constellation o f the problem  o f 
international m oney laundering.
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5.3 Degree of legalisation
This third and penultimate sub-chapter moves on to assess the degree of legalisation 
found in the most recent version of the Forty Recommendations of the Financial Action 
Task Force. As in the case study presented above, this analysis will be structured around 
the three dimensions obligation, precision and delegation already introduced in chapter 
2. This assessment will allow us to see which of the contradictory expectations raised in 
the previous sub-chapter prevailed in the actual design of the agreement, specifically, 
whether the asset specificity-driven pull towards high levels of legalisation finally pre­
vailed over the environmental uncertainty-driven pull into the opposite direction. Given 
the inconclusiveness of the TCE-based design expectations, this chapter will conclude by 
seeking to explain why the FATF adopted a moderate degree of legalisation.
5.3.1 Obligation
The first dimension of legalisation—obligation—can be assessed based on the three crite­
ria already introduced in chapter 2. First, the question arises whether an international 
agreement is legally or only politically binding. Second, it needs to be established to 
what extent the obligations created by an agreement, in particular by a legally binding 
agreement, are attenuated by reservations, safeguards and withdrawal procedures. 
Third, the degree of obligation created by an agreement depends on the extent to which 
it establishes mechanisms to monitor and enforce compliance. These three aspects will 
guide the analysis of the Forty Recommendations of 2003 below.
5.3.1.1 Legal bindingness
The name of the core FATF agreement is very telling—'‘Forty Recommendations’— 
making it unambiguously clear that they are mere ‘Recommendations’ in the sense that 
they are legally non-binding. This non-bindingness is reflected in several aspects. Offi­
cial terminology and clauses typically associated with legally binding treaties or conven­
tions are missing (Aust 2000). The Recommendations are formulated with ‘should’ 
rather than ‘shall’, the term ‘countries’ substitutes ‘parties’, and the Recommendations
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do not include any provisions on entry into force, reservations or denunciation. Fur­
thermore, the Recommendations were adopted by the participating states without going 
through the procedures designated for the approval of treaties, such as the consent of 
parliaments. All these aspects support the legally non-binding character of the agree­
ment, and suggest its categorisation as a memorandum of understanding (Aust 2000). 
Stessens posits that ‘[i]t was a deliberate choice not to cast the Recommendations into 
the mould of a treaty. This was to avoid elaborate ratification procedures and to allow for 
flexible adaptation of the Recommendations’ (2000,19; see also FATF 2004).
5.3.1.2 Tenacity o f obligation
Despite their legal non-bindingness, the Forty Recommendations contain some provi­
sions that can be seen as safeguards allowing states to deviate from certain provisions. 
The most important type of safeguard is the reference to the supremacy of the ‘principles 
of domestic law* (Recommendation 1, 3 and 36). For example, the final sentence of Rec­
ommendation 3 relativises the suggested measures on confiscation by stating that they 
only have to be applied ‘to the extent that such a requirement is consistent with the prin­
ciples of their domestic law\ As the Forty Recommendations are not designed as a le­
gally binding convention, states cannot attenuate the degree of obligation of these Rec­
ommendations through the deposit of any formal reservations, nor can they escape its 
reach through a formal withdrawal.
5.3.1.3 Compliance mechanisms
The Forty Recommendations compensate their legally non-binding design through a set 
of effective monitoring and enforcement mechanisms established to strengthen the 
credibility of the agreement and to enhance compliance.
• Monitoring
One element in this strategy is compliance supervision that is based on two pillars. All 
members of the FATF are required to go through an annual self-assessment exercise.
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The information complied through this process is later analysed by the FATF in Paris, 
and used as a basis to determine the extent to which the country has implemented the 
Forty Recommendations. In addition, each member state is subject to a mutual evalua­
tion process, which involves on-site visits conducted by a team of three or four selected 
experts from other member governments and the FATF secretariat (FATF 2005b). A 
third round of mutual evaluations started in the beginning of 2005 and will continue till 
mid-2008. In 2004, the FATF participating states agreed to make the summaries of 
these mutual evaluation reports available to the public through the FATF’s website, but 
with the reviewed state retaining the right to oppose the publication of its own review. It 
remains to be seen whether this move towards greater transparency will strengthen non­
state actors’ role as anti-money laundering ‘watchdogs’. As discussed above (5.2.2), only 
Transparency International has taken an active, although not sustained, interest in this 
issue.
• Sanctions
Over the course of its fifteen years of existence, the FATF has developed a strategy of 
gradual reinforcement of peer pressure against countries and territories whose anti­
money laundering efforts have been found to be wanting. This approach evolved in 
praxis and is only partly enshrined in the Forty Recommendations (Recommendation 
21). In 2000, the FATF developed the policy of ‘black-listing’ countries which were iden­
tified as so-called ‘non-cooperative countries and territories’ (NCCT) with detrimental 
rules and practices in place that impede international co-operation in the fight against 
money laundering. The FATF reviewed a total of 47 jurisdictions it suspected of being 
deficient in regard to their anti-money laundering policies. Based on a catalogue of 25 
criteria, the FATF reviews conducted between June 2000 and September 2001 desig­
nated a total of 23 jurisdictions as NCCTs46. Being included in this black-list results in
46 Bahamas, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Dominica, Egypt, Grenada, Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, Israel,
Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Marshall Islands, Myanmar, Nauru, Nigeria, Niue, Panama, Philippines, Russia, St. Kitts
and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Ukraine.
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negative direct and indirect consequences for the jurisdictions concerned. Recommen­
dation 21 of the 2003 Recommendations stipulates that ‘[financial institutions should 
give special attention to business relationships and transactions with persons, including 
companies and financial institutions, from countries which do not or insufficiently apply 
the FATF Recommendations’.
Whereas a similar provision was already included in the Forty Recommendations of 
1996, the latest version of the Forty Recommendations strengthens enforcement by sug­
gesting the imposition of appropriate counter-measures against NCCTs (Recommenda­
tion 21). Such counter-measures include the imposition of enhanced identification and 
reporting requirements on financial institutions dealing with an NCCT; the requirement 
for governments to take into account the NCCT status of a country when dealing with 
requests from banks headquartered in NCCTs for approval of the establishment of 
branches, subsidiaries or representative offices in a FATF member state; and finally the 
issuing of warnings to the non-financial business sector that transactions with entities 
within the NCCTs might run the risk of being related to money laundering (FATF 
2003b). The FATF indicated to six NCCTs (Nauru, Philippines, Russia, Nigeria, Myan­
mar, and Ukraine) that counter-measures would go into effect if they did not adopt ade­
quate reforms within a deadline of either one or two months. Half of these NCCTs were 
able to satisfy FATF demands in a timely manner, whereas as counter-measures went 
into effect against the remaining three—namely Nauru, Ukraine and Myanmar (FATF 
2005b). Countermeasures were imposed against Ukraine from December 2002 until 
February 2003. Myanmar was sanctioned from November 2003 until October 2004, 
when also the countermeasures against Nauru, already in place since December 2001, 
were lifted (FATF 2005a, 15). Since that date no NCCTs have been subject to counter­
measures. But even in cases where no counter-measures are imposed, a country still suf­
fers considerably from being included in the NCCT list, primarily indirectly in the form 
of reputational costs. For instance, the Deputy Head of the Central Bank of Russia, Vic­
tor Melnikov, welcomed the removal of his country from the NCCT list as a move that 
strengthened Russia’s credibility among investors (Pravda 2002). The FATF considers
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its NCCT policy as an effective tool that ‘triggered significant improvements in anti­
money laundering systems throughout the world’ (FATF 2005b). 70 percent of all 
NCCTs were de-listed within three years after the enactment and substantial implemen­
tation of anti-money laundering reforms, and only two jurisdictions—Myanmar and Ni­
geria-remained on the ‘black-list’ at the time of writing (October 2005). The FATF is 
currently reconsidering its practice of imposing counter-measures mainly in the light of 
the costs the secretariat incurs from compiling country profiles of sufficiently high qual­
ity to legitimate the potential imposition of such sanctions.
In theory, the FATF also allows for membership sanctions to be imposed on a non­
complying member (FATF 2003a). So far, only one FATF member state, Russia, was 
ever categorised as a NCCT, and its membership was not suspended during the twenty- 
eight months it was included in the black list.
It is noteworthy that through its strategy of black-listing of and imposing counter­
measures against non-cooperative countries and territories, the FATF seeks to ensure 
global compliance with its anti-money laundering standards, also among states which 
are not FATF members. Whereas legally binding treaties can only bind those states that 
have formally consented to be bound by it, the non-binding FATF Recommendations 
oblige also states that have never endorsed them. Against this background, Mitsilegas 
remarks that the FATF “is an ad hoc body consisting of ‘rich’ countries, and not an inter­
national organisation, which evaluates, on the basis of soft law, action taken by sover­
eign states” (2003, 205). With respect to enforcement, the compliance mechanisms of 
the non-binding Forty Recommendations surpass substantially that of most legally bind­
ing treaties.
* * * * *
Overall, the Forty Recommendations presents an illustrative example of how soft law 
can compensate its weakness stemming from legal non-bindingness with rigorous moni­
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toring and sanctioning mechanisms. The overall degree of obligation of the Forty Rec­
ommendations can thus be categorised as moderate.
5.3.2 Precision
The second dimension of legalisation, precision, can be analysed from two complemen­
tary angles: determinacy and coherence. As will be argued in the following, the Forty 
Recommendations of 2003 attain a moderate degree of determinacy and a high degree 
of coherence.
• Determinacy
The Recommendations contain a relatively high number of vague formulations. The am­
biguous term ‘appropriate’, for instance is mentioned no less than 21 times, i.e. on aver­
age in every other Recommendation. The equally vague term ‘possible’ appears a total of 
seven times in formulations such as ‘as far as possible’ (Recommendation 11, 21, 27, 40) 
and ‘to the widest extent possible’ (Recommendation 36, 37, 40). Other ambiguous 
terms include ‘unreasonable or unduly restrictive conditions’ (Recommendation 36 and 
Recommendation 40). All these formulations open a wide range of interpretation for the 
participating states. The relative popularity of formulations such as ‘may consider’ (em­
ployed ten times) also make it hard to establish whether or not a state complies with the 
provisions in question as these formulations do not specify—though imply—what the 
outcome of such considerations should be. Also weak formulations such as ‘countries are 
encouraged to’ take certain actions (Recommendation 16, 20, 27, 35, 40) do not create a 
sufficient degree of obligation to allow for an unambiguous detection of cases of non- 
compliance.
The need for flexibility identified in the analysis of the degrees of environmental uncer­
tainties is reflected in the phrasing of the Recommendations. In the introduction of the 
Forty Recommendations of 2003, the Financial Action Task Force acknowledges the 
need for flexibility resulting from the existing diversity in legal and financial systems and
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from the increasing sophistication displayed by money launderers. Consequently, the 
FATF perceives the Forty Recommendations as a ‘set of minimum standards for action 
for countries to implement the details according to their particular circumstances and 
constitutional frameworks’. States’ sovereignty in judicial affairs is for example recog­
nised by allowing states to define the twenty offences listed in the glossary as ‘designated 
categories of offences’. Furthermore, the Recommendations abstain from specifying the 
type and severity of sanctions to be imposed against natural and legal persons found to 
violate anti-money laundering requirements. Recommendation 17 contents itself with 
stating that ‘[c]ountries should ensure that effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanc­
tions, whether criminal, civil or administrative, are available’. In general, the Recom­
mendations rely primarily on ‘standard-like’ rather than precise, ‘rule-like’ prescriptions 
(Abbott et al. 2000). Many of these standards (e.g. ‘due diligence’ Recommendation 5) 
can, however, be interpreted unambiguously based on other anti-money laundering 
agreements (e.g. Basel Statement) and previous court rulings and allow for sufficient 
predictability on this basis. Thirty-three of the Forty Recommendations are specific 
enough to allow for a distinction between compliance and non-compliance.
• Coherence
Furthermore, the Recommendations in their entirety largely meet Franck’s (1990) crite­
rion of ‘coherence’, as they create a non-contradictory framework which allows for a 
case-by-case interpretation. The Recommendations are not only in themselves coherent 
but also with respect to other relevant international agreements. The Forty Recommen­
dations explicitly acknowledge the importance of such external coherence in Recom­
mendation 1 which refers directly to the anti-money laundering provisions of the Vienna 
Convention and the Palermo Convention. The Forty Recommendations of 1996 even 
called upon states to ‘take immediate steps to ratify and to implement 6111/ the two pre­
vious agreements. The FAFT Recommendations are also coherent with respect to the 
provisions established by other intergovernmental bodies, as they are often modelled 
very closely to the standard set out by the FATF.
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5 .3-3  Delegation
Delegation presents the third and final dimension of legalisation. The degree of delega­
tion created by the Forty Recommendations and its praxis will be based on the two as­
pects centralisation and independence already introduced in chapter 2. It will be shown 
that the degree of delegation enshrined in the Forty Recommendations is moderate, as 
both of its components have a moderate level.
• Centralisation
Centralisation refers to the extent to which an international agreement delegates certain 
functions to a centralised body. The FATF consists of two main organisational entities: 
the plenary and a permanent secretariat. The plenary is the primary actor assuming five 
major tasks. First, the FATF plenary sets the international anti-money laundering stan­
dards and specifies them through additional interpretation and guidelines. Second, it 
monitors the compliance of its members with the Forty Recommendations as discussed 
in the previous section. Third, the FATF plenary works towards the implementation of 
its anti-money laundering standards also among non-members through the establish­
ment of and co-operation with the FSRBs, as well as through the NCCT review process 
and through the assessment of capacity building needs. Fourth, the FATF plenary exam­
ines the methods and trends of money laundering in its annual so-called ‘typologies’ ex­
ercise. These studies are undertaken so as to ensure that the FATF anti-money launder­
ing measures remain appropriate in dealing with the evolving money laundering threat. 
Finally, the FATF is dedicated to developing better mechanisms for international coop­
eration, conducting outreach to the private sector, conducting training seminars for as­
sessors in the use of the new methodology and working to improve international co­
ordination of AML/CFT efforts with the FSRBs, the OGBS, international financial insti­
tutions and other relevant international organisations. The FATF does not dispose of any 
established dispute settlement mechanisms, leaving it to member states to seek an 
agreement on the basis of bilateral negotiations.
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The FATF secretariat assumes many—albeit only—supportive functions (FATF 2005b). 
It organises meetings of the plenary and of working groups, and offers administrative 
support to the president and the steering group. The secretariat prepares and produces 
the policy papers discussed in working groups and/or in the plenary, organises mutual 
evaluation missions, and produces the related assessment reports. Furthermore, the ex­
ecutive secretary and his or her staff are in charge of maintaining external relations of 
the FATF with partner organisations and with the media.
• Independence
The second element of delegation is the degree of independence the central bodies—here 
the plenary and the secretariat—of an international institution enjoy.
The FATF functions primarily as an intergovernmental working party (Stessens 2000, 
18) based on negotiations between representatives from member states. These negotia­
tions are institutionalised in three plenary meetings per year, one annual meeting of 
governmental experts on typologies, and, depending on the focus of current work, meet­
ings of various ad hoc groups (FATF 2005c). The degree of independence is low, as all 
states are represented in the plenary, and all decisions within the FATF are taken on a 
consensus basis. Furthermore, the FATF presidency is assumed by a representative of a 
member state and is rotating on an annual basis, which precludes the FATF from devel­
oping an identity independent of the member states. The FATF’s independence is further 
circumscribed by its limited lifespan. When the FATF was created in 1989, the founding 
members decided to limit its mandate to five years. Only when all member governments 
agree that a continuation of the FATF is necessary will its mandate be extended for an­
other five years. Again, this measure is designed to bind the ‘agent’ (i.e. the FATF) 
closely to its ‘principal’ (i.e. the member states). In 2004, the participating states agreed 
to renew the FATF’s mandate for an eight-year period (FATF 2005b). In comparison to 
the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme—which will be discussed in detail in the 
next chapter—the FATF’s independence is weakened by the non-inclusion of representa­
tives from civil society. FATF meetings are only open to delegations from FATF mem­
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bers, observer members, and observer international organisations, but not to the general 
public or representatives from civil society organisations. Also the review missions are 
exclusively carried out by government representatives. The only element that lends a lit­
tle bit of independence to the plenary is the comparably high frequency of plenary meet­
ings, which allows the participants to develop some sort of esprit de corps.
The only centralised support structure in place is provided by a small specialised secre­
tariat headquartered in, but independent of, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) in Paris. The degree of independence of this secretariat is 
moderate. On the one hand, it is limited by its small number of staff (currently ten4?), a 
small budget (€1,740,100 for the fiscal year 2005), the absence of an independent source 
of income and by the fact that the executive secretary is selected by the plenary. On the 
other hand, the secretariat’s independence has increased with a considerable expansion 
of both staff*8 and budget49—albeit starting from very modest levels—, with a funding 
mechanism that defines the financial contribution of each participating country as a per­
centage of that country’s economic wealth, and finally with the fact that the tenure of the 
executive secretaiy is not limited in practice, with the last executive secretary assuming 
his post for almost ten years.
Overall, the FATF reaches a moderate level of delegation, both with respect to centralisa­
tion and independence.
5.3.4 In sum: level of legalisation
Table 5.2 summarises the assessment of the level of legalisation of the Forty Recom­
mendations of the Financial Action Task Force. While looking purely at the text of the 
Forty Recommendations, one would be misled to believe that the level of legalisation is
47 One executive secretaiy, two principal administrators, four administrators, one administrative assistant, and two 
assistants/secretaries (FATF 2005b).
4® Total of three in 1998 (FATF 2005b).
49 Four million French francs in 1998 (Gilmore 1999).
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low, this picture changes once the practice of the FATF and its legal environment are 
taken into account. The legal bindingness of the FATF is low, as signatories did not ini­
tially intend a legally binding treaty and are still opposed to such a move. However, in 
practice, the FATF has developed tough mechanisms to monitor compliance and to sanc­
tion non-compliance—procedures, which are only weakly founded in the FATF’s Forty 
Recommendations themselves. Similarly, the FATF agreement as such is imprecise, but 
once other international anti-money laundering agreements and court judgments are 
taken into account, its wording gains considerably in determinacy. The FATF’s degree of 
delegation is moderate, as the plenary possesses significant powers with respect to rule- 
making, implementation and enforcement, but cannot use these powers independently 
from signatory states, as all decisions are taken unanimously and since representatives 
from all signatories participate in the decision making process.
Indicator Level Argument
1. Obligation Moder­
ate
A. Legal bindingness
a. Language Low ■ Agreement is titled ‘Recommendations’, not ‘Convention’ or ‘Treaty’, 
thereby signalling legal non-bindingness.
■ Other formulations typically associated with binding treaties are 
missing, e.g. participating states are referred to as ‘countries’ not as 
‘parties’.
b. Procedural provi­ Low ■ On the domestic level, agreement did not go through procedures re­
sions quired for the ratification of binding treaties.
■ Agreement is not registered under article 102 of the UN charter.
B. Tenacity of obliga­ Moderate ■ Despite its legal non-bindingness, the agreement contains three pro­
tion visions with safeguard-like formulations.
C. Compliance mecha­
nisms
a. Monitoring High ■ Countries are required to complete an annual self-assessment exer­
cise analysed by FATF in Paris.
■ Each member state is subject to a mutual evaluation process, which 
involves on-site visits conducted by a team of three or four selected 
experts from other member governments and the FATF secretariat.
b. Enforcement High ■ Sanctioning mechanisms developed in praxis, only partially en­
shrined in Forty Recommendations.
■ Non-cooperating countries jure put on a black-list, with counter­
measures including the imposition of enhanced identification and 
reporting requirements imposed on financial institutions dealing 
with black-listed countries.
■ Membership sanction for black-listed countries possible.
2. Precision Moder­
ate
A. Determinacy Moderate ■ Extensive use of ambiguous formulations such as ‘appropriate’, ‘pos­
sible’, ‘unreasonable’, ‘unduly’, ‘may consider’ and ‘encouraged’.
■ Many imprecise terms can be interpreted using other anti-money 
laundering agreements and court rulings.
B. Coherence High ■ High degree of internal coherence.
■ Forty Recommendations explicitly acknowledge the importance of 
such external coherence in Recommendation 1.
■ Other AML agreements often modelled very closely to the standard 
set out by the FATF.
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3. Delegation Moder­
ate
A. Independence
a. Human resources
b. Financial re­
sources
c. Decision making
Moderate
Moderate
Low
■ Plenary consists of representatives from member countries.
■ FATF presidency is assumed by a representative of a member coun­
try and is rotating on an annual basis.
■ Secretariat permanent, selected by the plenary
■ Funding mechanisms defines the financial contribution of each par­
ticipating country as a percentage of that country’s economic wealth.
■ All states are represented in the plenary.
■ All decisions within the FATF are taken on a consensus basis.
■ The FATF’s mandate is limited to five years but subject to renewal.
B. Centralisation
a. Rule making
b. Implementation
c. Dispute resolution 
and enforcement
Low
Moderate
Low
■ Plenary sets the international anti-money laundering standards and 
specifies them through additional interpretation and guidelines
■ Plenary monitors the compliance of its members with the Forty Rec­
ommendations
■ Secretariat charged with organising and reporting on mutual 
evaluation missions
■ Secretariat compiles, but plenary adopts black-lists
Table 5.2 Summary o f the assessm ent o f the level o f legalisation o f the 
Forty Recom m endations o f the Financial Action Task Force.
5.4 Comparing expectations and reality
This second case study poses a real challenge to explanatory power of the transaction 
cost economics framework set out in part one. The analysis of the problem constellation 
underlying the internationally concerted fight against money laundering failed to yield a 
specific expectation on the optimal design of an international institution created for this 
purpose. This failure resulted from the contradictory design expectations a simultane­
ously high degree of asset specificity and environmental uncertainty give rise to. 
Whereas the high levels of asset specificity associated with anti-money laundering 
measures require an international institution with hard legalisation that strengthens its 
credibility, the high levels of environmental uncertainty demand the flexibility granted 
by institutions built on soft law. It was therefore of particular interest to see how policy­
makers handled this contradiction when designing the institutional foundation of the 
Forty Recommendations.
The analysis of the level of legalisation actually incorporated in the Forty Recommenda­
tions revealed a moderate level of obligation, precision and delegation, but a closer look 
at the FATF practices around these Recommendations revealed that the degree of obli­
gation is not stable and oscillating between moderate and high. The key factor in this in­
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stability is the changing practice with respect to monitoring and sanctioning on non- 
compliance. In 2000, the FATF abandoned the policy of ‘white-listing’ complying states 
in favour of ‘black-listing’ non-cooperative countries and territories—including states 
that are not members of the FATF—and of subjecting them to financial sanctions by 
FAFT members. However, this ‘hardening’ of the Forty Recommendations was partially 
reversed, when the FATF decided in 2005 to rethink this black-listing policy.
This analysis of the anti-money laundering regime created by the FATF thus reveals an 
association between, on the one side, a contradictory problem constellation in the form 
of a simultaneously high degree of asset specificity and of environmental uncertainty 
and, on the other, an unstable design outcome. Whether this outcome is specific to this 
case or representative for a wider pattern is an interesting question to be subjected to 
further research.
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6 Conflict diamonds: The Kimberley Process Certifi­
cation Scheme
The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) of 2002 forms the centre-piece of 
international efforts to curb the illicit trade in rough diamonds. This chapter addresses 
the issue of conflict diamonds and examines to what extent the particular constellation 
of this problem provides an explanation for the degree of legalisation incorporated in the 
KPCS. The chapter starts by giving a brief tour dhorizon of the background of the issue 
and of international initiatives—and in particular the Kimberley Process—launched to 
decouple the devastating link between diamond mining and armed conflict under which 
some countries in central and western Africa have been—and to some extent still a re -  
suffering. Based on this background information, the chapter then proceeds to scrutinise 
the particularities of the constellation underlying this policy problem. This analysis will 
again be guided by the three criteria already introduced earlier, namely asset specificity, 
behavioural and environmental uncertainty. The discussion will show that the issue of 
conflict diamonds is characterised by a moderate degree of asset specificity, a moderate 
degree of behavioural uncertainty and a moderate degree of environmental uncertainty, 
which suggests an agreement with a moderate level of legalisation as the optimal institu­
tional response. Juxtaposing this predicted optimal governance mode with the actual de­
sign of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme of 2002 and its subsequent devel­
opment in praxis reveals that, in fact, the KPCS is indeed an international institution 
with a moderate level of legalisation, confirming the prediction by the transaction cost 
economic approach.
6.1 Conflict diam onds as an international policy problem
This first sub-chapter provides the background for the analysis of the problem constella­
tion and of the design of the international institution drawn up to tackle the problems 
arising from conflict diamonds. The first section of this sub-chapter explains why rough 
diamonds became a matter of international concern in the 1990s and, in particular,
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sheds light on the link between diamond mining and armed conflicts that were raging in 
several sub-Saharan states at that time. The discussion then moves on to present and as­
sess different international initiatives launched to tackle this problem. Finally, the Kim­
berley Process Certification Scheme of 2000, which forms the core agreement of the 
anti-conflict diamond framework, is presented in greater detail.
6.1.1 Conflict diamonds as an international policy problem
The issue of conflict diamonds emerged on the international agenda primarily against 
the background of intensified fighting and horrific atrocities committed in Angola and 
Sierra Leone, but also in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Liberia in the 
1990s. Both Angola and the DRC had previously suffered under decades of instability 
and armed conflicts, but the end of the Cold War changed the nature of these wars in 
important ways. During the Cold War, these conflicts were largely seen as results of the 
political antagonism between capitalism and communism, and both the Western and the 
Eastern block supported political movements in developing countries they felt stood for 
their political ideology5°. The end of the Cold War brought about a sharp decline in the 
economic and military assistance governments and rebel groups in these countries re­
ceived from their respective patrons, creating the need for alternative sources of funding. 
Rebel groups and governments alike found them largely in the form of natural resources 
such as oil, gold, diamonds, other valuable minerals and old-growth timber. Although 
primary assets have a long history of being exploited to fund military activities, their 
relative importance increased significantly during the 1990s, as civil wars were becom­
ing increasingly self-financing in nature (Ballentine and Sherman 2003).
From the late 1990s onwards, the role of valuable primary resources in armed conflicts 
has gained considerable interest from both academics (among the first were Collier and 
Hoeffler 1998, ; Jean and Rufin 1996, ; Keen 1998a) and policymakers. No academic
s°Although it is questionable whether the antagonistic parties were ever true-blue supporters of either of the two 
Cold War ideologies (Cortright and Lopez 2000).
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consensus has yet emerged on the precise causal mechanisms that link natural resource 
abundance and armed conflicts51. The central point of disagreement is whether resource 
wealth has to he seen as a trigger of armed conflicts or as a factor sustaining them. Con­
sensus does exist, however, on the fact that in many conflicts in Africa, but also in Cam­
bodia, Borneo, New Guinea and in the Amazon basin (Cooper 2002, ; Keen 1998b, ; 
Klare 2001,; Le Billion, Sherman, and Hartwell 2002) natural resources have played an 
important role with negative consequences. This perception is also widely shared among 
policymakers.
A UN panel of experts (S/2000/203) found that in the case of Angola diamonds consti­
tuted an important pillar of the political and military economy of the Uniao Nacional 
para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA). This rebel group led by Jonas Savimbi 
had been engaged in armed confrontations with the ruling Movimento Popular para a 
Libertagao de Angola (MPLA) for most of the time after the country's independence 
from Portugal in 1975. Until the New York accords were signed in 1988, the two antago­
nists had relied heavily on the support provided by the superpowers, with the MPLA be­
ing backed by the Soviet Union and Cuba, while UNITA benefited from the support of 
the United States and South Africa (Le Billon 2001). In the accords, both superpowers 
promised to cease their support for the MPLA and UNITA respectively. This led to a lo­
calisation of the conflict, with the exploitation of the country’s natural resource becom­
ing the predominant source of income of both warring parties—oil in the case of the 
MPLA and diamonds for UNITA. It has been estimated that between 1992 and 2000 
UNITA managed to control 60-70 percent of Angola’s diamond production (Global Wit­
ness 1998), generating an estimated US$3-4 billion in revenue (Le Billion 2001, 69). 
These tremendous revenues allowed Savimbi’s movement to purchase weapons, hire 
soldiers as well as to acquire friends and to maintain external support, most prominently 
from Zaire (today’s DRC) under Mobutu.
s1 For a comprehensive summary of the debate see Humphreys (2005) and Basedau (2005).
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In Sierra Leone, diamonds played a similar role in supporting the Revolutionary United 
Front (RUF)’s fight against the government of Ahmed Tejan Kabah. Under the leader­
ship of Foday Sankoh, the RUF focused its efforts from 1995 onwards on securing access 
to diamonds and conquered the diamond rich regions of Kono and Tongo Field. Accord­
ing to estimates published by the UN Panel of Experts on Sierra Leone, the RUF man­
aged to generate an annual income between US$25 million and US$125 million 
(S/2000/1195). The same report also reproduced an estimate by De Beers which puts 
the estimated income at US$70 million for the year 1999. Even the lower estimates con­
stitute diamonds as the primary source of income for the RUF, an income which was 
more than enough to sustain RUF’s military activities.
In the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the abundance in natural re­
sources such as gold, old-growth timber, Columbite-tantalite (Coltan), copper, cobalt 
and diamonds, has contributed to the country’s instability mainly by attracting the inter­
est of foreign troops (Global Witness 2004b,; Montague 2002). The country’s wealth in 
natural resources played an important role already under the brutal rule of the Belgian 
King Leopold II in the 19th century (Hochschild 1999). In contemporary times, the DRC’s 
resource wealth has been seen as a motivating factor in the intervention of troops from 
Uganda, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Angola, Sudan, Namibia and Chad and in their reluctance 
to withdraw from the DRC (S/2001/357).
In Liberia, the main problem was not primarily the misuse of domestic diamonds, which 
constitute only a minor share of world production (Goreux 2001b) and of the country’s 
postwar economic potential (Gberie 2004), but rather the country’s role as a trading 
centre for illicit diamonds from Sierra Leone. In exchange for diamonds, the Liberian 
president Charles Taylor, granted his longtime friend Foday Sankoh military equipment 
and training as well as a sanctuary for RUF troops that needed a refuge (S/2000/1195).
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Against this background, the terms ‘blood diamonds’ and ‘conflict diamonds’52 started to 
make their rounds in the media and international policy fora in the second half of the 
1990s. The United Nations General Assembly defined conflict diamonds as ‘rough dia­
monds that are used by rebel movements to finance their military activities, including at­
tempts to undermine or overthrow legitimate Governments’ (A/RES/55/56)53. Estimates 
on the relative volume of conflict diamonds in the late 1990s varied between two percent 
(O’Ferrall 2002) and fifteen percent (Orogun 2004) of the world diamond market. The 
higher end of the estimate can he assumed to include also other forms of illicit diamond 
trade, including the smuggling and trading of diamonds for reasons of tax evasion, 
money laundering, terrorist financing and for other criminal purposes54. The most 
widely accepted estimate puts the relative volume of conflict diamonds between three 
and four percent (Goreux 2001b,; Tamm 2002). In 1999, almost 60 percent of conflict 
diamonds in the world market originated from Angola, followed by Sierra Leone which 
accounted for 28 percent (Goreux 2001b).
6.1.2 International initiatives dealing with conflict diamonds
As some policy analysts started to emphasise the economic rather than the political mo­
tives behind many armed conflicts, economic solutions gained prevalence over military 
ones. As the war on drugs turned towards the strategy of ‘taking profits out of crime’ 
from the 1990s onwards, so did international efforts to solve armed conflicts which were 
seen as ‘resource wars’ or quasi-criminal enterprises (Collier 2000). Instead of having to 
send troops to the complex and intractable ethnic and religious conflicts of the early 
1990s, the emphasis on the ‘greed’ dimension of these conflicts allowed for a seemingly 
easier and less expensive solution: targeted economic sanction, often also referred to as
s2 The two terms are essentially synonymous but with slightly different connotations. The term ‘conflict diamonds’ is 
more neutral and used in the KPCS and other official documents. The term ‘blood diamonds’, in contrast, is more 
widely used in the press and among NGOs.
53 This definition can be criticised for failing to address the question of what a ‘legitimate’ government can mean in 
the context of authoritarian rule, endemic corruption and government sponsored human rights abuse found in some 
of the countries concerned (Ballentine and Nitzschke 2005).
54 The UN Panel of Experts on Sierra Leone estimated that up to twenty percent of the worldwide trade in rough 
diamonds were of illicit nature (S/2000/1195).
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smart sanctions. The objectives of this strategy were twofold. First, it aimed at cutting off 
rebel groups from their revenue sources, thus, coercing them to the negotiation table or 
to full surrender. At the same time, it was important to ensure that the measures im­
posed would neither damage the legitimate diamond industry of the countries suffering 
directly under resource-related conflicts nor of other diamond-mining countries.
Pursuing these three objectives, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1173 on 12 
June 1998, which—among other targeted measures—imposed an embargo on all imports 
of rough diamonds not certified by the Angola government. It also prohibited the export 
of mining equipment to UNITA controlled territory. Similar steps were taken two years 
later against Sierra Leone’s RUF (S/RES/1306). As the Liberian president Charles Tay­
lor continued to lend military support to the RUF—often in exchange for diamonds— 
targeted sanctions were also imposed against Liberia (S/RES/1343). Although the UN 
fell short of imposing official sanctions with regard to the DRC (Cater 2003, ; Ross 
2003), a UN Panel of Experts still declared ‘[a]ll activities—extraction, production, 
commercialisation, and exports—taking place in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
without the consent of the legitimate government’ to be illegal (S/2001/357, 5).
As the armed conflicts in both Angola and Sierra Leone were brought to a resolution in 
2002, the sanctions on commodity exports from these two countries also ended. In the 
case of Sierra Leone, the sanctions were lifted following a United Nations Security Coun­
cil Resolution in December 2002 (S/RES/1448), while the sanctions imposed on UNITA 
expired in June 2003. The only diamond related sanctions currently in place are those 
imposed on Liberia. These sanctions were last renewed on 21 June 2005 (S/RES/1607) 
and extended for a further period until 21 December 2005 in order to bolster the peace 
process. In a letter to the president of the UN Security Council dated on 17 March 2005 
the chairman of the UNSC Committee recommended a continuation of the sanctions on 
the exports of rough diamonds from Liberia (S/2005/176) on the grounds that the dia­
mond trade in Liberia was largely illegally controlled by an opaque monopoly and that
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the country still lacked the funds to adequately certify rough diamonds for international 
sale.
The targeted sanctions proved little effective with regard to both Sierra Leone and An­
gola (Cortright and Lopez 2000, ; Global Witness 1998). Le Billion (2003, 235) points 
out that in both cases the conflict resolution was primarily an outcome of military inter­
vention rather than the result of commodity sanctions (on Angola see in particular 
S/2000/203). The reasons for this relative ineffectiveness were fourfold (Cortright and 
Lopez 2000,158; Le Billion 2001, 74). First, the effectiveness of the certification scheme 
set up by the governments was limited due to widespread corruption which led to a 
fraudulent use of the diamond certification system by government officials 
(S/2000/203). Second, the governments lacked the capacities to control the borders and 
to prevent diamonds from being smuggled out of the country to be sold in neighbouring 
states. Third, other states were often too willing to condone this practice or even openly 
collaborated and supported UNITA in its efforts to circumvent the sanctions. The UN 
panel of experts chaired by the Canadian Ambassador to the UN, Robert Fowler, de­
nounced presidents Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo and Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso 
as the main culprits; but also criticised other African states—namely Rwanda, Zambia, 
Cote d’Ivoire and Gabon—and European states—namely Portugal, France, Belgium and 
Switzerland—for being too lenient towards UNITA dealings taking place within their ter­
ritories (S/2000/203). The role of Charles Taylor as a major sanctions buster with re­
gard to Sierra Leone has already been mentioned above. Finally, the UNSC and the ma­
jor powers remained reluctant to adopt measures to monitor and enforce the sanctions 
more effectively despite the widespread knowledge about the strategies adopted by 
UNITA and RUF to circumvent the sanctions (Cortright and Lopez 2000,149).
When the fighting continued in Angola and Sierra Leone, despite the UN sanctions, non­
governmental organisations sought other means to prevent rough diamonds from fi­
nancing these armed conflicts. London-based Global Witness and Partnership Africa 
Canada (PAC) led a campaign to pressurise the diamond industry into assuming its re­
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sponsibility in this respect and the governments, mainly of the UK and the US, into 
launching international control efforts that went beyond the existing UN smart sanc­
tions regime. Both NGOs were highly influential through the thoroughly researched re­
ports they published on conflict diamonds. In December 1998, Global Witness released a 
short report which highlighted this problematique in the context of the civil war raging 
in Angola, followed by a longer study in 2000. Also in 2000, Partnership Africa Canada 
published a study, which showed that the illicit sales of rough diamonds played a similar 
role in the armed conflict in Sierra Leone (Smillie, Gberie, and Hazleton 2000).
Global Witness and PAC formed a network of over one hundred NGOs—including Am­
nesty International, Oxfam, Human Rights Watch—, which created significant public 
awareness for conflict diamonds through the media. This network also considered the 
option of launching a consumer boycott campaign to exert additional pressure on the in­
dustry and on governments, and some NGOs even contemplated the option of demand­
ing reparations for the damage caused by the civil wars and compensation for the vic­
tims from diamond-mining companies operating in the affected countries.
6.1.3 Overview of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme
The KPCS is the result of a comparably fast negotiation process between governments, 
NGOs and the diamond industry called the Kimberley Process (KP). The Kimberly Proc­
ess was launched against the backdrop of the largely ineffective sanctions imposed 
against unauthorised diamond exports from Sierra Leone and Angola and growing NGO 
pressure in reaction to the fatal consequences of this ineffectiveness. Worried about a 
potential consumer boycott, the diamond industry and the governments of a number of 
diamond producing, in particular South Africa, Botswana and Namibia, and consuming 
countries, mainly the US and the UK, decided to adopt a proactive policy to curb the il­
licit trade in conflict diamonds. As one policymaker recalled ‘[t]hey [the governments of 
these countries] got worried that the NGO movement could run amok and start a con­
sumer boycott. The NGOs had not much to lose from this—but for the diamond produc­
ing countries such a campaign could have had disastrous outcomes’ (Morrison 2004).
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The government of South Africa, the world’s third largest exporter of rough diamonds, 
supported by Botswana, the United Kingdom and the United States, took the lead and 
invited the representatives of governments, the industry and of NGOs to a meeting in the 
old diamond-mining city of Kimberley in May 2 0 0 0 . From its onset, the Kimberley 
Process sought to prevent rebel groups from financing their activities through selling 
rough diamonds while protecting the legitimate trade from adverse effects of a potential 
consumer boycott and of a proliferation of insulated UN embargoes on diamond exports. 
With the explicit backing of the UN General Assembly (A/RES/55/56 and 
A/RES/56/263) and of the UN Security Council (S/RES/1295), the participants devel­
oped the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), which spells out the minimum 
standards all participating states have to adopt with respect to the import and export of 
rough diamonds. This scheme was adopted by the representatives of 48 governments 
and of the European Community at a plenary session in Interlaken, Switzerland, on 5 
November 200255.
The KPCS contains a preamble, six sections, and three annexes. The first section pro­
vides the definitions of eighteen core terms used in the Kimberley Process Certification 
Scheme. Most importantly, it defines ‘conflict diamonds’ along the lines of the definition 
of the UN General Assembly resolution A/RES/55/56 mentioned above. This definition 
furthermore presupposes the existence of relevant UNSC resolutions. As a consequence 
of this definition, ‘conflict diamonds’ cease to exist, with the lifting or expiration of the 
last UNSC sponsored embargo on rough diamonds—at least according to this narrow 
definition. Section II establishes participants’ obligation to ensure that each shipment of 
rough diamonds is accompanied by a certificate that meets the minimum technical stan­
dards set out in Annex 1. Section III spells out which measures exporting and importing 
countries are required to implement with respect to international trade in rough dia­
monds. Most importantly, letter c of this section prohibits participating states to trade 
(import from or export to) rough diamonds with any state that is not an official partici-
55 The full text of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme can be found in Annex 2
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pant of the KPCS. Section IV calls upon states to establish mechanisms of internal con­
trol, most importantly through the penalisation of transgression and the collection of 
data on production, import and export. This same section also emphasises the impor­
tance of a voluntaiy system of industry self-regulation. In response to this call, the In­
ternational Diamond Manufacturers Association (IDMA) and the World Federation of 
Diamond Bourses (WFDB) established the ‘Essential Guide to Implementing the Kim­
berley Process’ on behalf of the whole industry. Section V addresses the matter of on in­
ternational co-operation and transparency, with a special emphasis on the importance of 
statistical data. Section VI, finally, is the longest of all sections of the Scheme and deals 
with administrative matters such as meetings, administrative support, and participation.
6.2 Problem constellation
After this brief overview of the emergence of conflict diamonds on the international po­
litical agenda, the discussion now moves on to analyse systematically the specific attrib­
utes of this problematique. This analysis will be guided by the three explanatory vari­
ables introduced in chapter 3, i.e. asset specificity, behavioural uncertainty, and envi­
ronmental uncertainty. The following paragraphs will examine how each of these three 
variables poses specific challenges to international efforts to curb the illicit trade in 
rough diamonds, giving rise to certain demands on the design of international institu­
tions established to achieve this goal. The assessment below will reveal that all three in­
dicators reach a moderate degree. Therefore, this sub-chapter concludes that an interna­
tional agreement established to tackle this problem is most appropriately designed when 
incorporating a moderate level of legalisation.
6.2.1 Asset specificity
The costs and benefits resulting from an effective scheme to fight the illegal trade in 
rough diamonds vary between countries, mainly as a result of the varying degrees to 
which they are involved in the rough diamond trade and to which they are exposed to the 
risk of diamond-related conflicts. It will be shown that all countries involved with the
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KPCS face costs proportional to the benefits they expect to receive by cooperating. In­
centives to shirk are moderate.
6.2.1.1 Costs
The adoption and implementation of an international cooperation to fight the illicit 
trade in rough diamonds involves both direct and indirect costs, which will be analysed 
separately in the following.
• Direct costs
The implementation costs associated with the KPCS are positively correlated with the 
volume of diamond trade, which varies considerably between countries. The trade in 
rough diamonds is concentrated in a very limited number of countries throughout the 
mining, trading and polishing stages. The commercially attractive mining of diamonds is 
limited to roughly a dozen countries (see Table 6.1). The five largest diamond producers 
account for 75 percent of the world export value, the ten largest producers even share 
more then 97 percent of the world market among them (Goreux 2001b).
Country
Production  
(m illions o f  US$)
Percentage o f  world  
Export value
Botswana 1613 22
Russia 1523 21
South Africa 985 14
DR Congo 725 10
Angola 544 8
Australia 437 6
Canada 422 6
Namibia 414 6
Sierra Leone 138 2
ROW 452 5
W orld _________________ £ 2 2 _______________ 100
Table 6.1 Major Diamond Producing Countries 1999 (Goreux 2001b).
The trading of rough diamonds is also concentrated in a small number of centres. The 
Belgian city Antwerp has a 560-year-old history as the centre of the global diamond in­
dustry, and still today do approximately 80 percent of all rough diamonds pass through
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Antwerp’s bourses (Global Witness 2000, ; Goreux 2001b). The remainder is traded in 
places like London, New York, Tel Aviv, Johannesburg, Bombay and Dubai, with the lat­
ter pursuing an aggressive strategy to challenge Antwerp’s dominance (Laitner 2005). 
The polishing of rough diamonds, finally, is concentrated in countries like India, which 
holds around half of the world market of polished diamonds and fast-growing China, but 
also Thailand and Mauritius seek to conquer a share of this labour-intensive part of the 
production chain (Global Witness 2000).
States that have a major stake in the mining, trading and polishing of rough diamonds 
face the highest implementation costs, as they need to issue and check the validity of cer­
tificates for diamonds leaving or entering their territory. These tasks require both dedi­
cated physical and human assets. The required dedicated physical assets come in the 
form of printing forgery-proof certificates and establishing secured internet links 
through which KP participants can send advance advice to the destination of an outgoing 
diamond shipment. These costs are, however, minor, and were, in the case of Sierra 
Leone, covered by the British government. Several policy options, such as the tagging of 
diamonds by means of laser and focused ion beam technologies were discussed but then 
discarded primarily because of the high costs involved (Cook 2001, ; Global Witness 
2000).
With respect to human assets, the implementation costs of the KP are more important. 
In the case of diamond producing countries, the overall responsibility for this task was 
usually assigned to an already existing ministry, such as the Ministry of Geology and 
Mines in the case of Angola. Diamond importing countries often had no dedicated of­
fices in place prior to the KP, as the import of rough diamonds was not considered a dis­
tinct category within the countries’ customs regulations nor within the World Customs 
Organisation. Some importing states established dedicated posts, like the ‘Special Nego­
tiator for Conflict Diamonds’ within the US State Department, or separate offices, like 
the ‘Government Diamond Office’ with a staff of three in the British Foreign and Com­
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monwealth Offices6. States with only a limited number of rough diamond imports did 
not create a new and dedicated position but added the responsibility for dealing with the 
issue to the normal workload of pre-established positions, in the case of Germany to 
three desk officers working in the Federal Foreign Office, the Federal Ministry of Fi­
nance and the Federal Ministry of Economics and Labour.
In sum, the implementation of the KPCS incurs a moderate amount of direct costs in a 
handful of mining, trading and polishing countries. Throughout the drafting process of 
the KPCS, participants were wary of avoiding cost-intensive implementation. It is thus 
not surprising that the substantive provisions of the scheme involve less technical and 
human asset specific costs than do the requirements spelled out in the Vienna Conven­
tion and the Forty Recommendations discussed in the preceding two chapters.
• Indirect costs
More important than the direct costs associated with the adoption of a scheme to curb 
the illicit trade in diamonds are the indirect negative consequences for countries that 
have so far benefited from this illicit trade. As mentioned above, an estimated 20 percent 
of the world market in rough diamonds is believed to be illicit (Tamm 2002)—usually 
associated with diamond smuggling motivated by the desire to avoid tighter regulation, 
high export taxes, or the obligation to sell exclusively to a parastatal diamond marketing 
company, which often offers only below-market prices.
Quite revealing is in this respect is Table 6.2 below, which compares the estimated dia­
mond mining value with its estimated official export value based on UN trade data. It 
shows cases with considerable discrepancies between these two values. Some countries 
export considerably more diamonds than they are believed to have mined domestically, 
while others display a deficit in that respect. Part of this discrepancy results from dia­
mond trade data limitations, but part of it reflects illicit diamond flows, i.e. diamond
s6 This office is about to move to the Department for International Development (DFID).
smuggling, between the countries with a net deficit and those with a net surplus in terms 
of diamond exports. It shows for example that in 2 0 0 0  the Central African Republic ex­
ported more than twice as many diamonds (in value) as it is estimated to have mined 
domestically; in Liberia the exports of rough diamonds exceed the value generated 
through mining even by a factor of five. The Republic of Congo was reported to have the 
greatest net export surplus—exporting annually 5.2 million carats of diamonds, while its 
production potential was estimated at 55,000 carats (Fraser 2 0 0 4 )57. These states with 
net surpluses benefited from the inflow of smuggled diamonds, as they typically levy an 
export tax on diamond sales before these diamonds are officially fed into the world mar­
ket. Although the KPCS was not primarily established to prevent international diamond 
smuggling it should still have the secondary effect of exposing states which benefit on a 
large scale from the export of illicitly imported diamonds and of undermining this addi­
tional source of export tax revenue.
Country Estimated m ining value (thousand o f US$)
Estimated export value 
(thousands o f  US$)
Difference between m ining  
and estim ated exports 
(thousands o f  US$)
Angola 739,662 633,265 (106,397)
Central African Rep. 72,000 168,515 96,515
Guinea 103,500 163,166 59,666
Liberia 27,200 101,861 74,661
Namibia 419,120 709,000 289,880
Sierra Leone 87,500 14,114 (73,386)
Tanzania 45,065 30,294 (15,671)
Table 6.2 Estimated m ining value and estim ated export value o f rough 
diamonds in  selected African countries, 2000  Source: (US Gen­
eral Accounting Office 2002).
In sum, the implementation of the KPCS will impose indirect costs on a small number of 
diamond mining countries, which have traditionally benefited from diamond smuggling. 
If the KPCS is thoroughly implemented, these countries will miss this particular source 
of revenue. While these indirect costs are real, they are much smaller than the indirect 
costs faced by countries that are obliged by the Vienna Convention to eliminate the culti-
57 The case of Congo Brazzaville is discussed further under 6.3.I.3.
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vation of narcotic plants. Whereas in these countries, the livelihood of a large population 
is provided for by narcotic plants, rough diamond smuggling does not provide benefits to 
a comparably large segments of the population neither in Liberia, nor in Namibia nor in 
other countries with excess rough diamond exports. For this reason, the indirect costs 
are judged to be just moderate.
6.2.1.2 Benefits
The KPCS has not only resulted in costs for participating states but also in considerable 
benefits. The type and scope of benefits the currently 43 KP participants reach from par­
ticipating in the agreement vary considerably. Two major types of immediate benefits58 
can be discerned: security-related benefits and economic benefits.
Security-related benefits of an effective instrument to curb illicit diamond flows arise 
from the fact that such an instrument limits rebel groups’ ability to finance their upris­
ing, maybe even weakening their incentives to take up their arms in the first place (see 
discussion above under 6.1.1). These benefits are of vital importance not only for dia­
mond-rich states that are threatened by such a rebellion but also for neighbouring states, 
as these conflicts often entail negative spill-over effects in the form of uncontrolled in­
flows of refugees but also of arms and fighters. Angola, the Central African Republic, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea, Liberia, the Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone 
all fall into this category of states with direct or indirect security concerns.
The economic benefits created by the Kimberley Process come in three forms. First, an 
effective international control of the trade in rough diamonds fosters stability in coun­
tries exposed to the risk of diamond related conflicts. This benefit is illustrated by the
s® Several states did not primarily support the KP out of an immediate self-interest but rather motivated by concerns 
about the devastation caused by diamond-related conflicts in the affected states and about the negative economic 
consequences a potential consumer boycott would have on a number of developing states. Tim Martin, a Canadian 
diplomat and chair of the KP from 2003-2004 stated for example that „Canada has always taken a human security 
approach to the question of conflict diamonds.... Our goal is to ensure that diamonds start to support, rather than 
undermine, human development" (Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2004).
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case of Sierra Leone, where the economy grew by 9.3 percent in the year following the 
official end of the conflict (White 2005b).
Second, all diamond producing countries—not only those threatened by diamond related 
conflicts—can derive direct economic benefit resulting from the KPCS’ anti-smuggling 
effect already mentioned above. As the KPCS renders it more difficult for any illicit 
rough diamonds—not only conflict diamonds in the narrow sense—to enter the legiti­
mate market, it increases the revenues of diamond mining states through an increase in 
diamond export taxes and taxes on mining firms’ profits as well as through an increase 
in profits of state owned diamond companies, as for example Empresa National de Dia- 
mantes de Angola (Endiama), of joint-ventures between a government and a private 
company, as Debswana (Botswana and De Beers) and Namdeb (Namibia and De Beers). 
Table 6.2 above showed not only states with an diamond export surplus but also states 
where the estimated value of mined diamonds exceeded that of exported diamonds. 
Most dramatic is this negative discrepancy in the case of Sierra Leone, where in 2000 
the estimated value of the diamonds mined surpassed the official exports by a factor of 
seven. As William Reno (1995) notes, this country has a long-established history of ille­
gal diamond mining, dating back decades before the outbreak of the civil war. Following 
the end of the armed conflict in Sierra Leone and the implementation of the Kimberley 
Process Certification Scheme official diamond exports rose by two thirds between 2003 
and 2004 to reach a total of US$i27m (White 2005a). However, official exports still ac­
count for only a quarter to a half of total exports in rough diamonds. Also the govern­
ment of the Democratic Republic of Congo has claimed to lose diamonds worth a total of 
US$8oom annually due to smuggling. The government therefore expressed strong hopes 
that the Kimberley Process will curb the fraudulent export of diamonds from DRC and 
enable the Congolese to reap the full benefits of their country’s natural wealth (Business 
Day 2002).
The third and final type of economic benefit created by the Kimberley Process Certifica­
tion Scheme lays in the fact that its successful launch helped to avert a potential con­
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sumer boycott campaigned by NGOs. Such a campaign could have crippled the sales of 
diamonds, negatively affecting the economy of diamond producing and processing coun­
tries. Diamond mining constitutes an indispensable pillar of the economy in a number of 
countries. In the world’s largest diamond producer country, Botswana, diamond mining 
generates 80 percent of the country’s export revenues (Kuriyan 2005) and 40 percent of 
the country’s GDP (US General Accounting Office 2002, 49). In Namibia, rough dia­
mond exports accounted for 47.9 percent of total exports in 2000, in Sierra Leone for 
18.6 percent and in Angola for 8.1 percent, respectively (Laitner 2005). The world’s larg­
est diamond trading centre, Antwerp, generates an annual turnover of US$34bn and 
contributes 7 percent to Belgium’s exports (US General Accounting Office 2002). In the 
world’s leading diamond cutting centre, India, cut and polished diamond exports also 
accounted for US$io.8bn or 13 percent of the country’s total exports in 2004 (Kuriyan 
2005, calculations by author). Lesotho, which itself is not a diamond producer, relies 
heavily on the diamond industry as the remittances from diamond miners employed in 
South Africa present a major source of income (CIA 2005a). Also in terms of employ­
ment, the diamond industry is an important factor. For example, more than 100,000 
people work in Angola’s remote areas as so-called garimpeiros, freelance diamond seek­
ers (Roox 2002). In India, around 750,000 people, many of them with little formal 
qualifications, find work in the diamond industry, mainly in polishing (Laitner 2005). 
Consequently, the launch of a consumer boycott would have had severe economic conse­
quences for these countries.
In sum, the benefits some countries can derive from an effective scheme to curb trade in 
conflict diamonds can be assessed as high. Hence, the Vienna Convention and the KPCS 
are comparable in this respect, as in both cases illicit activities threaten to seriously un­
dermine stability in the affected states.
6.2.1.3 Comparison o f costs and benefits
Figure 6.1 shows the distribution of costs and benefits between different groups of coun­
tries. The KPCS induces costs primarily in diamond producing countries, which issue
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certificates and, hence, must maintain an infrastructure to assess the licit nature of all 
rough diamonds received for certification. These costs are higher in countries, whose 
diamond reserves are in alluvial deposits, because such deposits are spread out over vast 
areas of land and are exploited by a large number of independent artisanal operators. 
Polishing centres incur smaller costs for receiving and examining certificates, whereas 
such cost are reduced to a negligible amount in purely diamond consuming countries. 
This latter group of countries includes countries like Norway and France, which partici­
pate in such a global initiative solely to show their support for a purpose they consider 
worthwhile out of humanitarian considerations.
The benefits of the KPCS are also mostly felt in diamond producing countries, especially 
in those conflict-ridden states with primarily alluvial deposits. Inhibiting rebels to fi­
nance their fight by trading rough diamonds will increase the national security of coun­
tries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Angola, and thereby facilitate 
the emergence of a more stable environment conducive for economic growth. But also 
Botswana, which does not suffer from violent internal conflict, benefits from participa­
tion in the KPCS, as the lion’s share of its economy is based in the diamond industry and 
non-participation would exclude it from the world diamond market. Diamond polishing 
and consuming states also benefit by averting a consumer boycott and a potential col­
lapse of the diamond trade.
The above depiction of the distribution of costs and benefits also shows that the degree 
of asset specificity resulting from the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme is only 
moderate. The incentive of most states to shirk is rather modest mainly due to the low 
level of direct implementation costs. Only diamond producing countries that are gener­
ating or hope to generate additional tax revenues from certifying diamonds of illicit ori­
gin may feel compelled to shirk from their obligations. These states are typically located 
in geographical proximity of states that are threatened by diamond-related conflicts. 
Given the great importance a functioning agreement has for the latter category of states, 
these states will seek to endow an international institution created to combat conflict
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diamonds with at least a moderate degree of legalisation in order to alter the incentive 
structures of unofficial ‘surplus’ exporters.
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Figure 6.1 The distribution o f costs and benefits am ongst countries partici­
pating in  the Kimberley Process Certification Schem e.
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In sum, the degree of asset specificity stemming from efforts to curb illicit flows in rough 
diamonds can be considered to be moderate. Incentives to shirk are low to moderate as 
the implementation of the KPCS does not result in high costs for any of the participating 
states, while the potential loss from an ex post breakdown of an agreement could be very 
significant for countries at risk of diamond-related conflicts.
6.2.2 Behavioural uncertainty
Whereas the above discussion examined the extent to which states may have an incen­
tive to deliberately shirk from their obligations to control the trade in rough diamonds,
218
behavioural uncertainty addresses the extent to which states can disregard their obliga­
tions without being detected. As in the preceding two case studies, behavioural will be 
assessed based on three indicators—government incapacity, the relative reliance on gov­
ernmental monitoring and industry opacity. It will be shown that the general level of be­
havioural uncertainty associated with an international scheme to combat the illicit trade 
in conflict diamonds is of moderate degree. State incapacity and industry opacity are 
both high, but valiant NGOs are at hand to operate as fire alarms, limiting countries’ 
ability to shirk from their obligations without being exposed.
• Government incapacity
An effective solution to the problems associated with the trade in rough diamonds re­
quires governments to have full control over the mining and movement of rough dia­
monds within their territory and across borders. However, those countries, which give 
rise to the creation of a global anti-conflict diamond scheme are weak states plagued by 
internal war or just emerging from conflict. The Democratic Republic of Congo and the 
Central African Republic, Liberia and Angola all rank in the bottom decile of the World 
Bank’s 2004 rule of law index. The rule of law fares only slightly better in Sierra Leone, 
which is assumes a percentile rank of 12.6. The KP was launched specifically to compen­
sate for these states’ governance incapacity by enlisting other states with a stronger rule 
of law in the fight against conflict diamonds. In that respect, governance incapacity 
found in association with conflict diamonds is comparable to that found in the case of 
narcotic drugs.
219
• Relative reliance on governmental monitoring
As discussed in section above, NGOs have been exceptionally active in promoting inter­
national efforts to curb the trade in conflict diamonds. The two most important organi­
sations are Global Witness and Partnership Africa Canada (PAC). Throughout the KP, 
these two NGOs were lobbying the governments of the UK and the US very effectively to 
create an effective anti-conflict diamond regime. They attracted significant attention by 
completing and publishing well-researched reports about conflict diamonds, which have 
become the standard reference for policy makers. The involvement of Global Witness 
and Partnership Africa Canada has not ceased since the signing of the KPCS. Both NGOs 
are still active in monitoring the implementation of the agreement. Thanks to a number 
of highly qualified members of staff directly in the field they are able to detect inconsis­
tent implementation. Well-established media contacts ensure that they can create suffi­
cient bad publicity about cases of non-compliance.
• Industry opacity
The diamond industry is traditionally secretive (US General Accounting Office 2002), 
with trade data hardy obtainable from mining companies. Most business in the diamond 
industry is conducted on the basis of a handshake and little written documentation of 
deals exist (Laitner 2005). A more important source of industry opacity, however, re­
sults from differences in the nature of rough diamonds.
Diamonds are extracted from two types of deposits—primary and secondary deposits—, 
which differ from each other with respect to the extent to which they allow for undetect­
able shirking. The majority of diamonds, around 78 percent (US General Accounting Of­
fice 2002), are mined from primary deposits—kimberhte and lamproite pipes that raise 
diamonds from Earth's mantle to close to the surface (American Museum of Natural 
History 2004). Alluvial diamonds are the most important form of secondary diamonds. 
On the African continent, these diamonds were eroded from their mother rocks in
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Southern Africa and carried westwards to countries like Angola, Sierra Leone, Congo 
Brazzaville and the DRC.
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The potential for undetectable shirking differs between these two types of diamonds for 
two major reasons. First, the mining potentials and the actual level of mining activities 
of primary deposits are easier to assess than those of secondaiy deposits. Diamond ex­
traction from kimberlite deposits requires capital-intensive technology, leading to an in­
dustry concentration of a small number of big scale companies. Furthermore, mining is 
concentrated on a few spots, which are fenced and heavily controlled (Goreux 2001a). In 
contrast, the mining of alluvial diamonds requires nothing but a shovel and pan. This 
low capital intensity allows the artisan or small-scale mining to thrive in many places in 
western and central Africa, Latin America and Asia. In Angola, for instance, it is esti­
mated that more than 100,000 so-called garimpeiros are engaged in the exploitation of 
alluvial diamonds spread out over vast areas of land (US General Accounting Office
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2002, 44)- For all these reasons, it is easier to assess whether the export volume of a 
diamond mining country with primarily khnberlite deposits is in line with its domestic 
mining potentials than it is the case with countries exporting predominantly alluvial 
diamonds. Second, the identification of the provenance of alluvial diamonds is techni­
cally impossible. Whereas cost-intensive physical and chemical identification processes 
can establish the origin of kimberlite diamonds with some degree of certainty, it is out­
right impossible to determine where an alluvial diamond was mined, as the diamond 
only carries the characteristics of the kimberlite pipe where it originated from but not of 
the place where it was actually extracted. Consequently, it is thus virtually impossible to 
detect non-compliance when Guinea certifies alluvial diamonds as domestic production 
when these diamonds were in fact extracted in Sierra Leone.
The extent to which states can shirk from their KP obligations without detection depends 
not only on the type of their diamond deposits but also on the volume of diamonds they 
trade legally. A country like Botswana, which exported diamonds worth more than 
US$2billion in 2004 (Kuriyan 2005), has in absolute terms many more opportunities to 
certify diamonds of dubious origin than does for example Tanzania, which only contrib­
utes 0.1 percent to the world production in rough diamonds worth only US$20 million 
(MBendi 2004).
In terms of industry opacity, the case on conflict diamonds can be best compared to the 
case on illicit drugs. Both policy problems are highly opaque, a sharp contrast to the well 
documented world of financial services.
***
In sum, behavioural uncertainty reaches a moderate level in the case of conflict dia­
monds, with governance incapacity and industry opacity both being pronounced but 
partly offset by the important role non-state actors play in the monitoring of compliance.
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6.2.3 Environmental uncertainty
Environmental uncertainty is the third and final variable the TCE model uses to assess 
the problem constellation underlying an international institution. This variable refers to 
two major aspects: first, to the novelty of a policy issue and, second, to the degree of in­
novativeness associated with the activity that is to be regulated. It will be shown that the 
problems associated with the trade in conflict diamonds are new, while the innovative­
ness of the industry is moderate.
6.2.3.1 Novelty o f policy issue
Before the late 1990s, the link between armed conflicts and diamonds had received 
hardly any attention neither from academics, NGOs, media nor policymakers. It is there­
fore little surprising that most policymakers had no previous knowledge neither of the 
problem mechanisms nor of potential solutions. Several of the desk officers interviewed 
by the author confirmed that the issue was ‘brand new* to them as individuals as well as 
to their ministerial department. Also the regulatory instruments finally adopted by the 
KPCS to tackle the problem of conflict diamonds are often described as highly innova­
tive.
Of the three policy problems discussed so far in this study, the policy issue of conflict 
diamonds presents the highest level of policy issue novelty. In the case of money laun­
dering, for instance, policy makers have to adapt to the spread of laundering activities 
beyond the traditional financial sector to sectors in which they possess little pre-existing 
regulatory experience but they can still build upon a more than two decades long history 
of coordinated efforts against money laundering. This experience is missing in the case 
of conflict diamonds, as the diamond trade has never been regulated on a global scale 
before, and no comparable commodity certification scheme has even been imple­
mented—neither on the global level nor on regional levels.
223
6.2.3.2 Innovativeness o f criminal field.
This second aspect of environmental uncertainty refers to the ease with which rebels or 
criminals engaged in the illicit trafficking of conflict diamonds can circumvent regula­
tory measures.
Diamonds have been described as the most concentrated form of wealth (Tamm 2002), 
and are therefore easy to conceal and to smuggle. However, and as already mentioned, 
the KPCS limits the smuggling opportunities, because smuggled diamonds—at least on 
the large scale—can only be certified and introduced to the licit world market in states 
that are engaged in diamond mining and have a substantial licit output or reserves, large 
enough to dwarf the volume of illicit gems.
More important than these strategies to circumvent KPCS regulations for criminal pur­
poses are developments, which have the effect, though not the intention, of rendering 
the KPCS void. One such trend is the current move towards the establishment of cutting 
and polishing centres in diamond mining countries. For instance, the Israeli diamond 
magnate, Lev Leviev, opened Namibia’s biggest polishing factory on June 28, 2004 (The 
Economist 2004). This trend undermines the KPCS because the scheme only covers in­
ternational trade in rough diamonds, not cut or polished diamonds, which fall under a 
different WCO category. An expansion of the scheme so as to cover cut and polished 
diamonds is little meaningful as ‘[t]here are no practical means to determine the country 
of origin of a polished diamond’ according to the director of research at the Gemological 
Institute of America, James Shigley (Wright 2001). The only techniques that do allow for 
the identification of the origin of polished diamonds lead to their complete destruction. 
Some diamond producing countries, namely Botswana, Namibia, Angola and Sierra 
Leone, have recently embraced a ‘beneficiation strategy’, which seeks to create addi­
tional employment opportunities and wealth by compelling diamond mining companies 
to process the diamonds in the country where the diamonds were mined (Reed 2005a). 
An expansion of such a beneficiation strategy will ultimately lead to a significant reduc­
tion in rough diamond trade volumes, thereby reducing the relevance of the KPCS.
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A second trend with a similar effect stems from technological advancements in the syn- 
thetisation of diamonds. The technology to produce synthetic diamonds has been 
around since the 1950s, with most synthetic diamonds used as industrial diamonds as 
part of cutting tools. Technological advances now allow for the production of synthetic 
diamonds of gem like quality (Reed 2005b). As these synthetic diamonds are, although 
expensive, still cheaper than mined diamonds they might eventually become serious 
competitors to natural diamonds and lead to a drop in the price for diamonds. Such a 
development could in turn mollify the risk of diamond related conflicts as this commod­
ity loses in attractiveness in the eyes of rebel groups.
The innovativeness of the conflict diamond trade can be compared to that of the illicit 
narcotics trade. Product innovation is low in both cases, because the traded products 
cannot be substituted easily, whereas criminals involved in money laundering can easily 
switch to other carriers of value. The level of process innovation is higher, but still lower 
than in the case of money laundering, because places and techniques of production can 
be altered only relatively slowly.
***
The environmental uncertainty associated with international efforts to curb the trade in 
conflict diamonds can be described as moderate. Policy makers had little knowledge of 
the diamonds industry and of conflict diamonds prior to the report published by the 
NGO Global Witness. Also, a regulatory scheme for rough diamonds is threatened by 
process innovation, as processing centres can be relocated to diamond mining countries 
and because synthetic diamonds may become true rivals to mined diamonds. However, 
process innovation is very slow and the scope for product innovation is veiy limited— 
from the viewpoint of buyers of diamonds these gems cannot be substituted by anything 
else.
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6.2.4 In sum: institutional preferences based on problem structure
As the analysis above shows, the issue of conflict diamonds can be characterised as in­
volving a moderate degree of asset specificity, a moderate degree of behavioural uncer­
tainty and a moderate degree of environmental uncertainty. Such a problem constella­
tion leads us to expect a moderate degree of legalisation in an international institution 
established to tackle this problem. Countries threatened by diamond related conflicts 
can be expected to insist on at least a moderate degree of legalisation in order to prevent 
other participating states from shirking, which could jeopardise the benefits the former 
category of states hopes to derive from an effective global regime against conflict dia­
monds. It can be assumed that they will not insist on hard law as a high degree of legali­
sation would make it more difficult for the created institution to respond to changes in a 
moderately uncertain environment. Furthermore, a moderate degree of legalisation can 
be expected to be sufficient to prevent shirking, as no state faces high direct and/or indi­
rect implementation costs and, consequently, no state has a strong incentive to shirk.
Problem attribute Level Argument
1. Asset specificity M oderate
A. Potential loss Moderate ■ Tough global policies to curb the illicit trade in conflict diamonds can 
help create peace and spur economic growth in conflict-ridden states in 
sub-Saharan Africa.
■ An effective policy helps to avert a consumer boycott in consuming 
states and keeps operations going in polishing states.
B. Propensity to 
shirk
Moderate ■ The costs borne by individual countries is largely proportional to the 
benefits they are expecting to gain from curbing the international trade 
in conflict diamonds.
■ Some countries profiting from trading illicit diamonds forego a source 
of revenue.
2. Behavioural un­
certainty
M oderate
A. Governance inca­
pacity
High ■ Most diamond producing countries with weak state capacities
B. Relative reliance 
on governmental 
monitoring
Low ■ Well organised NGOs with great expertise and staff on the ground ena­
bling them to act as watchdogs
C. Industry opacity High ■ Identification of origin of alluvial diamonds almost impossible
■ Diamond industry traditionally secretive with business done on the ba­
sis of a handshake
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3. Environmental 
uncertainty
M oderate
A. Novelty of policy 
issue
High ■ Governments had little knowledge of the trade in rough diamonds and 
the problems associated with conflict diamonds prior to the start of the 
KP.
B. Innovativeness 
a. Product innova­
tion
Low ■ Technological advances increase the attractiveness of synthetic dia­
monds, but still not a major challenge to natural diamonds of gem 
quality
b. Process innova­
tion
Moderate ■ Trend towards beneficiation, i.e. the establishment of cutting and pol­
ishing centres in mining countries which would undermine effective­
ness of KPCS; takes time to establish local expertise and economic ad­
vantages of beneficiation questionable from firms’ perspective
Table 6.3 Summary o f the assessm ent o f the constellation o f the problem  o f 
conflict diam onds.
6.3 Degree of legalisation
The degree of legalisation of the Kimberley Process will be assessed based on the Kim­
berley Process Certification Scheme as adopted with the Interlaken Declaration of No­
vember 2002, on final communiques adopted at plenary meetings thereafter, and on the 
praxis of implementation of the agreement. The trilogy of obligation, precision and dele­
gation already introduced in chapter 2 will guide the analysis below. It will be argued 
that the overall level of legalisation enshrined in the KPCS is of moderate degree.
6.3.1 Obligation
Assessing the degree of obligation established by an international institution requires 
the examination of three major elements: first, the question of whether or not the insti­
tution rests upon a legally binding agreement; second, in the case of a legally binding 
agreement, the extent to which the obligations established by the agreement are attenu­
ated through reservations, safeguards, and denunciation; third and finally, the extent to 
which the institution provides for procedures to detect non-compliance and to deter 
such behaviour through predefined consequences of breach.
6.3.1.1 Legal bindingness
The KPCS does not explicate whether or not it is a legally binding treaty. However, both 
the language adopted in the KPCS and the process through which it was made effective
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on the national level give strong indications for states’ intention not to design a legally 
binding treaty. The key document of the KP is simply called the ‘Kimberley Process Cer­
tification Scheme’, the terms ‘convention’ or ‘treaty’ do not appear anywhere in the offi­
cial documents. The preamble concludes for example with the phrase that participants 
‘recommend the following provisions’, and each provision states what participants 
‘should’ do (and not what they ‘shall’ do). Formulations such as ‘obligation’ are also 
missing throughout the document. The document refers to its signatories as ‘partici­
pants’, instead of ‘parties’. The official website of the Kimberley P ro c e s s ^  refers to the 
Scheme as ‘an innovative, voluntary system that imposes extensive requirements on 
participants to certify that shipments of rough diamonds are free from conflict dia­
monds’ (emphasis added). Furthermore, the KPCS was not implemented in the partici­
pating states in the same way as legally binding treaties are. In the United States, for ex­
ample, the KPCS was not presented to the Senate for its advice and consent, as would be 
required for the ratification of a legally binding treaty.
For these reasons, the KPCS cannot be considered a legally binding treaty. Price argues 
that because of its lack of formality, treaty-like final clauses, or registration require­
ments’ the KPCS presents a memorandum of understanding or a political agreement 
(Price 2003). The KPCS is therefore very much comparable to the Forty Recommenda­
tions discussed in the preceding chapter.
6.3.1.2 Tenacity o f obligation
Obligation attenuating provisions such as reservations, safeguards and withdrawal pro­
cedures are missing in the KPCS as this type of procedural provisions are typically only 
found in legally binding agreements.
59 The official website of the Kimberley Process can be accessed at http://www.kimberleyprocess.com:8o8o/site/.
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6.3 -1-3 Compliance mechanisms
The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme compensates for the low level of obligation 
resulting from legal non-bindingness through the mechanisms it established to detect 
and sanction non-compliance. For this assessment it is important to look beyond the 
KPCS as adopted in November 2002 and to include associated decisions made by par­
ticipants later on and the actual practice that developed around it to strengthen monitor­
ing mechanisms and to enforce compliance through a number of specific sanctions.
• Monitoring
On a ‘leaming-by-doing’ basis, the Kimberley Process has developed unique mechanisms 
to monitor compliance of both states applying to become official participants and of ex­
isting participants. A first important development that increased the degree of obligation 
enshrined in the KPCS was the policy it developed regarding the admission of applicants. 
As observed correctly by Price (2003), the KPCS of 2002 itself does not make clear how 
it should be determined which states are to be considered as official participants and 
which are not. Paragraph 8 of section VI only stipulates that ‘participation in the Certifi­
cation Scheme is open on a global, non-discriminatory basis to all applicants willing and 
able to fulfil the requirements of that Scheme’, without specifying how an applicant’s 
true willingness and capacity to comply ought to be assessed. This question proved 
highly controversial and was only settled at the first plenary meeting in Johannesburg in 
April 2003, be. three months after the official start of the KPCS. In that meeting, partici­
pants agreed that only those states should be formally admitted which documented that 
they had adopted a national legislation which ensured that the minimum requirements 
spelled out in the KPCS were met. States that did not meet this condition by the end of 
an agreed tolerance period were removed from the KP list. From the originally 51 states 
plus the EC which had originally signalled their interest in participating in the scheme, 
forty-five states plus the EC fulfilled these requirements by the expiration of the toler­
ance period and were therefore recognised as official KP participants. The remaining six 
states were in contrast removed from the list of official participants, among them some
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states with no stakes in the diamond trade, such as North Korea, and states with direct 
interests in the diamond trade but which had failed to demonstrate convincingly that 
they had established the domestic institutions necessary to correct previously poor prac­
tice with regard to conflict diamonds, such as Burkina Faso.
More recently, the admission procedures have further been toughened. In connection 
with Liberia’s application to join the KP, the KP chair of 2004 decided that in addition to 
‘a formal application including the required legislation and Kimberley Process certifi­
cate’ Liberia also had to accept ‘an ad hoc mission, led by South Africa, to assess the 
measures put in place ... to implement the KPCS; and an independent assessment by a 
recognised international organisation of Liberia's rough diamond production capacity’ 
(Martin 2004).
These accession procedures strengthened the KP’s degree of obligation considerably. A 
second development with the same effect relates to the question of how compliance 
could be ensured after a state had been officially accepted as a participant. The KPCS al­
ready addressed this question by establishing certain post-accession monitoring mecha­
nisms, in paragraphs 11-15 of Section VI. Paragraph 11 provides that ‘participants are to 
prepare, and make available to other participants ... information ... outlining how the re­
quirements of the Certification Scheme are being implemented within their respective 
jurisdictions’. Paragraph 13 specifies that ‘[wjhere further clarification is needed, par­
ticipants at plenary meetings, ... can decide on additional verification measures to be 
undertaken ... such as (a) requesting additional information and clarification from par­
ticipants; (b) review missions by other participants or their representatives where there 
are credible indications of significant non-compliance with the Certification Scheme’. 
This latter verification mechanism was also surrounded by considerable controversy, as 
some states feared that such review missions might give rise to industrial espionage. 
Paragraph 14 seeks to dispel such concerns by stipulating that ‘[rjeview missions are to 
be conducted in an analytical, expert and impartial manner with the consent of the par­
ticipant concerned’.
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A first test case of this review mechanism was the review mission that was sent to assess 
the implementation of the KPCS in the Central African Republic in June 2003, after the 
country's participation had been suspended following a military coup d’etat in March 
that same year. The review mission was satisfied with the Central African Republic’s 
willingness and capacity to implement the KPCS, and the suspension was lifted. The Re­
public of Congo was the second, and so far only, other participant to receive a review 
mission. In this case, the review mission was not satisfied and—as it will be explained 
below—Congo’s membership in the KPCS was suspended.
Whereas these review missions were already established in the original KPCS document 
the Scheme strengthened the monitoring mechanisms even further in its plenary meet­
ing in Sun City, South Africa in October 2003. A major breakthrough was achieved when 
the plenary adopted a peer review mechanism, so called ‘review visits’, to guarantee that 
the provisions of the KPCS are effectively implemented by all participants. In contrast to 
the already mentioned review missions, the review visits do not follow any suspected 
non-compliance but offer all participants on a voluntary basis an opportunity to demon­
strate their compliance. The desire was expresses for ‘the largest number of participants 
possible to volunteer to receive a review visit’ by the end of 2006 (Kimberley Process 
2003). A total of 12 participating states plus the EC, including most of the major export­
ing and importing states, had welcomed a review visit by end December 2004; another 
thirty participants have invited a review visit between 2005 and 2006 (Martin 2004).
TheKPCS’ two monitoring mechanisms are further strengthened by the significant role 
non-state actors are playing in this process. Their role is officially acknowledged in Sec­
tion VI paragraph 10 which grants their representatives, along with the representatives 
of the diamond industry and of international organisations—upon the invitation of par­
ticipants—the right to participate in plenary meetings as observers. The NGO commu­
nity is represented by Global Witness and Partnership Africa Canada, two NGOs with a 
highly focused interest in this topic and unparalleled expertise (see above under 6.2.2). 
The diamond industry is represented by the World Diamond Council and the Antwerp
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High Diamond Council (often referred to under its Flemish acronym HRD). Given their 
strong official status within the KP framework and their institutional strength, including 
several field officers, they are well disposed to provide ‘fire alarm’ oversight, to use 
McCubbins and Schwartz’s notion (1984).
These monitoring mechanisms are more far-reaching than those established under most 
other international institutions. They are largely comparable to those established under 
the Financial Action Task (see chapter 5), but go even a step further by assigning non­
state actors an official role in the monitoring process.
• Sanctions
Section III letter c of the KPCS lays the grounds for very far-reaching consequences for 
non-participation and non-compliance. This provision calls upon participants to ‘ensure 
that no shipment of rough diamonds is imported from or exported to a non-participant’. 
As the current participants of the scheme account for 99.8 percent of the world trade in 
rough diamonds (Kimberley Process 2005a), states with stakes in this business have 
very strong incentives, first, to become participants and second not be expelled from the 
scheme in order not be locked out of their market. The inclusion of this provision cre­
ated considerable controversy among the enacting states. Some states—namely Austra­
lia, Brazil, Canada, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Sierra Leone, Thailand, 
United Arab Emirates and United States—were concerned that such a provision contra­
dicted their obligations under the World Trade Organisation, in particular GATT provi­
sions on most-favoured-nation treatment (article I:i), elimination of quantitative restric­
tions (article XI :i) and non-discriminatory administration of quantitative restrictions 
(article XIII:i). On 24 February 2003, the General Council of the WTO recognised ‘the 
extraordinary humanitarian nature of this issue and the devastating impact of conflicts 
fuelled by the trade in conflict diamonds on the peace, safety and security of people in af­
fected countries and the systematic and gross human rights violations that have been 
perpetrated in such conflicts’. The Council therefore decided to waive the relevant GATT 
articles with respect to the prohibition of rough diamond imports from and exports to
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non-participants as stipulated by the KPCS from January 2003 until 31 December 2006 
(WTO 2003).
So far, the membership sanction has been used in the aforementioned case of the Re­
public of Congo. Since the very beginning of the KPSC, concerns were expressed about 
the certification practice of Congo Brazzaville. The country issued certificates for exports 
of considerably more rough diamonds than it could possible have mined domestically 
given its geological makeup. According to the 2003 KP chair, Abbey Chikane, the ROC 
had been exporting about 5.2-million carats of diamonds a year, while its production po­
tential was estimated at 55,000 carats a year. He suggested that this ‘huge discrepancy5 
resulted from a big illegal trade in rough diamonds (Fraser 2004).
This unaccounted inflow of rough diamonds was believed to stem primarily from the 
DRC and be driven mainly by tax evasion motives. As a result of the increasing doubts 
about the practices of Congo Brazzaville, other Kimberley Process participants and 
NGOs urged the government to accept a review mission. This review mission took place 
in May 2004 and found the ROC’s system of controls to be inadequate and poorly en­
forced (Fraser 2004,; Global Witness 2004a). Based on these findings, the chair decided 
on 9 July 204 to remove Congo Brazzaville from the list of participants with immediate 
effect. This step not only cut the ROC off the world trade in rough diamonds but also did 
not help the country to repair its reputation after a prolonged civil conflict.
The KPCS is comparable to the Forty Recommendations also with respect to the sanc­
tioning mechanisms. In both cases, sanctions evolved in practice and were not part of 
the original institution at its launch. Both institutions have developed strong instru­
ments to induce compliance with the rules they established by sanctioning non­
complying states independent of whether they officially accepted to be bound by these 
rules or not. The sanctions mechanism established by the KP therefore goes beyond 
those found in most other international agreements and also beyond the legally binding 
Vienna Convention.
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* * * * *
In sum, the level of obligation embodied by the KPCS is moderate. On the one hand, the 
agreement’s level of obligation is low, because states did not intend to create a legally 
binding agreement. It neither passed legislative ratification in member states nor was it 
registered under article 102 of the UN charter. On the other hand, enforcement mecha­
nisms set out in the KPCS and developed in subsequent practice are exceptionally strict. 
Participants are monitoring each other’s compliance with review visits and send review 
missions to countries which are suspected of breaching commitments. Countries found 
in neglect of their promises are excluded from the KPCS and, thus, from the lion’s share 
of the world market for rough diamonds, as participants are not allowed to trade with 
non-participants and entry into the club is also preceded by a review process.
6.3.2 Precision
The second dimension of an international institution’s design is the degree of precision 
with which its founding agreement is formulated. As in the previous two case studies, 
the degree of precision will be assessed based on the determinacy of the provisions 
found in the core agreement and their internal and external coherence. The KPCS is 
found to have a high degree of determinacy, but a moderate degree of coherence, as it is 
at odds with general principles of WTO law.
• Determinacy
The provisions contained in the KPCS are overall very determinate. Section I provides an 
18-item-long list of definitions, which is rather long compared to the overall shortness of 
the document and the limited scope of the agreement.
Some of the more ambiguous terms used in the KPCS such as ‘duly validated Certifi­
cates’ become clear in the overall context of the document and in particular in the light 
of the recommendations provided in the annexes. The term ‘appropriate’ appears only
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three times in the entire document, seven times less often than in the Forty Recommen­
dations, and ten times less often than in the Vienna Convention. The term ‘possible’ fea­
tures twice in the KPCS, whereas seven mentions are present in the Forty Recommenda­
tions. Taking also the general length of these agreements into consideration, the KPCS’ 
level of precision is certainly higher.
Annex I of the KPCS adds considerably to the degree of detail of the agreement. It spells 
out the minimum requirements of the certificates in terms of the information they must 
provide, including a great number of technical details such as ‘unique numbering with 
the Alpha 2 country code, according to ISO 3166-1’ and ‘Relevant Harmonised Commod­
ity Description and Coding System’.
• Coherence
The internal coherence of the norms spelled out in the KPCS is high, as they form to­
gether a non-contradictory whole with all provisions clearly serving one clear and over­
riding objective—to increase transparency in the international trade in rough diamonds. 
The external coherence, i.e. the relationship of the norms spelled out in the KPCS and 
other international norms, is slightly more problematic. As already noted, the restriction 
to trade exclusively with official KP participants as stipulated by Section III letter c of the 
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme conflicts with core GATT provisions. However, 
this clash of norms has been unambiguously sorted with the waiver granted by the WTO. 
The issue of non-compatibility with WTO rules has not been a problem in the case of 
neither the Vienna Convention, nor the Forty Recommendations, which have been as­
sessed in the previous chapters to possess a high—instead of only a moderate—degree of 
coherence.
6.3.3 Delegation
The overall degree of delegation found in the Kimberley Process is low, with both the de­
gree of centralisation and the level of independence being low. Kimberley Process estab­
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lishes a number of institutional bodies: plenary meetings, working groups and commit­
tees, groups carrying out the review missions and review visits, plus a chair and his se­
cretariat.
The central body of decision-making is the plenary. The KPCS requires that the ‘partici­
pants and observers are to meet in plenary annually, and on other occasions as partici­
pants may deem necessary, in order to discuss die effectiveness of the Certification 
Scheme’ (Section VI paragraph l). The plenary elects the chair and the vice-chair, re­
views the information submitted by the participants in accordance with Section V of the 
KPCS, decides whether and what kind of additional verification measures are needed in 
certain cases, and decides upon proposed modifications of the KPCS (Section VI para­
graph 19). Subsequent practice of the KPCS has shown that the plenary has taken its 
mandate very far. It has exercised substantial freedom in shaping and advancing the 
anti-conflict diamonds regime, most notably by establishing the instrument of member­
ship sanctions and peer reviews already discussed above. It is authorised to send review 
missions to countries suspected of breaching KPCS commitments, and has exercised this 
right twice already. The plenary has created working groups and committees (see below), 
to which it has delegated a number of functions. Representatives of the NGOs Global 
Witness and Partnership Africa Canada and of the diamond industry—namely of the 
World Diamond Council and HRD—participate in these plenary meetings. They do not 
possess the right to vote, but still exert considerable influence as decisions are usually 
without formal vote anyway and thanks to their expertise and clout. The influence of 
other civil society groups is, however, constrained by the fact that plenary meetings are 
usually held in private (Rule 27), and reports on compliance verification measures are 
strictly confidential (Section VI paragraph 15). While the degree of legalisation of the 
plenary is high, its independence is low. All participants can send a representative to the 
plenary meetings and as all decisions are made by consensus (Section VI paragraph 5 
KPCS, Rule 42 of Rules of Procedures), usually.
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In order to deal with certain issues in greater depth and with more continuity, the KP es­
tablished working groups and committees. The KPCS of November 2002 does not di­
rectly envisage working groups and committees, these bodies are rather the product of 
decisions taken later in plenary meetings. There are currently three working groups in 
place—one on monitoring, one on statistics and one on diamond expert issues—and two 
committees, namely the participation committee, and the selection committee. Authority 
has been delegated to these working groups and committees, as not all participants are 
represented in all of these committees or working groups, which usually comprise about 
ten members (incl. participants and NGO and industry). However, their authority is lim­
ited, as they do not possess the power to take any decisions. In the plenary meeting held 
in Gaineau, Canada, in late October 2004, the KP participants agreed to strengthen the 
role of the participation committee. The chair is now required to seek the advice of the 
committed on matters of non-compliance by participants, as well as on the assessment 
of applications to join the Kimberley Process. (Kimberley Process 2004).
The review visits and review missions already discussed above are conducted by groups 
of experts nominated by KP participants and observers. These groups are not fully inde­
pendent, as the state receiving the review visit or mission has to consent to the composi­
tion of the review group. However, the example of the Republic of Congo has shown, this 
imperfect independence does not necessarily stop a review mission recommending the 
suspension the membership of the participant, which has initially agreed to its work. The 
composition of the review missions is changing from review to review—the experts are 
drawn from a roster with currently more than 60 entries (Kimberley Process 2004).
The chairmanship is assumed by a government representative, typically a diplomat, 
from one of the participating states. The chair’s independence is limited. He is elected by 
the plenary and assumes this role for one year, starting on the first of January over every 
year (Rule 16 paragraph 1 (Rules of Procedures of Meetings of the Plenary, and its ad hoc 
Working Groups and Subsidiary Bodies). In the first year after the adoption of the KPCS, 
this function was assumed by Abbey Chikane from South Africa, who was succeeded by
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Tim Martin from Canada in 2004. For the year 2005 the Russian diplomat Vyacheslav 
Shtyrov acts as KP chairman. Recognising that this rather short-term of office could 
limit the continuity of the KP, the plenary amended the Rules of Procedure in October 
2003 so as to establish a vice-chair who succeeds the chair on completion of one calen­
dar year in office. Rule 16 paragraph 2 stipulates that the chair and vice-chair can only 
be re-elected once, thus serve a maximum period of two consecutive years. When elect­
ing a new chair, the plenary is urged to ensure ‘equitable geographical rotation and ... 
equitable representation of producing/exporting, importing/exporting and importing 
only participants’ (Rule 15 paragraph 3)
While the independence of chairman is limited, the centralisation of this role is not neg­
ligible. On the one hand, the functions assumed by the chairperson as listed in the Rules 
of Procedure are of procedural nature such as opening and closing of plenary meetings, 
directing the discussions, etc (Rule 33). However, section VI of the KPCS spells out more 
leading functions assumed by the chair including presiding over the plenary meetings, 
working groups, committees and ad hoc groups (paragraph 4), conduct consultations 
among participants when consensus seems impossible to establish (paragraph 5), receiv­
ing notification of an applicants interest in participating in the KPCS (paragraph 9), 
formulating recommendations regarding verification measures to be undertaken in 
cases of suspected non-compliance (paragraph 13), establishing review missions with the 
consent of the participant concerned (paragraph 14), and finally receiving reports on the 
results of compliance verification measures (paragraph 15).
The KP does not dispose of an independent and permanent secretariat. The secretariat is 
instead attached to the rotating chairmanship. The KPCS does not explicitly mention the 
establishment of a secretariat but recognises that ‘[f]or the effective administration of 
the Certification Scheme, administrative support will be necessary’ (Section VI para­
graph 6). Paragraph 7 goes on to mention four such administrative support functions. 
The role of the secretariat now covers responsibility ‘for scheduling meetings of the 
Working Groups, the circulation of documents between participants, maintenance of the
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Kimberley Process website and all other duties designated by the chair’, according to the 
official KP website (Kimberley Process 2005b). The centralisation of tasks in the secre­
tariat is thus very low.
* * * * *
The overall level of delegation reached by the KP is low. No institutionalised body with a 
degree of independence has been created. All decisions are taken by the plenary by con­
sensus. Its independence is low, because each member state sends one representative 
into the plenary, and because the plenary takes decisions unanimously.
Among the three cases studies discussed so far, the KPCS possesses the lowest level of 
delegation. With respect to delegation, the Vienna Convention and the KPCS represent 
the two opposing ends of the scale for assessing the level of delegation in international 
institutions, while the Forty Recommendations are in between. There are substantial dif­
ferences that exist between the level of independence established in the Vienna Conven­
tion and in the KPCS. Most importantly, INBC decisions require a two-thirds majority, 
whereas the KPCS plenary can take decisions unanimously only. Also, not all members 
are present in both the CND and the INBC, whereas the only decision making body of 
the KP is the plenary which assembles all participants. Similarly, the level of centralisa­
tion on the anti-narcotics framework is substantially higher than that of the anti-conflict 
diamonds institution. The UNODC is offering far-reaching technical and operational 
services, whereas no permanent support bodies have been created by the KP.
6.3.4 In sum: level of legalisation
As Table 6.4 summarises, the KPCS is an international agreement with a low level of le­
gal bindingness, but with strict non-compliance mechanisms, which were developed by 
the plenary in practice. Hence, this institution possesses a moderate level of obligation. 
The level of precision of the KPCS is high, as it is determinate and coherent, while having 
been in need of getting a special waiver from the WTO to ensure conformity with exist­
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ing principles of international law. The level of delegation is low, because the plenary— 
thus the convention of all signatories—is the only decision-making body, with no other 
independent body having been created. In sum, the KPCS’ level of legalisation is moder­
ate.
Indicator Level Argument
1. Obligation High
A. Legal bindingness
a. Language Low ■ Agreement is titled ‘Scheme’ and not ‘Convention’ or ‘Treaty’.
■ States are referred to as ‘participants’ not ‘parties’.
■ Agreement text uses formulations such as ‘recommend’, rather than 
‘shall’.
b. Procedural provi­ Low ■ Agreement not required to be adapted through ratification process in
sions participating states
B. Tenacity of obliga­ n/a ■ As typical for legally non-binding agreements, the KPCS does not
tion contain any provisions on withdrawal, reservations, etc.
C. Compliance mecha­
nisms
a. Monitoring High ■ Countries applying for KPCS participation may be reviewed before 
admission.
■ Review missions dispatched to participating countries suspected of 
non-compliance.
■ Review visits to participating countries as part of a voluntary peer- 
review system
■ Representatives from NGOs and industry organisations are officially 
included in these review missions and review visits.
b. Enforcement High ■ Non-participating and non-complying states excluded from KPCS, 
thus from 99.8% of the world market in rough diamonds
2. Precision High
A. Determinate High ■ Key terms are very precisely defined.
■ Annexes provide additional detailed requirements, thereby enhanc­
ing the determinacy of the core agreement.
B. Coherence Moderate ■ High degree of internal coherence
■ KPCS conflicts with fundamental WTO rules, but was granted a 
waiver from the WTO.
3. Delegation Low
A. Independence
a. Human resources Low ■ Secretariat provided by annually rotating chair
■ Representatives of the plenary are directly sent by member states
b. Financial re­ Low ■ The agreement does not establish any agents with additional funding
sources to fulfil delegated tasks.
c. Decision maldng Low ■ Plenary decisions are taken by consensus, usually no formal vote
■ Plenary consists of delegates from all countries acting as their coun­
try’s representative
■ Working groups and committees preparing plenary decisions consist 
of about 10 members acting on behalf of all KP participants but with­
out decision-making power.
B. Centralisation
a. Rule making Low ■ All decisions remain with plenary, no rule making powers delegated
b. Implementation Low ■ Implementation remains with plenary, no implementation delegated
■ Secretariat only limited support role
c. Dispute resolution Low ■ Enforcement dealt with by plenary, working groups can only recom­
and enforcement mend measures
Table 6 .4  Summary o f the assessm ent o f the level o f legalisation o f the 
Kimberley Process Certification Schem e.
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6.4 Comparing expectations and reality
After the troubling case presented by the TCE framework’s failure to reach a conclusive 
design prediction in the previous chapter, this third case study is restoring the frame­
work’s record to some extent. The analysis of the problem constellation underlying the 
trafficking in conflict diamonds reached the conclusion that an international institution 
with a moderate level of legalisation is best apt at catering for the specific hazards inter­
national cooperation on this policy issue. Moderately hard law would simultaneously 
help to keep at bay the medium incentives that some states have to shirk and to provide 
policymakers with sufficient flexibility to adjust their instruments gradually as they are 
gaining more experience in dealing with this very novel policy problem.
The actual design of the KPCS and its institutional development since its adoption 
matches indeed these expectations. It is an institution with a moderate level of legalisa­
tion, as it disposes of an effective sanctioning and monitoring mechanism, administered 
by the plenary. Although the KPCS’ degree of legalisation is weaker than that of the Vi­
enna Convention in terms of legal bindingness and delegation, it compensates these 
weaknesses partly with extraordinarily well established monitoring mechanisms and 
sanctions, which it effectively imposes not only on states that have formally committed 
themselves to comply with the Scheme and later failed to do so, but also on states that 
have never accepted the Kimberley Process to be applicable to their jurisdiction. Also in 
terms of precision and delegation does the KPCS reach moderate levels of legalisation. 
Thus, in the case of the global anti-conflict diamond regime, the transaction cost eco­
nomics approach has correctly predicted the design of the international institution cre­
ated to tackle the concerning problem.
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7 Small arms and light weapons: The United Nations 
Programme of Action on the Illicit Trade in Small 
Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects
The proliferation and accumulation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) provides 
another illustration of the blurring boundary between crime and war. Weapons of this 
category kill almost as many people in homicides and suicides as in armed conflicts, and 
in many cases organised crime groups engage with politically motivated rebels in ex­
changes of weapons and illicit drugs. A central element of the increasing blur between 
the criminal and the military side of the small arms and light weapons problem is the 
growing multiplicity of actors who have access to such arms. During the Cold War era, 
leading powers equipped allied states and rebel groups with small arms and light weap­
ons in great numbers. Consequently, the proliferation of SALW, i.e. the transfer from a 
handful of producing states to a growing number of recipient states, does not constitute 
a new phenomenon, whereas their diffusion, i.e. the dispersal within societies, certainly 
does (Klare 1995). The splintering of governmental forces and guerrilla troops contrib­
utes to an uncontrolled leakage from firearm stocks, and improved means of transport 
and communications facilitate the worldwide diffusion of these arms—especially into 
countries with weak governance capacities (Muggah 2001).
As in the case of conflict diamonds discussed in the previous chapter, international in­
terest into the diffusion of small arms and light weapons arose in the mid-1990s against 
the backdrop of a decline in regional conflict and superpower confrontation and the si­
multaneous rise in internal warfare involving irregular troops pitched against govern­
mental forces.
In contrast to the negotiations aimed at curbing the trade in conflict diamonds, which 
cumulated in the signing of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, the Small Arms 
Light Weapons (SALW) initiative has so far not resulted in a unified agreement, nor are 
the measures adopted anywhere close to the far-reaching mechanisms developed under
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the KPCS. Rather, SALW became a matter of negotiations in a variety of regional and 
global policy fora, leading to the adoption of over a dozen agreements and protocols 
dedicated to this topic. The United Nations have been at the centre stage both in pushing 
this problem onto the international policy agenda and in developing measures to counter 
it. The cornerstone of the UN efforts is the legally non-binding Programme o f Action to 
Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in 
All Its Aspects (Programme of Action or PoA, in brief), which was adopted at a special 
United Nations Conference in New York on 20 July 2001.
As the following discussion will show, this fourth and final case study challenges the de­
sign hypotheses formulated in the opening chapters of this study more than did any of 
the previous cases. Specifically, we will find that the predicted institutional design does 
not match the actual design outcome, as the analysis of the problem constellation leads 
us to expect a moderate degree of legalisation whereas the PoA remains very weakly le­
galised. We reach this finding by following the same structure of argument as in the pre­
vious case studies. In a first analytic step, the underlying problem constellation is as­
sessed based on our three TCE variables, which allows us to reach certain expectations 
regarding the optimal design of an institution established to tackle this type of problem. 
This design expectation is then compared to the actual design of the Programme of Ac­
tion, which is categorised in a second analytic step based on the three legalisation di­
mensions obligation, precision and delegation. Again, this two-step analysis is preceded 
by an opening sub-chapter which presents the scope and nature of the small arms and 
light weapons phenomenon and provides and overview of the major international initia­
tives launched to tackle the problems arising from an uncontrolled flow in these weap­
ons. Special attention is paid to the already mentioned Programme of Action.
7.1 Sm all arm s and light weapons as an international policy problem
This first subchapter seeks to prepare the grounds for the later testing of the design hy­
potheses by positioning the small arms and light weapons phenomenon in its context 
and by assessing its scope and nature. Subsequently, an overview of major international
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initiatives launched to tackle the problems associated with the diffusion of small arms 
and light weapons will be provided. The third paragraph of this subchapter examines the 
2001 United Nations Programme of Action in greater detail.
7.1.1 Scope and nature of the international policy problem
There does not exist a single universally agreed definition of small arms and light weap­
ons. According to the OSCE’s working definition—the definition most widely referred to 
in international policy circles—these two weapon categories include weapons that are 
‘man-portable, made or modified to military specifications for use as lethal instruments 
of war’ (OSCE 2000, Preamble, paragraph 3). The distinction between small arms and 
fight weapons is based on the number of people typically operating such a weapon. The 
category of small arms comprises ‘those weapons intended for use by individual mem­
bers of armed or security forces’, such as revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and 
carbines, sub-machine guns, assault rifles, and fight machine guns (European Union 
1998,; OSCE 2000). Hunting rifles, civilian handguns, and weapons considered as col­
lectibles do not fall within this category (Calhoun 2001). Light weapons, on the other 
hand, are designed for use by a small team or crew of armed or security forces (OSCE 
2000). This second category includes heavy machine guns, hand held under-barrel and 
mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft guns, portable anti-tank guns, recoil- 
less rifles, portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems, portable launchers 
of anti-aircraft missile systems, and mortars of calibres less than 100 mm. This defini­
tion situates fight weapons between the category of small arms and major weapons that 
are reported to the UN Register of Conventional Arms as established by the United Na­
tions General Assembly resolution 46/36L of 9 December 1991. Anti-personnel land­
mines, which according to the above definition would fall within the category of small 
arms, have been addressed with separate international initiatives and are usually not in­
cluded in the international negotiations focused on SALW. Man-portable air defence 
systems, so-called MANPADs, have recently gained considerable attention of the inter­
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national community and are now often debated separately from other SALW60. The 
United States has taken a particularly strong interest in this weapons category. A 2004 
CRS report estimated that 25-30 non-state groups might be in possession of such weap­
ons (Bolkcom, Feickert, and Elias 2004)61 and be possibly prepared to launch them 
against civilian aircrafts as occurred in November 2002 when a Kenya based Al-Qaeda 
cell fired two surface-to-air missiles at an Israeli Boeing 757 jet flying out of Mombassa.
The variety of weapons subsumed under the SALW category is mirrored in the many dif­
ferent types of problems the diffusion and accumulation of these weapons causes. As the 
following discussion will show, small arms and light weapons affect states in very differ­
ent ways and to varying degrees. It is thereby not so much the absolute prevalence rate 
of SALW found in one society that matters but rather the inexistence of governance 
structures that are strong enough to control the misuse of such weapons. A central as­
pect is hereby the control over access, which in turn requires effective oversight of the 
manufacture and trade in small arms and light weapons. This paragraph engages in this 
discussion by examining in a first step why small arms and light weapons present a 
problem requiring an international response. In a second step, the discussion sheds light 
on the production, demand and trafficking patterns found with respect to small arms 
and light weapons.
y.1.1.1 Scope o f the problem
As mentioned briefly in the beginning of this chapter, the diffusion of small arms and 
light weapons lays right in the intersection between crime and war both in terms of the 
functions they serve and the actors they involve.
First, small arms—light weapons much less so—are at the centre stage of violent crime. 
The United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA) estimates that ap­
60 One example of such a separate MANPAD policy is the “Elements for Export Controls of Man-Portable Air De­
fence Systems” as adopted by the participating states of the Wassenaar Arrangement in December 2003.
61 Small Arms Survey puts the number of non-state actors in MANPAD possession to 13 (SAS 2004).
245
proximately 200,000 people die annually from small arms-inflicted homicides and sui­
cides (DDA 2005). It is thereby of interest to note that empirical studies typically find 
the correlation between gun ownership and the level of violent crime to be weak. For in­
stance, the average annual number of gun homicides per 100,000 guns varies between
0.5 in Germany to 302 in South Africa (Small Arms Survey 2004). However, the share of 
violent acts with a deadly outcome tends to be higher in places with a high arms preva­
lence. Zimring (1995), for instance, notes that while the serious assault rate in the gun- 
wielding United States was only about 30 percent higher than in the United Kingdom, 
the homicide rate of the former exceeded that of the latter by a full 530 percent. Killias 
(1993) confirms this correlation based on a broader country sample.
On the international level, it is generally agreed that the extensive diffusion and an easy 
availability of small arms and light weapons poses a significant factor in most contempo­
rary armed conflicts (Wezeman 2003). The UN assumes that more than 95 percent of 
the major violent conflicts in the 1990s were waged with small arms, killing more than 
four million people62, 90 percent of which were civilians. Also after an abating of the 
most deadly civil wars of the 1990s, around 300,000 deaths can still directly be attrib­
uted to the use of small arms and light weapons in armed conflicts each year (DDA 
2005). The consensus on the impact the diffusion of small arms and light weapons 
breaks down when it comes to the actual causal mechanisms and to the direction of cau­
sation underlying this link. Many UN officials see in the SALW diffusion a factor trigger­
ing the outbreak of violence and armed conflict as for instance reflected in the statement 
by Mervyn Patterson, the UN chief representative in northern Afghanistan: ‘There is a 
universal understanding that if weapons are present it will lead to conflict’ (quoted in 
Oxfam and Amnesty International 2003,11). In addition to the triggering effect, the UN 
Department for Disarmament Affairs attributes SALW also a conflict prolonging and ag­
gravating effect when stating that that small arms and light weapons ‘destabilise regions; 
spark, fuel and prolong conflicts; obstruct relief-programmes; undermine peace initia­
62 The European Commission’s estimates are at three million fatalities (European Commission 2001).
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tives; exacerbate human rights abuses; hamper development; and foster a ‘culture of vio­
lence’ (DDA 2005). This lumping together of various distinct causal effects is contra­
dicted both inside and outside the UN. The UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small 
Arms asserts in its 1997 report that ‘[w]hile not in themselves causing the conflicts in 
which they are used, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons affects the inten­
sity and duration of violence and encourages militancy rather than peaceful resolution of 
unsettled differences. Perhaps most grievously, we see a vicious circle in which insecu­
rity leads to a higher demand for weapons, which itself breeds still greater insecurity, 
and so on’ (UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms 1997, 2). The United 
States stresses the position that the primary effect of SALW is that of exacerbating con­
flicts the causes of which have to be found in ‘political, economic, ethnic, and religious 
differences and disparities’ (Calhoun 2001, 10). Also the majority of academic scholars 
maintains that there is little empirical evidence suggesting that the supply of weapons is 
either necessary or sufficient to start violent conflict (e.g. Sislin and Pearson 2001). 
Similar to the weak correlation between the prevalence of gun ownership and the assault 
rate on the domestic level, we find the relationship between SALW prevalence and the 
risk of civil or interstate war to be largely spurious. As we will see in the discussion in the 
next sub-section, small arms and light weapons are significantly more common in stable 
countries of Western Europe and North America than in most conflict-ridden regions of 
the world. The risk that small arms and light weapons unfold their deadly potentials in 
armed conflict can be assumed to be positively correlated not with the prevalence of 
SALW but with the weakness of domestic governance structures.
7.1.1.2 Demand, supply and trafficking
This paragraph scrutinises the global demand for and supply of small arms and light 
weapons, and sheds light on both licit and illicit trade in these weapons.
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• Demand and prevalence
Worldwide, there are about 500 million small arms and light weapons in circulation^, 
with the AK-47 accounting for more than 10 percent of this total. With respect to the dis­
tribution of small arms and light weapons, two separate aspects are of interest: the com­
parison, first, between government controlled stockpiles and private gun ownership and, 
second, between different world regions.
The independent research institute Small Arms Survey (2003)64 posits that more than 
80 percent of all firearms manufactured around the globe are purchased by civilians, 
who are supposed to legally possess 59 percent of all firearms. In the European Union of 
the 15 member states of 2002, around 81 percent of all firearms (or 67 million) were in 
civilian possession, while 17 percent were hold by police and only 2 percent by military 
forces. Great disparities existed, however, between different EU member states, with 
private gun ownership being relatively widespread in Germany, Finland and France, 
while being considerably more limited in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Ex­
act numbers are hard to come by, as public officials throughout the EU acknowledge that 
unlicensed ownership greatly outnumbers legal ownership. The United States is pre­
sumably the country with the greatest number of privately owned small arms, with a 
prevalence of 238 to 276 million firearms and still growing demand. In many conflict 
prone regions of the world small arms and light weapons are much less common than 
generally assumed. Small Arms Survey showed in its 2003 yearbook that, for instance, 
Afghanistan’s actual weapon stockpiles are estimated to contain only between 500,000 
and 1.5 million weapons. Also stockpiles in Africa have been greatly exaggerated, with 
firearm prevalence much lower than in most other world regions. SAS asserts that the 44 
sub-Saharan countries account for no more than 30 million firearms (or less than 5 per­
cent of the world total), including those in possession of civilians, insurgents and public
63 Estimates range from 100-640 million (Calhoun 2001). Small Arms Survey (2002) puts the total global stockpiles 
of small arms and light weapons to at least 638 million; the number most widely cited is 500 million.
64 This paragraph relies extensively on research conducted by SAS, which has established itself as the most trusted 
source of data on small arms and light weapons.
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officials. As these comparisons demonstrate, the total number of small arms is of very 
limited relevance for understanding the issue of arms and conflict. This phenomenon 
may be attributed to three major reasons (Wezeman 2003, 20). First, the SALW cate­
gory is very broad encompassing weapons that vary considerably in terms of their capa­
bilities. Second, most of world’s SALW are held by civilians and regular armies, most of 
which are unlikely to use them in situations other than justifiable violence such as self- 
defence or peacekeeping operations (Stohl 2005, 20). Third, and finally, in many of to­
day’s armed conflicts both the official military and the irregular troops are relatively 
poorly armed, so that even small-scale transfers of small arms can make an important 
difference in terms of military capabilities and the development of the conflict. Overall, it 
is not so much the prevalence of SALW as such that matters but only in relation to a so­
ciety’s capacity to control ownership and regulate use of such arms as already noted 
above.
• Supply
The manufacturing of small arms and light weapons is dispersed throughout the globe, 
whereby we need to distinguish between large-scale industrial and craft production. 
Small Arms Survey (2004) estimates that at least 1,249 companies in more than 90 
countries are involved in some aspect of small arms and light weapons production. The 
geographical distribution of SALW-producing companies is relatively concentrated, with 
Europe—including the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)—accounting for 40 
percent of the number all such companies. Also in terms of output levels, can we find a 
strong geographical concentration. Of the nearly eight million small arms that were pre­
sumably produced in 2000, 70 percent originated from the US and the EU (Small Arms 
Survey 2002). Global SALW production continues to be dominated by only 13 coun­
tries65, although the number of SALW producing countries has doubled between 1960- 
1999 (Oxfam and Amnesty International 2003, 5b), and an increasing number of coun­
65 Austria, Belgium, Brazil, China, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, the Russian Federation, Spain, Switzerland, the 
UK, and the US.
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tries is becoming self-sufficient in the manufacturing of small arms and related ammuni­
tion either through indigenous or licensed production (Calhoun 2001).
An important aspect of SALW manufacturing is craft production, which takes place on a 
low-scale, and typically involving the recycling of spare parts or remnants of more so­
phisticated arms (Small Arms Survey 2003). In economic terms, craft production is a 
minor, but not negligible, segment of global small arms production. However, it is of 
considerable importance with respect to the destabilising effect of SALW as this type of 
production predominantly takes place in or close to countries threatened by armed con­
flict and these hand-made small arms are typically manufactured and sold outside legal 
frameworks. Ghana, for instance, is an important artisan manufacturer reported to pro­
duce up to 200,000 firearms each year (Vines 2005). Other countries with illicit craft 
production are Pakistan, South Africa, Chile and the Philippines. Growing craft produc­
tion is also reported from Senegal, Guinea and Nigeria.
• Trafficking
The aspect that is most amenable to international intervention is the trade in small arms 
and light weapons. The total value of annual global transfers of small arms and light 
weapons is estimated to measure US$4 billion (Small Arms Survey 2002), which is more 
than half the estimated US$7 billion global SALW production. Illicit trafficking in SALW 
is believed to be worth less then US$1 billion a year, accounting for 10-20 percent of 
global trade in SALW (Small Arms Survey 2001)66. According to the UN Guidelines for 
International Arms Transfers of 1991, illicit trafficking in weapons can be understood as 
‘international trade in conventional arms which is contrary to the laws of states and/or 
international law’ (Paragraph 7, A/RES/46/36H). The Panel of Governmental Experts 
on Small Arms refers to this definition directly in its 1997 report (para 57). Despite the 
apparent simplicity of this definition, the distinction between licit and illicit trade is in
66 A UN estimate put the share of illicitly acquired small arms to 40-60 percent (Crossette 2001).
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practice far from clear, as the overwhelming majority of small arms traded on the black 
market began as part of the legal trade (Mathiak and Lumpe 2000). An increasing body 
of empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that the primary channel by which actors 
obtain arms for misuse is through diversion. According to Small Arms Survey, diversion 
‘can be authorised, or unauthorised, intentional or unintentional, since in the broadest 
sense diversion is simply the movement of a weapon from legal origins to the illicit 
realm’ (Small Arms Survey 2002, 128). Four major channels of diversion from the for­
mal to informal sector can be discerned.
First, weapons can become illicit when individuals, companies or states seek to secretly 
carry out small arms transfers to a non-state party without the official approval of gov­
ernment of the recipient state. In this case, the transfer constitutes an interference in the 
internal affairs of the state to which the weapons are shipped and is thus an illegal act 
(UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms 1997, 51). A contemporary example 
of this type of illicit transfer is Venezuela’s alleged support of FARC in Colombia 
(Wezeman 2003). Even with the approval of the recipient state, a small arms transfer 
can become illicit when it is in violation of a regional or international arms embargo tar­
geted against that state or a non-state party operating in its territory. According to esti­
mates of the Small Arms Survey, more than 54 countries can be directly or indirectly 
linked to SALW transfers in violation of international arms embargoes (Small Arms Sur­
vey 2002). For instance, a panel of experts examining the effectives of a weapons em­
bargo imposed on UNITA in 1993 exposed Togo and Burkina Faso as issuing false end- 
user certificates for weapons which were later diverted to UNITA (S/2000/203 of 10 
March 2000). The UN Panel of Experts on Liberia reported illicit transfers between 1998 
and 2002 from Serbia to embargoed Liberia, involving surplus weapons such as 5,000 
automatic rifles, over four million rounds of rifle ammunition, machine guns, pistols, 
grenade launchers, and hand grenades. In this case, arms dealers used false documenta­
tion to obtain export permits from the Ukrainian and Yugoslav governments to transfer 
small arms to Nigeria and then to divert the weapons to Liberia (S/2002/1115 of 25 Oc­
tober 2002). In some cases such contraventions of national laws and international sane-
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tions are motivated by political considerations, whereas in other cases they are driven by 
economic motives. With the end of the Cold War and shrinking defence budgets, many 
states became increasingly willing to sell weapons for profit, where previously political 
considerations had prevailed (Lumpe, Meek, and Naylor 2000).
A second important source of diversion consists of weapons that may disappear from 
government and military weapons stockpiles as a result of mismanagement, corruption 
among soldiers or other personnel with legal access to government-owned weapons, or 
theft or raid by criminal organisations or rebel groups. Small Arms Survey estimates in­
dicate that annually over 1 million light weapons are stolen or lost in this way around the 
world. For instance, Soviet troops are reported to have ‘lost’ 81,000 tons of ammunition 
during the withdrawal from East Germany (Smith 1999a). But also in today’s Russia, the 
problem of unexplained losses of arms and weapons from military stockpiles is still 
prevalent, with the Russian Office of the Chief Military Prosecutor claiming that up to 
54,000 firearms disappeared in 2004 (Biting the Bullet 2005). Albania’s collapse in 1997 
was accompanied by raids of government arsenals with more than half a million weap­
ons flowing into the hands of looting individuals and gangs (Stohl 2005). Iraq provides a 
more recent example with research by Small Arms Survey suggesting that ‘[t]he collapse 
of Saddam Hussein’s regime led to the single most significant small arms stockpile 
transfer the world has known’ (Small Arms Survey 2004). According to the same source, 
Iraqi civilians may have brought 7-8 million small arms in their possession. Cragin and 
Hoffman (2003) show how most SALW trafficked into Colombia from Ecuador and Peru 
emanates from stolen military stocks or supplies that have been illegally resold by mem­
bers of private security firms. In Africa, allegations have been raised against Guinean 
troops participating in the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) to have 
supplied Liberian rebels with weapons on a regular basis—although these allegations 
have not yet been fully proven (Vines 2005).
Third, it is also quite common for small arms to fall into the hands of criminals or rebel 
groups as a result of theft from legitimate private owners. In the US, for example, no
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safe-storage requirements exist for legal gun ownership (Cook and Leitzel 1998), with 
the consequence that annually approximately 500,000 small arms enter the black mar­
ket through this channel (Small Arms Survey 2004). In South Africa, this same figure 
amounts to almost 25,000 firearms a year (Swart 2005).
A forth and final source of diversion is found in countries with little constraining, am­
biguous or ineffective domestic laws concerning the purchase and reselling of small 
arms. Under such circumstance ‘straw purchasers’ can buy several weapons at once and 
then illegally resell them, typically across international borders from one country with 
rather lax regulations, e.g. United States, to one with comparably strict gun laws, e.g. 
Mexico and Canada (Fridman and Andreas 1999).
7.1.2 International initiatives
Given the growing concern about the disastrous consequences of the misuse of small 
arms and light weapons in a great number of intrastate conflicts, a several international 
initiatives were launched from the second half of the 1990s onwards to tackle the traf­
ficking in these weapons. The UN can be seen as the driving motor behind these efforts, 
but a number of regional initiatives have emerged alongside the development of a global 
framework. The following discussion seeks to untangle this patchwork by providing a 
short overview of the major international and regional initiatives.
The first—and most conventional—type of initiatives to reduce the SALW-inflicted vio­
lence in post-Cold War conflicts are mandatory arms embargoes imposed on warring 
parties—on governmental and/or irregular troops. Arms embargoes imposed by the 
UNSC prohibit states from transferring arms to the embargoed state or non-state party, 
and—pursuant to article 25 of the UN Charter—oblige states to adopt the necessary 
measures to implement and enforce the embargo domestically against individuals and 
companies within their jurisdiction (Gillard 2000). During the 1990s, the UNSC im­
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posed arms embargoes against a total of 13 different parties6? (Lumpe, Meek, and Naylor 
2000). The effectiveness of such arms embargoes is, however, often quite limited. In 
many cases, states are far too willing to circumvent such embargoes for political or eco­
nomic reasons, especially since compliance with these embargoes is typically neither 
monitored nor enforced68. Given the limited effectiveness of arms embargoes and their 
ex post facto  adoption, the UN started to look for other policy tools, which would tackle 
the problem at an earlier stage—possibly before the actual outbreak of armed conflict. 
With its resolution adopted on 12 December 1995 (A/RES/50/70B), the UN General As­
sembly sparked off a number of international initiatives that sought to curb the illicit 
trade in SALW. This resolution required the secretary general to scrutinise the small 
arms problem and to assess possible cures in a report with the assistance of the Panel of 
Governmental Experts on Small Arms, which this resolution also established. A first 
such report was published on 27 August 1997 (A/52/298) which presented 24 specific 
recommendations on SALW reduction and the prevention of their spread. One of these 
recommendations suggested the convening of a UN conference addressing the issues 
raised in the report (recommendation k). This recommendation was acted upon with an 
international conference held in New York between 9th and 20th of July 2001, which 
culminated in the adaptation of a Programme of Action (PoA) to Prevent, Combat and 
Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects 
(A/CONF.192/15). This Programme of Action presents the core in the establishment of 
global norms on the trafficking in SALW, and will be discussed further in the next sec­
tion.
67 Including arms embargoes targeted against Afghanistan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, UNITA and Yugoslavia.
68 The United Nations has recently adopted a number of measures to strengthen the effectiveness of embargoes such 
as (1) the call on states to pass domestic legislation that makes violations of UN embargoes by individuals and com­
panies within their jurisdiction a criminal—not just a civil—offence (S/RES/1196 of 16 September 1998 paragraph 
2); (2) the establishment of international commissions to investigate allegations of embargo violations (e.g. Rwanda 
(S/RES/1013 of 7 September 1995 and S/RES/1161 of 9 April 1998) and UNITA (S/RES/1237 of 7 May 1999); and 
(3) the imposition of secondary sanctions against non-complying states (e.g. Liberia (S/RES/1343 of 7 March 
2001)). The effectiveness of these measures still remains to be seen.
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Almost simultaneously to the process that led to the PoA, the Vienna-based UN Com­
mission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice started negotiations on a draft Proto­
col Against the Illicit Manufacturing o f and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and 
Components and Ammunition (hereafter referred to as the Firearms Protocol) 
(A/RES/55/255) from April 1998 onwards. This Protocol was largely pioneered by the 
G8 (then still G7) Lyon Group69 and incorporated in the UN framework as a supplement 
to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime. The protocol 
entered into force on 3 July 2005 after the minimum threshold of forty ratifications had 
been passed ninety days prior to that date in accordance with article 18 of the protocol. 
By end October 2005, a total of 44 states had ratified the protocol, and other 52 states 
had signed but not yet ratified. Among the bystanders are a number of states with major 
stakes in this problem such as the Russian Federation, United States, and Israel 
(UNODC 2005b). The Protocol complements the PoA by addressing the problem of 
SALW proliferation primarily from a law enforcement perspective targeted against 
transnational organised crime, while the Programme of Action perceives the proble- 
matique primarily from a human security view point and seeks to tackle it with arms 
control and disarmament measures.
The awareness created through the UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms 
also gave rise to a large number of regional agreements—whereby marked differences 
exist between world regions. The African continent is home to the greatest number of 
agreements that are specifically targeted against the illicit trade in small arms and light 
weapons. The most far-reaching agreement on SALW is the Moratorium on the Impor­
tation, Exportation and Manufacture o f Small Arms and Light Weapons in West A f­
rica— at least in letter if not so much in practice. This moratorium was adopted by the 
fourteen states of the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) in Oc­
tober 1998. In contrast to most other agreements, this moratorium seeks to curb SALW
69 The Lyon group is a working group within the G8. It was established at the 1995 Economic Summit in Halifax to 
address the risks emerging from transnational organised crime.
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procurement not only by non-state actors but also by governments, as it prohibits the 
‘importation, exportation and manufacture of light weapons in ECOWAS member 
states’. Article 9 of the Code of Conduct Code adopted in Lome on 10 December 1999 for 
the implementation of the Moratorium stipulates that the prohibition of imports can 
only be waived when states or individual obtain an exemption certificate from the 
ECOWAS secretariat prior to importing weapons. Despite this moratorium, ECOWAS 
states still continue to import significant amounts of small arms and light weapons from 
Western and other sources (Small Arms Survey 2004). An important share of these im­
ports takes place in violation of article 9 without the prior authorisation by the ECOWAS 
secretariat. Alex Vines (2005) demonstrates how Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea 
and Liberia all received numerous arms shipments between 2002 and 2004 without re­
questing an exemption. Recognising the weakness of the existing moratorium, several 
ECOWAS member states have lobbied for a legally binding convention on SALW. The 
current working draft Protocol Regarding the Fight Against the Proliferation o f Small 
Arms and Light Weapons is scheduled to be adopted by the end of 2005. Less ambitious 
in their substantive scope, but legally binding are the Protocol on Control o f Fire Arms, 
Ammunition and Other Related Materials adopted by the Southern African Develop­
ment Community (SADC) in August 2001 and the Nairobi Protocol fo r  the Prevention, 
Control and Reduction o f Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region 
and the Horn of Africa, which was adopted in 2004. This agreement, signed by the Gov­
ernments of Burundi, the DRC, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, the Sey­
chelles, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda, will be legally binding once ratified by two thirds 
of signatory states, which has not occurred at the time of writing.
In the Americas, the two most important agreements on small arms and light weapons 
arc the Inter-American Convention Against the Manufacture and Illicit Trafficking o f 
Firearms, Explosives and Related Materials (CIFTA) (AG/RES. 1800 (XXXI-O/01)), 
wlich entered into force on 1 July, 1998 and the Model Regulations fo r  the Control o f 
International Movement o f Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition. 
Beth agreements were concluded under the auspices of the Organisation of American
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States (OAS). The focus of these two initiatives is similar to that of the UN Firearms Pro­
tocol in the sense that it is primarily concerned about illicit arms trafficking by criminal 
groups, rather than in the context of security and development. Of the total 34 OAS 
member states eight have neither signed nor ratified, among them Canada, Colombia 
and the United States (OAS 2005).
Within the European Union, the core agreement with respect to SALW is the EU Joint 
Action on Small Arms which was adopted on 17 December 1998. The EU pledges in this 
legally non-binding agreement to work towards the realisation of a series of principles 
and measures, most important of which is the restriction imposed on exporting coun­
tries to supply arms only to governments. This joint action is strongly embedded in the 
EU  Code o f Conduct fo r  Arms Exports, which the General Affairs Council adopted half a 
year earlier (8675/2/98 Rev. 2, of 8 June 1998). The EU designed its measures primarily 
as tools to provide security assistance to regions emerging from conflict rather than as a 
law enforcement instrument.
Furthermore, a number of transatlantic agreements exist, with the Document in Small 
Arm s and Light Weapons o f the Organisation fo r  Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE) being the most important one. This legally non-binding agreement was adopted 
by the 55 member states on 24 November 2000 and makes detailed recommendations to 
exporting countries on the criteria that should be used when evaluating whether a coun­
try is to be allowed to import SALW. Although more precise in its recommendations, the 
OSCE largely overlaps with the PoA in terms of scope.
Still more far-reaching in terms of its geographical reach is the Wassenaar Arrangement 
on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, 
which comprises a total 34 member states from the Americas, Asia, Europe and Oceania. 
On 11-12 December 2002 the Wassenaar states adopted a non-binding Best Practice 
Guidelines fo r  Exports o f Small Arms and Light Weapons, which refers directly to UN 
PoA and the 2000 OSCE Document.
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The least active region with respect to SALW regulation remain South Asia and the Mid­
dle East. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has shown some willing­
ness to discuss small arms, but the strong reluctance against any agreement that could 
potentially sanction outside interference in internal matters has limited the scope of 
these initiatives (Small Arms Survey 2001).
A major limitation of almost all these international initiatives on SALW—the ECOWAS 
moratorium being the sole exception—is their exclusive focus on transfers to non-state 
parties and their neglect of the equally wide-spread misuse by government officials or by 
government-backed militias. The Report of the Panel of Governmental (sic) Experts on 
Small Arms of 1997 (A/52/298), for instance, clearly distinguishes between governmen­
tal forces which are presented as disciplined troops respecting established norms of in­
ternational law and irregular forces which make no distinction between a combatant and 
non-combatant, with the effect of de-legitimising the latter’s right to acquired small 
arms and light weapons.
The 1999 SALW Report (A/54/404 of 24 September 1999) consequently identifies the 
following categories as recipient of illicit small arms trafficking: armed groups, criminal 
organisations, terrorists, individual criminals, private security services, mercenaries, and 
private citizens—with governments being conspicuous by absence in this enumeration. 
This almost exclusive focus of today’s global intergovernmental discussion on illicit 
small arms transfers is highly regrettable as also government officials have a history of 
misusing SALW (Wezeman 2003). Human rights abuses committed with small arms can 
either be directly attributed to governmental actors, or governments can be blamed for 
failing to exercise control over private actors, allowing armed individuals and groups to 
commit small arms-aided abuses with impunity. In this sense, William Reno is right 
with his criticism that ‘international norms support tyrants because they support the 
state’ (SSRC 2002,11). A first corrective step was taken in 2003 with the appointment of 
a UN Special Rapporteur to study the prevention of human rights violations committed 
with small arms and light weapons.
258
7 -1.3 The UN Programme of Action
The United Nations Programme o f Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit 
Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA) stands as the central 
global agreement on preventing and reducing trafficking and proliferation of SALW. 
This program was the final output of the conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms 
and Light Weapons in All its Aspects hosted by the United Nations in New York from 9- 
20 July 2001. This conference attracted high-level representatives?0 from over 150 coun­
tries. The PoA seeks to curb SALW trafficking through a strengthening of export con­
trols, embargo enforcement, arms brokering enforcement, and through the provision of 
assistance to affected regions. The final document is 87 paragraphs long and structured 
in four sections. The first section, the Preamble, establishes a consensus on the causes 
and consequences of the problem and on the general norms and principles needed to 
solve it. The second section contains 41 paragraphs and forms the core of the Pro­
gramme, spelling out national, regional, and global measures to prevent, combat, and 
eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. The provisions contained in 
this section encourage states to adopt preventive measures that allow them to better 
monitor the manufacture, possession and trade in SALW. On the domestic level, these 
measures include the record keeping of manufacturers and of officially-held guns, and 
the establishment of procedures to monitor legal sales, transfer and stockpiling, includ­
ing laws to regulate arms brokers. The PoA furthermore urges governments to criminal­
ise the illegal manufacture, possession and trade of these weapons. In order to facilitate 
the identification and tracing of illicitly trafficked weapons states are encouraged to en­
sure that producers mark small arms and light weapons at point of manufacture. States 
are also urged to establish controls over the export and transit of small arms and light 
weapons, including the issuing of end-user certificates for exports and transit and the
t° Some representatives were disappointed by what they saw as a poor ministerial level attendance, which they 
considered to reflect a “lack of commitment to the issue on the part of many countries” (Small Arms Survey 2002, 
218). For instance, then foreign secretary Robin Cook was widely criticised for his failure to appear in person at the 
conference.
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notification of the original supplier nation in the case of re-export. As corrective meas­
ures, the PoA calls upon states to identify and destroy stocks of surplus weapons and to 
establish and implement disarmament, demobilization and re-integration programmes 
of ex-combatants, including the collection and destruction of their weapons. Section 
three addresses implementation, international co-operation and assistance. While rec­
ognising that the prime responsibility for curbing illicit trade in SALW rests upon the 
individual states, this section emphasises the need for cooperation on the bilateral and 
multilateral level. Section four, finally, establishes a review process for the PoA. Most 
importantly, paragraph l  (a) stipulates that states endorsing the PoA should convene a 
conference no later than 2006 to review progress made in the implementation of the 
Programme.
Three aspects proved to be particularly controversial in the negotiations leading to the 
PoA. First, the EU, Canada, Costa Rica, and some African states lobbied for a mention­
ing in the Programme’s Preamble of the link between the illicit trade and the excessive 
accumulation of SALW on the one hand, and violations of human rights and of interna­
tional humanitarian law on the other (Small Arms Survey 2002). This position met, 
however, fierce opposition from a number of countries, including China, which stated 
firmly that they would not agree to a document that referred to human rights violations 
in any way. This position finally prevailed with the PoA evading any references to human 
rights violations. Second, the United States aired strong objections against any provi­
sions that could potentially circumscribe the possession of small arms by civilians. As 
Herbert L. Calhoun, one of the US negotiators at the UN SALW conference and then- 
deputy division chief in the Office of Policy, Plans and Analysis at the State Department’s 
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs made it plain: ‘We had warned the international 
community as far as nine months out of the conference that we could not accept any 
controls on civilian possession of firearms, because we consider that beyond the UN 
mandate for the conference’ (cited in Kellerhals 2001). As will be discussed farther be­
low, the question of civilian possession was of particular importance to the US, where 
the constitution grants its citizens the right to bear arms and a strong pro-gun lobby—
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the National Rifle Association (NRA)—was very successful in making its voice heard high 
up in the political hierarchy. A third and final point that stirred up considerable contro­
versy was the question of whether to aim for a full ban on arms sales to all non-state 
groups. This point will also be subject to further discussion below.
7.2 Problem  constellation
After this overview of the nature and scope of the SALW problem and of various interna­
tional initiatives launched to tackle it, we can now embark on a systematic analysis of the 
problem constellation underlying in this issue. As in previous chapters, this examination 
is guided by the three transaction cost economics variables—asset specificity, behav­
ioural uncertainty and environmental uncertainty—which have already been introduced 
in chapter 3. The animating question behind this analysis is again to see which institu­
tional design mechanisms have to be incorporated in order to optimally support the sub­
stantive measures deemed necessary for tackling the problem at hand. The analysis be­
low suggests a moderate degree of legalisation as the optimal institutional design for 
tacking the SALW problematique.
7.2.1 Asset specificity
As in previous chapters, the first of our problem constellation variables—asset specific­
ity—refers, first, to the extent significant incentives exist for states to shirk from the ob­
ligations spelled out in an agreement and, second, to the severity of losses that would re­
sult for states from a later breakdown of the agreement. As before, we assume that 
states’ incentive to shirk as well as the losses they potentially incur are determined by 
the cost-benefit structure they face when establishing an institution to tackle a global 
problem, here the illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons. We will start the 
analysis of asset specificity with the examination of the distribution of direct and indirect 
implementation costs of the PoA followed by a discussion of the benefits such an initia­
tive generates for different categories of states. As in the previous case studies, the quali­
tative assessment of the costs and benefits is based on the scenario that all states inter­
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pret and implement the substantive provisions of the agreement bona fides, i.e. as they 
would do if they were genuinely interested in solving the problem as stated. A particular 
challenge in the assessment of the asset specificity associated with the implementation 
of the UN Programme of Action arises from the fact that the Programme is embedded in 
a network of other international and regional initiatives with a similar focus, many of 
which were launched prior to the PoA. This simultaneity of initiatives makes it difficult 
to determine whether a state’s increased efforts to control small arms is to be attributed 
to the Programme of Action or reflects a broader process of bringing its practices in line 
with international and regional norms and legal requirements (Stott 2005). Similarly, it 
is difficult to determine the Value added’ of the Programme on the benefit side. For this 
reason, the following analysis will seek to distinguish in what ways the Programme of 
Action goes beyond international initiatives that were already adopted at the time poli­
cymakers negotiated the final version of the PoA in July 2001. When the PoA was 
adopted, it surpassed other international SALW policies in one ways. The PoA extended 
the geographical reach of international SALW policies to include virtually all states of 
the world, whereas the pre-existing initiatives were only regional (e.g. ECOWAS) or in­
terregional (e.g. OSCE, Wassenaar Arrangement). Most importantly, it covered countries 
and regions (in particular South East Asia and Arab states), which had not previously 
been part of any international SALW agreement. For these states, all the substantive 
provisions of the PoA are relevant in determining the costs and benefits they derive from 
this agreement. For states, which had already endorsed one or several of the earlier ini­
tiatives, only those substantive provisions of the PoA are relevant for the determination 
of costs and benefits which go beyond the recommendations of earlier initiatives.
The following discussion of the costs and benefits resulting from the UN Programme of 
Action draws heavily upon two reports which assess the implementation of the PoA. The 
first report was compiled by Kytomaki and Yaneky-Wayne for the UNIDIR in 2004 and 
the second one by the NGO-platform Biting the Bullet, which brings together people as­
sociated with the two British NGOs International Alert and Saferworld as well as with
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the University of Bradford. These two reports present to date the most comprehensive 
assessment of the impact the PoA has had so far.
7.2.1.1 Costs
The following analysis of the distribution of implementation costs resulting from the 
PoA distinguishes between direct costs in terms of dedicated human resources, legisla­
tive costs, and implementation costs (including financial and technical assistance pro­
vided to other countries) and indirect costs which arise from negative consequences in 
the realm of national security, foreign and domestic policy.
• Direct costs
The following discussion of the direct implementation costs resulting from the Pro­
gramme of Action is structured along the four dimensions human resource related costs, 
legislative costs, domestic implementation costs and assistance to other countries.
In terms of dedicated human capacities, the PoA calls upon states to undertake only low 
asset specific investments. Section II paragraph 4 asks states to establish or designate a 
national coordination agency in charge of co-ordinating small arms policies and activi­
ties within the state. In most countries, this function is assumed by a single desk officer 
(e.g. Germany and France) or by a commission composed of government officials with 
related portfolios (e.g. Benin). In most countries, the SALW coordinator assumes this 
role only as a part of a wider work portfolio. For instance, for the desk officer in charge 
of this dossier in New Zealand and Australia SALW coordination accounts for only ten to 
twenty percent of his or her total workload (Biting the Bullet 2005). This national coor­
dination agency presented a novelty for most states, since of all the international SALW 
agreements that predated the PoA only the ECOWAS moratorium of 1998 contained a 
provision on the establishment of such an agency. In that sense, Section I paragraph 4 of 
the PoA did indeed involve some human asset specific costs, albeit to an almost negligi­
ble extent.
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Section II paragraph 5 calls upon states to establish or dedicate a national point of con­
tact whose mission it is to ensure the exchange of information with other states and in­
ternational and regional organisations on national practices and systems for SALW and 
to coordinate the implementation of SALW policies with other states. In most countries, 
this function was already being assumed by government officials dealing with the control 
of conventional arms and weapons or arms control and disarmament (Kytomaki and 
Yankey-Wayne 2004). Furthermore, the OSCE states already agreed under Section VI 
paragraph 1 of the 2000 OSCE Document on Small Arms to establish such a point of 
contact for SALW related matters. Consequently, for most states the implementation of 
paragraph 5 did not result in any additional human asset specific investments. In sum, 
the human asset specificity of the PoA’s call for national coordination agencies and na­
tional points of contact is very limited and comparable to that resulting from KPCS’ Sec­
tion II paragraph (b), which requires states to designate an importing and an exporting 
authority.
In terms of legislative costs, the direct costs created by the PoA are more significant than 
the costs in terms of dedicated human resources. Since the adoption of the UN Pro­
gramme of Action, 54 states have reviewed at least some of their domestic laws and/or 
procedures controlling international SALW transfers in order to bring them in line with 
Section II paragraph 2 (Biting the Bullet 2005). Among these states are also some im­
portant SALW exporters like Russia and Bulgaria, as well as states, which were not part 
of any pre-existing regional SALW agreement, as for instance Sri Lanka. Furthermore, 
approximately 47 states have reviewed at least some of their laws and/or procedures on 
civilian possession of SALW, the domestic SALW trade and SALW manufacturing. The 
same report also finds that 11 states have reviewed their standards and procedures for 
the management and security of stockpiles since 2001. Legislative reform was also an 
important feature in Africa, where—prior to the UN Conference—a number of countries 
like Niger and Senegal were still operating under regulation and laws dating from the 
years of independence (Sail 2005).
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Apart from legislative reform, the Programme of Action also calls upon states to take 
very practical measures to reduce the risk of diversion and trafficking of small arms and 
light weapons. One pillar in this respect are paragraph 16 and 19 of Section II which ask 
states to destroy confiscated, seized or collected small arms and light weapons (para­
graph 16) as well as surplus small arms and light weapons (paragraph 19). According to 
data from the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, OSCE states have considerably stepped 
up their efforts in the destruction of small arms and light weapons either deemed sur­
plus or seized from illicit trafficking (referred to in Biting the Bullet 2005). Whereas 35 
OSCE states destroyed a total of almost half a million of SALW units in 2001, the annual 
destruction rate more than tripled by 2003 to a total of 1,747,264 units. It is difficult to 
determine to what extent the PoA has contributed to this notable expansion of weapons 
destruction programmes. But also states outside the OSCE have taken significant steps 
in this direction. For example, in Argentina 3,131 firearms were destroyed at a public 
event in 2002 and another 4,265 the year after (Kytomaki and Yankey-Wayne 2004), 
and in Cambodia over 120,000 confiscated and surplus weapons were publicly destroyed 
by burning between 2001 and end 2004 (Biting the Bullet 2005).
Section II Paragraph 35 and 36 and several paragraphs under Section III encourage 
states to support SALW-related capacity building in other states either directly or by 
supporting international organisations like Interpol, the UNIDIR and DDA in their ef­
forts. Although not setting any specific target, the PoA has still unleashed considerable 
financial transfers in support of SALW-related activities. For instance, Japan provided 
US$1.03 million to the UNDP SALW program in Kosovo in April 2003 and another 
US$3.35 million to UN DDA and UNIDIR for SALW related work. The United States do­
nated US$125,000 to Interpol to enhance the organization’s Weapons and Explosives 
Tracking System (IWETS), while the Canadian Government supported the continuation 
of this programme with Can$300,000. The Finish government donated a total of 
€504,564 to the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa as 
seed-money for this Centre’s Small Arms Transparency and Control Regime programme, 
which was launched in October 2003. Direct assistance to specific projects in individual
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countries was even more considerable. For instance, Japan donated a total of US$35 
million for Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR) programmes in Af­
ghanistan and has been a very active supporter of various SALW programmes in Cam­
bodia. The US dedicated a total of US$2 million in 2001 for small arms destruction pro­
grammes around the world (US State Department 2001). The British government estab­
lished a dedicated Small Arms Destruction Fund within the Foreign Office, which to­
gether with a £13.25 million contribution from DFID’s Global Conflict Prevention Pool 
has funded weapons destruction projects in Latin America, East Africa, the Caribbean, 
Southern Africa and Eastern and South Eastern Europe (Biting the Bullet 2005). The 
UNIDIR emphasised in particular the SALW-related contributions made by the follow­
ing nineteen states: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, It­
aly, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, South Africa, Spain, Swe­
den, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States of America, plus the EU 
(Kytomaki and Yankey-Wayne 2004).
• Indirect costs
More important than the direct implementation costs are a number of very different 
types of indirect costs. The following discussion will first highlight the indirect costs 
states fear to incur from a global small arms and light weapons agreement in terms of 
additional constraints on their national security policy. Second, we will see that states 
are also concerned about retaining sovereignty over the use of small arms transfers as a 
means to foster their foreign policy goals. Third, the discussion will gauge the economic 
implications of a strict implementation of the PoA and find them to be of lesser impor­
tance than in the previous cases. Fourth, and finally, we will assess the extent to which 
the implementation of this global agreement creates domestic tensions and see how it 
clashes in some countries with well-entrenched political values.
One major obstacle to global efforts to regulate the manufacturing and trading of small 
arms and light weapons is the tension any such efforts create with states’ national secu­
rity interests. Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations establishes the right of
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states for individual and collective self-defence. This article is commonly referred to as 
establishing the legal basis for the right to manufacture and trade armament. This right 
is explicitly and unambiguously recognised in paragraph 45 of the 1997 Panel of Experts 
and reaffirmed in the Preamble of the PoA as the ‘right of each State to manufacture, 
import and retain small arms and light weapons for its self-defence and security needs’. 
Especially states with underdeveloped domestic production capacities were worried that 
a global agreement on trafficking in SALW might limit their ability to procure SALW for 
their national defence (Small Arms Survey 2002). Even some countries which had been 
or still were suffering severely under internal SALW-induced armed conflicts considered 
these concerns about their unconstrained access to arms as outweighing the pacifying ef­
fect a tighter regulation could have on their country, as for instance Angola.
Some states, in particular the United States, Russia and China, feared that important 
foreign policy objectives would be jeopardised by a far-reaching agreement, which repre­
sented a second category of important indirect costs of a global SALW institution. Al­
though the practice of (covert) weapons transfers in support of one or the other warring 
party was scaled back after the end of the Cold War, it continues to serve a number of 
important foreign policy objectives. For instance, Russia allegedly supported insurgents 
in Georgia and Moldova as a means to convince the governments of those countries that 
it was not in their interest to act against Moscow’s will (Mathiak and Lumpe 2000). In 
the United States, covert arms transfers are explicitly authorised by the National Secu­
rity Act of 1947. Section 505 of the act requires the government agency involved, typi­
cally the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), to notify the congressional committees re­
sponsible for the oversight of US intelligence community activities. However, this notifi­
cation requirement only applies to transfers valued US$1 million or more. Given the 
relatively low value of small arms and light weapons, substantial SALW shipments can 
be made below this threshold. Examples of the application of this act include long- 
running clandestine military transfers to the contras in Nicaragua in the 1980s, to
26 7
UNITA from 1974 to 1992, to various mujahideen factions in Afghanistan from 1979 to 
1991, and, and more recently to opposition groups in Iraq from 199871 to 2002 (Mathiak 
and Lumpe 2000). US official Herbert Calhoun explained his country’s opposition to a 
general ban on SALW transfers to non-state parties with the following words: ‘We 
thought it would preclude being able to give arms to oppressed groups, such as victims 
of genocide, and it violated traditions of the American Constitution. We were sort of a 
non-state actor group when we founded this country’ (cited in Kellerhals 2001). The US 
view on this point contrasted sharply with that of the African bloc, which wanted the cir­
cle of recipients of SALW-transfers to be limited to states. In the end, the former posi­
tion prevailed, and the paragraph in the draft Programme which limited small arms ex­
ports to governmental actors alone was dropped altogether (Small Arms Survey 2002).
The economic implications the implementation of the Program of Action presented a po­
tential third source of indirect costs. However, in contrast to the previous case studies, 
this aspect was only of minor importance with respect to small arms and light weapons. 
Although a great number of states is engaged in the production of small arms and light 
weapons, the economic impact of this sector remains of minor importance to all of them. 
Whereas the export value of opium accounted for 60 percent of the total value of exports 
of the world-leading opium producer, i.e. Afghanistan (UNODC 2005c), the correspond­
ing figure amounts to no more than 0.2 percent for the world’s largest SALW exporter,
i.e. the United States (AJIL 2001). The production of small arms and light weapons is of 
local importance in some states, as for example in Germany where the SALW producing 
companies Heckler & Koch and Carl Walther absorb almost the entire workforce of the 
small towns in which they are located. But this local economic interests had little bearing 
on the formulation of the German SALW position. In Ghana, small-scale blacksmith 
production of small arms presents an important, though illicit, addition to smiths’ mea­
gre income. However, the illicit status of this activity severely undermines the lobbying
71 At least with the passage by the US Congress of the Iraq Liberation Act in 1998, the arms transfers which had 
reportedly already been started earlier, were adopted as an official policy.
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position of the blacksmiths on this issue. In sum, we can conclude that economic consid­
erations were of only secondary order for almost all states.
A fourth and final category of indirect costs is found in the tensions a strict implementa­
tion of a global SALW regulatory agreement may stir up on the domestic level. This as­
pect of a global SALW agreement was probably the most important reason for the 
United States’ strong opposition. The question of civilian possession proved hereby to be 
the neuralgic point of much of the international negotiations. In contrast to most other 
countries, the United States has a long and well-established tradition of civilian posses­
sion of small arms, which is guarded by the country’s constitution. The Second Amend­
ment of the US constitution stipulates that ‘[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to 
the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be in­
fringed’. This right is based on the belief that that widespread ownership of firearms 
tends to deter criminals or even tyrants—a belief that enjoyed as much support in the 
times of the Founding Fathers as today (Cook and Leitzel 1998). This political credo in 
the socially beneficial functions of private gun ownership is vigorously kept alive by the 
National Rifle Association (NRA), arguably one of the most influential non-profit inter­
est groups in the United States. The NRA launched a concerted campaign against any 
UN agreement months before the start of Conference in July 2001, arguing that gun con­
trol was exclusively an internal affair. The NRA succeeded in establishing the question of 
civilian possession as the greatest concern of the US delegation during the negotiations 
in the run-up to the UN Programme of Action. The US delegation to the conference ar­
gued vehemently that it would reject any agreement that would abrogate the right of US 
civilians to bear arms as guaranteed by the Second Amendment. John Bolton, the head 
of the US delegation at the UN SALW Conference therefore made it clear at several occa­
sions that ‘[t]he United States believes that the responsible use of firearms is a legitimate 
aspect of national life’ (quoted in AJIL 2001). South Africa declared in contrast that the 
inclusion of some kind of reference problematising the civilian possession presented a 
sine qua non for its support of the Programme. Based on the Report of the 1999 Group, 
an earlier draft of the Programme made such as reference by asking states to ‘seriously
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consider the prohibition of unrestricted trade and private ownership of small arms and 
light weapons specifically designed for military purposes’ (UNGA, 2001a, sec. II, para­
graph 20). Despite the fact that also in the United States private ownership of weapons is 
already now restricted (e.g. excluding minors, and convicted criminals), the US delega­
tion-echoing the National Rifle Association’s orchestrated lobbying campaign—still in­
sisted that it would reject any mention of the term ‘civilian possession’ in the text, no 
matter how general or meagre in commitment (SAS 2002, p.224). As all efforts to reach 
a compromise on this issue failed, the final document evades the question of civilian 
possession all together.
7.2.1.2 Benefits
Given the global nature of SALW trafficking one of the major benefits of the Programme 
of Action is its global reach, which includes world regions which had previously not been 
part of any regional SALW initiatives and whose domestic legislation and control over 
small arms and light weapons was very weak. Most important in that respect is the in­
clusion of the Middle East, a region that has long been a major recipient of SALW trans­
fers. As a considerable part of the weapons destabilising weak states are not directly im­
ported from (Western) producing countries but ‘recycled’ among various conflicts within 
a region, any initiative focussing exclusively on major producing states—as does for in­
stance the Wassenaar Arrangement—is indispensable but insufficient to tackle the prob­
lem in its complexity. The UN Programme of Action recognises that—given the poor or 
inadequate governance capacities of a number of states emerging from conflict—it is of 
particular importance to adopt global measures that help these states more directly in 
their efforts to gain control over the diffusion and trafficking of small arms and light 
weapons and to strengthen cooperation within the affected regions. As already discussed 
above from the costs perspective, the Programme of Action does indeed include signifi­
cant provisions specifically addressing these aspects.
The main beneficiaries of SALW-related capacity building efforts are weak or fragile 
states, mainly in sub-Saharan Africa. For instance, Kytotmaki and Yankey-Wayne
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(2004) note that a number of states of this region received support to either establish 
national coordination authorities and/or national points of contact or national action 
plans to implement the PoA. For instance, the government of Burundi requested and 
was granted assistance for the dispatch of a inter-agency fact-finding mission whose task 
it was to determine the nature and extent of Burundi’s SALW problem and to assess how 
the government and the UN could best counter this problem (A/60/161 of 25 July 2005). 
Also located within the fragile and weapons saturated Great Lake region, Uganda has 
also pinned great hopes on closer international cooperation and control of international 
SALW trafficking which it sees as indispensable for pacifying the ongoing conflict with 
the Lords Resistance Army in the North of the county. Similarly, its Western neighbour 
Kenya hopes that an internationally supported arms regime will mitigate some of its 
problems associated with armed crime, fluctuating levels of violent conflict (often asso­
ciated with cattle rustling), poaching and terrorism. In Western Africa, Ghana hopes that 
a strengthened international regime on small arms and light weapons will help to re­
verse or at least stall the marked rise in firearms-related violence it experienced in recent 
years as a result of an uncontrolled increase in domestic crafts production in SALW and 
of a negative spill-over from its unstable immediate neighbours Cote d’Ivoire and Togo.
Outside the African continent, the main beneficiaries of a thorough implementation of 
the PoA around the globe are countries emerging from conflict such as Cambodia, the 
SALW-related projects of which rely heavily on the support provided by the EU and Ja­
pan and Sri Lanka, where the 2002 ceasefire in the long-running conflict between the 
national government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) is still very frag­
ile.
A number of countries, first and foremost the EU member states plus Canada, Japan, 
Norway, and Switzerland were active promoters of a global SALW agreement with 
strong commitments especially on issues such as transparency measures, marking and 
tracing, strengthened export and re-export controls and tighter limits on civilian posses­
sion. The anti-SALW position of these states can largely be attributed to the strong hu­
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manitarian interest they share in a number of countries suffering severely under the un­
controlled influx and diffusion of small arms and light weapons. Many of these states ar­
gued that many of the development projects they sponsor in these conflict-ridden states 
were jeopardised by the widespread misuse of these arms.
7.2.1.3 Comparison o f costs and benefits
The discussion above revealed that PoA participants can be grouped into four distinct 
groups (see Figure 7.1). First, countries emerging from conflict or located in a conflict- 
ridden region like Burundi, Uganda, and Cambodia are the clear beneficiaries from the 
programme as the stability of these countries is considerably threatened by the uncon­
trolled diffusion and accumulation of small arms and light weapons. They benefit from a 
global SALW regime both as it would help to stem the uncontrolled influx of small arms 
and light weapons into their territories and to strengthen their governance capacity 
through technical assistance and financial support. While gaining substantial benefits 
from the global regulation of SALW trafficking, countries in the first group only face a 
low level of costs, as they are no major producers of SALW. These states therefore face a 
moderate level of potential loss, in case the PoA is not implemented properly. This loss is 
reflected in the foregone benefits a reduction in the scale of SALW incited violence that 
the PoA may help to achieve. The reason why the potential loss is moderate and not high 
is lies in the fact that these countries only face a low level of costs. Hence, the ex-post 
break down of the PoA will cause the loss of benefits, but not so much of futile invest­
ments. Overall, conflict ridden states are expected to lobby hard for at least a moderate 
degree of legalisation for the PoA primarily in order to protect their potential benefits 
from the relatively high propensity to shirk a second group of states experiences.
In contrast, a second group of non-conflict ridden countries can gain only low benefits 
from regulating the SALW trade, while facing comparably high costs. These costs origi­
nate from the importance these countries ascribe to their sovereign rights to arm them­
selves without undue scrutiny (especially the Arab countries), to their right to use arms 
transfers to other states and non-state actors as a means of their foreign and security
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policy (especially Russia and China) and to their right to regulate domestic civilian pos­
session without any outside interference (especially USA). Taken direct and indirect 
costs together, the United States emerges as the country incurring the greatest asset spe­
cific costs from a thorough implementation of the PoA as it is an important exporter of 
small arms and light weapons and expected to support generously SALW-related capac­
ity building projects around the globe while, on the domestic front, incurring high indi­
rect costs from a likely clash with the National Rifle Association and its strongly organ­
ised and politicised membership base. This second group of countries have a high incen­
tive to shirk from any obligation set forward in the PoA.
For European SALW producing countries, the implementation of the SALW is associated 
with a moderate level of costs and a moderate level of benefits. The costs are primarily 
caused indirect economic costs and a decrease in their ability to use SALW exports as a 
secretive instrument of foreign policy. Their benefits are derived from strong humanitar­
ian interests with respect to conflict ridden states.
Finally, a fourth group of countries neither derives benefits nor incurs costs from im­
plementing the PoA, as for instance Uruguay, since they neither suffer significantly un­
der SALW-related violence nor do SALW play neither and important economic nor po­
litical role in these countries.
This constellation of costs and benefits associates the Programme of Action with a mod­
erate degree of asset specificity.
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7.2.2 Behavioural uncertainty
The discussion above highlighted that some states have moderate incentives to shirk 
from implementing the measures they officially endorsed with the Programme of Action. 
The risk that shirking will actually occur does not only depend on the intensity of the in­
centives to do so but also on the likelihood of such behaviour being detected by other 
states. This aspect of shirking is captured by our second TCE variable—behavioural un­
certainty. As in the case studies presented in the preceding chapters, we will examine to 
what extent the nature of the problem lends itself to surreptitious shirking. This analysis 
is based on the three indicators—governance incapacity, the relative reliance of govern­
mental monitoring and industry opacity. All three of these indicators will be found to al­
low states to shirk with a moderate risk of detection.
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y.2.2.1 Governance incapacity
This first element of behavioural uncertainty—governance incapacity—refers to involun­
tary non-compliance resulting from a state’s insufficient capacity to implement a policy, 
which it genuinely endorses. The question therefore arises to what extent the success of a 
global institution relies on substantive contributions by states with weak governance ca­
pacities. In the case of SALW, we find considerable variance in the ability of govern­
ments to control the inflow, outflow and possession of small arms and light weapons 
within their jurisdiction. The most important SALW producing regions, namely Western 
Europe and North America, possess bureaucracies well-disposed to effectively regulate 
and control small arms and light weapons. The United States, Germany and the United 
Kingdom all fall within the top decile of the World Bank’s rule of law indicator of 2004.
In addition to some exporting countries’ insufficient ability to make their SALW export 
policies prevail throughout the country, the severe problems the diffusion and accumula­
tion of SALW cause in a great number of developing countries can also be attributed to 
large extent to these developing countries’ inability to prevent unapproved SALW im­
ports. International initiatives were launched exactly for this very reason, seeking to 
compensate these countries’ governance incapacity through a coordinated international 
response. If the SALW problem was only a matter of small arms and light weapons being 
(illicitly) exported from a developed producing country to a specific country of the devel­
oping world, behavioural uncertainty could be assumed to be low to moderate, as the 
problem could largely be tackled if the exporting countries were truly willing to deploy 
their bureaucratic resources to control the outflow of SALW from their territories. But as 
already touched upon in the previous sections, the export of small arms and light weap­
ons from the western world to developing countries only covers one part of the problem. 
More important is the uncontrolled flow of used weapons from transitional states to de­
veloping states and from one developing state to another. For instance, Muggah and 
Berman note that ‘[t]he lax, even non-existent, control and oversight over national 
stockpiles in a hypermilitarised region [Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia]— 
coupled with the traditionally porous constitution of the countries’ borders— have led to
275
a situation where small arms are continuously circulated within a ‘conflict system” 
(2001, 10). Similar observations have been made on the Latin American subcontinent, 
where arms used by the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Sal­
vador and by the Contras and Sandanistas in Nicaragua during the 1980s have been 
traced to the civil war in Colombia (US State Department 2001). Also, many former So­
viet states are emerging as important SALW exporters while making only modest pro­
gress in the establishment of the rule of law. Russia and Ukraine both fall within bottom 
third decile of the World Bank’s 2004 rule of law index (29.5 and 23.2, respectively); and 
Belarus’ weak rule of law relegates it to the bottom decile (7.2), well below many devel­
oping countries. Consequently, the government incapacity of all these states tends to be 
rather high, thereby increasing the risk of inadvertent non-compliance and consequently 
of behavioural uncertainty.
Whereas in the case of money laundering the Hon share of illicit flows went through fi­
nancial centres based in countries with effective governance mechanisms, we find that 
with respect to SALW both states with strong and weak governance structures play a role 
as countries of origin or transhipment. Consequently, the level of governance incapacity 
in the present case is to be assessed as being of moderate degree.
7.2.2.2 Relative reliance on governmental monitoring
The second element of behavioural uncertainty captures the idea that the risk of surrep­
titious shirking is reduced when civil society organisations are actively monitoring activi­
ties related to the policy issue in question, thereby facilitating ‘naming and shaming’ as 
an potentially important enforcement mechanism. With respect to the small arms and 
light weapons problematique, a number of specialised and well-funded think tanks, 
NGOs and activist networks have been launched since the late 1990s, complemented by 
existing organisations, which adopted SALW as a new focus of their work. Most re­
spected and referred to is undoubtedly the already mentioned Small Arms Survey, which 
was launched in 1999 as an independent research project located at the Graduate Insti­
tute of International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland. Its yearbook, published since 2001,
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working papers and its database on government documents and statements, voting re­
cords and implementation records constitute one of the most important sources of in­
formation not only for the media and researchers but also for government officials. The 
work of Small Arms Survey is complemented by a handful of other think tanks which are 
either fully specialised in SALW, like the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms (NISAT), 
or have made this topic one of their main research missions, like the Belgian Groupe de 
recherche et d'information sur la paix et la securite (GRIP), the South African Institute 
for Security Studies (ISS), the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), or the 
US American Center for Defense Information (CDI).
A wide range of non-governmental organisations around the globe have also taken a 
strong interest in the issue and added SALW to their existing portfolio, like Oxfam, Am­
nesty International or Human Rights Watch—and more specialised, Saferworld and In­
ternational Alert. In order to co-ordinate the efforts of this growing number and diver­
sity of organisations researching on or campaigning for SALW control, the International 
Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) was founded in 1998. This network currently 
provides an umbrella for more than 500 member organisations.
The interest of civil society organisations in small arms and light weapons is incompara­
bly greater than the one we observed with respect to money laundering, and appears at 
first sight to be as strong as in the conflict diamond case. This second impression needs 
to be modified when engaging in a direct comparison between the two civil society or­
ganisations that are leading the debate in each issue are, i.e. between Small Arms Survey 
and Global Witness. Small Arms Survey relies on secondary data to a much greater ex­
tent than does Global Witness, which gathers most of its data through their own mem­
bers of staff deployed in the field. Government statistics constitute the lion share of the 
secondary data used by Small Arms Survey, which decreases the independence of their 
work and increases the relative reliance on governmental monitoring. Consequently, the 
behavioural uncertainty in the case of SALW stemming from the relative reliance on
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governmental monitoring falls between that observed in the money laundering and in 
the conflict diamond case, and can thus be considered as of moderate degree.
7.2.2.S Industry opacity
Industry opacity is the third element that determines the risk of detection a shirking 
state faces. In the case of SALW, this variable has to be extended to include the opacity 
of SALW-related governmental action, as—compared to previous cases—governments 
play a  significantly more active role in this type of illicit flows. While some corrupt gov­
ernment official may be implicated in the flow of conflict diamonds through the issuing 
of an export certificate for diamonds of dubious origin, the facilitation of such illicit ex­
ports does not present an official governmental policy comparable to covert arms ship­
ments as practiced by a non-negligible number of states. The assessment of the degree of 
industry opacity will therefore be followed by a discussion of the opacity surrounding 
governmental action in this field.
In order to assess industiy opacity with respect to SALW, we need to distinguish be­
tween the opacity surrounding the legal and the illicit segment of the industry. As men­
tioned above, illicit trafficking in SALW accounts for 10-20 percent of the total trade in 
this category. By its very nature, this segment of the trade is marked by a high degree of 
opacity, as it could not exist otherwise in states with at least a minimum law enforce­
ment capacity. With respect to the 80 percent which account for the legal part of the 
SALW business, we can note that most states have at least some laws or regulations con­
trolling production, possession, export and import of SALW, although the scope and 
stringency of these laws and procedures is very uneven.
For instance, the United States does not keep a central, government-controlled register 
of who buys and resells small arms. Instead, records of commercial trafficking are kept 
by the manufacturers. In Switzerland, no centralized register exists either, and sales or 
non-monetary exchanges of small arms between private individuals can be conducted 
without any kind of records (NZZ 2005b). In England, Scotland and Wales, civilian gun
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ownership is controlled through the mandatoiy requirement of all firearms dealers to 
register with their local Police Constabulary.
The opacity of arms transfers is often deplored, and diversion is not an uncommon phe­
nomenon (see above). This is little surprising, as security and foreign policy interests re­
quire secrecy about specific transfers in some circumstances. Importing states, for in­
stance, may have an incentive to exaggerate their military capacities, which also requires 
a manipulation of arms import data, in order to deter potential attackers. Small Arms 
Survey, for instance, attributes the huge discrepancy they found between the size of 
SALW stockpiles in many African countries according to their own research compared to 
the size one could deduce from various statements and data provided by African gov­
ernment officials to deliberate misinformation motivated by security calculations of this 
kind (Small Arms Survey 2001). Exporting states, on the other hand, may favour secrecy 
about certain arms transfers, as these transfers might violate international embargoes or 
stir up political controversy at home. The US Iran-Contra affair of the mid-1980s pro­
vides just one illustration out of many. In this case, the Reagan administration diverted 
proceeds from an arms sale to Iran to purchase arms for the Contras, a Nicaraguan anti­
communist rebel group, thereby circumventing an amendment passed by the US Con­
gress in 1982 that prohibited such activities. The revelation of these arrangements in 
1986 plunged the administration in a serious crisis and cost the posts of several high- 
level officials.
However, important progress has been made in this field. This progress can be attrib­
uted to several national and international initiatives aiming towards greater openness in 
arms transfers (including major weapons systems and small arms) that followed the end 
of the Cold War and towards a general increase in transparency with respect to all gov­
ernmental activities (as for instance required in the United States by the Freedom of In­
formation Act (amended in 1996) or its British counterpart o 2000). As Haug et al ob­
serve (2002), an increasing number of governments are now reporting openly on the 
monetary value of weapons shipments they are authorizing or delivering, usually on a
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country-by-countiy basis. Exemplary in this respect is the United States, which provides 
a highly detailed annual report breaking down exports by destination and weapon type 
and also providing information on the quantity and value of exports. Also France, Ger­
many and the United Kingdom are now providing highly detailed reports of their small 
arms exports.
In addition, a number of publicly available data sets on international arms transfers 
compiled by intergovernmental organisations and non-governmental organisations now 
exist. Although these data sets all have their own limitations, taken together, they still al­
low the vigilant observer to obtain a rough idea of the direction and volume of transfers.
An important step towards greater transparency in arms transfers in this direction is the 
UN Register of Conventional Arms as established by the UN General Assembly resolu­
tion 46/36L in 1991. This legally non-binding resolution calls upon all member states to 
submit annually relevant data on imports and exports of conventional arms to be in­
cluded in the Register. UN member states are also invited to report on their military 
holdings and on procurement from domestic production. This information is compiled 
by the UN DDA and made publicly available on its website72. Although the Register does 
not include small arms, it has still contributed greatly to consolidate the idea that trans­
parency on arms transfers can contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability 
(Vines 2005). Togo, which had previously attracted serious international criticism for its 
arms policy (Fowler report) decided to use its 2001 submission to the UN Register as an 
opportunity to demonstrate exemplary transparency. It submitted on 3 July 2001 an in­
ventory of weapons, including small arms, which was more detailed than any other re­
port the Register had ever received from a state (Wezeman 2003).
72 The website of the Department for Disarmament Affairs can be accessed at 
http://disarmament.un.org:8o8o/cab/regfster.htmI.
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The possibility of an extension of the scope of this register so as to include SALW has 
been raised, however, but no definite decision has yet been reached (A/55/281 o 9 Au­
gust 2000).
Another important source states can use in order to assess whether other states are 
complying with their SALW commitments is the information-sharing process estab­
lished by the 2000 OSCE SALW document. Although reporting within this framework is 
confidential, Germany, Spain and Belarus decided to publicize their submissions in the 
spirit of public transparency.
A third publicly available source of information on international trade in small arms and 
light weapons is the COMTRADE database. This database, which is managed by the UN 
Statistics Division, compiles customs data on both imports and exports of seven different 
harmonized categories of arms and weapons (Haug et al. 2002).
Based on the internationally uneven regulation of the SALW industry and the important 
direct involvement of states in SALW transfers we can assess the degree of opacity sur­
rounding this policy issue to be moderate.
*****
In, sum the behavioural uncertainty associated with a global institution regulating the 
production and trafficking of SALW is moderate, with the three subcomponents of be­
havioural (governance incapacity, reliance on governmental monitoring and industry 
opacity) all reaching a moderate level. This judgement is based on the finding that on the 
one hand a large amount of official data on SALW exists, but on the other hand, these 
figures tend to be and often are manipulated for strategic reasons both in exporting and 
importing countries. Also, on the one hand, government incapacity tends to be low in 
producing countries, but on the other hand high in destination countries. While a num­
ber of NGOs and UN bodies monitor the situation of SALW, they do not rely on similarly 
accurate and proprietary data as in the case of, for example, conflict diamonds.
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7.2.3 Environmental uncertainty
Environmental uncertainty constitutes the third and final variable we use in our assess­
ment of the problem constellation. As in the previous case studies, we will distinguish 
two sub-components of this variable: first, the relevant policy experience upon which 
policymakers were able to draw when negotiating and adopting the Programme of Ac­
tion in 2001, and second, the innovativeness with which the illicit SALW sector seeks to 
evade tighter control. As developed earlier in this study, the underlying hypothesis states 
that, ceteris paribus, the greater the novelty of the policy issue, the greater the degree of 
environmental uncertainty. Additionally, the more the problem is subject to significant 
change due to technological advances or other reasons, the greater, ceteris paribus, the 
environmental uncertainty. High levels of environmental uncertainty require, in turn, 
flexible international institutions and thus soft legalisation.
As the following analysis will show, the SALW issue was neither particularly novel to 
policymakers when they gathered for the UN Conference in 2001, nor is SALW traffick­
ing marked by a high level of innovativeness. When only considering this third transac­
tion cost economics variable, we could therefore expect a high degree of legalisation to 
be incorporated in an international institution created to tackle SALW-associated prob­
lems.
7.2.3.1 Novelty o f policy issue
When the diffusion of small arms and light weapons was first raised in the UN in 1995 as 
a factor undermining human and national security, the topic was perceived as com­
pletely novel by the overwhelming majority of policymakers, and the discussion built 
upon little previous experience in this field. However, by the time the final version of the 
UN Programme of Action was negotiated and adopted in July 2001, policymakers felt 
they had gained sufficient experience and confidence in this issue matter. This consider­
able reduction in the novelty of the issue in only six years can be attributed to three ma­
jor reasons.
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First, the SALW initiative was able to build upon the experience gained with disarma­
ment and transfer control measures related to major conventional weapons. Unlike 
SALW, major conventional weapons already became the topic of international negotia­
tions during the Cold War. In the 1970s, the United States and the Soviet Union held 
four rounds of Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) talks to agree on ways to limit the 
growing conventional arms trade. These talks prepared the grounds for a number of bi­
lateral and multilateral agreements that followed later, most important of which was the 
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe signed in 1990. The experience gained 
in relation to these initiatives on conventional weapons system provided an important 
knowledge base for the acquisition of the expertise needed for handling SALW. This 
knowledge transfer was facilitated by the fact that many of the desk officers who were 
assigned the SALW dossier in the run-up to the UN Conference of 2001 had previously 
been working on major conventional weapons issues. An important limitation to this 
knowledge transfer presented the fact that negotiations on major weapons systems were 
almost exclusively limited to government officials whereas the anti-SALW campaign in­
volved a great diversity of stakeholders.
The experience in negotiating security related issues with a great number of civil society 
representatives, including NGOs and industry officials, was gained in another related 
policy initiative: the movement to ban landmines which culminated in the signing of the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti- 
Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Ottawa Convention) in 1997. The landmine 
initiative is closely related to the SALW initiative. First, landmines fall technically speak­
ing within the small arms category. Second, and more importantly, we can observe a 
great similarity between the NGO campaigns in the two areas. In fact, the enthusiastic 
embracement by a large numbers of NGOs the SALW initiative enjoyed in the late 1990s 
and first years of 2000 was spurred on by the success of the anti-landmine campaign. 
Many NGO representatives who had previously worked on the landmines dossier got 
personally engaged in the SALW campaign, and the above-mentioned International Ac­
tion Network on Small Arms (IANSA) was directly modelled on the International Cam­
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paign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). Policy makers dealing with the SALW campaign there­
fore already largely knew most of the players of the game and understood its dynamics.
Third, by the time the PoA was concluded in July 2001, six major intergovernmental 
SALW initiatives outside the UN framework had already been implemented (see 7.1.2). 
The 2000 OSCE Document thereby served as the strongest source of inspiration for the 
PoA. It possessed particular authority as it represented a compromise between a great 
number of states with major and diverse stakes in the issue—either as important export­
ers of SALW or as states seriously affected by the proliferation and misuse of these 
weapons. The reason why the PoA as it was finally adopted did not follow the OSCE 
model more closely, is not so much a reflection of policymakers’ doubts about the viabil­
ity or effectiveness of this agreement, but quite the opposite. Some OSCE states, in 
bvstory and used it as evidence that the best level to tackle the SALW problem was re­
gional rather than global, thus declaring the UN efforts in this field futile or even 
counter-productive.
Given the considerable experience government officials brought to the negotiation table 
of the UN SALW conference in 2001, environmental uncertainty stemming from the 
novelty of the issue can be categorised as minor.
7.2.3.2 Innovativeness o f criminal field
The innovativeness of the criminal field can be disaggregated into the two sub­
components product innovation and process innovation. The following analysis will 
show that also this second source of environmental uncertainty remains at a low level 
with respect to international efforts to stem the illicit trade in small arms and light 
weapons.
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■ Product innovation
Product innovation refers to innovation stemming from technological advances, which 
allows individuals and organisations involved in the illicit transfer of SALW to defy the 
grip of the regulator and of law enforcement agents. Although not completely absent, 
technological innovation is not a driving factor in the SALW issue. The technology ap­
plied in the manufacture of small arms and light weapons has not changed significantly 
over the last 50 years (Small Arms Survey 2003). For instance, the design of the 0.50 
calibre Browning heavy machine gun, a staple in the inventories of military forces 
around the world, has hardly changed since it was first introduced early in the twentieth 
century (Hart Ezell 2002). This stagnation results only partially from low or inexistent 
investment in research and development and more from the fact that the industry is cur­
rently stuck on a technological plateau. Small Arms Survey expects that ‘[i]n the absence 
of unforeseen innovation, small arms technology is likely to remain on this plateau for 
years to come’ (Small Arms Survey 2003,34).
The few technological developments that have taken place increase simultaneously the 
necessity for state control and the potential effectiveness of such measures. On the one 
hand, technological advances have enhanced the overall lethality of military small arms 
through increased accuracy—resulting from improved laser aiming devices, penetration, 
and rate of fire. On the other hand, some recent technological developments in the in­
dustry could help to make gun control more effective in the future. One promising tech­
nology is the development of so-called intelligent firearms, which can be discharged only 
by a given individual identified by fingerprints or a special ring worn on a finger. This 
technology could render stolen guns unusable.
However, both these fronts of product innovation are only of subordinate relevance with 
respect to the core problems international initiatives on small arms and light weapons 
seek to solve, i.e. the misuse of these weapons in conflict regions. This is the case be­
cause ‘majority of the small arms and light weapons being used in conflicts [...] are not 
newly produced’, as the UN Panel of Governmental Experts noted in its report (1997,
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14). Small arms Survey shares this assessment and concludes that the market tends to be 
dominated by the ‘oldest and cheapest’ weapons (2004).
■ Process innovation
Traffickers of small arms and light weapons can seek to circumvent tighter regulation 
and control in two major ways. A first strategy small arms and light weapons traders 
might adopt in response to policies aimed at curbing the illicit trafficking in this weap­
ons is geographical diversion. There is little in the nature of small arms and light weap­
ons as such that prevents traffickers from redirecting their trafficking routes in ways to 
evade countries with tighter controls. As already noted, SALW are very easy to conceal, 
can easily be dissembled and reassembled so as to make concealment still easier and 
have in general few logistical requirements. Again, one counter-measure policymakers 
can adopt against such geographical diversion is the drafting of an agreement that enjoys 
the endorsement of the greatest possible number of states.
Second, tighter regulation on exports and imports of small arms and light weapons can 
he circumvented by an increase in domestic production. In terms of industrial produc­
tion, this strategy is—at least from an economic perspective—little attractive as SALW 
demand in most countries is insufficient to sustain domestic production without heavy 
subsidies. The great dramatic restructuring the SALW industry of Central and Easter 
Europe faced during the 1990s provides a good illustration of this point (Small Arms 
Survey 2003). Domestic craft production in many developing countries may, in contrast, 
be strengthened through international efforts to curb illicit SALW trafficking. Although 
of only minor importance in terms of output levels, craft production is a factor of con­
cern as it takes place in many countries most at risk of large-scale violence.
7.2.4 In sum: institutional preferences based on problem constellation
The above analysis has revealed a moderate degree of asset specificity and of behavioural 
uncertainty for problems arising from an uncontrolled diffusion of small arms and light
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weapons. Consequently, these two variables point towards a moderate level of legalisa­
tion as the optimal institutional design, as soft legalisation would be insufficient to pre­
vent participating states from shirking. The low level of environmental uncertainty 
found in the previous section suggests that policymakers should endow an international 
institution created to tackle SALW trafficking with a high degree of legalisation. The 
combination of moderate asset specificity and behavioural uncertainty plus low envi­
ronmental uncertainty raises the overall expectation of a moderate to high level of legali­
sation as the optimal institutional design. However, adopting the refinement of the de­
sign hypothesis as developed in the case study on money laundering (chapter 5) we can 
argue that the environmental uncertainty variable in itself never pushes towards harder 
forms of legalisation, but only exerts a ‘softening’ influence on an institutional design 
with hard legalisation resulting from high asset specificity and behavioural uncertainty. 
The adoption of this refined understanding of environmental uncertainty leads us to ex­
pect an overall moderate level of legalisation to be chosen as the design of an interna­
tional institution on small arms and light weapons.
Table 7.1 below summarises the core findings of the above analysis of the problem con­
stellation underlying the small arms and light weapons issue. In its bottom row it also 
indicates the expected institutional design outcome we derived from this analysis. The 
remainder of this chapter sets out to determine whether or not this design expectation 
corresponds with the actual design outcome of the United Nations Programme of Action 
of 2001.
Problem attribute Level Arguments
1. Asset specificity M oderate
A  Potential loss Moderate ■ In case of an ex post breakdown of a SALW agreement, conflict ridden 
states would lose a potentially effective instrument to reduce the uncon­
trolled influx of SALW, which is often seen as an important destabilising 
factor.
B. Propensity to shirk Moderate ■ A number of important countries do not benefit directly from a function­
ing SALW agreement, while incurring a moderate—primarily indirect— 
implementation costs in the form of a curtailment of their ability to pur­
chase SALW on international markets (especially the Arab countries) 
and to use (clandestine) SALW transfers as a foreign policy instrument 
(e.g. Russia) or to continue a very liberal domestic policy of private gun 
ownership (especially USA).
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2. Behavioural un­
certainty
Moderate
A. Governance inca­
pacity
Moderate ■ The most important SALW exporting countries have an effective system 
to regulate this sector (North America, Western Europe).
■ Many states that belong to the second most important group of SALW 
exporters have a moderate to poor capacity to enforce the rule of law 
within their territories (e.g. former Soviet states).
■ Countries most affected by SALW related problems have typically poor 
record on the maintenance of the rule of law, as they are weakened by 
an ongoing or recently concluded conflict.
B. Relative reliance 
on governmental 
monitoring
Moderate ■ Publicly available data sets compiled my multiple UN agencies and 
non-governmental agencies but typically building on data reported by 
states.
C. Industry opacity Moderate ■ Producer countries have the ability to track trafficking, but often keep 
information secret for security purposes or for fearing negative public 
reaction.
■ Many countries make SALW stockpiles public, but figures are some­
times purposefully distorted for strategic reasons.
■ Monitoring and estimation of true stockpile figures by NGOs and UN 
agencies.
3. Environmental 
uncertainty
Low
A Novelty of policy 
issue
Low ■ Experience on regulating other types of weapons applicable to SALW
■ Several anti-SALW initiatives adopted prior to the UN SALW confer­
ence.
B. Innovativeness 
a. Product innova­
tion
Low ■ Technology applied in the production of SALW has not changed sig­
nificantly over the past half century.
■ SALW used in most armed conflicts are typically of older generations 
of production.
b. Process innova­
tion
Moderate ■ Increasing domestic production can help circumvent rules on traffick­
ing.
Table 7.1 Summary o f the assessm ent o f the constellation o f the problem  o f 
the international trafficking o f sm all arms and light weapons.
7.3 Degree o f legalisation
The degree of obligation enshrined in the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and 
Light Weapons will be assessed along the three dimensions already used in the preced­
ing case studies—namely obligation, precision and delegation. As the following discus­
sion will show, the PoA is consistently weak with respect to all three of these elements, 
thus constituting an illustrative example of an international agreement with considera­
bly soft legalisation.
7.3.1 Obligation
The degree of obligation created by the Programme of Action will be assessed based on 
the three criteria already introduced earlier—namely, the agreement’s legal bindingness,
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the extent to which it includes provisions that attenuate the degree of obligation of the 
agreement such as reservations, safeguards and escape clauses, and the extent to which 
the agreement makes provisions for monitoring and enforcement. It will be shown that 
the level of obligation of the PoA is low.
7.3.1.1 Legal bindingness
There can be little doubt about the PoA’s lack of legal bindingness. The question of 
whether or not the final document should be legally or only politically binding was sub­
ject of considerable controversy among the negotiating parties. EU member states, Can­
ada, Switzerland and, to a lesser extent, SADC states lobbied hard in favour of a legally 
binding small arms treaty, in particular with regard to arms brokering and the marking 
and tracing of weapons. This position was fiercely opposed by the US, China, the Arab 
group, and a few other key states from the South (Small Arms Survey 2002). The latter 
group prevailed, and the final agreement was designed to be of politically binding nature 
only—to the great disappointment of the NGO community, which had also pressed hard 
for a legally binding treaty. The legally non-binding nature of the agreement is reflected 
in its name ‘Programme’ rather than ‘Convention’ or ‘T reat/. Binding formulations such 
as ‘shall’ are carefully avoided, with the paragraph on self-determination and territorial 
integrity in the Preamble (paragraph 11) being the sole exception. Instead, considerably 
weaker formulations such as the declaratory ‘We, the States participating in this Confer­
ence, ... undertake the following measures’ (e.g. section II paragraph 1), or the hortatory 
‘States are encourage to ...’ (e.g. section III paragraph 12) and recommendation for ac­
tion ‘on a voluntary basis’ were chosen. The agreement was adopted by consensus 
among the states participating at the conference and formally welcomed by the UN Gen­
eral Assembly in its resolution A/RES/56/24 V of 24 December 2001. No ratification 
process followed on the national level. Furthermore, no provisions on procedural issues 
such as accession, ratification, reservations, and withdrawal that are typically included 
in legally binding treaties, exist in the PoA, which confirms the agreement’s non-binding 
character. Also, the PoA is not registered under article 102 of the UN Charter.
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7 -3 -1 -2 Tenacity o f obligation
Although the agreement does not create any binding obligations, it still includes a num­
ber of formulations that can be seen as safeguards, which states can use to excuse a cer­
tain behaviour that seems to violate the recommendations contained in the PoA. For in­
stance, the introduction of section II acknowledges explicitly the ‘different situations, 
capacities and priorities of States and regions’ thus allowing for a non-uniform applica­
tion of the 41 measures that are suggested thereafter. Paragraph 23 of the national rec­
ommendations of section II point into the same direction when relativising the call for 
international information exchange with the reference ‘in accordance with national prac­
tices’.
7.3.1.3 Compliance mechanisms
Also with respect to the third and final element of obligation the PoA presents a ‘soft’ 
outcome. It does not contain any reference to potential consequences of non- 
compliance, nor has the praxis that has developed around the PoA since its adoption 
made any progress on this issue.
Monitoring mechanisms are not developed much further either. All monitoring rests 
strictly upon government self-reporting. All recommendations regarding the sharing of 
information come with considerable qualifications such as in paragraph 23 of section II 
which asks states ‘to submit, on a voluntary basis, to relevant regional and international 
organisations and in accordance with their national practices, information on ...’ (em­
phasis added) or in section III paragraph 13, which posits that ‘States are encouraged to 
exchange information on a voluntary basis on their national marking systems on small 
arms and light weapons’ (emphasis added).
The PoA creates very limited mechanisms to review the progress on implementing the 
steps outlined in the PoA (Klare and Stohl 2003). Section III paragraph 1 letter b stipu­
lates biennial meetings to be held on a regional level. This has resulted in a number of 
conferences, meetings, and discussions since the PoA’s adoption in 2001. Section IV
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paragraph 1 letter (a) of this section recommends the General Assembly ‘to convene a 
conference no later than 2006 to review progress made in the implementation of the 
Programme of Action’. This provision is weaker than many negotiators had wanted as 
they favoured a more direct obligation to hold such a review conference. The US delega­
tion opposed such a review process which they viewed as ‘automatic and empty* and 
therefore undesirable. By insisting on a preceding approval by the General Assembly 
they preserved the possibility to obstruct such a review conference at a later stage.
Overall, few would agree with the judgment by a US negotiator’s judgment that this fol­
low-up mechanism was ‘strong’ and ‘aggressive’ (Calhoun quoted in Kellerhals 2001).
* * * * *
In sum, the degree of obligation created by the Programme of Action is veiy modest, as it 
is only politically binding, contains several safeguards and no real monitoring nor en­
forcement mechanisms.
7.3.2 Precision
Also with respect to the second dimension of legalisation, i.e. precision, does the UN 
Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons remain at the lower end of the 
spectrum, whereby a weak degree of determinacy of the agreement’s formulations ren­
ders it almost impossible to assess its degree of coherence.
• Determinacy
The PoA leaves wide margins for states to exercise discretion or interpretation both as a 
result of a failure to provide definitions of central terms and of the frequent use of am­
biguous expressions.
Conspicuous by absence is the definition of small arms and light weapons. This non­
inclusion of a definition of these two central terms resulted from unbridgeable differ­
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ences among the participants of the UN SALW conference on the scope of the definition. 
Whereas some states, including India, Sri Lanka, and some African states, lobbied in fa­
vour of using the definition developed by the 1997 Panel of Experts, the United States— 
adopting the NRA’s concern about any UN infringement on civilian possession of arms— 
advocated a more narrow definition focused on weapons of strictly military types. A 
third camp was against the inclusion of any definition all together, arguing that precision 
was not necessary as the document was of non-legally binding nature (SAS 2002, 221). 
As these differences could not be settled by the end of the Conference, the participating 
states adopted a Programme of Action which evades defining its very object—small arms 
and light weapons.
The second source of indeterminacy stems from the liberal use of vague clauses such as 
‘where applicable’, ‘as appropriate’, or ‘where needed’. The second formulation, ‘as ap­
propriate’ appears no less than 38 times, which is on average almost in every other para­
graph, with a disproportionate, but telling, accumulation in section II on steps to be un­
dertaken by states on the national, regional and global level—with an increasing ten­
dency towards higher hierarchical levels.
An illustrative example of the vague and non-obliging spirit of the Programme of Action 
is paragraph 35 of section II, which declares that participating states will undertake 
measures ‘[t]o encourage the United Nations Security Council to consider, on a case-by- 
case basis, the inclusion, where applicable, of relevant provisions for disarmament, de­
mobilisation and reintegration in the mandates and budgets of peacekeeping opera­
tions’.
• Coherence
Coherence is not so much of an issue with regard to the Programme of Action. It does 
not contain any paragraphs that are in direct contradiction with each other or with any 
other existing international agreement on small arms and light weapons. However, this 
seemingly high degree of coherence can be largely attributed to the PoA’s low precision,
292
as many formulations are vague enough to allow for both an interpretation which is in 
line with, for instance, the considerably more precise OSCE document on SALW as well 
as for the an interpretation which is in contradiction with it.
7.3.3 Delegation
The degree of delegation established by the UN Programme of Action is very low. Section 
III paragraph 1 emphasises explicitly that ‘the primary responsibility for solving the 
problems associated with the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its as­
pects falls on all States’. The Programme of Action does not create any new body com­
missioned to implement or monitor the Programme of Action, but refers a very limited 
number of times to existing ones, namely the UN secretary general (once) and the UN 
general assembly (four times). Section II paragraph 33 requests the secretary general, 
through the Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA), ‘to collate and circulate data 
and information provided by States on a voluntary basis and including national reports, 
on implementation by those States of the Programme of Action’. However, this case of 
delegation is severely circumscribed by the very limited scope of the delegated task (low 
centralisation) and by the refusal of the participating states to grant the DDA the neces­
sary means to add any independent value to this task flow independence). The very same 
paragraph states explicitly that the DDA has to assume this function ‘within existing re­
sources’. With respect to the General Assembly, delegation goes slightly further in terms 
of centralisation but is weaker in terms of independence. Section IV paragraph 1 recom­
mends the General Assembly to undertake four steps for the effective follow-up of the 
Conference. First, it asks the General Assembly to decide when and where a follow-up 
conference ought to be held in 2006 (letter a)—as already discussed above under 7.3.I.3.
Second, letter b of the same paragraph asks the UNGA to ‘convene a meeting of States on 
a biennial basis to consider the national, regional and global implementation of the Pro­
gramme of Action’. Third, letter c of section IV paragraph 1 asks the UNGA further to 
conduct a study ‘examining the feasibility of developing an international instrument to 
enable States to identify and trace in a timely and reliable manner illicit small arms and
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light weapons’. This sub-paragraph was included as a ‘consolation’ for states, in particu­
lar France and Switzerland, which had advocated strongly in favour of a legally binding 
agreement on these aspects. The final sub-paragraph grants the UNGA the right to ‘con­
sider further steps to enhance international cooperation in preventing, combating and 
eradicating illicit brokering in small arms and light weapons’. This formulation reflects 
the noncommittal nature and limited scope of this right, which falls clearly short in 
comparison, for instance, with the right granted by the Vienna Convention to the Inter­
national Narcotics Control Board and to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs to present 
suggestions and recommendations.
Whereas section IV establishes a certain, although very limited, degree of delegation in 
terms of centralisation, the degree of independence resulting from this delegation is nil— 
for two major reasons. First, no independence in terms of personnel exists, as all mem­
ber states are represented in the General Assembly and decisions are only politically 
binding, sot that these provisions do not constitute a real case of delegation as no inde­
pendence between the General Assembly and the participating states exists. Second, 
there exists no degree of financial independence either, as letter c of section IV para­
graph 1 states explicitly that the UN has to assume these functions ‘within existing re­
sources’.
7.3.4 In sum: institutional design
The above analysis has shown—and Table 7.2 summarises—that the overall degree of le­
galisation enshrined in the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons 
has to be qualified as low. With respect to all three dimensions—obligation, precision 
and delegation—does the PoA remain a soft agreement.
The agreement’s failure to establish stronger forms of legalisation were the main reason 
for the widespread dissatisfaction of NGOs who decried the outcome of the UN Confer­
ence on Small Arms and Light Weapons as a Programme of Inaction.
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Indicator Level Argument
1. Obligation Low
A. Legal bindingness
a. Language
b. Procedural provi­
sions
Low
Low
■ Agreement is referred to as ‘Programme’, not ’Convention’ or ‘Treaty’.
■ Agreement text uses horatory formulations such as ‘encouraged’.
■ Agreement not required to go through national ratification proce­
dures.
■ The PoA is not registered under article 102 of the UN Charter
B. Tenacity of obliga­
tion
Low ■ PoA contains several safeguard-like provisions.
■ Agreement accepts non-uniform implementation by acknowledging 
‘different situations, capacities and priorities of states’.
C. Compliance mecha­
nisms
a. Monitoring
b. Enforcement
Low
Low
■ States provide data on a voluntary basis.
■ Agreement does not provide for an automatic review, solely recom­
mends a review to be called by the UN secretary general/UNGA.
■ Nor the agreement text nor subsequent practice provide for measures 
to rectify non-compliance.
2. Precision Low
A. Determinacy Low ■ Key terms not defined by agreement text (such as the terms small 
arms and light weapons).
■ Frequent use of vague terms such as ‘appropriate’, which appears in 
half of all paragraphs.
B. Coherence n/a ■ Coherence cannot be assessed because of the low degree of precision.
3. Delegation Low
A. Independence
a. Human resources
b. Financial re­
sources
c. Decision making
Low
Low
Low
■ Decision makers are delegates of signatories in the UN General As­
sembly.
■ DDA independent from signatories
■ The agreement does not provide agents with additional funding to ful­
fil delegated tasks.
■ Decisions are delegated to the UN General Assembly.
B. Centralisation
a. Rule making
b. Implementation
c. Dispute resolution 
and enforcement
Low
Low
Low
■ Department for Disarmament Affairs is requested to collate and cir­
culate data and information provided by states.
■ UN General Assembly is requested to decide whether a follow-up con­
ference is needed.
■ Solely states are in charge of implementation.
■ Solely states are in charge of enforcement.
Table 7.2 Summary o f the assessm ent o f the level o f legalisation o f the Pro­
gramme o f Action on the Illicit Trade in  Small Arms and Light 
W eapons.
7.4 Comparing expectations and reality
The analysis of the institutional design of the Unite Nations Programme of Action re­
vealed only a low degree of legalisation. The PoA remains weak on all three dimensions 
of legalisation—obligation, precision and delegation. This reliance on soft legalisation 
contrasts with the design expectations we derived from the analysis of the problem con­
stellation underlying SALW as a global policy issue. The moderate level of asset specific­
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ity and behavioural uncertainty combined with a low level of environmental uncertainty 
suggested a moderate degree of legalisation as the optimal institutional design to cater 
for the specific contractual risks associate with a problem of this constellation and, thus, 
a harder institutional design than was incorporated in the PoA. This apparent failure to 
predict the correct design outcome casts serious doubts on the explanatory power of the 
TCE approach applied in this study. Before rejecting this approach entirely, it might, 
however, be worthwhile taking a second look at possible reasons that might explain why 
the UN Programme of Action adopted only low levels of legalisation.
The most promising starting point to search for a potential explanation is to take a closer 
look at the negations in the run-up to and during the UN Conference on Small Arms and 
Light Weapons. As already mentioned in the introductory part of this chapter, these ne­
gotiations were marked by strong controversies between two camps. On the one side 
were a number of developing states that were severely suffering under the diffusion of 
small arms light weapons and therefore pressing on a global agreement with deep sub­
stance and an institutional design which ensured that these far-reaching measures 
would indeed be implemented by all states. These states were supported by the Euro­
pean Union, Norway, Switzerland, Japan and Canada and by a large pool of non­
governmental organisation. On the other side were a handful of powerful states, includ­
ing the US, Russia and China, which fiercely resisted any such move. The primary role 
the US played at the Conference was often described as that of an ‘obstructionist’ (Small 
Arms Survey 2002, 219), and at several occasions the US delegation came close at block­
ing agreement on the action programme (Stohl 2001). The critics of a strong UN spon­
sored SALW agreement largely prevailed in the end, which becomes manifest not so 
much in the PoA’s substance being insufficient but rather in the insufficient institutional 
support given to this substance in terms of too low levels of legalisation. First and fore­
most, the substantive provisions are mostly formulated in veiy vague terms. Conse­
quently, although a benevolent interpretation of these vague provisions would result in 
significant benefits for SALW-affected states, the vagueness provides too easy an excuse 
for passivity for a number of states who are not truly concerned about solving the prob­
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lem. Inexistent monitoring and delegation do nothing to counterbalance this tendency. 
From this perspective, the mismatch of form and substance in the PoA appears as a de­
liberate design decision imposed by those powerful states that were opposed to the crea­
tion of an effective global regime to curb the trafficking of small arms and light weapons.
This speculative explanation of the reasons why the TCE framework failed to reach a 
correct design prediction in the case of UN Programme on small arms and light weapons 
highlights an important lacuna of this approach. As all functionalist theories, it fails to 
incorporate power asymmetries as a potentially important explanation. The preceding 
three case studies provided examples of situations where existing power asymmetries 
did not distort the design outcome predicted on the basis of our TCE approach. As these 
cases suggest, TCE and power asymmetries may be reconcilable in two scenarios. First, 
power asymmetries between participating states may not invalidate the TCE approach 
when—for humanitarian or ideological reasons—powerful states do not throw in their 
weight against an international agreement from which they do not directly benefit, as in 
the case of the Kimberley Process. Second, our TCE framework might also generate valid 
design expectations when a powerful state is among those states facing a high degree of 
asset specificity as in the case of illicit drugs, where the USA hoped to shift much of the 
regulatory burden to the drug-producing countries. The concluding chapter will take a 
deeper look at these theoretical issues, discuss the merits and weaknesses the case stud­
ies have revealed of the TCE approach and examine the extent to which modifications 
might help to overcome the challenges exposed by this final case study.
29 7
8 Conclusion
As the cases studied above demonstrated, states design international institutions in very 
different ways. The central question animating this study has been why states opt for 
such a variety in institutional designs. The study has sought to contribute to the emerg­
ing institutional design literature by testing the explanatory power of one of the three 
competing design theories that are emerging in the international relations literature. Af­
ter the detailed presentation of the four cases of illicit drugs trafficking, money launder­
ing, conflict diamonds and the trafficking in small arms and light weapons, this conclud­
ing chapter embarks on a number of tasks. First, it summarises the data and examines 
whether we can find a correlation between the three components of the dependent vari­
able in these four cases. Second, this concluding chapter assesses the explanatory power 
of the functionalist framework developed and tested here by critically examining in 
which cases the design predictions corresponded well with the actual design outcome 
and in which cases and for what reasons the predictions failed. This discussion is the 
foundation of the development of conjectures in the third and final section of this chap­
ter on how the framework might be adapted and extended in order to increase its ex­
planatory power. Given the small number of cases studied here, no definite answers can 
be reached. But understanding social science research as an'iterative and cumulative 
process, it is hoped that this study can provide a template for future small-n and a large- 
n studies.
8.1 Summary o f data
This first subchapter provides a summary of the dependent variable describing the de­
sign of international institutions and of the independent variables characterising the un­
derlying problem constellations. This summary helps to recall the major characteristics 
of the four cases analysed in this study and thereby to prepare the grounds for the sub­
sequent discussion of the patterns and interactions between the variables.
298
8.1.1 Degree of legalisation
As discussed in the introduction, the cases covered by this study were purposefully se­
lected so as to span the full spectrum from low to high levels of legalisation. While this 
selection was based on the overall level of legalisation, the tabular synopsis provided be­
low also shows the full variance in the three constituent elements of legalisation— 
namely obligation, precision and delegation. Table 8.1 provides the basis for the next 
sub-chapter, which embarks on the examination of the interaction between these three 
variables. This discussion is motivated by the conjecture that the three component of the 
design variable may not be fully independent but may rather present complements to or 
substitutes for each other.
Indicator Drugs Money L Diamonds SALW
1. Obligation High Moderate Moderate Low
A. Legal bindingness High Low Low Low
a. Language High Low Low Low
b. Procedural provisions High Low Low Low
B. Tenacity of obligation High n/a n/a n/a
C. Compliance mechanisms Moderate High High Low
a. Monitoring Moderate High High Low
b. Sanctions Moderate High High Low
2. Precision Moderate M oderate High Low
A. Determinacy Moderate Moderate High Low
B. Coherence High High Moderate n/a
3. Delegation High M oderate Low Low
A. Independence High Moderate Low Low
a. Human resources High Moderate Low Low
b. Financial resources Moderate Moderate Low Low
c. Decision making High Low Low Low
B. Centralisation High Low Low Low
a. Rule making High Low Low Low
b. Implementation High Moderate Low Low
c. Dispute resolution and Low Low Low Low
enforcement
Overall level o f  legalisation High M oderate Moderate Low
Table 8.1 Detailed summary o f the level o f legalisation o f the four interna­
tional institutions assessed in  th is study.
8.1.2 Problem constellation
Table 8.2 shows the summary of the problem constellation of the four cases analysed by 
this study, whereby the three independent variables asset specificity, behavioural uncer­
tainty and environmental uncertainty are presented in a disaggregated form to allow the 
reader to recapitulate how the assessment of these variables was reached. The three TCE 
variables and their subcomponents are assumed to be independent. This is assumption
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is an indispensable requirement, as the model would otherwise face problems with mul- 
ticollinearity.
The bottom row of the table shows the level of legalisation functionalist hypotheses sug­
gest as the optimal design option for institutions set up to tackle the individual policy 
problems. The analysis of the problem characteristics of the four cases suggested a high 
level of legalisation as the optimal institutional design in one case (drugs trafficking), 
while in two cases (conflict diamonds and small arms and light weapons) a moderate 
level of legalisation was the expected design outcome. In the case of money laundering, 
the model failed to generate a clear design expectation as the simultaneously high levels 
of asset specificity and environmental uncertainty led to conflicting design predictions— 
a high degree of legalisation to cater for the opportunistic risks stemming from pro­
nounced asset specificity on the one hand, and soft legalisation so as to remain flexible 
enough to adjust to a highly uncertain environment, on the other. The discussion of the 
extent to which these design expectations corresponded with the real design outcomes 
will be subject of the next sub-chapter.
Problem attribute Drugs Money L Diamonds SALW
1. Asset specificity High High Moderate M oderate
A. Potential loss High High Moderate Moderate
B. Propensity to shirk High High Moderate Moderate
2. Behavioural uncertainty High Moderate M oderate Moderate
A. Governance incapacity High Low High Moderate
B. Relative reliance on gov­ High High Low Moderate
ernmental monitoring
C. Industry opacity High Low High Moderate
3. Environmental uncer­ Low High Moderate Low
tainty
A. Novelty of policy issue Low Moderate High Low
B. Innovativeness Low High Low Low
a. Product innovation Low High Low Low
b. Process innovation Moderate High Moderate Low
Expected level o f  legalisa­ High ? Moderate M oderate
tion
Table 8.2 Summary o f the characteristics o f the constellations o f the four 
international policy problem s covered by this study.
8.2 Interactions between the com ponents o f the dependent variable
In reaction to the publication of the concept of legalisation in 2000, a number of schol­
ars have engaged in analysing potential interactions between the three components of
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the aggregated design variable legalisation, namely obligation, precision and delegation. 
The central questions in this debate are whether some design combinations are more 
likely than others and whether one component may serve as a complement or supple­
ment for another.
This section seeks to make a contribution to this discussion by analysing, based on the 
four cases studied in part two, whether there is any correlation between the three com­
ponents of legalisation. As the number of cases is very limited it is impossible to reach 
any definite answer to the questions raised above. Table 8.3 summarises the data with 
regard to the correlation between three pairs of components: obligation-precision, obli- 
gation-delegation and precision-delegation. For each of the four international institu­
tions analysed in this study, each cell contains the level of the component indicated in 
the top row—followed by a hyphen and—followed by the level of the component indi­
cated in the first column. In each cell, the top entry relates to the Vienna Convention, 
followed by the Forty Recommendations, the KPCS and finally the PoA.
(1K1 ■ (Totinn
Oblij
I : p p
Ration Precision Delegation - ...........  --
UUllgdLIUIl
Precision H -M ----
-----------
M-M
M -H .
L - L
Delegation H -H M--H
M-M M--M "
M -L H--L
L - L L --L
Table 8.3 Analysis o f a po ten tia l co rre la tion  betw een th e  th re e  com ponents 
o f legalisation.
The table shows that there is no perfect correlation between any of the three compo­
nents. However, in three out of four cases, the level of obligation is equal to the level of 
delegation. This is true in the case of all international institutions except the KPCS. The 
correlation between obligation and precision on the one hand, and between precision 
and delegation on the other hand is weaker, because the extent of these component vari­
ables only matches is two out of four cases.
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8.3 Does form follow function? Empirical verification of theoretical 
model
The main task this study set out to tackle was to test functionalist design hypotheses in 
four specific cases which represent the full range of institutional design options. It is 
therefore of central interest to see in how many of these cases the functionalist frame­
work was indeed able to generate an accurate prediction of the institutional design out­
come. This subchapter summarises the central findings on the (mis)match of design and 
problem structure as they emerged from the case studies presented in part two of this 
study. As the predictive power of the model was far from absolute the question arises 
why the TCE model was able to generate accurate design predictions in two cases but 
failed in the other two. This discussion will suggest, first, a more disaggregated analysis 
of the explanatory power of the individual independent variables and, second, a qualifi­
cation and extension of the model.
8.3.1 Matches and mismatches
The functionalist design hypotheses this study derived from transaction cost economics 
generated accurate design predictions in two of the four case studies, namely with re­
spect to the 1988 Vienna Convention on drugs trafficking and the Kimberley Process 
Certification Scheme of 2002 on conflict diamonds (see Table 8.4). In the former case, 
the model suggested high levels of legalisation as the optimal design option. All three in­
dependent variables pointed in the same direction: high levels of asset specificity and of 
behavioural uncertainty required ‘harder’ institutions, while the low level of environ­
mental uncertainty did not provide any reason why this push towards the upper end of 
the legalisation spectrum should be lessened. The expected high level of legalisation cor­
responded well with the high level of obligation and delegation and the moderate level of 
precision that characterise the actual design of the Vienna Convention.
In the case of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme we found, in contrast, all three 
TCE variables to be of moderate degree, thus suggestion an institution with a moderate 
level of legalisation as best suitable for tackling the problem of conflict diamonds. This
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prediction matched well the actual design of the KPCS, which presents a moderate level 
of obligation combined with great precision and hardly any delegation, thus leading to 
an overall moderate level of legalisation.
More intriguing is the case of money laundering. In this case, the TCE framework failed 
to produce any clear design expectation as two of the three independent variables, 
namely asset specificity and environmental uncertainty, pointed in diametrically op­
posed directions. While the high level of asset specificity involved in anti-money laun­
dering efforts suggests international institutions with high levels of legalisation as the 
optimal design option, the high degree of environmental uncertainty associated with the 
problem requires instead highly flexible institutions and thus low levels of legalisation. 
The moderate level of behavioural uncertainty did not tilt the balance in favour of any of 
the two directions. Consequently, we were unable to formulate any design expectation in 
this case, thus, making it impossible to judge whether or not the overall moderate level 
of legalisation found in the Forty Recommendations of 2003 does represent an optimal 
design match for the given problem constellation.
While the result of the money laundering case study is inconclusive, the design expecta­
tions generated in the final case study on small arms and light weapons is outright 
wrong. The problem constellation found in association with SALW trafficking is charac­
terised by a moderate level of asset specificity and a moderate level of behavioural uncer­
tainty. Together with the low level of environmental uncertainty we would expect an in­
stitution with at least a moderate degree of legalisation, whereas in fact the UN Pro­
gramme of Action displays very low levels of obligation, precision and delegation, and 
thus a very soft institution. In brief, we find the actual level of legalisation in the PoA to 
be lower than deemed optimal for the given problem constellation.
Drugs Money L Diam onds SALW
Expected level o f  legalisation High Inconclusive Moderate Moderate
Realised level o f legalisation High Moderate Moderate Low
Match expectation & realisa­
tion
Yes n/a Yes No ^
Table 8 .4  Summary o f the explanatory power o f the functionalist m odel de­
veloped in  this study.
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Especially given the very limited number of cases studied here, a fifty percent ‘success 
rate’ of the TCE model is little satisfactory. Has this study therefore shown that this 
model needs to be dismissed as possessing insufficient explanatory power? The answer 
to this question strongly depends on whether promising adaptations to this functionalist 
design model can be made that cater for the reasons why it failed in the two cases. The 
next subsection therefore takes a closer look at these two failed cases, in order to better 
understand why the model may have reached no —in the case of money laundering—or 
the wrong—in the case of SALW—design prediction.
8.3.2 Taking a second look at failed predictions
This section is dedicated to the detailed discussion of the two cases where the TCE model 
was unable to generate an accurate design prediction, in order to reach a conclusion on 
whether the model merits further refinement and investigation. First, the money laun­
dering case will be re-examined. By reverting to the rich body of empirical literature on 
TCE in business settings, this re-examination leads us to a nuanced understanding of the 
interaction between the independent variables and of their relative strength. As will be 
shown below, a refinement of the model along these lines helps us to reach design pre­
dictions in seemingly inconclusive problem constellations as found in money laundering. 
Second, the re-examination of the case of trafficking in small arms and light weapons 
brings up a question already touched upon in chapter 3 of this study: the validity of the 
efficiency assumption underlying all functionalist theories. As will emerge from the dis­
cussion under 8.3.2.2, international efforts to combat the trafficking in small arms and 
light weapons present an insight-full example of a case where this assumption breaks 
down and power imposes itself as the overriding factor.
8.3.21 Tensions, dynamics, and biases
The money laundering case study confronts us with the paradoxical situation that, on 
the one hand, high levels of asset specificity increase the risk of opportunism which 
needs to be mitigated by institutions with hard legalisation, and that on the other hand
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great environmental uncertainty requires flexible institutions with soft legalisation. The 
high degree of asset specificity is caused by significant potential losses for off-shore fi­
nancial centres and their high propensity to shirk from their obligations. The environ­
ment of anti-money laundering efforts is markedly uncertain because, first, an ever ex­
panding list of predicate offences associated with money laundering constantly confronts 
policymakers and law enforcement agencies with new problems, and, second, because 
the nature of the offence allows for considerable innovativeness. As behavioural uncer­
tainty is only of moderate degree, it does not allow us to decide whether the asset speci­
ficity-induced pull towards the higher end of the legalisation spectrum or the environ­
mental uncertainty-induced pull towards the lower end of the spectrum determines 
which design is to be deemed optimal for this type of problem constellation. The ques­
tion of how to handle such inconclusive problem constellations gives rise to two more 
far-reaching considerations.
One way of managing the contradictory design expectations is by assuming that one 
variable outweighs the other or that the effect of one explanatory variable may depend 
on another explanatory variable. This possibility has been raised in a number of recent 
empirical studies on transaction cost economics in business settings73. For instance, it 
emerges from Buvik and John’s study (2000) that the effect of environmental uncer­
tainty may depend on the level of asset specificity. Following the argument presented by 
Masten, Meehan and Snyder (1991), one can assume low levels of integration (i.e. spot 
markets) to be the default governance structure for business transactions as vertical in­
tegration or internal organisation is associated with considerable costs. Economic actors 
are only willing to shoulder these costs if tighter integration helps them to reduce risks 
of opportunism arising from high levels of asset specificity and if this outweighs the in­
tegration costs. In the context of IR, the analogous assumption is widespread which 
maintains that ad hoc coalitions are the preferred mode of cooperation as they involve
73 One of the few non-economists addressing this issue—although not from an empirical but from a theoretical per­
spective—is Kal Raustiala (2004, 26).
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the least sovereignty costs (Abbott and Snidal 1998) States only consider higher degrees 
of legalisation when so-designed international institutions reduce the risk that other 
states shirk from their obligation and thereby inflict considerable losses for the other 
participating states, as it is the case in the presence of significant asset specific invest­
ments combined with considerable behavioural uncertainty.
Two consequences for the efficacy of the three explanatory variables follow from assum­
ing low levels of legalisation as the ‘default’ design option. First, behavioural uncertainty 
alone cannot be expected to lead to a deviation from the default design, i.e. from soft le­
galisation. Even if states find it easy to cheat surreptitiously from the obligations created 
by a certain institution, such a high level of behavioural uncertainty remains inconse­
quential if (a) states have little incentive to exploit this situation and if (b) such a breach 
does not result in any significant loss or harm for other states. Both the incentives to 
shirk and the level of harm inflicted on other participating states by such behaviour in­
fluence the asset specificity of a certain cooperative project. Hence, only when asset 
specificity has passed a certain threshold, increasing behavioural uncertainty can— 
ceteris paribus—be expected to motivate states to choose higher levels of legalisation. 
The inverse is equally true, as states will see little need in creating an institution with 
high levels of legalisation and, for instance, delegate monitoring and sanctioning author­
ity when they feel that they themselves can easily detect non-compliance of other states.
Similar to behavioural uncertainty, the effect of environmental uncertainty can be as­
sumed to depend on the level of asset specificity. Only when a non-trivial level of asset 
specificity is involved, can we assume that decreasing levels of environmental uncer­
tainty are correlated with harder forms of legalisation. But in contrast to behavioural un­
certainty, environmental uncertainty never exerts a pull towards higher levels of legali­
sation as low environmental uncertainty simply means that flexibility (and thus soft le­
galisation) is not of major importance, but not that harder legalisation is necessary. In 
other words, environmental uncertainty can only drag the optimal level of legalisation
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down—as it is expected in the money laundering case where high environmental uncer­
tainty requires a flexible design—but never push it up.
This brings us to the second question the inconclusive problem constellation underlying 
the money laundering case raises: by how much does the high level of environmental 
uncertainty reduce the optimal level of legalisation? Are the effects of high asset specific­
ity and high environmental uncertainty of equal strength? If we assume this to be the 
case, the ‘puli’ exerted by asset specificity towards the higher end of the legalisation 
spectrum and by environmental uncertainty towards the lower end neutralise each 
other. Behavioural uncertainty then becomes the determinant factor, and—as it is of 
moderate degree—requires an institutional design of moderate legalisation. As the actual 
design of the 2003 FATF Recommendations has been classified as representing a mod­
erate degree of legalisation, this assumption leads us to an accurate design prediction 
and to the temptation to consider the puzzle fully resolved.
However, a closer look at the practises evolving around the Forty Recommendations 
suggests that this would be a premature conclusion. As discussed in chapter 5, the FATF 
has changed its practices considerably over the last few years, especially with regard to 
monitoring and sanctioning, although without these changes having been explicitly re­
flected in the Forty Recommendations. Most important in this regard is the black-listing 
of the so-called noncompliant countries and territories, a monitoring and sanctioning 
mechanism the FATF adopted in 2000. By substituting the previously practised white- 
listing approach with a black-listing approach the anti-money laundering institution 
strengthened its obligatory dimension, thus leading to a move from low to moderate lev­
els of legalisation. However, the FATF is currently engaged in reviewing this practice as 
it feels that the black-listing exercise is too cost-intensive and restrictive for dealing with 
a policy issue that is marked by considerable environmental uncertainty. The likely sus­
pension of this practice would re-assign the anti-money laundering institution to the 
lower end of the legalisation spectrum.
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These frequent policy reversals which directly alter the institutional design may be a re­
flection of the tensions emanating from a contradictory problem constellation as found 
in the case of money laundering. We may therefore conjecture that contradictory prob­
lem constellations marked by simultaneously high levels of asset specificity and envi­
ronmental uncertainty may hinder the establishment of a stable design equilibrium. It 
would be worthwhile examining whether a similar dynamic can be found in other inter­
national institutions which are tackling problems with contradictory constellations.
Summarising the discussion above, we can expect to find institutions with low levels of 
legalisation whenever asset specificity is insignificant, independent of the values of be­
havioural and environmental uncertainty. This discussion of the possible interactions 
among the independent variables leads us to a revision of the design hypothesis devel­
oped in part one of this study. The revised hypotheses are summarised in Table 8.5 be­
low.
Design Problem constellation______________________________  Number o f  different prob-
(level o f  le ­
galisation)
Asset
specificity
Behavioural
uncertainty
Environmental
uncertainty
lem  constellations leading  
to  the sam e design outcom e
Low Low Any value Any value 9
Moderate Moderate Any value Any value
Moderate High Any value Moderate Total for moderate = 14
Moderate High Moderate or Low Low
Unstable High Any value High 3
High ________ High Low 1
Table 8.5 Revised hypotheses regarding the relationship betw een levels o f 
legalisation and problem  characteristics.
When assuming that three variables representing the problem constellation are equally 
distributed, these hypotheses suggest a strong bias in the distribution of design out­
comes towards the middle and lower end of the legalisation spectrum. Given the small 
number of cases studied here, such a bias is mere speculation and needs further testing 
based on a large-n sample of international institutions. If such a study confirmed the 
skew towards soft legalisation it would be well in line with the realist position which 
stresses the rarity of deep cooperation among states (e.g. Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 
1996).
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8 .3-2.2 Power and efficiency, power versus efficiency
The efficiency assumption is one of the central pillars of transaction cost economics the­
ory. The central tenet of TCE states that actors choose among alternative governance 
structures that allow them to carry out their transaction in most efficient ways. This as­
sumption has attracted considerable and sustained criticism from scholars associated 
with a wide range of theoretical orientations and disciplines—within IR namely, histori­
cal institutionalists, constructivists, and realists. While the first-mentioned see path- 
dependency and isomorphism as the central explanatory design factors, the second- 
mentioned emphasise the importance of norms and shared believes about appropriate 
ways of tackling a given problem, and the last-mentioned focus on the role powerful 
states have in imposing their design preferences upon others. Oliver Williamson himself, 
the ‘founding father’ of transaction cost economics, recognised that the efficiency as­
sumption may not be absolute. Adopting an evolutionist line of reasoning, he argues that 
not all organisational structures found at a given time present an optimal fit for the un­
derlying problem constellation, but that ‘more efficient modes will eventually supplant 
less efficient modes—though entrenched power interests can sometimes delay the dis­
placement’ (Williamson 1985, 236). This quote states implicitly that powerful interests 
may obstruct the establishment of efficient governance structures. The case of small 
arms and light weapons can be seen as a paradigmatic example of such a situation where 
power outweighs efficiency. In this case, a powerful actor, namely the United States74, 
strongly opposed any international institution which incorporated anything more than 
soft legalisation. In its cost-benefit analysis, the US reached the conclusion that if it en­
dorsed an international institution with considerable powers over SALW trading and 
trafficking the resulting costs would outweigh the benefits considerably. Costs would 
have arisen almost exclusively in the form of domestic political costs by incurring the 
wrath of the well-organised and powerful National Rifle Association—a risk that was 
considered more significant than the potential domestic benefits in terms of a reduction
74 As discussed in chapter 7, two other powerful states—Russia and China—were equally opposed, but they largely 
contended themselves with band-wagoning on the US opposition campaign.
in gun crime. Given the US’ strong opposition to a draft international institution with a 
moderate level of legalisation, which the TCE-based analysis presented here as the opti­
mal design option for this type of problem, those states that were truly interested in es­
tablishing an effective solution for this problem found themselves confronted with a dif­
ficult trade-off. They had to choose between pressing for an international institution 
with the optimal level of legalisation which would have led to the renunciation by an in­
strumental country—the US—, and accepting an international institution whose design 
was softer than deemed optimal for the given problem constellation. Using the terminol­
ogy developed by Abbot and Snidal, the choice was between opting for a ‘plurilateral 
pathway5, where actors ‘begin with an agreement that includes deep substantive com­
mitments and is highly legalised, but has a limited membership, and expand participa­
tion in the agreement over time’ (2004, 58) and the ‘soft law pathway5 with wider par­
ticipation but lower levels of legalisation. This situation reminded us very much of the 
trade-off the international community found itself confronted with in the run-up to the 
1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of 
Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Ottawa Convention). In contrast to this 
earlier case, the coalition of states most strongly interested in an international solution 
to the problems caused by the trafficking in SALW opted for the soft law pathway rather 
than the plurilateral pathway.
In the light of this discussion, transaction cost economics may have to qualify its claim of 
providing a framework for explaining the design of international institutions by ac­
knowledging that its predictions can only be expected to be valid when no powerful ac­
tor, or a powerful group of actors, is opposed to the establishment of an institution ade­
quately designed for tackling the problem in question. This was for instance the case 
with regard to conflict diamonds where—although not directly concerned—powerful 
states backed the efforts of less powerful states to create an international solution to this 
problem. We also found a match between expected and actual institutional design in the 
case of the Vienna Convention, but in this case the design outcome was primarily a re­
flection of the design preference of the powerful states which were considerably and di­
3io
rectly concerned about the problem. When, in contrast, a powerful actor opposes the es­
tablishment of an international institution designed to tackle a problem efficiently, the 
design outcome becomes more dependent on bargaining strategies than on efficiency 
considerations. In this case, transaction cost economics may provide a useful analytic in­
strument for predicting the design preferences of the initiators of international efforts to 
tackle the problem but not of the actual outcome of these efforts, as TCE has little to say 
on bargaining strategies and outcomes.
8 .4  Outlook
The insights and limitations of this study suggest four promising avenues for further re­
search. First, from the discussion of the interaction between the design variables obliga­
tion, precision and delegation it emerged that the first and third-mentioned might be 
complementary to each other, whereas the level of precision seems not to be correlated 
with the other two design components. Future studies could contribute to this unsettled 
discussion by engaging in a large-n study of international institutions that sets out to test 
specifically whether such a correlation does indeed exist. Such studies would benefit 
from not limiting themselves to a ‘snap-shot’ of the design of international institutions at 
a given time but to follow the evolution of the design of these institutions over time, as 
the currently popular view of a ‘hardening’ of institutions over time is still far from 
firmly established.
Second, as discussed in chapter three, the main goal of this study—like that of most 
functionalist design studies—was to detect regularity patterns between problem constel­
lations and institutional designs. This analysis was guided by the assumption that trans­
acting actors seek to adopt governance structures that are best apt for dealing with the 
specific hazards that arise from a given problem constellation. However, the moderately 
good explanatory power of the transaction cost economics framework developed here 
does not provide any grounds to judge whether this efficiency assumption is justified, i.e. 
whether institutions with ‘matching’ designs are indeed more efficient or more effective 
in tackling the policy problem they were created for. It would present a significant con­
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tribution to the farther development of functionalist design theories to test this effi­
ciency hypothesis explicitly in a separate study.
Closely related to this second open research question is the third question of whether al­
ternative approaches may not be equally strong or even stronger in explaining the ob­
served variance between this study’s three independent variable asset specificity, behav­
ioural uncertainty and environmental uncertainty and its dependent variables obliga­
tion, precision and delegation. Promising candidates for such an alternative test may be 
derived, for instance, from historic institutionalism75 (‘form follows form’), or from legal 
scholars like Slaughter (2004b) and Raustiala (2004) who suggest that certain epochs 
favour certain types of institutional designs (‘form follows fashion’). The latter hypothe­
sise that the 21st centuiy is supplanting the 20th century’s inclination towards formal in­
ternational agreements with a trend towards an increasing reliance on trans- 
goveramental networks and on legally non-binding and often unwritten understandings.
Fourth and finally, the findings of this study suggest that transaction cost economics 
may provide a valuable analytic tool for predicting the design preferences of actors who 
are truly interested in finding the optimal institutionalised solution to a given problem. 
Whether or not the design preference of these actors finally holds the upper hand de­
pends on the relative bargaining power—which may be based on normative or material 
sources—these actors possess. It seems therefore indispensable for future functionalist 
studies on institutional design to pay greater attention to the analysis of the divergence 
in interests and the distribution of bargaining power. Such an extension of the model 
would present a promising step towards a more integrated design theory, which brings 
together the realist, functionalist and constructivist approaches to institutional design. If 
this study has presented a first step in this direction it has achieved more than it had 
ever hoped for.
75 A first attempt in this direction has been undertaken by the economists Hughes, Lesley and McHale (1997).
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Appendix is List of UN resolutions and reports
General Assem bly
• Resolutions
A/RES/39/141 Resolution ‘International campaign against traffic in narcotic 
drugs’ of 14 December 1984
A/RES/46/36 H Resolution ‘International arms transfers’ of 6 December 1991
A/RES/46/36 L Resolution Transparency in armaments’ of 9 December 1991
A/RES/50/70B Resolution ‘Small Arms’ of 12 December 1995
A/RES/5 5 /5 6 Resolution ‘The role of diamonds in fuelling conflict’ of 1 December 
2000
A/RES/55/255 Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in 
Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supple­
menting the United Nations Convention against Transnational Or­
ganized Crime of 8 June 2001
A/RES/56/24 V Resolution ‘The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all 
its aspects’ of 24 December 2001
A/RES/56/263 Resolution ‘The role of diamonds in fuelling conflict’ of 13 March 
2002
• Reports & conference
A/8028 Declaration of Principles concerning Friendly Relations among 
States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations of 24 
October 1970
A/52/298 Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms of 27 
August 1997
A/CONF. 183/9 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court of 17 July 1998
A/5 4 / 4 0 4 Report of the Secretary-General on Small Arms of 24 September 
1 9 9 9
A/55/281 Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on the Continuing 
Operation of the UN Register of Conventional Arms and its Further 
Development of 9 August 2000
A/CONF.192/15 Report of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in 
Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects of 9 -  20 July 
2001
A/60/161 Report of the Secretary-General ‘Assistance to States for curbing il­
licit traffic in small arms and collecting them’ of 25 July 2005
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Security Council
• Resolutions
S/RES/1013 Resolution on Rwanda establishing an international commission of 
inquiry of 7 September 1995
S/RES/1161 Resolution on Rwanda re-instating the international commission 
of inquiry for the investigation of illegal weapon supplies of 9 April 
1998
S/RES/1196 Resolution on the monitoring of arms embargoes of 16 September 
1998
S/RES/1237 Resolution establishing an independent Panel of Experts on Angola 
of 7 May 1999
S/RES/1295 Resolution on sanctions against UNITA of 18 April 2000
S/RES/1306 Resolution on sanctions against import of diamonds from Sierra 
Leone of 5 July 2000
S/RES/1343 Resolution on sanctions and embargoes on Liberia of 7 March 2001
S/RES/1448 Resolution on the termination of all sanctions against UNITA of 9 
December 2002
S/RES/1607 Resolution renewing the trade embargo on rough diamonds from 
Liberia of 1 June 2005
• Reports
S/2000/203 Final Report of the UN Panel of Experts on Violations of Security 
Council Sanctions against UNITA of 10 March 2000 [‘Fowler Re­
port’]
S/2000/1195 Report of the Panel of Experts on Sierra Leone of 20 December 
2000.
S/2001/35 7 Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural 
Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic 
of Congo of 12 April 2001
S/2005/176 Preliminary report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia of 17 March 
2005
S/2002/1053 Report of the Secretary-General on Small Arms of 20 September 
2005
S/2002/1115 Report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia of 25 October 2002
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Appendix 2: United Nations Convention against Illicit 
Traffic In Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
THE PARTIES TO THIS CONVENTION,
DEEPLY CONCERNED by the magnitude of and rising trend in the illicit production of, 
demand for and traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, which pose a seri­
ous threat to the health and welfare of human beings and adversely affect the economic, 
cultural and political foundations of society,
DEEPLY CONCERNED ALSO by the steadily increasing inroads into various social 
groups made by illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, and particu­
larly by the fact that children are used in many parts of the world as an illicit drug con­
sumers market and for purposes of illicit production, distribution and trade in narcotic 
drugs and psychotropic substances, which entails a danger of incalculable gravity,
RECOGNIZING the links between illicit traffic and other related organized criminal ac­
tivities which undermine the legitimate economies and threaten the stability, security 
and sovereignty of States,
RECOGNIZING ALSO that illicit traffic is an international criminal activity, the suppres­
sion of which demands urgent attention and the highest priority,
AWARE that illicit traffic generates large financial profits and wealth enabling transna­
tional criminal organizations to penetrate, contaminate and corrupt the structures of 
government, legitimate commercial and financial business, and society at all its levels,
DETERMINED to deprive persons engaged in illicit traffic of the proceeds of their 
criminal activities and thereby eliminate their main incentive for so doing,
DESIRING to eliminate the root causes of the problem of abuse of narcotic drugs and 
psychotropic substances, including the illicit demand for such drugs and substances and 
the enormous profits derived from illicit traffic,
CONSIDERING that measures are necessary to monitor certain substances, including 
precursors, chemicals and solvents, which are used in the manufacture of narcotic drugs 
and psychotropic substances, the ready availability of which has led to an increase in the 
clandestine manufacture of such drugs and substances,
DETERMINED to improve international co-operation in the suppression of illicit traffic 
by sea,
RECOGNIZING that eradication of illicit traffic is a collective responsibility of all States 
and that, to that end, co-ordinated action within the framework of international co­
operation is necessary,
ACKNOWLEDGING the competence of the United Nations in the field of control of nar­
cotic drugs and psychotropic substances and desirous that the international organs con­
cerned with such control should be within the framework of that Organization,
REAFFIRMING the guiding principles of existing treaties in the field of narcotic drugs 
and psychotropic substances and the system of control which they embody,
RECOGNIZING the need to reinforce and supplement the measures provided in the Sin­
gle Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, that Convention as amended by the 1972 Proto­
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col Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, and the 1971 Convention 
on Psychotropic Substances, in order to counter the magnitude and extent of illicit traffic 
and its grave consequences,
RECOGNIZING also the importance of strengthening and enhancing effective legal 
means for international co-operation in criminal matters for suppressing the interna­
tional criminal activities of illicit traffic,
DESIRING to conclude a comprehensive, effective and operative international conven­
tion that is directed specifically against illicit traffic and that considers the various as­
pects of the problem as a whole, in particular those aspects not envisaged in the existing 
treaties in the field of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances,
HEREBY AGREE AS FOLLOWS:
Article 1 
D efinitions
Except where otherwise expressly indicated or where the context otherwise requires, the 
following definitions shall apply throughout this Convention:
a) “Board” means the International Narcotics Control Board established by the Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, and that Convention as amended by the 1972 Pro­
tocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961;
b) “Cannabis plant” means any plant of the genus Cannabis;
c) “Coca bush” means the plant of any species of the genus Erythroxylon;
d) “Commercial carrier” means any person or any public, private or other entity engaged 
in transporting persons, goods or mails for remuneration, hire or any other benefit;
e) “Commission” means the Commission on Narcotic Drugs of the Economic and Social 
Council of the United Nations;
f) “Confiscation”, which includes forfeiture where applicable, means the permanent dep­
rivation of property by order of a court or other competent authority;
g) “Controlled deliveiy” means the technique of allowing illicit or suspect consignments 
of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, substances in Table I and Table II annexed 
to this Convention, or substances substituted for them, to pass out of, through or into 
the territory of one or more countries, with the knowledge and under the supervision of 
their competent authorities, with a view to identifying persons involved in the commis­
sion of offences established in accordance with article 3, paragraph 1 of the Convention;
h) “1961 Convention” means the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961;
i) “1961 Convention as amended” means the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, 
as amended by the 1972 Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 
1961;
j) “1971 Convention” means the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1971;
k) “Council” means the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations;
1) “Freezing” or “seizure” means temporarily prohibiting the transfer, conversion, dispo­
sition or movement of property or temporarily assuming custody or control of property 
on the basis of an order issued by a court or a competent authority;
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m) “Illicit traffic” means the offences set forth in article 3, paragraphs 1 and 2, of this 
Convention;
n) “Narcotic drug” means any of the substances, natural or synthetic, in Schedules I and 
II of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, and that Convention as amended by 
the 1972 Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961;
o) “Opium poppy” means the plant of the species Papaver somniferum L;
p) “Proceeds” means any property derived from or obtained, directly or indirectly, 
through the commission of an offence established in accordance with article 3, para­
graph 1;
q) “Property” means assets of every kind, whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or 
immovable, tangible or intangible, and legal documents or instruments evidencing title 
to, or interest in, such assets;
r) “Psychotropic substance” means any substance, natural or synthetic, or any natural 
material in Schedules I, II, III and IV of the Convention on Psychotropic Substances,
1971;
s) “Secretary-General” means the Secretary-General of the United Nations;
t) “Table I” and “Table II” mean the correspondingly numbered lists of substances an­
nexed to this Convention, as amended from time to time in accordance with article 12,
u) “Transit State” means a State through the territory of which illicit narcotic drugs, psy­
chotropic substances and substances in Table I and Table II are being moved, which is 
neither the place of origin nor the place of ultimate destination thereof.
Article 2 
Scope o f the Convention
1. The purpose of this Convention is to promote co-operation among the Parties so that 
they may address more effectively the various aspects of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs 
and psychotropic substances having an international dimension. In carrying out their 
obligations under the Convention, the Parties shall take necessary measures, including 
legislative and administrative measures, in conformity with the fundamental provisions 
of their respective domestic legislative systems.
2. The Parties shall carry out their obligations under this Convention in a manner con­
sistent with the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity of States and 
that of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other States.
3. A Party shall not undertake in the territory of another Party the exercise of jurisdic­
tion and performance of functions which are exclusively reserved for the authorities of 
that other Party by its domestic law.
Article 3
Offences and Sanctions
1. Each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal of­
fences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally:
a)
i) The production, manufacture, extraction; preparation, offering, offering for sale, 
distribution, sale, delivery on any terms whatsoever, brokerage, dispatch, dispatch
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in transit, transport, importation or exportation of any narcotic drug or any psy­
chotropic substance contrary to the provisions of the 1961 Convention, the 1961 
Convention as amended or the 1971 Convention;
ii) The cultivation of opium poppy, coca bush or cannabis plant for the purpose of 
the production of narcotic drugs contrary to the provisions of the 1961 Convention 
and the 1961 Convention as amended;
iii) The possession or purchase of any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance for 
the purpose of any of the activities enumerated in i) above;
iv) The manufacture, transport or distribution of equipment, materials or of sub­
stances listed in Table I and Table II, knowing that they are to be used in or for the 
illicit cultivation, production or manufacture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic 
substances;
v) The organization, management or financing of any of the offences enumerated 
in i), ii), iii) or iv) above;
b)
i) The conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is derived 
from any offence or offences established in accordance with subparagraph a) of 
this paragraph, or from an act of participation in such offence or offences, for the 
purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of assisting 
any person who is involved in the commission of such an offence or offences to 
evade the legal consequences of his actions;
ii) The concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, 
movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of property, knowing that such 
property is derived from an offence or offences established in accordance with 
subparagraph a) of this paragraph or from an act of participation in such an of­
fence or offences;
c) Subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system:
i) The acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the time of receipt, 
that such property was derived from an offence or offences established in accor­
dance with subparagraph a) of this paragraph or from an act of participation in 
such offence or offences;
ii) The possession of equipment or materials or substances listed in Table I and 
Table II, knowing that they are being or are to be used in or for the illicit cultiva­
tion, production or
iii) Publicly inciting or inducing others, by any means, to commit any of the of­
fences established in accordance with this article or to use narcotic drugs or psy­
chotropic substances illicitly;
iv) Participation in, association or conspiracy to commit, attempts to commit and 
aiding, abetting, facilitating and counselling the commission of any of the offences 
established in accordance with this article.
2. Subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system, each 
Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence 
under its domestic law, when committed intentionally, the possession, purchase or culti­
vation of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances for personal consumption contrary 
to the provisions of the 1961 Convention, the 1961 Convention as amended or the 1971 
Convention.
3. Knowledge, intent or purpose required as an element of an offence set forth in para­
graph 1 of this article may be inferred from objective factual circumstances.
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a) Each Party shall make the commission of the offences established in accordance 
with paragraph 1 of this article liable to sanctions which take into account the grave 
nature of these offences, such as imprisonment or other forms of deprivation of lib­
erty, pecuniary sanctions and confiscation.
b) The Parties may provide, in addition to conviction or punishment, for an offence 
established in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article, that the offender shall un­
dergo measures such as treatment, education, aftercare, rehabilitation or social rein­
tegration.
c) Notwithstanding the preceding subparagraphs, in appropriate cases of a minor na­
ture, the Parties may provide, as alternatives to conviction or punishment, measures 
such as education, rehabilitation or social reintegration, as well as, when the offender 
is a drug abuser, treatment and aftercare.
d) The Parties may provide, either as an alternative to conviction or punishment, or 
in addition to conviction or punishment of an offence established in accordance with 
paragraph 2 of this article, measures for the treatment, education, aftercare, rehabili­
tation or social reintegration of the offender.
5. The Parties shall ensure that their courts and other competent authorities having ju­
risdiction can take into account factual circumstances which make the commission of the 
offences established in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article particularly serious, 
such as:
a) The involvement in the offence of an organized criminal group to which the of­
fender belongs;
b) The involvement of the offender in other international organized criminal activi­
ties;
c) The involvement of the offender in other illegal activities facilitated by commission 
of the offence;
d) The use of violence or arms by the offender;
e) The fact that the offender holds a public office and that the offence is connected 
with the office in question;
f) The victimization or use of minors;
g) The fact that the offence is committed in a penal institution or in an educational 
institution or social service facility or in their immediate vicinity or in other places to 
which school children and students resort for educational, sports and social activities;
h) Prior conviction, particularly for similar offences, whether foreign or domestic, to 
the extent permitted under the domestic law of a Party.
6. The Parties shall endeavour to ensure that any discretionary legal powers under their 
domestic law relating to the prosecution of persons for offences established in accor­
dance with this article are exercised to maximize the effectiveness of law enforcement 
measures in respect of those offences, and with due regard to the need to deter the 
commission of such offences.
7. The Parties shall, ensure that their courts or other competent authorities bear in mind 
the serious nature of the offences enumerated in paragraph 1 of this article and the cir­
cumstances enumerated in paragraph 5 of this article when considering the eventuality 
of early release or parole of persons convicted of such offences.
8. Each Party shall, where appropriate, establish under its domestic law a long statute of 
limitations period in which to commence proceedings for any offence established in ac­
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cordance with paragraph 1 of this article, and a longer period where the alleged offender 
has evaded the administration of justice.
9. Each Party shall take appropriate measures, consistent with its legal system, to ensure 
that a person charged with or convicted of an offence established in accordance with 
paragraph 1 of this article, who is found within its territory, is present at the necessary 
criminal proceedings.
10. For the purpose of co-operation among the Parties under this Convention, including, 
in particular, co-operation under articles 5, 6, 7 and 9, offences established in accor­
dance with this article shall not be considered as fiscal offences or as political offences or 
regarded as politically motivated, without prejudice to the constitutional limitations and 
the fundamental domestic law of the Parties.
11. Nothing contained in this article shall affect the principle that the description of the 
offences to which it refers and of legal defences thereto is reserved to the domestic law of 
a Party and that such offences shall be prosecuted and punished in conformity with that 
law.
Article 4  
Jurisdiction
1. Each Party:
a) Shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the 
offences it has established in accordance with article 3, paragraph 1, when:
i) The offence is committed in its territory;
ii) The offence is committed on board a vessel flying its flag or an aircraft which is 
registered under its laws at the time the offence is committed;
b) May take such measures as maybe necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the 
offences it has established in accordance with article 3, paragraph 1, when:
i) The offence is committed by one of its nationals or by a person who has his ha­
bitual residence in its territory;
ii) The offence is committed on board a vessel concerning which that Party has 
been authorized to take appropriate action pursuant to article 17, provided that 
such jurisdiction shall be exercised only on the basis of agreements or arrange­
ments referred to in paragraphs 4 and 9 of that article;
iii) The offence is one of those established in accordance with article 3, paragraph 
1, subparagraph c) iv), and is committed outside its territory with a view to the 
commission, within its territory, of an offence established in accordance with arti­
cle 3, paragraph 1.
2. Each Party:
a) Shall also take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over 
the offences it has established in accordance with article 3, paragraph 1, when the al­
leged offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite him to another Party 
on the ground:
i) That the offence has been committed in its territory or on board a vessel flying 
its flag or an aircraft which was registered under its law at the time the offence was 
committed; or
ii) That the offence has been committed by one of its nationals;
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b) May also take such measures as may be necessaiy to establish its jurisdiction over 
the offences it has established in accordance with article 3, paragraph 1, when the al­
leged offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite him to another 
Party.
3. This Convention does not exclude the exercise of any criminal jurisdiction established 
by a Party in accordance with its domestic law.
A rticles
Confiscation
1. Each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to enable confiscation of:
a) Proceeds derived from offences established in accordance with article 3, paragraph 
1, or property the value of which corresponds to that of such proceeds;
b) Narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, materials and equipment or other in­
strumentalities used in or intended for use in any manner in offences established in 
accordance with article 3, paragraph 1.
2. Each Party shall also adopt such measures as may be necessary to enable its compe­
tent authorities to identify, trace, and freeze or seize proceeds, property, instrumentali­
ties or any other things referred to in paragraph 1 of this article, for the purpose of even­
tual confiscation.
3. In order to carry out the measures referred to in this article, each Party shall empower 
its courts or other competent authorities to order that bank, financial or commercial re­
cords be made available or be seized. A Party shall not decline to act under the provi­
sions of this paragraph on the ground of bank secrecy.
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a) Following a request made pursuant to this article by another Party having jurisdic­
tion over an offence established in accordance with article 3, paragraph 1, the Party in 
whose territory proceeds, property, instrumentalities or any other things referred to 
in paragraph 1 of this article are situated shall:
i) Submit the request to its competent authorities for the purpose of obtaining an 
order of confiscation and, if such order is granted, give effect to it; or
ii) Submit to its competent authorities, with a view to giving effect to it to the ex­
tent requested, an order of confiscation issued by the requesting Party in accor­
dance with paragraph 1 of this article, in so far as it relates to proceeds, property, 
instrumentalities or any other things referred to in paragraph 1 situated in the ter­
ritory of the requested Party.
b) Following a request made pursuant to this article by another Party having jurisdic­
tion over an offence established in accordance with article 3, paragraph 1, the re­
quested Party shall take measures to identify, trace, and freeze or seize proceeds, 
property, instrumentalities or any other things referred to in paragraph 1 of this arti­
cle for the purpose of eventual confiscation to be ordered either by the requesting 
Party or, pursuant to a request under subparagraph a) of this paragraph, by the re­
quested Party.
c) The decisions or actions provided for in subparagraphs a) and b) of this paragraph 
shall be taken by the requested Party, in accordance with and subject to the provi­
sions of its domestic law and its procedural rules or any bilateral or multilateral 
treaty, agreement or arrangement to which it may be bound in relation to the re­
questing Party.
321
d) The provisions of article 7, paragraphs 6 to 19 are applicable mutatis mutandis. In 
addition to the information specified in article 7, paragraph 10, requests made pursu­
ant to this article shall contain the following:
i) In the case of a request pertaining to subparagraph a) i) of this paragraph, a de­
scription of the property to be confiscated and a statement of the facts relied upon 
by the requesting Party sufficient to enable the requested Party to seek the order 
under its domestic law;
ii) In the case of a request pertaining to subparagraph a) ii), a legally admissible 
copy of an order of confiscation issued by the requesting Party upon which the re­
quest is based, a statement of the facts and information as to the extent to which 
the execution of the order is requested;
iii) In the case of a request pertaining to subparagraph b), a statement of the facts 
relied upon by the requesting Party and a description of the actions requested.
e) Each Party shall furnish to the Secretary-General the text of any of its laws and 
regulations which give effect to this paragraph and the text of any subsequent 
changes to such laws and regulations.
f) If a Party elects to make the taking of the measures referred to in subparagraphs a) 
and b) of this paragraph conditional on the existence of a relevant treaty, that Party 
shall consider this Convention as the necessary and sufficient treaty basis.
g) The Parties shall seek to conclude bilateral and multilateral treaties, agreements or 
arrangements to enhance the effectiveness of international co-operation pursuant to 
this article.
a) Proceeds or property confiscated by a Party pursuant to paragraph 1 or paragraph 
4 of this article shall be disposed of by that Party according to its domestic law and 
administrative procedures.
b) When acting on the request of another Party in accordance with this article, a Party 
may give special consideration to concluding agreements on:
i) Contributing the value of such proceeds and property, or funds derived from the 
sale of such proceeds or property, or a substantial part thereof, to intergovernmen­
tal bodies specializing in the fight against illicit traffic in and abuse of narcotic 
drugs and psychotropic substances;
ii) Sharing with other Parties, on a regular or case-by-case basis, such proceeds or 
property, or funds derived from the sale of such proceeds or property, in accor­
dance with its domestic law, administrative procedures or bilateral or multilateral 
agreements entered into for this purpose.
a) If proceeds have been transformed or converted into other property, such property 
shall be liable to the measures referred to in this article instead of the proceeds.
b) If proceeds have been intermingled with property acquired from legitimate 
sources, such property shall, without prejudice to any powers relating to seizure or 
freezing, be liable to confiscation up to the assessed value of the intermingled pro­
ceeds. c) Income or other benefits derived from:
i) Proceeds;
ii) Property into which proceeds have been transformed or converted; or
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iii) Property with which proceeds have been intermingled shall also be liable to the 
measures referred to in this article, in the same manner and to the same extent as 
proceeds.
7. Each Party may consider ensuring that the onus of proof be reversed regarding the 
lawful origin of alleged proceeds or other property liable to confiscation, to the extent 
that such action is consistent with the principles of its domestic law and with the nature 
of the judicial and other proceedings.
8. The provisions of this article shall not be construed as prejudicing the rights of bona 
fide third parties.
9. Nothing contained in this article shall affect the principle that the measures to which 
it refers shall be defined and implemented in accordance with and subject to the provi­
sions of the domestic law of a Party.
Article 6 
Extradition
1. This article shall apply to the offences established by the Parties in accordance with ar­
ticle 3, paragraph 1.
2. Each of the offences to which this article applies shall be deemed to be included as an 
extraditable offence in any extradition treaty existing between Parties. The Parties un­
dertake to include such offences as extraditable offences in every extradition treaty to be 
concluded between them.
3. If a Party which makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty receives a 
request for extradition from another Party with which it has no extradition treaty, it may 
consider this Convention as the legal basis for extradition in respect of any offence to 
which this article applies. The Parties which require detailed legislation in order to use 
this Convention as a legal basis for extradition shall consider enacting such legislation as 
may be necessary.
4. The Parties which do not make extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty 
shall recognize offences to which this article applies as extraditable offences between 
themselves.
5. Extradition shall be subject to the conditions provided for by the law of the requested 
Party or by applicable extradition treaties, including the grounds upon which the re­
quested Party may refuse extradition.
6. In considering requests received pursuant to this article, the requested State may re­
fuse to comply with such requests where there are substantial grounds leading its judi­
cial or other competent authorities to believe that compliance would facilitate the prose­
cution or punishment of any person on account of his race, religion, nationality or politi­
cal opinions, or would cause prejudice for any of those reasons to any person affected by 
the request.
7. The Parties shall endeavour to expedite extradition procedures and to simplify eviden­
tiary requirements relating thereto in respect of any offence to which this article applies.
8. Subject to the provisions of its domestic law and its extradition treaties, the requested 
Party may, upon being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant and are urgent, and at 
the request of the requesting Party, take a person whose extradition is sought and who is 
present in its territory into custody or take other appropriate measures to ensure his 
presence at extradition proceedings.
9. Without prejudice to the exercise of any criminal jurisdiction established in accor­
dance with its domestic law, a Party in whose territory an alleged offender is found shall:
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a) If it does not extradite him in respect of an offence established in accordance with 
article 3, paragraph 1, on the grounds set forth in article 4, paragraph 2, subparagraph
a), submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, unless 
otherwise agreed with the requesting Party;
b) If it does not extradite him in respect of such an offence and has established its ju­
risdiction in relation to that offence in accordance with article 4, paragraph 2, sub- 
paragraph b), submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecu­
tion, unless otherwise requested by the requesting Party for the purposes of preserv­
ing its legitimate jurisdiction.
10. If extradition, sought for purposes of enforcing a sentence, is refused because the 
person sought is a national of the requested Party, the requested Party shall, if its law so 
permits and in conformity with the requirements of such law, upon application of the 
requesting Party, consider, the enforcement of the sentence which has been imposed 
under the law of the requesting Party, or the remainder thereof.
11. The Parties shall seek to conclude bilateral and multilateral agreements to carry out 
or to enhance the effectiveness of extradition.
12. The Parties may consider entering into bilateral or multilateral agreements, whether 
ad hoc or general, on the transfer to their country of persons sentenced to imprisonment 
and other forms of deprivation of liberty for offences to which this article applies, in or­
der that they may complete their sentences there.
Article 7 
Mutual Legal A ssistance
1. The Parties shall afford one another, pursuant to this article, the widest measure of 
mutual legal assistance in investigations, prosecutions and judicial proceedings in rela­
tion to criminal offences established in accordance with article 3, paragraph 1.
2. Mutual legal assistance to be afforded in accordance with this article maybe requested 
for any of the following purposes:
a) Taking evidence or statements from persons;
b) Effecting service of judicial documents;
c) Executing searches and seizures;
d) Examining objects and sites;
e) Providing information and evidentiary items;
f) Providing originals or certified copies of relevant documents and records, including 
bank, financial, corporate or business records;
g) Identifying or tracing proceeds, property, instrumentalities or other things for evi­
dentiary purposes.
3. The Parties may afford one another any other forms of mutual legal assistance allowed 
by the domestic law of the requested Party.
4. Upon request, the Parties shall facilitate or encourage, to the extent consistent with 
their domestic law and practice, the presence or availability of persons, including per­
sons in custody, who consent to assist in investigations or participate in proceedings.
5. A Party shall not decline to render mutual legal assistance under this article on the 
ground of bank secrecy.
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6. The provisions of this article shall not affect the obligations under any other treaty, bi­
lateral or multilateral, which governs or will govern, in whole or in part, mutual legal as­
sistance in criminal matters.
7. Paragraphs 8 to 19 of this article shall apply to requests made pursuant to this article 
if the Parties in question are not bound by a treaty of mutual legal assistance. If these 
Parties are bound by such a treaty, the corresponding provisions of that treaty shall ap­
ply unless the Parties agree to apply paragraphs 8 to 19 of this article in lieu thereof.
8. Parties shall designate an authority, or when necessary authorities, which shall have 
the responsibility and power to execute requests for mutual legal assistance or to trans­
mit them to the competent authorities for execution. The authority or the authorities 
designated for this purpose shall be notified to the Secretary-General. Transmission of 
requests for mutual legal assistance and any communication related thereto shall be ef­
fected between the authorities designated by the Parties; this requirement shall be with­
out prejudice to the right of a Party to require that such requests and communications be 
addressed to it through the diplomatic channel and, in urgent circumstances, where the 
Parties agree, through channels of the International Criminal Police Organization, if 
possible.
9. Requests shall be made in writing in a language acceptable to the requested Party. 
The language or languages acceptable to each Party shall be notified to the Secretary- 
General. In urgent circumstances, and where agreed by the Parties, requests may be 
made orally, but shall be confirmed in writing forthwith.
10. A request for mutual legal assistance shall contain:
a) The identity of the authority making the request;
b) The subject matter and nature of the investigation, prosecution or proceeding to 
which the request relates, and the name and the functions of the authority conducting 
such investigation, prosecution or proceeding;
c) A summaiy of the relevant facts, except in respect of requests for the purpose of 
service of judicial documents;
d) A description of the assistance sought and details of any particular procedure the 
requesting Party wishes to be followed;
e) Where possible, the identity, location and nationality of any person concerned;
f) The purpose for which the evidence, information or action is sought.
11. The requested Party may request additional information when it appears necessary 
for the execution of the request in accordance with its domestic law or when it can facili­
tate such execution.
12. A request shall be executed in accordance with the domestic law of the requested 
Party and, to the extent not contrary to the domestic law of the requested Party and 
where possible, in accordance with the procedures specified in the request.
13. The requesting Party shall not transmit nor use information or evidence furnished by 
the requested Party for investigations, prosecutions or proceedings other than those 
stated in the request without the prior consent of the requested Party.
14. The requesting Party may require that the requested Party keep confidential the fact 
and substance of the request, except to the extent necessary to execute the request. If 
the requested Party cannot comply with the requirement of confidentiality, it shall 
promptly inform the requesting Party.
15. Mutual legal assistance may be refused:
a) If the request is not made in conformity with the provisions of this article;
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b) If the requested Party considers that execution of the request is likely to prejudice 
its sovereignty, security, ordre public or other essential interests;
c) If the authorities of the requested Party would be prohibited by its domestic law 
from carrying out the action requested with regard to any similar offence, had it been 
subject to investigation, prosecution or proceedings under their own jurisdiction;
d) If it would be contrary to the legal system of the requested Party relating to mutual 
legal assistance for the request to be granted.
16. Reasons shall be given for any refusal of mutual legal assistance.
17. Mutual legal assistance may be postponed by the requested Party on the ground that 
it interferes with an ongoing investigation, prosecution or proceeding. In such a case, 
the requested Party shall consult with the requesting Party to determine if the assistance 
can still be given subject to such terms and conditions as the requested Party deems nec­
essary.
18. A witness, expert or other person who consents to give evidence in a proceeding or to 
assist in an investigation, prosecution or judicial proceeding in the territory of the re­
questing Party, shall not be prosecuted, detained, punished or subjected to any other re­
striction of his personal liberty in that territory in respect of acts, omissions or convic­
tions prior to his departure from the territory of the requested Party. Such safe conduct 
shall cease when the witness, expert or other person having had, for a period of fifteen 
consecutive days, or for any period agreed upon by the Parties, from the date on which 
he has been officially informed that his presence is no longer required by the judicial au­
thorities, an opportunity of leaving, has nevertheless remained voluntarily in the terri­
tory or, having left it, has returned of his own free will.
19. The ordinary costs of executing a request shall be borne by the requested Party, 
unless otherwise agreed by the Parties concerned. If expenses of a substantial or ex­
traordinary nature are or will be required to fulfil the request, the Parties shall consult to 
determine the terms and conditions under which the request will be executed as well as 
the manner in which the costs shall be borne.
20. The Parties shall consider, as may be necessary, the possibility of concluding bilat­
eral or multilateral agreements or arrangements that would serve the purposes of, give 
practical effect to, or enhance the provisions of this article.
Article 8
Transfer o f Proceedings
The Parties shall give consideration to the possibility of transferring to one another pro­
ceedings for criminal prosecution of offences established in accordance with article 3, 
paragraph 1, in cases where such transfer is considered to be in the interests of a proper 
administration of justice.
Article 9
Other Forms o f Co-operation and Training
1. The Parties shall co-operate closely with one another, consistent with their respective 
domestic legal and administrative systems, with a view to enhancing the effectiveness of 
law enforcement action to suppress the commission of offences established in accor­
dance with article 3, paragraph 1. They shall, in particular, on the basis of bilateral or 
multilateral agreements or arrangements:
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a) Establish and maintain channels of communication between their competent 
agencies and services to facilitate the secure and rapid exchange of information con­
cerning all aspects of offences established in accordance with article 3, paragraph 1, 
including, if the Parties concerned deem it appropriate, links with other criminal ac­
tivities;
b) Co-operate with one another in conducting enquiries, with respect to offences es­
tablished in accordance with article 3, paragraph 1, having an international character, 
concerning:
i) The identity, whereabouts and activities of persons suspected of being involved 
in offences established in accordance with article 3, paragraph 1;
ii) The movement of proceeds or property derived from the commission of such of­
fences;
iii) The movement of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, substances in Table 
I and Table II of this Convention and instrumentalities used or intended for use in 
the commission of such offences;
c) In appropriate cases and if not contrary to domestic law, establish joint teams, tak­
ing into account the need to protect the security of persons and of operations, to carry 
out the provisions of this paragraph. Officials of any Party taking part in such teams 
shall act as authorized by the appropriate authorities of the Party in whose territory 
the operation is to take place; in all such cases, the Parties involved shall ensure that 
the sovereignty of the Party on whose territory the operation is to take place is fully 
respected;
d) Provide, when appropriate, necessary quantities of substances for analytical or in­
vestigative purposes;
e) Facilitate effective co-ordination between their competent agencies and services 
and promote the exchange of personnel and other experts, including the posting of li­
aison officers.
2. Each Party shall, to the extent necessary, initiate, develop or improve specific training 
programmes for its law enforcement and other personnel, including customs, charged 
with the suppression of offences established in accordance with article 3, paragraph 1. 
Such programmes shall deal, in particular, with the following:
a) Methods used in the detection and suppression of offences established in accor­
dance with article 3, paragraph 1;
b) Routes and techniques used by persons suspected of being involved in offences es­
tablished in accordance with article 3, paragraph 1, particularly in transit States, and 
appropriate countermeasures;
c) Monitoring of the import and export of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances 
and substances in Table I and Table II;
d) Detection and monitoring of the movement of proceeds and property derived 
from, and narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and substances in Table I and Ta­
ble II, and instrumentalities used or intended for use in, the commission of offences 
established in accordance with article 3, paragraph 1;
e) Methods used for the transfer, concealment or disguise of such proceeds, property 
and instrumentalities;
f) Collection of evidence;
g) Control techniques in free trade zones and free ports;
h) Modem law enforcement techniques.
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3- The Parties shall assist one another to plan, and implement research and training pro­
grammes designed to share expertise in the areas referred to in paragraph 2 of this arti­
cle and, to this end, shall also, when appropriate, use regional and international confer­
ences and seminars to promote co-operation and stimulate discussion on problems of 
mutual concern, including the special problems and needs of transit States.
Article 10
International Co-operation and A ssistance for Transit States
1. The Parties shall co-operate, directly or through competent international or regional 
organizations, to assist and support transit States and, in particular, developing coun­
tries in need of such assistance and support, to the extent possible, through programmes 
of technical co-operation on interdiction and other related activities.
2. The Parties may undertake, directly or through competent international or regional 
organizations, to provide financial assistance to such transit States for the purpose of 
augmenting and strengthening the infrastructure needed for effective control and pre­
vention of illicit traffic.
3. The Parties may conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements or arrangements to en­
hance the effectiveness of international co-operation pursuant to this article and may 
take into consideration financial arrangements in this regard.
Article 11 
Controlled Delivery
1. If permitted by the basic principles of their respective domestic legal systems, the Par­
ties shall take the necessary measures, within their possibilities, to allow for the appro­
priate use of controlled delivery at the international level, on the basis of agreements or 
arrangements mutually consented to, with a view to identifying persons involved in of­
fences established in accordance with article 3, paragraph 1, and to taking legal action 
against them.
2. Decisions to use controlled delivery shall be made on a case-by-case basis and may, 
when necessary, take into consideration financial arrangements and understandings 
with respect to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Parties concerned.
3. Illicit consignments whose controlled delivery is agreed to may, with the consent of 
the Parties concerned, be intercepted and allowed to continue with the narcotic drugs or 
psychotropic substances intact or removed or replaced in whole or in part.
Article 12
Substances Frequently Used in  the Illicit Manufacture o f 
Narcotic Drugs o f Psychotropic Substances
1. The Parties shall take the measures they deem appropriate to prevent diversion of 
substances in Table I and Table II used for the purpose of illicit manufacture of narcotic 
drugs or psychotropic substances, and shall co-operate with one another to this end.
2. If a Party or the Board has information which in its opinion may require the inclusion 
of a substance in Table I or Table II, it shall notify the Secretary-General and furnish him 
with the information in support of that notification. The procedure described in para­
graphs 2 to 7 of this article shall also apply when a Party or the Board has information
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justifying the deletion of a substance from Table I or Table II, or the transfer of a sub­
stance from one Table to the other.
3. The Secretary-General shall transmit such notification, and any information which he 
considers relevant, to the Parties, to the Commission, and, where notification is made by 
a Party, to the Board. The Parties shall communicate their comments concerning the 
notification to the Secretary-General, together with all supplementary information 
which may assist the Board in establishing an assessment and the Commission in reach­
ing a decision.
4. If the Board, taking into account the extent, importance and diversity of the licit use of 
fiie substance, and the possibility and ease of using alternate substances both for licit 
purposes and for the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances, 
finds:
a) That the substance is frequently used in the illicit manufacture of a narcotic drug 
or psychotropic substance;
b) That the volume and extent of the illicit manufacture of a narcotic drug or psycho­
tropic substance creates serious public health or social problems, so as to warrant in­
ternational action,
it shall communicate to the Commission an assessment of the substance, including the 
likely effect of adding the substance to either Table I or Table II on both licit use and il­
licit manufacture, together with recommendations of monitoring measures, if any, that 
would be appropriate in the light of its assessment.
5. The Commission, taking into account the comments submitted by the Parties and the 
comments and recommendations of the Board, whose assessment shall be determinative 
as to scientific matters, and also taking into due consideration any other relevant factors, 
may decide by a two-thirds majority of its members to place a substance in Table I or 
Table II.
6. Any decision of the Commission taken pursuant to this article shall be communicated 
by the Secretary-General to all States and other entities which are, or which are entitled 
to become, Parties to this Convention, and to the Board. Such decision shall become 
fully effective with respect to each Party one hundred and eighty days after the date of 
such communication.
7-
a) The decisions of the Commission taken under this article shall be subject to review 
by the Council upon the request of any Party filed within one hundred and eighty 
days after the date of notification of the decision. The request for review shall be sent 
to the Secretary-General, together with all relevant information upon which the re­
quest for review is based.
b) The Secretary-General shall transmit copies of the request for review and the rele­
vant information to the Commission, to the Board and to all the Parties, inviting them 
to submit their comments within ninety days. All comments received shall be sub­
mitted to the Council for consideration.
c) The Council may confirm or reverse the decision of the Commission. Notification 
of the Council’s decision shall be transmitted to all States and other entities which 
are, or which are entitled to become, Parties to this Convention, to the Commission 
and to the Board.
8 .
a) Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in paragraph 1 of 
this article and the provisions of the 1961 Convention, the 1961 Convention as 
amended and the 1971 Convention, the Parties shall take the measures they deem ap-
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propriate to monitor the manufacture and distribution of substances in Table I and 
Table II which are carried out within their territory.
b) To this end, the Parties may:
i) Control all persons and enterprises engaged in the manufacture and distribution 
of such substances;
ii) Control under licence the establishment and premises in which such manufac­
ture or distribution may take place;
ii) Require that licensees obtain a permit for conducting the aforesaid operations;
iv) Prevent the accumulation of such substances in the possession of manufactur­
ers and distributors, in excess of the quantities required for the normal conduct of 
business and the prevailing market conditions.
9. Each Party shall, with respect to substances in Table I and Table II, take the following 
measures:
a) Establish and maintain a system to monitor international trade in substances in 
Table I and Table II in order to facilitate the identification of suspicious transactions. 
Such monitoring systems shall be applied in close co-operation with manufacturers, 
importers, exporters, wholesalers and retailers, who shall inform the competent au­
thorities of suspicious orders and transactions.
b) Provide for the seizure of any substance in Table I or Table II if there is sufficient 
evidence that it is for use in the illicit manufacture of a narcotic drug or psychotropic 
substance.
c) Notify, as soon as possible, the competent authorities and services of the Parties 
concerned if there is reason to believe that the import, export or transit of a substance 
in Table I or Table II is destined for the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs or psy­
chotropic substances, including in particular information about the means of pay­
ment and any other essential elements which led to that belief.
d) Require that imports and exports be properly labelled and documented. Commer­
cial documents such as invoices, cargo manifests, customs, transport and other ship­
ping documents shall include the names, as stated in Table I or Table II, of the sub­
stances being imported or exported, the quantity being imported or exported, and the 
name and address of the exporter, the importer and, when available, the consignee.
e) Ensure that documents referred to in subparagraph d) of this paragraph are main­
tained for a period of not less than two years and may be made available for inspec­
tion by the competent authorities.
a) In addition to the provisions of paragraph 9, and upon request to the Secretary- 
General by the interested Party, each Party from whose territory a substance in Table 
I is to be exported shall ensure that, prior to such export, the following information is 
supplied by its competent authorities to the competent authorities of the importing 
country:
i) Name and address of the exporter and importer and, when available, the con­
signee;
ii) Name of the substance in Table I;
iii) Quantity of the substance to be exported;
iv) Expected point of entry and expected date of dispatch;
v) Any other information which is mutually agreed upon by the Parties.
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b) A Party may adopt more strict or severe measures of control than those provided 
by this paragraph if, in its opinion, such measures are desirable or necessary.
11. Where a Party furnishes information to another Party in accordance with paragraphs 
9 and 10 of this article, the Party furnishing such information may require that the Party 
receiving it keep confidential any trade, business, commercial or professional secret or 
trade process.
12. Each Party shall furnish annually to the Board, in the form and manner provided for 
by it and on forms made available by it, information on:
a) The amounts seized of substances in Table I and Table II and, when known, their 
origin;
b) Any substance not included in Table I or Table II which is identified as having 
been used in illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances, and 
which is deemed by the Party to be sufficiently significant to be brought to the atten­
tion of the Board;
c) Methods of diversion and illicit manufacture.
13. The Board shall report annually to the Commission on the implementation of this ar­
ticle and the Commission shall periodically review the adequacy and propriety of Table I 
and Table II.
14. The provisions of this article shall not apply to pharmaceutical preparations, nor to 
other preparations containing substances in Table I or Table II that are compounded in 
such a way that such substances cannot be easily used or recovered by readily applicable 
means.
Article 13
M aterials and Equipment
The Parties shall take such measures as they deem appropriate to prevent trade in and 
the diversion of materials and equipment for illicit production or manufacture of nar­
cotic drugs and psychotropic substances and shall co-operate to this end.
Article 14
M easures to Eradicate Illicit Cultivation o f Narcotic Plants and to Elim inate 
Illicit Demand for Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
1. Any measures taken pursuant to this Convention by Parties shall not be less stringent 
than the provisions applicable to the eradication of illicit cultivation of plants containing 
narcotic and psychotropic substances and to the elimination of illicit demand for nar­
cotic drugs and psychotropic substances under the provisions of the 1961 Convention, 
the 1961 Convention as amended and the 1971 Convention.
2. Each Party shall take appropriate measures to prevent illicit cultivation of and to 
eradicate plants containing narcotic or psychotropic substances, such as opium poppy, 
coca bush and cannabis plants, cultivated illicitly in its territory. The measures adopted 
shall respect fundamental human rights and shall take due account of traditional licit 
uses, where there is historic evidence of such use, as well as the protection of the envi­
ronment.
3 -
a) The Parties may co-operate to increase the effectiveness of eradication efforts. 
Such co-operation may, inter aha, include support, when appropriate, for integrated
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rural development leading to economically viable alternatives to illicit cultivation. 
Factors such as access to markets, the availability of resources and prevailing socio­
economic conditions should be taken into account before such rural development 
programmes are implemented. The Parties may agree on any other appropriate 
measures of co-operation.
b) The Parties shall also facilitate the exchange of scientific and technical information 
and the conduct of research concerning eradication.
c) Whenever they have common frontiers, the Parties shall seek to co-operate in 
eradication programmes in their respective areas along those frontiers.
4. The Parties shall adopt appropriate measures aimed at eliminating or reducing illicit 
demand for narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, with a view to reducing human 
suffering and eliminating financial incentives for illicit traffic. These measures may be 
based, inter alia, on the recommendations of the United Nations, specialized agencies of 
the United Nations such as the World Health Organization, and other competent inter­
national organizations, and on the Comprehensive Multidisciplinary Outline adopted by 
the International Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking, held in 1987, as it 
pertains to governmental and non-governmental agencies and private efforts in the 
fields of prevention, treatment and rehabilitation. The Parties may enter into bilateral or 
multilateral agreements or arrangements aimed at eliminating or reducing illicit de­
mand for narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.
5. The Parties may also take necessary measures for early destruction or lawful disposal 
of the narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and substances in Table I and Table II 
which have been seized or confiscated and for the admissibility as evidence of duly certi­
fied necessary quantities of such substances.
Article 15 
Commercial Carriers
1. The Parties shall take appropriate measures to ensure that means of transport oper­
ated by commercial carriers are not used in the commission of offences established in 
accordance with article 3, paragraph 1; such measures may include special arrangements 
with commercial carriers.
2. Each Party shall require commercial carriers to take reasonable precautions to pre­
vent the use of their means of transport for the commission of offences established in ac­
cordance with article 3, paragraph 1. Such precautions may include:
a) If the principal place of business of a commercial carrier is within the territory of 
the Party:
i) Training of personnel to identify suspicious consignments or persons;
ii) Promotion of integrity of personnel;
b) If a commercial carrier is operating within the territory of the Party:
i) Submission of cargo manifests in advance, whenever possible;
ii) Use of tamper-resistant, individually verifiable seals on containers;
iii) Reporting to the appropriate authorities at the earliest opportunity all suspi­
cious circumstances that may be related to the commission of offences established 
in accordance with article 3, paragraph 1.
3. Each Party shall seek to ensure that commercial carriers and the appropriate authori­
ties at points of entry and exit and other customs control areas co-operate, with a view to
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preventing unauthorized access to means of transport and cargo and to implementing 
appropriate security measures.
Article 16
Commercial Docum ents and Labelling Exports
1. Each Party shall require that lawful exports of narcotic drugs and psychotropic sub­
stances be properly documented. In addition to the requirements for documentation 
under article 31 of the 1961 Convention, article 31 of the 1961 Convention as amended 
and article 12 of the 1971 Convention, commercial documents such as invoices, cargo 
manifests, customs, transport and other shipping documents shall include the names of 
the narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances being exported as set out in the respec­
tive Schedules of the 1961 Convention, the 1961 Convention as amended and the 1971 
Convention, the quantity being exported, and the name and address of the exporter, the 
importer and, when available, the consignee.
2. Each Party shall require that consignments of narcotic drugs and psychotropic sub­
stances being exported be not mislabelled.
Article 17 
Illicit Traffic by Sea
1. The Parties shall co-operate to the fullest extent possible to suppress illicit traffic by 
sea, in conformity with the international law of the sea.
2. A Party which has reasonable grounds to suspect that a vessel flying its flag or not dis­
playing a flag or marks of registry is engaged in illicit traffic may request the assistance 
of other Parties in suppressing its use for that purpose. The Parties so requested shall 
render such assistance within the means available to them.
3. A Party which has reasonable grounds to suspect that a vessel exercising freedom of 
navigation in accordance with international law, and flying the flag or displaying marks 
of registry of another Party is engaged in illicit traffic may so notify the flag State, re­
quest confirmation of registiy and, if confirmed, request authorization from the flag 
State to take appropriate measures in regard to that vessel.
4. In accordance with paragraph 3 or in accordance with treaties in force between them 
or in accordance with any agreement or arrangement otherwise reached between those 
Parties, the flag State may authorize the requesting State to, inter aria:
a) Board the vessel;
b) Search the vessel;
c) If evidence of involvement in illicit traffic is found, take appropriate action with re­
spect to the vessel, persons and cargo on board.
5. Where action is taken pursuant to this article, the Parties concerned shall take due ac­
count of the need not to endanger the safety of life at sea, the security of the vessel and 
the cargo or to prejudice the commercial and legal interests of the flag State or any other 
interested State.
6. The flag State may, consistent with its obligations in paragraph 1 of this article, sub­
ject its authorization to conditions to be mutually agreed between it and the requesting 
Party, including conditions relating to responsibility.
7. For the purposes of paragraphs 3 and 4 of this article, a Party shall respond expedi­
tiously to  a request from another Party to determine whether a vessel that is flying its
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flag is entitled to do so, and to requests for authorization made pursuant to paragraph 3. 
At the time of becoming a Party to this Convention, each Party shall designate an author­
ity or, when necessary, authorities to receive and respond to such requests. Such desig­
nation shall be notified through the Secretary-General to all other Parties within one 
month of the designation.
8. A Party which has taken any action in accordance with this article shall promptly in­
form the flag State concerned of the results of that action.
9. The Parties shall consider entering into bilateral or regional agreements or arrange­
ments to  carry out, or to enhance the effectiveness of, the provisions of this article.
10. Action pursuant to paragraph 4 of this article shall be carried out only by warships or 
military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on 
government service and authorized to that effect.
11. Any action taken in accordance with this article shall take due account of the need not 
to interfere with or affect the rights and obligations and the exercise of jurisdiction of 
coastal States in accordance with the international law of the sea.
Article 18 
Free Trade Zones and Free Ports
1. The Parties shall apply measures to suppress illicit traffic in narcotic drugs, psycho­
tropic substances and substances in Table I and Table II in free trade zones and in free 
ports that are no less stringent than those applied in other parts of their territories.
2. The Parties shall endeavour:
a) To monitor the movement of goods and persons in free trade zones and free ports, 
and, to that end, shall empower the competent authorities to search cargoes and in­
coming and outgoing vessels, including pleasure craft and fishing vessels, as well as 
aircraft and vehicles and, when appropriate, to search crew members, passengers and 
their baggage;
b) To establish and maintain a system to detect consignments suspected of containing 
narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and substances in Table I and Table II pass­
ing into or out of free trade zones and free ports;
c) To establish and maintain surveillance systems in harbour and dock areas and at 
airports and border control points in free trade zones and free ports.
Article 19 
The Use o f the Mails
1. In conformity with their obligations under the Conventions of the Universal Postal 
Union, and in accordance with the basic principles of their domestic legal systems, the 
Parties shall adopt measures to suppress the use of the mails for illicit traffic and shall 
co-operate with one another to that end.
2. The measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall include, in particular:
a) Co-ordinated action for the prevention and repression of the use of the mails for il­
licit traffic;
b) Introduction and maintenance by authorized law enforcement personnel of inves­
tigative and control techniques designed to detect illicit consignments of narcotic 
drugs, psychotropic substances and substances in Table I and Table II in the mails;
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c) Legislative measures to enable the use of appropriate means to secure evidence re­
quired for judicial proceedings.
Article 20
Inform ation to be Furnished by the Parties
1. The Parties shall furnish, through the Secretary-General, information to the Commis­
sion on the working of this Convention in their territories and, in particular:
a) The text of laws and regulations promulgated in order to give effect to the Conven­
tion;
b) Particulars of cases of illicit traffic within their jurisdiction which they consider 
important because of new trends disclosed, the quantities involved, the sources from 
which the substances are obtained, or the methods employed by persons so engaged.
2. The Parties shall furnish such information in such a manner and by such dates as the 
Commission may request.
Article 21 
Functions o f the Com mission
The Commission is authorized to consider all matters pertaining to the aims of this Con­
vention and, in particular.
a) The Commission shall, on the basis of the information submitted by the Parties in 
accordance with article 20, review the operation of this Convention;
b) The Commission may make suggestions and general recommendations based on 
the examination of the information received from the Parties;
c) The Commission may call the attention of the Board to any matters which may be 
relevant to the functions of the Board;
d) The Commission shall, on any matter referred to it by the Board under article 22, 
paragraph 1 b), take such action as it deems appropriate;
e) The Commission may, in conformity with the procedures laid down in article 12, 
amend Table I and Table II;
f) The Commission may draw the attention of non-Parties to decisions and recom­
mendations which it adopts under this Convention, with a view to their considering 
taking action in accordance therewith.
Article 22 
Functions o f the Board
1. Without prejudice to the functions of the Commission under article 21, and without 
prejudice to the functions of the Board and the Commission under the 1961 Convention, 
the 1961 Convention as amended and the 1971 Convention:
a) If, on the basis of its examination of information available to it, to the Secretary- 
General or to the Commission, or of information communicated by United Nations 
organs, the Board has reason to believe that the aims of this Convention in matters 
related to its competence are not being met, the Board may invite a Party or Parties to 
furnish any relevant information;
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b) With respect to articles 12,13 and 16:
i) After taking action under subparagraph a) of this article, the Board if satisfied 
that it is necessary to do so, may call upon the Party concerned to adopt such re­
medial measures as shall seem under the circumstances to be necessary for the 
execution of the provisions of articles 12,13 and 16;
ii) Prior to taking action under iii) below, the Board shall treat as confidential its 
communications with the Party concerned under the preceding subparagraphs;
iii) If the Board finds that the Party concerned has not taken remedial measures 
which it has been called upon to take under this subparagraph, it may call the at­
tention of the Parties, the Council and the Commission to the matter. Any report 
published by the Board under this subparagraph shall also contain the views of the 
Party concerned if the latter so requests.
2. Any Party shall be invited to be represented at a meeting of the Board at which a ques­
tion of direct interest to it is to be considered under this article.
3. If in any case a decision of the Board which is adopted under this article is not unani­
mous, the views of the minority shall be stated.
4. Decisions of the Board under this article shall be taken by a two-thirds majority of the 
whole number of the Board.
5. In carrying out its functions pursuant to subparagraph 1 a) of this article, the Board 
shall ensure the confidentiality of all information which may come into its possession.
6. The Board’s responsibility under this article shall not apply to the implementation of 
treaties or agreements entered into between Parties in accordance with the provisions of 
this Convention.
7. The provisions of this article shall not be applicable to disputes between Parties falling 
under the provisions of article 32.
Article 23 
Reports o f the Board
1. The Board shall prepare an annual report on its work containing an analysis of the in­
formation at its disposal and, in appropriate cases, an account of the explanations, if 
any, given by or required of Parties, together with any observations and recommenda­
tions which the Board desires to make. The Board may make such additional reports as 
it considers necessary. The reports shall be submitted to the Council through the Com­
mission which may make such comments as it sees fit.
2. The reports of the Board shall be communicated to the Parties and subsequently pub­
lished by the Secretary-General. The Parties shall permit their unrestricted distribution.
Article 24
Application o f Stricter M easured than those Required by th is Convention
A Party may adopt more strict or severe measures than those provided by this Conven­
tion if, in its opinion, such measures are desirable or necessary for the prevention or 
suppression of illicit traffic.
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Article 25
Non-derogation from  Earlier Treaty Rights and Obligations
The provisions of this Convention shall not derogate from any rights enjoyed or obliga­
tions undertaken by Parties to this Convention under the 1961 Convention, the 1961 
Convention as amended and the 1971 Convention.
Article 26 
Signature
This Convention shall be open for signature at the United Nations Office at Vienna, from 
20 December 1988 to 28 February 1989, and thereafter at the Headquarters of the 
United Nations at New York, until 20 December 1989, by:
a) All States;
b) Namibia, represented by the United Nations Council for Namibia;
c) Regional economic integration organizations which have competence in respect of 
the negotiation, conclusion and application of international agreements in matters 
covered by this Convention, references under the Convention to Parties, States or na­
tional services being applicable to these organizations within the limits of their com­
petence.
Article 27
Ratification, Acceptance, Approval or Act o f Formal Confirmation
1. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by States and by 
Namibia, represented by the United Nations Council for Namibia, and to acts of formal 
confirmation by regional economic integration organizations referred to in article 26, 
subparagraph c). The instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval and those re­
lating to acts of formal confirmation shall be deposited with the Secretary-General.
2. In their instruments of formal confirmation, regional economic integration organiza­
tions shall declare the extent of their competence with respect to the matters governed 
by this Convention. These organizations shall also inform the Secretary-General of any 
modification in the extent of their competence with respect to the matters governed by 
the Convention.
Article 28 
A ccession
1. This Convention shall remain open for accession by any State, by Namibia, repre­
sented by the United Nations Council for Namibia, and by regional economic integration 
organizations referred to in article 26, subparagraph c). Accession shall be effected by 
the deposit of an instrument of accession with the Secretary-General.
2. In their instruments of accession, regional economic integration organizations shall 
declare the extent of their competence with respect to the matters governed by this Con­
vention. These organizations shall also inform the Secretary-General of any modifica­
tion in the extent of their competence with respect to the matters governed by the Con­
vention.
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Article 29 
Entry into Force
1. This Convention shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date of the deposit 
with the Secretary-General of the twentieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, ap­
proval or accession by States or by Namibia, represented by the Council for Namibia.
2. For each State or for Namibia, represented by the Council for Namibia, ratifying, ac­
cepting, approving or acceding to this Convention after the deposit of the twentieth in­
strument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, the Convention shall enter 
into force on the ninetieth day after the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratifica­
tion, acceptance, approval or accession.
3. For each regional economic integration organization referred to in article 26, sub- 
paragraph c) depositing an instrument relating to an act of formal confirmation or an in­
strument of accession, this Convention shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after 
such deposit, or at the date the Convention enters into force pursuant to paragraph 1 of 
this article, whichever is later.
Article 30  
Denunciation
1. A Party may denounce this Convention at any time by a written notification addressed 
to the Secretary-General.
2. Such denunciation shall take effect for the Party concerned one year after the date of 
receipt of the notification by the Secretary-General.
Article 31 
Amendments
1. Any Party may propose an amendment to this Convention. The text of any such 
amendment and the reasons therefor shall be communicated by that Party to the Secre­
tary-General, who shall communicate it to the other Parties and shall ask them whether 
they accept the proposed amendment. If a proposed amendment so circulated has not 
been rejected by any Party within twenty-four months after it has been circulated, it 
shall be deemed to have been accepted and shall enter into force in respect of a Party 
ninety days after that Party has deposited with the Secretary-General an instrument ex­
pressing its consent to be bound by that amendment.
2. If a proposed amendment has been rejected by any Party, the Secretary-General shall 
consult with the Parties and, if a majority so requests, he shall bring the matter, together 
with any comments made by the Parties, before the Council which may decide to call a 
conference in accordance with Article 62, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Na­
tions. Any amendment resulting from such a Conference shall be embodied in a Proto­
col of Amendment. Consent to be bound by such a Protocol shall be required to be ex­
pressed specifically to the Secretary-General.
Article 32
Settlem ent o f Disputes
1. If there should arise between two or more Parties a dispute relating to the interpreta­
tion or application of this Convention, the Parties shall consult together with a view to 
the settlement of the dispute by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitra­
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tion, recourse to regional bodies, judicial process or other peaceful means of their own 
choice.
2. Any such dispute which cannot be settled in the manner prescribed in paragraph l  of 
this article shall be referred, at the request of any one of the States Parties to the dispute, 
to the International Court of Justice for decision.
3. If a regional economic integration organization referred to in article 26, subparagraph
c) is a Party to a dispute which cannot be settled in the manner prescribed in paragraph 
1 of this article, it may, through a State Member of the United Nations, request the 
Council to request an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in accor­
dance with Article 65 of the Statute of the Court, which opinion shall be regarded as de­
cisive.
4. Each State, at the time of signature or ratification, acceptance or approval of this Con­
vention or accession thereto, or each regional economic integration organization, at the 
time of signature or deposit of an act of formal confirmation or accession, may declare 
that it does not consider itself bound by paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article. The other 
Parties shall not be bound by paragraphs 2 and 3 with respect to any Party having made 
such a declaration.
5. Any Party having made a declaration in accordance with paragraph 4 of this article 
may at any time withdraw the declaration by notification to the Secretary-General.
Article 33 
Authentic Texts
The Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts of this Convention are 
equally authentic.
Article 34  
Depositary
The Secretary-General shall be the depositary of this Convention.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto, have signed 
this Convention.
DONE AT VIENNA, in one original, this twentieth day of December one thousand nine 
hundred and eighty-eight.
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Appendix 3: The Forty Recommendations
A. LEGAL SYSTEMS
Scope o f the crim inal offence o f m oney laundering
1. Countries should criminalise money laundering on the basis of the United Nations 
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 
1988 (the Vienna Convention) and the United Nations Convention against Transna­
tional Organized Crime, 2000 (the Palermo Convention).
Countries should apply the crime of money laundering to all serious offences, with a 
view to including the widest range of predicate offences. Predicate offences may be 
described by reference to all offences, or to a threshold linked either to a category of 
serious offences or to the penalty of imprisonment applicable to the predicate of­
fence (threshold approach), or to a list of predicate offences, or a combination of 
these approaches.
Where countries apply a threshold approach, predicate offences should at a mini­
mum comprise all offences that fall within the category of serious offences under 
their national law or should include offences which are punishable by a maximum 
penalty of more than one year’s imprisonment or for those countries that have a 
minimum threshold for offences in their legal system, predicate offences should 
comprise all offences, which are punished by a minimum penalty of more than six 
months imprisonment.
Whichever approach is adopted, each country should at a minimum include a range 
of offences within each of the designated categories of offences76.
Predicate offences for money laundering should extend to conduct that occurred in 
another country, which constitutes an offence in that country, and which would have 
constituted a predicate offence had it occurred domestically. Countries may provide 
that the only prerequisite is that the conduct would have constituted a predicate of­
fence had it occurred domestically.
Countries may provide that the offence of money laundering does not apply to per­
sons who committed the predicate offence, where this is required by fundamental 
principles of their domestic law.
2. Countries should ensure that:
a) The intent and knowledge required to prove the offence of money laundering is 
consistent with the standards set forth in the Vienna and Palermo Conventions, in­
cluding the concept that such mental state may be inferred from objective factual cir­
cumstances.
b) Criminal liability, and, where that is not possible, civil or administrative liability, 
should apply to legal persons. This should not preclude parallel criminal, civil or ad­
ministrative proceedings with respect to legal persons in countries in which such 
forms of liability are available. Legal persons should be subject to effective, propor­
tionate and dissuasive sanctions. Such measures should be without prejudice to the 
criminal liability of individuals.
* See the definition of “designated categories of offences” in the Glossary.
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Provisonal m easures and confiscation
3. Countries should adopt measures similar to those set forth in the Vienna and Pal­
ermo Conventions, including legislative measures, to enable their competent au­
thorities to confiscate property laundered, proceeds from money laundering or 
predicate offences, instrumentalities used in or intended for use in the commission 
of these offences, or property of corresponding value, without prejudicing the rights 
of bona fide third parties.
Such measures should include the authority to: (a) identify, trace and evaluate prop­
erty which is subject to confiscation; (b) cany  out provisional measures, such as 
freezing and seizing, to prevent any dealing, transfer or disposal of such property; (c) 
take steps that will prevent or void actions that prejudice the State’s ability to re­
cover property that is subject to confiscation; and (d) take any appropriate investiga­
tive measures.
Countries may consider adopting measures that allow such proceeds or instrum en­
talities to be confiscated without requiring a criminal conviction, or which require an 
offender to demonstrate the lawful origin of the property alleged to be liable to con­
fiscation, to the extent that such a requirement is consistent with the principles of 
their domestic law.
B. MEASURES TO BE TAKEN BY FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND NON- 
FINANCIAL BUSINESSES AND PROFESSIONS TO PREVENT MONEY 
LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING
4. Countries should ensure that financial institution secrecy laws do not inhibit im­
plementation of the FATF Recommendations.
Customer due diligence and record-keeping
5.* Financial institutions should not keep anonymous accounts or accounts in obvi­
ously fictitious names.
Financial institutions should undertake customer due diligence measures, including 
identifying and verifying the identity of their customers, when:
• establishing business relations;
• carrying out occasional transactions: (i) above the applicable designated thresh­
old; or (ii) that are wire transfers in the circumstances covered by the Interpreta­
tive Note to Special Recommendation VII;
• there is a suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing; or x the financial 
institution has doubts about the veracity or adequacy of previously obtained cus­
tomer identification data.
The customer due diligence (CDD) measures to be taken are as follows:
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a) Identifying the customer and verifying that customer’s identity using reliable, in­
dependent source documents, data or information.^
b) Identifying the beneficial owner, and taking reasonable measures to verify the 
identity of the beneficial owner such that the financial institution is satisfied that it 
knows who the beneficial owner is. For legal persons and arrangements this should 
include financial institutions taking reasonable measures to understand the owner­
ship and control structure of the customer.
c) Obtaining information on the purpose and intended nature of the business rela­
tionship.
d) Conducting ongoing due diligence on the business relationship and scrutiny of 
transactions undertaken throughout the course of that relationship to ensure that the 
transactions being conducted are consistent with the institution’s knowledge of the 
customer, their business and risk profile, including, where necessary, the source of 
funds.
Financial institutions should apply each of the CDD measures under (a) to (d) above, 
bu t may determine the extent of such measures on a risk sensitive basis depending 
on the type of customer, business relationship or transaction. The measures that are 
taken should be consistent with any guidelines issued by competent authorities. For 
higher risk categories, financial institutions should perform enhanced due diligence. 
In  certain circumstances, where there are low risks, countries may decide that finan­
cial institutions can apply reduced or simplified measures.
Financial institutions should verify the identity of the customer and beneficial owner 
before or during the course of establishing a business relationship or conducting 
transactions for occasional customers. Countries may permit financial institutions to 
complete the verification as soon as reasonably practicable following the establish­
m ent of the relationship, where the money laundering risks are effectively managed 
and where this is essential not to interrupt the normal conduct of business.
Where the financial institution is unable to comply with paragraphs (a) to (c) above, 
it should not open the account, commence business relations or perform the transac­
tion; or should terminate the business relationship; and should consider making a 
suspicious transactions report in relation to the customer.
These requirements should apply to all new customers, though financial institutions 
should also apply this Recommendation to existing customers on the basis of mate­
riality and risk, and should conduct due diligence on such existing relationships at 
appropriate times.
6.* Financial institutions should, in relation to politically exposed persons, in addi­
tion to performing normal due diligence measures:
a) Have appropriate risk management systems to determine whether the customer is 
a politically exposed person.
b) Obtain senior management approval for establishing business relationships with 
such customers.
77 Reliable, independent source documents, data or information will hereafter be referred to 
as “identification data”.
* Recommendations marked with an asterisk should be read in conjunction with their Inter­
pretative Note.
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c) Take reasonable measures to establish the source of wealth and source of funds.
d) Conduct enhanced ongoing monitoring of the business relationship.
7. Financial institutions should, in relation to cross-border correspondent banking 
and other similar relationships, in addition to performing normal due diligence 
measures:
a) Gather sufficient information about a respondent institution to understand fully 
the nature of the respondent’s business and to determine from publicly available in­
formation the reputation of the institution and the quality of supervision, including 
whether it has been subject to a money laundering or terrorist financing investigation 
or regulatory action.
b) Assess the respondent institution’s anti-money laundering and terrorist financing 
controls.
c) Obtain approval from senior management before establishing new correspondent 
relationships.
d) Document the respective responsibilities of each institution.
e) With respect to “payable-through accounts”, be satisfied that the respondent bank 
has verified the identity of and performed on-going due diligence on the customers 
having direct access to accounts of the correspondent and that it is able to provide 
relevant customer identification data upon request to the correspondent bank.
8. Financial institutions should pay special attention to any money laundering 
threats that may arise from new or developing technologies that might favour ano­
nymity, and take measures, if needed, to prevent their use in money laundering 
schemes. In particular, financial institutions should have policies and procedures in 
place to address any specific risks associated with non-face to face business relation­
ships or transactions.
9.* Countries may permit financial institutions to rely on intermediaries or other 
third parties to perform elements (a) -  (c) of the CDD process or to introduce busi­
ness, provided that the criteria set out below are met. Where such reliance is perm it­
ted, the ultimate responsibility for customer identification and verification remains 
with the financial institution relying on the third party.
The criteria that should be met are as follows:
a) A financial institution relying upon a third party should immediately obtain the 
necessary information concerning elements (a) -  (c) of the CDD process. Financial 
institutions should take adequate steps to satisfy themselves that copies of identifica­
tion data and other relevant documentation relating to the CDD requirements will be 
made available from the third party upon request without delay.
b) The financial institution should satisfy itself that the third party is regulated and 
supervised for, and has measures in place to comply with CDD requirements in line 
with Recommendations 5 and 10.
It is left to each country to determine in which countries the third party that meets 
the conditions can be based, having regard to information available on countries 
that do not or do not adequately apply the FATF Recommendations.
10.* Financial institutions should maintain, for at least five years, all necessary re­
cords on transactions, both domestic or international, to enable them to comply 
swiftly with information requests from the competent authorities. Such records 
must be sufficient to permit reconstruction of individual transactions (including the 
amounts and types of currency involved if any) so as to provide, if necessary, evi­
dence for prosecution of criminal activity.
343
Financial institutions should keep records on the identification data obtained 
through the customer due diligence process (e.g. copies or records of official identifi­
cation documents like passports, identity cards, driving licenses or similar docu­
ments), account files and business correspondence for at least five years after the 
business relationship is ended.
The identification data and transaction records should be available to domestic 
competent authorities upon appropriate authority.
11.* Financial institutions should pay special attention to all complex, unusual large 
transactions, and all unusual patterns of transactions, which have no apparent eco­
nomic or visible lawful purpose. The background and purpose of such transactions 
should, as far as possible, be examined, the findings established in writing, and be 
available to help competent authorities and auditors.
12* The customer due diligence and record-keeping requirements set out in Rec­
ommendations 5, 6, and 8 to n  apply to designated non-financial businesses and 
professions in the following situations:
a) Casinos -  when customers engage in financial transactions equal to or above the 
applicable designated threshold.
b) Real estate agents - when they are involved in transactions for their client concern­
ing the buying and selling of real estate.
c) Dealers in precious metals and dealers in precious stones - when they engage in 
any cash transaction with a customer equal to or above the applicable designated 
threshold.
d) Lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals and accountants when 
they prepare for or carry out transactions for their client concerning the following ac­
tivities:
• buying and selling of real estate;
• managing of client money, securities or other assets;
• management of bank, savings or securities accounts;
• organisation of contributions for the creation, operation or management of com­
panies;
• creation, operation or management of legal persons or arrangements, and buy­
ing and selling of business entities.
e) Trust and company service providers when they prepare for or carry out transac­
tions for a client concerning the activities listed in the definition in the Glossary.
Reporting o f suspicious transactions and com pliance
13.* If a financial institution suspects or has reasonable grounds to suspect that 
funds are the proceeds of a criminal activity, or are related to terrorist financing, it 
should be required, directly by law or regulation, to report promptly its suspicions to 
the financial intelligence unit (FIU).
14.* Financial institutions, their directors, officers and employees should be:
a) Protected by legal provisions from criminal and civil liability for breach of any re­
striction on disclosure of information imposed by contract or by any legislative, regu­
latory or administrative provision, if they report their suspicions in good faith to the
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FIU, even if they did not know precisely what the underlying criminal activity was, 
and regardless of whether illegal activity actually occurred.
b) Prohibited by law from disclosing the fact that a suspicious transaction report 
(STR) or related information is being reported to the FIU.
15.* Financial institutions should develop programmes against money laundering 
and terrorist financing. These programmes should include:
a)The development of internal policies, procedures and controls, including appropri­
ate compliance management arrangements, and adequate screening procedures to 
ensure high standards when hiring employees.
b) An ongoing employee training programme.
c) An audit function to test the system.
16.* The requirements set out in Recommendations 13 to 15, and 21 apply to all 
designated non-financial businesses and professions, subject to the following quali­
fications:
a) Lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals and accountants should 
be required to report suspicious transactions when, on behalf of or for a client, they 
engage in a financial transaction in relation to the activities described in Recommen­
dation 12(d). Countries are strongly encouraged to extend the reporting requirement 
to the rest of the professional activities of accountants, including auditing.
b) Dealers in precious metals and dealers in precious stones should be required to re­
port suspicious transactions when they engage in any cash transaction with a cus­
tomer equal to or above the applicable designated threshold.
c) Trust and company service providers should be required to report suspicious 
transactions for a client when, on behalf of or for a client, they engage in a transaction 
in relation to the activities referred to Recommendation 12(e).
Lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals, and accountants acting as 
independent legal professionals, are not required to report their suspicions if the 
relevant information was obtained in circumstances where they are subject to pro­
fessional secrecy or legal professional privilege.
Other m easures to deter m oney laundering and terrorist financing
17. Countries should ensure that effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions, 
whether criminal, civil or administrative, are available to deal with natural or legal 
persons covered by these Recommendations that fail to comply with anti-money 
laundering or terrorist financing requirements.
18. Countries should not approve the establishment or accept the continued opera­
tion of shell banks. Financial institutions should refuse to enter into, or continue, a 
correspondent banking relationship with shell banks. Financial institutions should 
also guard against establishing relations with respondent foreign financial institu­
tions that permit their accounts to be used by shell banks.
19.* Countries should consider:
a) Implementing feasible measures to detect or monitor the physical cross-border 
transportation of currency and bearer negotiable instruments, subject to strict safe­
guards to ensure proper use of information and without impeding in any way the 
freedom of capital movements.
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b) The feasibility and utility of a system where banks and other financial institutions 
and intermediaries would report all domestic and international currency transactions 
above a fixed amount, to a national central agency with a computerised data base, 
available to competent authorities for use in money laundering or terrorist financing 
cases, subject to strict safeguards to ensure proper use of the information.
20. Countries should consider applying the FATF Recommendations to businesses 
and professions, other than designated non-financial businesses and professions, 
that pose a money laundering or terrorist financing risk.
Countries should further encourage the development of modern and secure tech­
niques of money management that are less vulnerable to money laundering.
M easures to be taken with respect to countries that do not or insufficiently  
comply with the FATF Recom m endations
21. Financial institutions should give special attention to business relationships and 
transactions with persons, including companies and financial institutions, from 
countries which do not or insufficiently apply the FATF Recommendations. When­
ever these transactions have no apparent economic or visible lawful purpose, their 
background and purpose should, as far as possible, be examined, the findings estab­
lished in writing, and be available to help competent authorities. Where such a coun­
try continues not to apply or insufficiently applies the FATF Recommendations, 
countries should be able to apply appropriate countermeasures.
22. Financial institutions should ensure that the principles applicable to financial in­
stitutions, which are mentioned above are also applied to branches and majority 
owned subsidiaries located abroad, especially in countries which do not or insuffi­
ciently apply the FATF Recommendations, to the extent that local applicable laws 
and regulations permit. When local applicable laws and regulations prohibit this 
implementation, competent authorities in the country of the parent institution 
should be informed by the financial institutions that they cannot apply the FATF 
Recommendations.
Regulation and supervision
23.* Countries should ensure that financial institutions are subject to adequate regu­
lation and supervision and are effectively implementing the FATF Recommenda­
tions. Competent authorities should take the necessary legal or regulatory measures 
to prevent criminals or their associates from holding or being the beneficial owner of 
a significant or controlling interest or holding a management function in a financial 
institution.
For financial institutions subject to the Core Principles, the regulatory and supervi­
sory measures that apply for prudential purposes and which are also relevant to 
money laundering, should apply in a similar manner for anti-money laundering and 
terrorist financing purposes.
Other financial institutions should be licensed or registered and appropriately regu­
lated, and subject to supervision or oversight for anti-money laundering purposes, 
having regard to the risk of money laundering or terrorist financing in that sector. At 
a minimum, businesses providing a service of money or value transfer, or of money 
or currency changing should be licensed or registered, and subject to effective sys­
tems for monitoring and ensuring compliance with national requirements to combat 
money laundering and terrorist financing.
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24- Designated non-financial businesses and professions should be subject to regula­
tory and supervisory measures as set out below.
a) Casinos should be subject to a comprehensive regulatory and supervisory regime 
that ensures that they have effectively implemented the necessaiy anti-money laun­
dering and terrorist-financing measures. At a minimum:
• casinos should be licensed;
• competent authorities should take the necessary legal or regulatory measures to 
prevent criminals or their associates from holding or being the beneficial owner 
of a significant or controlling interest, holding a management function in, or be­
ing an operator of a casino
• competent authorities should ensure that casinos are effectively supervised for 
compliance with requirements to combat money laundering and terrorist financ­
ing.
b) Countries should ensure that the other categories of designated non-financial 
businesses and professions are subject to effective systems for monitoring and ensur­
ing their compliance with requirements to combat money laundering and terrorist fi­
nancing. This should be performed on a risk-sensitive basis. This may be performed 
by a government authority or by an appropriate self-regulatory organisation, pro­
vided that such an organisation can ensure that its members comply with their obli­
gations to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.
25.* The competent authorities should establish guidelines, and provide feedback 
which will assist financial institutions and designated non-financial businesses and 
professions in applying national measures to combat money laundering and terrorist 
financing, and in particular, in detecting and reporting suspicious transactions.
C. INSTITUTIONAL AND OTHER MEASURES NECESSARY IN SYSTEMS 
FOR COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANC­
ING
Competent authorities, their powers and resources
26.* Countries should establish a FIU that serves as a national centre for the receiv­
ing (and, as permitted, requesting), analysis and dissemination of STR and other in­
formation regarding potential money laundering or terrorist financing. The FIU 
should have access, directly or indirecdy, on a timely basis to the financial, adminis­
trative and law enforcement information that it requires to properly undertake its 
functions, including the analysis of STR.
27.* Countries should ensure that designated law enforcement authorities have re­
sponsibility for money laundering and terrorist financing investigations. Countries 
are encouraged to support and develop, as far as possible, special investigative tech­
niques suitable for the investigation of money laundering, such as controlled deliv­
ery, undercover operations and other relevant techniques. Countries are also en­
couraged to use other effective mechanisms such as the use of permanent or tempo­
rary groups specialised in asset investigation, and co-operative investigations with 
appropriate competent authorities in other countries.
28. When conducting investigations of money laundering and underlying predicate 
offences, competent authorities should be able to obtain documents and information 
for use in those investigations, and in prosecutions and related actions. This should 
include powers to use compulsory measures for the production of records held by fi­
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nancial institutions and other persons, for the search of persons and premises, and 
for the seizure and obtaining of evidence.
29. Supervisors should have adequate powers to monitor and ensure compliance by 
financial institutions with requirements to combat money laundering and terrorist 
financing, including the authority to conduct inspections. They should be author­
ised to compel production of any information from financial institutions that is rele­
vant to monitoring such compliance, and to impose adequate administrative sanc­
tions for failure to comply with such requirements.
30. Countries should provide their competent authorities involved in combating 
money laundering and terrorist financing with adequate financial, human and tech­
nical resources. Countries should have in place processes to ensure that the staff of 
those authorities are of high integrity.
31. Countries should ensure that policy makers, the FIU, law enforcement and su­
pervisors have effective mechanisms in place which enable them to co-operate, and 
where appropriate coordinate domestically with each other concerning the develop­
ment and implementation of policies and activities to combat money laundering and 
terrorist financing.
32. Countries should ensure that their competent authorities can review the effec­
tiveness of their systems to combat money laundering and terrorist financing sys­
tems by maintaining comprehensive statistics on matters relevant to the effective­
ness and efficiency of such systems. This should include statistics on the STR re­
ceived and disseminated; on money laundering and terrorist financing investiga­
tions, prosecutions and convictions; on property frozen, seized and confiscated; and 
on mutual legal assistance or other international requests for co-operation.
Transparency o f legal persons and arrangem ents
33. Countries should take measures to prevent the unlawful use of legal persons by 
money launderers. Countries should ensure that there is adequate, accurate and 
timely information on the beneficial ownership and control of legal persons that can 
be obtained or accessed in a timely fashion by competent authorities. In particular, 
countries that have legal persons that are able to issue bearer shares should take ap­
propriate measures to ensure that they are not misused for money laundering and be 
able to demonstrate the adequacy of those measures. Countries could consider 
measures to facilitate access to beneficial ownership and control information to fi­
nancial institutions undertaking the requirements set out in Recommendation 5.
34. Countries should take measures to prevent the unlawful use of legal ar­
rangements by money launderers. In particular, countries should ensure that there 
is adequate, accurate and timely information on express trusts, including informa­
tion on the settlor, trustee and beneficiaries, that can be obtained or accessed in a 
timely fashion by competent authorities. Countries could consider measures to fa­
cilitate access to beneficial ownership and control information to financial institu­
tions undertaking the requirements set out in Recommendation 5.
D. INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION
35. Countries should take immediate steps to become party to and implement fully 
the Vienna Convention, the Palermo Convention, and the 1999 United Nations In­
ternational Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. Countries
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are also encouraged to ratify and implement other relevant international conven­
tions, such as the 1990 Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Sei­
zure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and the 2002 Inter-American 
Convention against Terrorism.
Mutual legal assistance and extradition
36. Countries should rapidly, constructively and effectively provide the widest possi­
ble range of mutual legal assistance in relation to money laundering and terrorist fi­
nancing investigations, prosecutions, and related proceedings. In particular, coun­
tries should:
a) Not prohibit or place unreasonable or unduly restrictive conditions on the provi­
sion of mutual legal assistance.
b) Ensure that they have clear and efficient processes for the execution of mutual le­
gal assistance requests.
c) Not refuse to execute a request for mutual legal assistance on the sole ground that 
the offence is also considered to involve fiscal matters.
d) Not refuse to execute a request for mutual legal assistance on the grounds that 
laws require financial institutions to maintain secrecy or confidentiality.
Countries should ensure that the powers of their competent authorities required under 
Recommendation 28 are also available for use in response to requests for mutual legal 
assistance, and if consistent with their domestic framework, in response to direct re­
quests from foreign judicial or law enforcement authorities to domestic counterparts.
To avoid conflicts of jurisdiction, consideration should be given to devising and applying 
mechanisms for determining the best venue for prosecution of defendants in the inter­
ests of justice in cases that are subject to prosecution in more than one country.
37. Countries should, to the greatest extent possible, render mutual legal assistance not­
withstanding the absence of dual criminality.
Where dual criminality is required for mutual legal assistance or extradition, that re­
quirement should be deemed to be satisfied regardless of whether both countries place 
the offence within the same category of offence or denominate the offence by the same 
terminology, provided that both countries criminalise the conduct underlying the of­
fence.
38.* There should be authority to take expeditious action in response to requests by for­
eign countries to identify, freeze, seize and confiscate property laundered, proceeds from 
money laundering or predicate offences, instrumentalities used in or intended for use in 
the commission of these offences, or property of corresponding value. There should also 
be arrangements for co-ordinating seizure and confiscation proceedings, which may in­
clude the sharing of confiscated assets.
39. Countries should recognise money laundering as an extraditable offence. Each coun­
try should either extradite its own nationals, or where a country does not do so solely on 
the grounds of nationality, that country should, at the request of the country seeking ex­
tradition, submit the case without undue delay to its competent authorities for the pur­
pose of prosecution of the offences set forth in the request. Those authorities should take 
their decision and conduct their proceedings in the same manner as in the case of any 
other offence of a serious nature under the domestic law of that country. The countries 
concerned should cooperate with each other, in particular on procedural and evidentiary 
aspects, to ensure the efficiency of such prosecutions.
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Subject to their legal frameworks, countries may consider simplifying extradition by al­
lowing direct transmission of extradition requests between appropriate ministries, ex­
traditing persons based only on warrants of arrests or judgements, and/or introducing a 
simplified extradition of consenting persons who waive formal extradition proceedings.
Other form s o f co-operation
40.* Countries should ensure that their competent authorities provide the widest 
possible range of international co-operation to their foreign counterparts. There 
should be clear and effective gateways to facilitate the prom pt and constructive ex­
change directly between counterparts, either spontaneously or upon request, of in­
formation relating to both money laundering and the underlying predicate offences. 
Exchanges should be permitted without unduly restrictive conditions. In particular:
a) Competent authorities should not refuse a request for assistance on the sole 
ground that the request is also considered to involve fiscal matters.
b) Countries should not invoke laws that require financial institutions to maintain se­
crecy or confidentiality as a ground for refusing to provide co-operation.
c) Competent authorities should be able to conduct inquiries; and where possible, in­
vestigations; on behalf of foreign counterparts.
Where the ability to obtain information sought by a foreign competent authority is 
not within the mandate of its counterpart, countries are also encouraged to permit a 
prompt and constructive exchange of information with non-counterparts. Co­
operation with foreign authorities other than counterparts could occur directly or 
indirectly. When uncertain about the appropriate avenue to follow, competent au­
thorities should first contact their foreign counterparts for assistance.
Countries should establish controls and safeguards to ensure that information ex­
changed by competent authorities is used only in an authorised manner, consistent 
with their obligations concerning privacy and data protection.
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GLOSSARY
In these Recommendations the following abbreviations and references are used:
“B eneficial ow ner” refers to the natural person(s) who ultimately owns or con­
trols a customer and/or the person on whose behalf a transaction is being con­
ducted. It also incorporates those persons who exercise ultimate effective control 
over a legal person or arrangement.
“Core P rincip les” refers to the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision 
issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the Objectives and Princi­
ples for Securities Regulation issued by the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions, and the Insurance Supervisory Principles issued by the International 
Association of Insurance Supervisors.
“D esignated categories o f offen ces” means:
• participation in an organised criminal group and racketeering;
• terrorism, including terrorist financing;
• trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling;
• sexual exploitation, including sexual exploitation of children;
• illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances;
• illicit arms trafficking;
• illicit trafficking in stolen and other goods;
• corruption and bribery;
• fraud;
• counterfeiting currency;
• counterfeiting and piracy of products;
• environmental crime;
• murder, grievous bodily injury;
• kidnapping, illegal restraint and hostage-taking;
• robbery or theft;
• smuggling;
• extortion;
• forgery;
• piracy; and
• insider trading and market manipulation.
When deciding on the range of offences to be covered as predicate offences under each of 
the categories listed above, each country may decide, in accordance with its domestic 
law, how it will define those offences and the nature of any particular elements of those 
offences that make them serious offences.
“D esignated non-financial b u sin esses and p rofession s” means:
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a) Casinos (which also includes internet casinos).
b) Real estate agents.
c) Dealers in precious metals.
d) Dealers in precious stones.
e) Lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals and accountants -  this re­
fers to sole practitioners, partners or employed professionals within professional 
firms. It is not meant to refer to ‘internal’ professionals that are employees of other 
types of businesses, nor to professionals working for government agencies, who may 
already he subject to measures that would combat money laundering.
f) Trust and Company Service Providers refers to all persons or businesses that are 
not covered elsewhere under these Recommendations, and which as a business, pro­
vide any of the following services to third parties:
• acting as a formation agent of legal persons;
• acting as (or arranging for another person to act as) a director or secretary of a
company, a partner of a partnership, or a similar position in relation to other le­
gal persons;
• providing a registered office; business address or accommodation, correspon­
dence or administrative address for a company, a partnership or any other legal 
person or arrangement;
• acting as (or arranging for another person to act as) a trustee of an express trust;
• acting as (or arranging for another person to act as) a nominee shareholder for
another person.
“D esignated threshold” refers to the amount set out in the Interpretative Notes.
“Financial in stitu tion s” means any person or entity who conducts as a business 
one or more of the following activities or operations for or on behalf of a customer:
1. Acceptance of deposits and other repayable funds from the public.78
2. Lending.79
3. Financial leasing.80
4. The transfer of money or value.81
5. Issuing and managing means of payment (e.g. credit and debit cards, cheques, 
traveller’s cheques, money orders and bankers’ drafts, electronic money).
6. Financial guarantees and commitments.
7. Trading in:
t8 This also captures private banking.
79 This includes inter alia: consumer credit; mortgage credit; factoring, with or without recourse; and finance of 
commercial transactions (including forfaiting).
80 This does not extend to financial leasing arrangements in relation to consumer products.
81 This applies to financial activity in both the formal or informal sector e.g. alternative remittance activity. See the 
Interpretative Note to Special Recommendation VI. It does not apply to any natural or legal person that provides fi­
nancial institutions solely with message or other support systems for transmitting funds. See the Interpretative Note 
to Special Recommendation VII.
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(a) money market instruments (cheques, bills, CDs, derivatives etc.);
(b) foreign exchange;
(c) exchange, interest rate and index instruments;
(d) transferable securities;
(e) commodity futures trading.
8. Participation in securities issues and the provision of financial services related to 
such issues.
9. Individual and collective portfolio management.
10. Safekeeping and administration of cash or liquid securities on behalf of other 
persons.
11. Otherwise investing, administering or managing funds or money on behalf of 
other persons.
12. Underwriting and placement of life insurance and other investment related in­
surance.82
13. Money and currency changing.
When a financial activity is carried out by a person or entity on an occasional or veiy 
limited basis (having regard to quantitative and absolute criteria) such that there is 
little risk of money laundering activity occurring, a country may decide that the ap­
plication of anti-money laundering measures is not necessary, either fully or par­
tially.
In strictly limited and justified circumstances, and based on a proven low risk of 
money laundering, a country may decide not to apply some or all of the Forty Rec­
ommendations to some of the financial activities stated above.
“F IU ” means financial intelligence unit.
“Legal arrangem ents” refers to express trusts or other similar legal arrange­
ments.
“Legal p erson s” refers to bodies corporate, foundations, anstalt, partnerships, or 
associations, or any similar bodies that can establish a permanent customer rela­
tionship with a financial institution or otherwise own property.
“Payable-through accounts” refers to correspondent accounts that are used di­
rectly by third parties to transact business on their own behalf.
“Politically  Exposed P ersons” (PEPs) are individuals who are or have been en­
trusted with prominent public functions in a foreign country, for example Heads of 
State or of government, senior politicians, senior government, judicial or military of­
ficials, senior executives of state owned corporations, important political party offi­
cials. Business relationships with family members or close associates of PEPs involve 
reputational risks similar to those with PEPs themselves. The definition is not in­
tended to cover middle ranking or more junior individuals in the foregoing catego­
ries.
82 This applies both to insurance undertakings and to insurance intermediaries (agents and brokers).
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“Shell bank” means a bank incorporated in a jurisdiction in which it has no physi­
cal presence and which is unaffiliated with a regulated financial group.
“STR” refers to suspicious transaction reports.
“Supervisors” refers to the designated competent authorities responsible for en­
suring compliance by financial institutions with requirements to combat money 
laundering and terrorist financing.
“the FATF R ecom m endations” refers to these Recommendations and to the 
FATF Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing.
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ANNEX
INTERPRETATIVE NOTES TO THE FORTY RECOMMENDATIONS 
INTERPRETATIVE NOTES
General
1. Reference in this document to “countries” should be taken to apply equally to “ter­
ritories” or “jurisdictions”.
2. Recommendations 5-16 and 21-22 state that financial institutions or designated 
non-financial businesses and professions should take certain actions. These refer­
ences require countries to take measures that will oblige financial institutions or 
designated non-financial businesses and professions to comply with each Recom­
mendation. The basic obligations under Recommendations 5, 10 and 13 should be 
set out in law or regulation, while more detailed elements in those Recommenda­
tions, as well as obligations under other Recommendations, could be required either 
by law or regulation or by other enforceable means issued by a competent authority.
3. Where reference is made to a financial institution being satisfied as to a matter, 
that institution must be able to justify its assessment to competent authorities.
4. To comply with Recommendations 12 and 16, countries do not need to issue laws 
or regulations that relate exclusively to lawyers, notaries, accountants and the other 
designated non-financial businesses and professions so long as these businesses or 
professions are included in laws or regulations covering the underlying activities.
5. The Interpretative Notes that apply to financial institutions are also relevant to 
designated nonfinancial businesses and professions, where applicable.
Recom m endations 5,12 and 16
The designated thresholds for transactions (under Recommendations 5 and 12) are 
as follows:
• Financial institutions (for occasional customers under Recommendation 5) - 
USD/EUR 15,000.
• Casinos, including internet casinos (under Recommendation 12) - USD/EUR 
3000
• For dealers in precious metals and dealers in precious stones when engaged in 
any cash transaction (under Recommendations 12 and 16) - USD/EUR 15,000.
Financial transactions above a designated threshold include situations where the 
transaction is carried out in a single operation or in several operations that appear to 
be linked.
Recom mendation 5 
Custom er due diligence and tipping o ff
1. If, during the establishment or course of the customer relationship, or when con­
ducting occasional transactions, a financial institution suspects that transactions re­
late to money laundering or terrorist financing, then the institution should:
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a) Normally seek to identify and verify the identity of the customer and the beneficial 
owner, whether permanent or occasional, and irrespective of any exemption or any 
designated threshold that might otherwise apply.
b) Make a STR to the FIU in accordance with Recommendation 13.
2. Recommendation 14 prohibits financial institutions, their directors, officers and 
employees from disclosing the fact that an STR or related information is being re­
ported to the FIU. A risk exists that customers could be unintentionally tipped off 
when the financial institution is seeking to perform its customer due diligence 
(CDD) obligations in these circumstances. The customer’s awareness of a possible 
STR or investigation could compromise future efforts to investigate the suspected 
money laundering or terrorist financing operation.
3. Therefore, if financial institutions form a suspicion that transactions relate to 
money laundering or terrorist financing, they should take into account the risk of 
tipping off when performing the customer due diligence process. If the institution 
reasonably believes that performing the CDD process will tip-off the customer or po­
tential customer, it may choose not to pursue that process, and should file an STR. 
Institutions should ensure that their employees are aware of and sensitive to these 
issues when conducting CDD.
CDD fo r  legal person s and arrangem ents
4. When performing elements (a) and (b) of the CDD process in relation to legal per­
sons or arrangements, financial institutions should:
a) Verify that any person purporting to act on behalf of the customer is so authorised, 
and identify that person.
b) Identify the customer and verify its identity - the types of measures that would be 
normally needed to satisfactorily perform this function would require obtaining proof 
of incorporation or similar evidence of the legal status of the legal person or ar­
rangement, as well as information concerning the customer’s name, the names of 
trustees, legal form, address, directors, and provisions regulating the power to bind 
the legal person or arrangement.
c) Identify the beneficial owners, including forming an understanding of the owner­
ship and control structure, and take reasonable measures to verify the identity of 
such persons. The types of measures that would be normally needed to satisfactorily 
perform this function would require identifying the natural persons with a controlling 
interest and identifying the natural persons who comprise the mind and management 
of the legal person or arrangement. Where the customer or the owner of the control­
ling interest is a public company that is subject to regulatory disclosure requirements, 
it is not necessary to seek to identify and verify the identity of any shareholder of that 
company.
The relevant information or data may be obtained from a public register, from the 
customer or from other reliable sources.
Reliance on identification and verification a lready pe ifo rm ed
5. The CDD measures set out in Recommendation 5 do not imply that financial insti­
tutions have to repeatedly identify and verify the identity of each customer eveiy 
time that a customer conducts a transaction. An institution is entitled to rely on the 
identification and verification steps that it has already undertaken unless it has 
doubts about the veracity of that information. Examples of situations that might lead
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an institution to have such doubts could be where there is a suspicion of money 
laundering in relation to that customer, or where there is a material change in the 
way that the customer’s account is operated which is not consistent with the cus­
tom er’s business profile.
Timing o f  verification
6. Examples of the types of circumstances where it would be permissible for verifica­
tion to be completed after the establishment of the business relationship, because it 
would be essential not to interrupt the normal conduct of business include:
• Non face-to-face business.
• Securities transactions. In the securities industry, companies and intermediaries 
may be required to perform transactions very rapidly, according to the market 
conditions at the time the customer is contacting them, and the performance of 
die transaction may be required before verification of identity is completed.
• Life insurance business. In relation to life insurance business, countries may 
permit the identification and verification of the beneficiary under the policy to 
take place after having established the business relationship with the policy­
holder. However, in all such cases, identification and verification should occur at 
or before the time of payout or the time where the beneficiary intends to exercise 
vested rights under the policy.
7. Financial institutions will also need to adopt risk management procedures with 
respect to the conditions under which a customer may utilise the business relation­
ship prior to verification. These procedures should include a set of measures such as 
a limitation of the number, types and/or amount of transactions that can be per­
formed and the monitoring of large or complex transactions being carried out out­
side of expected norms for that type of relationship. Financial institutions should re­
fer to the Basel CDD paper83 (section 2.2.6.) for specific guidance on examples of 
risk management measures for non-face to face business.
Requirem ent to iden tify existing custom ers
8. The principles set out in the Basel CDD paper concerning the identification of ex­
isting customers should serve as guidance when applying customer due diligence 
processes to institutions engaged in banking activity, and could apply to other finan­
cial institutions where relevant.
Sim plified or reduced CDD m easures
9. The general rule is that customers must be subject to the full range of CDD meas­
ures, including the requirement to identify the beneficial owner. Nevertheless there 
are circumstances where the risk of money laundering or terrorist financing is lower, 
where information on the identity of the customer and the beneficial owner of a cus­
tomer is publicly available, or where adequate checks and controls exist elsewhere in 
national systems. In such circumstances it could be reasonable for a country to allow
83 “Basel CDD paper” refers to the guidance paper on Customer Due Diligence for Banks is­
sued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in October 2001.
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its financial institutions to apply simplified or reduced CDD measures when identi­
fying and verifying the identity of the customer and the beneficial owner.
10. Examples of customers where simplified or reduced CDD measures could apply 
are:
• Financial institutions -  where they are subject to requirements to combat money 
laundering and terrorist financing consistent with the FATF Recommendations 
and are supervised for compliance with those controls.
• Public companies that are subject to regulatoiy disclosure requirements.
• Government administrations or enterprises.
11. Simplified or reduced CDD measures could also apply to the beneficial owners of 
pooled accounts held by designated non financial businesses or professions provided 
that those businesses or professions are subject to requirements to combat money 
laundering and terrorist financing consistent with the FATF Recommendations and 
are subject to effective systems for monitoring and ensuring their compliance with 
those requirements. Banks should also refer to the Basel CDD paper (section 2.2.4.), 
which provides specific guidance concerning situations where an account holding in­
stitution may rely on a customer that is a professional financial intermediary to per­
form the customer due diligence on his or its own customers (i.e. the beneficial own­
ers of the bank account). Where relevant, the CDD Paper could also provide guid­
ance in relation to similar accounts held by other types of financial institutions.
12. Simplified CDD or reduced measures could also be acceptable for various types 
of products or transactions such as (examples only):
13. Countries could also decide whether financial institutions could apply these sim­
plified measures only to customers in its own jurisdiction or allow them to do for 
customers from any other jurisdiction that the original country is satisfied is in com­
pliance with and has effectively implemented the FATF Recommendations.
• Life insurance policies where the annual premium is no more than USD/EUR 
1000 or a single premium of no more than USD/EUR 2500.
• Insurance policies for pension schemes if there is no surrender clause and the 
policy cannot be used as collateral.
• A pension, superannuation or similar scheme that provides retirement benefits 
to employees, where contributions are made by way of deduction from wages 
and the scheme rules do not permit the assignment of a member’s interest under 
the scheme.
Simplified CDD measures are not acceptable whenever there is suspicion of money 
laundering or terrorist financing or specific higher risk scenarios apply.
Recom mendation 6
Countries are encouraged to extend the requirements of Recommendation 6 to individu­
als who hold prominent public functions in their own country.
Recom mendation 9
This Recommendation does not apply to outsourcing or agency relationships.
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This Recommendation also does not apply to relationships, accounts or transactions be­
tween financial institutions for their clients. Those relationships are addressed by Rec­
ommendations 5 and 7.
Recom m endations 10 and 11
In  relation to insurance business, the word “transactions” should be understood to refer 
to  the insurance product itself, the premium payment and the benefits.
Recom mendation 13
1. The reference to criminal activity in Recommendation 13 refers to:
a) all criminal acts that would constitute a predicate offence for money laundering in 
the jurisdiction; or
b) at a minimum to those offences that would constitute a predicate offence as re­
quired by Recommendation 1.
Countries are strongly encouraged to adopt alternative (a). All suspicious transactions, 
including attempted transactions, should be reported regardless of the amount of the 
transaction.
2. In implementing Recommendation 13, suspicious transactions should be reported by 
financial institutions regardless of whether they are also thought to involve tax matters. 
Countries should take into account that, in order to deter financial institutions from re­
porting a suspicious transaction, money launderers may seek to state inter alia that their 
transactions relate to tax matters.
Recom mendation 14 (tipping off)
Where lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals and accountants acting 
as independent legal professionals seek to dissuade a client from engaging in illegal ac­
tivity, this does not amount to tipping off.
Recom mendation 15
The type and extent of measures to be taken for each of the requirements set out in the 
Recommendation should be appropriate having regard to the risk of money laundering 
and terrorist financing and the size of the business.
For financial institutions, compliance management arrangements should include the 
appointment of a compliance officer at the management level.
Recom mendation 16
1. It is for each jurisdiction to determine the matters that would fall under legal professional 
privilege or professional secrecy. This would normally cover information lawyers, notaries or 
other independent legal professionals receive from or obtain through one of their clients: (a) 
in the course of ascertaining the legal position of their client, or (b) in performing their task 
of defending or representing that client in, or concerning judicial, administrative, arbitration 
or mediation proceedings. Where accountants are subject to the same obligations of secrecy 
or privilege, then they are also not required to report suspicious transactions.
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2. Countries may allow lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals and account­
ants to send their STR to their appropriate self-regulatoiy organisations, provided that there 
are appropriate forms of co-operation between these organisations and the FIU.
Recom mendation 19
1. To facilitate detection and monitoring of cash transactions, without impeding in any way 
the freedom of capital movements, countries could consider the feasibility of subjecting all 
cross-border transfers, above a given threshold, to verification, administrative monitoring, 
declaration or record keeping requirements.
2. If a country discovers an unusual international shipment of currency, monetary instru­
ments, precious metals, or gems, etc., it should consider notifying, as appropriate, the Cus­
toms Service or other competent authorities of the countries from which the shipment origi­
nated and/or to which it is destined, and should co-operate with a view toward establishing 
the source, destination, and purpose of such shipment and toward the taking of appropriate 
action.
Recom mendation 23
Recommendation 23 should not be read as to require the introduction of a system of 
regular review of licensing of controlling interests in financial institutions merely for 
anti-money laundering purposes, but as to stress the desirability of suitability review for 
controlling shareholders in financial institutions (banks and non-banks in particular) 
from a FATF point of view. Hence, where shareholder suitability (or “fit and proper”) 
tests exist, the attention of supervisors should be drawn to their relevance for anti- 
money laundering purposes.
Recom mendation 25
When considering the feedback that should be provided, countries should have regard to 
the FATF Best Practice Guidelines on Providing Feedback to Reporting Financial Insti­
tutions and Other Persons.
Recom mendation 26
Where a country has created an FIU, it should consider applying for membership in the 
Egmont Group. Countries should have regard to the Egmont Group Statement of Pur­
pose, and its Principles for Information Exchange Between Financial Intelligence Units 
for Money Laundering Cases. These documents set out important guidance concerning 
the role and functions of FIUs, and the mechanisms for exchanging information between 
FIU.
Recom mendation 27
Countries should consider taking measures, including legislative ones, at the national 
level, to allow their competent authorities investigating money laundering cases to post­
pone or waive the arrest of suspected persons and/or the seizure of the money for the 
purpose of identifying persons involved in such activities or for evidence gathering. 
Without such measures the use of procedures such as controlled deliveries and under­
cover operations are precluded.
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Recom mendation 38
Countries should consider:
a) Establishing an asset forfeiture fund in its respective country into which all or a 
portion of confiscated property will be deposited for law enforcement, health, educa­
tion, or other appropriate purposes.
b) Taking such measures as may be necessary to enable it to share among or between 
other countries confiscated property, in particular, when confiscation is directly or 
indirectly a result of co-ordinated law enforcement actions.
Recom mendation 40
1. For the purposes of this Recommendation:
• “Counterparts” refers to authorities that exercise similar responsibilities and 
functions.
• “Competent authority” refers to all administrative and law enforcement authori­
ties concerned with combating money laundering and terrorist financing, includ­
ing the FIU and supervisors.
2. Depending on the type of competent authority involved and the nature and purpose of the 
cooperation, different channels can be appropriate for the exchange of information. Exam­
ples of mechanisms or channels that are used to exchange information include: bilateral or 
multilateral agreements or arrangements, memoranda of understanding, exchanges on the 
basis of reciprocity, or through appropriate international or regional organisations. However, 
this Recommendation is not intended to cover co-operation in relation to mutual legal assis­
tance or extradition.
3. The reference to indirect exchange of information with foreign authorities other than 
counterparts covers the situation where the requested information passes from the foreign 
authority through one or more domestic or foreign authorities before being received by the 
requesting authority. The competent authority that requests the information should always 
make it clear for what purpose and on whose behalf the request is made.
4. FIUs should be able to make inquiries on behalf of foreign counterparts where this could 
be relevant to an analysis of financial transactions. At a minimum, inquiries should include:
• Searching its own databases, which would include information related to suspi­
cious transaction reports.
• Searching other databases to which it may have direct or indirect access, includ­
ing law enforcement databases, public databases, administrative databases and 
commercially available databases.
Where permitted to do so, FIUs should also contact other competent authorities and finan­
cial institutions in order to obtain relevant information.
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Appendix 4: Kimberley process Certification Scheme
Preamble
PARTICIPANTS,
RECOGNISING that the trade in conflict diamonds is a matter of serious international 
concern, which can be directly linked to the fuelling of armed conflict, the activities of 
rebel movements aimed at undermining or overthrowing legitimate governments, and 
the illicit traffic in, and proliferation of, armaments, especially small arms and light 
weapons;
FURTHER RECOGNISING the devastating impact of conflicts fuelled by the trade in 
conflict diamonds on the peace, safety and security of people in affected countries and 
the systematic and gross human rights violations that have been perpetrated in such 
conflicts;
NOTING the negative impact of such conflicts on regional stability and the obligations 
placed upon states by the United Nations Charter regarding the maintenance of interna­
tional peace and security;
BEARING IN MIND that urgent international action is imperative to prevent the prob­
lem of conflict diamonds from negatively affecting the trade in legitimate diamonds, 
which makes a critical contribution to the economies of many of the producing, process­
ing, exporting and importing states, especially developing states;
RECALLING all of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council under 
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, including the relevant provisions of Resolu­
tions 1173 (1998), 1295 (2000), 1306 (2000), and 1343 (2001), and determined to con­
tribute to and support the implementation of the measures provided for in these resolu­
tions;
HIGHLIGHTING the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 55/56 (2000) on the 
role of the trade in conflict diamonds in fuelling armed conflict, which called on the in­
ternational community to give urgent and careful consideration to devising effective and 
pragmatic measures to address this problem;
FURTHER HIGHLIGHTING the recommendation in United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution 55/56 that the international community develop detailed proposals for a 
simple and workable international certification scheme for rough diamonds based pri­
marily on national certification schemes and on internationally agreed minimum stan­
dards;
RECALLING that the Kimberley Process, which was established to find a solution to the 
international problem of conflict diamonds, was inclusive of concerned stake holders, 
namely producing, exporting and importing states, the diamond industry and civil soci­
ety;
CONVINCED that the opportunity for conflict diamonds to play a role in fuelling armed 
conflict can be seriously reduced by introducing a certification scheme for rough dia­
monds designed to exclude conflict diamonds from the legitimate trade;
RECALLING that the Kimberley Process considered that an international certification 
scheme for rough diamonds, based on national laws and practices and meeting interna­
tionally agreed minimum standards, will be the most effective system by which the prob­
lem of conflict diamonds could be addressed;
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ACKNOWLEDGING the important initiatives already taken to address this problem, in 
particular by the governments of Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea and 
Sierra Leone and by other key producing, exporting and importing countries, as well as 
by the diamond industry, in particular by the World Diamond Council, and by civil soci­
ety;
WELCOMING voluntary self-regulation initiatives announced by the diamond industry 
and recognising that a system of such voluntary self-regulation contributes to ensuring 
an effective internal control system of rough diamonds based upon the international cer­
tification scheme for rough diamonds;
RECOGNISING that an international certification scheme for rough diamonds will only 
be credible if all Participants have established internal systems of control designed to 
eliminate the presence of conflict diamonds in the chain of producing, exporting and 
importing rough diamonds within their own territories, while taking into account that 
differences in production methods and trading practices as well as differences in institu­
tional controls thereof may require different approaches to meet minimum standards;
FURTHER RECOGNISING that the international certification scheme for rough dia­
monds must be consistent with international law governing international trade;
ACKNOWLEDGING that state sovereignty should be fully respected and the principles 
of equality, mutual benefits and consensus should be adhered to;
RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING PROVISIONS:
SECTION I 
D efinitions
For the purposes of the international certification scheme for rough diamonds (hereinaf­
ter referred to as "the Certification Scheme") the following definitions apply:
CONFLICT DIAMONDS means rough diamonds used by rebel movements or their allies 
to finance conflict aimed at undermining legitimate governments, as described in rele­
vant United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions insofar as they remain in ef­
fect, or in other similar UNSC resolutions which may be adopted in the future, and as 
understood and recognised in United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 
55/56, or in other similar UNGA resolutions which maybe adopted in future;
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN means the country where a shipment of rough diamonds has 
been mined or extracted;
COUNTRY OF PROVENANCE means the last Participant from where a shipment of 
rough diamonds was exported, as recorded on import documentation;
DIAMOND means a natural mineral consisting essentially of pure crystallised carbon in 
the isometric system, with a hardness on the Mohs (scratch) scale of 10, a specific gravity 
of approximately 3.52 and a refractive index of 2.42;
EXPORT means the physical leaving/taking out of any part of the geographical territory 
of a Participant;
EXPORTING AUTHORITY means the authority(ies) or body(ies) designated by a Par­
ticipant from whose territory a shipment of rough diamonds is leaving, and which are 
authorised to validate the Kimberley Process Certificate;
FREE TRADE ZONE means a part of the territory of a Participant where any goods in­
troduced are generally regarded, insofar as import duties and taxes are concerned, as be­
ing outside the customs territory;
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IMPORT means the physical entering/bringing into any part of the geographical terri­
tory of a Participant;
IMPORTING AUTHORITY means the authority(ies) or body(ies) designated by a Par­
ticipant into whose territory a shipment of rough diamonds is imported to conduct all 
import formalities and particularly the verification of accompanying Kimberley Process 
Certificates;
KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATE means a forgery resistant document with a par­
ticular format which identifies a shipment of rough diamonds as being in compliance 
with the requirements of the Certification Scheme;
OBSERVER means a representative of civil society, the diamond industry, international 
organisations and non-participating governments invited to take part in Plenary meet­
ings; (Further consultations to be undertaken by the Chair.)
PARCEL means one or more diamonds that are packed together and that are not indi­
vidualised;
PARCEL OF MIXED ORIGIN means a parcel that contains rough diamonds from two or 
more countries of origin, mixed together;
PARTICIPANT means a state or a regional economic integration organisation for which 
the Certification Scheme is effective; (Further consultations to be undertaken by the 
Chair.)
REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION ORGANISATION means an organisation 
comprised of sovereign states that have transferred competence to that organisation in 
respect of matters governed by the Certification Scheme;
ROUGH DIAMONDS means diamonds that are unworked or simply sawn, cleaved or 
bruted and fall under the Relevant Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding 
System 7102.10, 7102.21 and 7102.31;
SHIPMENT means one or more parcels that are physically imported or exported;
TRANSIT means the physical passage across the territory of a Participant or a non- 
Participant, with or without transhipment, warehousing or change in mode of transport, 
when such passage is only a portion of a complete journey beginning and terminating 
beyond the frontier of the Participant or non-Participant across whose territory a ship­
ment passes;
SECTION II 
The Kimberley Process Certificate
Each Participant should ensure that:
(a) a Kimberley Process Certificate (hereafter referred to as the Certificate) accompa­
nies each shipment of rough diamonds on export;
(b) its processes for issuing Certificates meet the minimum standards of the Kimber­
ley Process as set out in Section IV;
(c) Certificates meet the minimum requirements set out in Annex I. As long as these 
requirements are met, Participants may at their discretion establish additional char­
acteristics for their own Certificates, for example their form, additional data or secu­
rity elements;
(d) it notifies all other Participants through the Chair of the features of its Certificate 
as specified in Annex I, for purposes of validation.
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SECTION III
Undertakings in  respect o f the international trade in  rough diam onds
Each Participant should:
(a) with regard to shipments of rough diamonds exported to a Participant, require 
that each such shipment is accompanied by a duly validated Certificate;
(b) with regard to shipments of rough diamonds imported from a Participant:
• require a duly validated Certificate;
• ensure that confirmation of receipt is sent expeditiously to the relevant Export­
ing Authority. The confirmation should as a minimum refer to the Certificate 
number, the number of parcels, the carat weight and the details of the importer 
and exporter;
• require that the original of the Certificate be readily accessible for a period of no 
less than three years;
(c) ensure that no shipment of rough diamonds is imported from or exported to a 
non-Participant;
(d) recognise that Participants through whose territory shipments transit are not re­
quired to meet the requirement of paragraphs (a) and (b) above, and of Section II (a) 
provided that the designated authorities of the Participant through whose territory a 
shipment passes, ensure that the shipment leaves its territory in an identical state as 
it entered its territory (i.e. unopened and not tampered with).
SECTION IV 
Internal Controls 
Undertakings by Participants
Each Participant should:
(a) establish a system of internal controls designed to eliminate the presence of con­
flict diamonds from shipments of rough diamonds imported into and exported from 
its territory;
(b) designate an Importing and an Exporting Authority(ies);
(c) ensure that rough diamonds are imported and exported in tamper resistant con­
tainers;
(d) as required, amend or enact appropriate laws or regulations to implement and en­
force the Certification Scheme and to maintain dissuasive and proportional penalties 
for transgressions;
(e) collect and maintain relevant official production, import and export data, and col­
late and exchange such data in accordance with the provisions of Section V.
(f) when establishing a system of internal controls, take into account, where appro­
priate, the further options and recommendations for internal controls as elaborated 
in Annex II.
Principles o f Industry Self-Regulation
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Participants understand that a voluntary system of industry self-regulation, as referred 
to in the Preamble of this Document, will provide for a system of warranties under­
pinned through verification by independent auditors of individual companies and sup­
ported by internal penalties set by industry, which will help to facilitate the full traceabil- 
ity of rough diamond transactions by government authorities.
Section V 
Co-operation and Transparency
Participants should:
(a) provide to each other through the Chair information identifying their designated 
authorities or bodies responsible for implementing the provisions of this Certification 
Scheme. Each Participant should provide to other Participants through the Chair in­
formation, preferably in electronic format, on its relevant laws, regulations, rules, 
procedures and practices, and update that information as required. This should in­
clude a synopsis in English of the essential content of this information;
(b) compile and make available to all other Participants through the Chair statistical 
data in line with the principles set out in Annex III;
(c) exchange on a regular basis experiences and other relevant information, including 
on self-assessment, in order to arrive at the best practice in given circumstances;
(d) consider favourably requests from other Participants for assistance to improve the 
functioning of the Certification Scheme within their territories;
(e) inform another Participant through the Chair if it considers that the laws, regula­
tions, rules, procedures or practices of that other Participant do not ensure the ab­
sence of conflict diamonds in the exports of that other Participant;
(f) cooperate with other Participants to attempt to resolve problems which may arise 
from unintentional circumstances and which could lead to non-fulfilment of the 
minimum requirements for the issuance or acceptance of the Certificates, and inform 
all other Participants of the essence of the problems encountered and of solutions 
found;
(g) encourage, through their relevant authorities, closer co-operation between law en­
forcement agencies and between customs agencies of Participants.
Section VI 
Adm inistrative Matters 
M eetings
1. Participants and Observers are to meet in Plenary annually, and on other occasions as 
Participants may deem necessary, in order to discuss the effectiveness of the Certifica­
tion Scheme.
2. Participants should adopt Rules of Procedure for such meetings at the first Plenary 
meeting.
3. Meetings are to be held in the country where the Chair is located, unless a Participant 
or an international organisation offers to host a meeting and this offer has been ac­
cepted. The host country should facilitate entry formalities for those attending such 
meetings.
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4. At the end of each Plenary meeting, a Chair would be elected to preside over all Ple- 
naiy meetings, ad hoc working groups and other subsidiary bodies, which might be 
formed until the conclusion of the next annual Plenary meeting.
5. Participants are to reach decisions by consensus. In the event that consensus proves 
to be impossible, the Chair is to conduct consultations.
Adm inistrative support
6. For the effective administration of the Certification Scheme, administrative support 
will be necessary. The modalities and functions of that support should be discussed at 
the first Plenary meeting, following endorsement by the UN General Assembly.
7. Administrative support could include the following functions:
(a) to serve as a channel of communication, information sharing and consultation be­
tween the Participants with regard to matters provided for in this Document;
(b) to maintain and make available for the use of all Participants a collection of those 
laws, regulations, rules, procedures, practices and statistics notified pursuant to Sec­
tion V;
(c) to prepare documents and provide administrative support for Plenary and work­
ing group meetings;
(d) to undertake such additional responsibilities as the Plenary meetings, or any 
working group delegated by Plenary meetings, may instruct.
Participation
8. Participation in the Certification Scheme is open on a global, non-discriminatory basis 
to all Applicants willing and able to fulfill the requirements of that Scheme.
9. Any applicant wishing to participate in the Certification Scheme should signify its in­
terest by notifying the Chair through diplomatic channels. This notification should in­
clude the information set forth in paragraph (a) of Section V and be circulated to all Par­
ticipants within one month.
10. Participants intend to invite representatives of civil society, the diamond industry, 
non-participating governments and international organizations to participate in Plenary 
meetings as Observers.
Participant m easures
11. Participants are to prepare, and make available to other Participants, in advance of 
annual Plenary meetings of the Kimberley Process, information as stipulated in para­
graph (a) of Section V outlining how the requirements of the Certification Scheme are 
being implemented within their respective jurisdictions.
12. The agenda of annual Plenary meetings is to include an item where information as 
stipulated in paragraph (a) of Section V is reviewed and Participants can provide further 
details of their respective systems at the request of the Plenary.
13. Where further clarification is needed, Participants at Plenary meetings, upon rec­
ommendation by the Chair, can identify and decide on additional verification measures 
to be undertaken. Such measures are to be implemented in accordance with applicable 
national and international law. These could include, but need not be limited to meas­
ures such as;
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(a.) requesting additional information and clarification from Participants;
(b.) review missions by other Participants or their representatives where there are 
credible indications of significant non-compliance with the Certification Scheme.
14. Review missions are to be conducted in an analytical, expert and impartial manner 
with the consent of the Participant concerned. The size, composition, terms of reference 
and time-frame of these missions should be based on the circumstances and be estab­
lished by the Chair with the consent of the Participant concerned and in consultation 
with all Participants.
15. A report on the results of compliance verification measures is to be forwarded to the 
Chair and to the Participant concerned within three weeks of completion of the mission. 
Any comments from that Participant as well as the report, are to be posted on the re­
stricted access section of an official Certification Scheme website no later than three 
weeks after the submission of the report to the Participant concerned. Participants and 
Observers should make every effort to observe strict confidentiality regarding the issue 
and the discussions relating to any compliance matter.
Compliance and dispute prevention
16. In the event that an issue regarding compliance by a Participant or any other issue 
regarding the implementation of the Certification Scheme arises, any concerned Partici­
pant may so inform the Chair, who is to inform all Participants without delay about the 
said concern and enter into dialogue on how to address it. Participants and Observers 
should make every effort to observe strict confidentiality regarding the issue and the dis­
cussions relating to any compliance matter.
M odification
17. This document may be modified by consensus of the Participants.
18. Modifications may be proposed by any Participant. Such proposals should be sent in 
writing to the Chair, at least ninety days before the next Plenary meeting, unless other­
wise agreed.
19. The Chair is to circulate any proposed modification expeditiously to all Participants 
and Observers and place it on the agenda of the next annual Plenary meeting.
Review m echanism
20. Participants intend that the Certification Scheme should be subject to periodic re­
view, to allow Participants to conduct a thorough analysis of all elements contained in 
the scheme. The review should also include consideration of the continuing requirement 
for such a scheme, in view of the perception of the Participants, and of international or­
ganisations, in particular the United Nations, of the continued threat posed at that time 
by conflict diamonds. The first such review should take place no later than three years 
after the effective starting date of the Certification Scheme. The review meeting should 
normally coincide with the annual Plenary meeting, unless otherwise agreed.
The start o f the im plem entation o f the Scheme
21. The Certification Scheme should be established at the Ministerial Meeting on the 
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for Rough Diamonds in Interlaken on 5 No­
vember 2002.
368
ANNEXI 
Certificates 
A. M inimum requirem ents for Certificates
A Certificate is to meet the following minimum requirements:
• Each Certificate should bear the title "Kimberley Process Certificate" and the fol­
lowing statement: "The rough diamonds in this shipment have been handled in 
accordance with the provisions of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme 
for rough diamonds"
• Country of origin for shipment of parcels of unmixed (i.e. from the same) origin
• Certificates may be issued in any language, provided that an English translation 
is incorporated
• Unique numbering with the Alpha 2 country code, according to ISO 3166-1
• Tamper and forgery resistant
• Date of issuance
• Date of expiry
• Issuing authority
• Identification of exporter and importer
• Carat weight/mass
• Value in US$
• Number of parcels in shipment
• Relevant Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System
• Validation of Certificate by the Exporting Authority
B. Optional Certificate Elem ents
A Certificate may include the following optional features:
• Characteristics of a Certificate (for example as to form, additional data or secu­
rity elements)
• Quality characteristics of the rough diamonds in the shipment
• A recommended import confirmation part should have the following elements:
Country of destination 
Identification of importer 
Carat/weight and value in US$
Relevant Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System 
Date of receipt by Importing Authority 
Authentication by Importing Authority
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C. Optional Procedures
Rough diamonds may be shipped in transparent security bags. The unique Certificate 
number may be replicated on the container.
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Annex II
Recom mendations as provided for in  Section IV, paragraph (f)
General Recom m endations
1. Participants may appoint an official coordinator(s) to deal with the implementation of 
the Certification Scheme.
2. Participants may consider the utility of complementing and/or enhancing the collec­
tion and publication of the statistics identified in Annex III based on the contents of 
Kimberley Process Certificates.
3. Participants are encouraged to maintain the information and data required by Section 
V on a computerised database.
4. Participants are encouraged to transmit and receive electronic messages in order to 
support the Certification Scheme.
5. Participants that produce diamonds and that have rebel groups suspected of mining 
diamonds within their territories are encouraged to identify the areas of rebel diamond 
mining activity and provide this information to all other Participants. This information 
should be updated on a regular basis.
6. Participants are encouraged to make known the names of individuals or companies 
convicted of activities relevant to the purposes of the Certification Scheme to all other 
Participants through the Chair.
7. Participants are encouraged to ensure that all cash purchases of rough diamonds are 
routed through official banking channels, supported by verifiable documentation.
8. Participants that produce diamonds should analyse their diamond production under 
the following headings:
• Characteristics of diamonds produced
• Actual production
Recom m endations for Control over Diamond M ines
9. Participants are encouraged to ensure that all diamond mines are licensed and to al­
low only those mines so licensed to mine diamonds.
10. Participants are encouraged to ensure that prospecting and mining companies main­
tain effective security standards to ensure that conflict diamonds do not contaminate le­
gitimate production.
Recom m endations for Participants w ith Sm all-scale Diamond Mining
11. All artisinal and informal diamond miners should be licensed and only those persons 
so licensed should be allowed to mine diamonds.
12. Licensing records should contain the following minimum information: name, ad­
dress, nationality and/or residence status and the area of authorised diamond mining 
activity.
Recom m endations for Rough Diamond Buyers, Sellers and Exporters
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13- All diamond buyers, sellers, exporters, agents and courier companies involved in car­
rying rough diamonds should be registered and licensed by each Participant's relevant 
authorities.
14. Licensing records should contain the following minimum information: name, ad­
dress and nationality and/or residence status.
15. All rough diamond buyers, sellers and exporters should be required by law to keep 
for a period of five years daily buying, selling or exporting records listing the names of 
buying or selling clients, their license number and the amount and value of diamonds 
sold, exported or purchased.
16. The information in paragraph 14 above should be entered into a computerised data­
base, to facilitate the presentation of detailed information relating to the activities of in­
dividual rough diamond buyers and sellers.
Recom m endations for Export Processes
17. A exporter should submit a rough diamond shipment to the relevant Exporting Au­
thority.
18. The Exporting Authority is encouraged, prior to validating a Certificate, to require an 
exporter to provide a declaration that the rough diamonds being exported are not con­
flict diamonds.
19. Rough diamonds should be sealed in a tamper proof container together with the Cer­
tificate or a duly authenticated copy. The Exporting Authority should then transmit a 
detailed e-mail message to the relevant Importing Authority containing information on 
the carat weight, value, country of origin or provenance, importer and the serial number 
of the Certificate.
20. The Exporting Authority should record all details of rough diamond shipments on a 
computerised database.
Recom m endations for Import Processes
21. The Importing Authority should receive an e-mail message either before or upon ar­
rival of a rough diamond shipment. The message should contain details such as the 
carat weight, value, country of origin or provenance, exporter and the serial number of 
the Certificate.
22. The Importing Authority should inspect the shipment of rough diamonds to verify 
that the seals and the container have not been tampered with and that the export was 
performed in accordance with the Certification Scheme.
23. The Importing Authority should open and inspect the contents of the shipment to 
verify the details declared on the Certificate.
24. Where applicable and when requested, the Importing Authority should send the re­
turn slip or import confirmation coupon to the relevant Exporting Authority.
25. The Importing Authority should record all details of rough diamond shipments on a 
computerised database.
Recom m endations on Shipm ents to and from  Free Trade Zones
26. Shipments of rough diamonds to and from free trade zones should be processed by 
the designated authorities.
372
Annex III 
Statistics
Recognising that reliable and comparable data on the production and the international 
trade in rough diamonds are an essential tool for the effective implementation of the 
Certification Scheme, and particularly for identifying any irregularities or anomalies 
which could indicate that conflict diamonds are entering the legitimate trade, Partici­
pants strongly support the following principles, taking into account the need to protect 
commercially sensitive information:
(a) to keep and publish within two months of the reference period and in a standard­
ised format, quarterly aggregate statistics on rough diamond exports and imports, as 
well as the numbers of certificates validated for export, and of imported shipments 
accompanied by Certificates;
(b) to keep and publish statistics on exports and imports, by origin and provenance 
wherever possible; by carat weight and value; and under the relevant Harmonised 
Commodity Description and Coding System (HS) classifications 7102.10; 7102.21; 
7102.31;
(c) to keep and publish on a semi-annual basis and within two months of the refer­
ence period statistics on rough diamond production by carat weight and by value. In 
the event that a Participant is unable to publish these statistics it should notify the 
Chair immediately;
(d) to collect and publish these statistics by relying in the first instance on existing 
national processes and methodologies;
(e) to make these statistics available to an intergovernmental body or to another ap­
propriate mechanism identified by the Participants for (1) compilation and publica­
tion on a quarterly basis in respect of exports and imports, and (2) on a semi-annual 
basis in respect of production. These statistics are to be made available for analysis 
by interested parties and by the Participants, individually or collectively, according to 
such terms of reference as may be established by the Participants;
(f) to consider statistical information pertaining to the international trade in and 
production of rough diamonds at annual Plenary meetings, with a view to addressing 
related issues, and to supporting effective implementation of the Certification 
Scheme.
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Appendix 5: Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat 
and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light 
Weapons in All Its Aspects
I. Preamble
1. We, the States participating in the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in 
Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, having met in New York from 9 to 20 
July 2001,
2. Gravely concerned about the illicit manufacture, transfer and circulation of small 
arms and light weapons and their excessive accumulation and uncontrolled spread in 
many regions of the world, which have a wide range of humanitarian and socio­
economic consequences and pose a serious threat to peace, reconciliation, safety, secu­
rity, stability and sustainable development at the individual, local, national, regional and 
international levels,
3. Concerned also by the implications that poverty and underdevelopment may have for 
the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects,
4. Determined to reduce the human suffering caused by the illicit trade in small arms 
and light weapons in all its aspects and to enhance the respect for life and the dignity of 
the human person through the promotion of a culture of peace,
5. Recognizing that the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects sus­
tains conflicts, exacerbates violence, contributes to the displacement of civilians, under­
mines respect for international humanitarian law, impedes the provision of humanitar­
ian assistance to victims of armed conflict and fuels crime and terrorism,
6. Gravely concerned about its devastating consequences on children, many of whom 
are victims of armed conflict or are forced to become child soldiers, as well as the nega­
tive impact on women and the elderly, and in this context, taking into account the spe­
cial session of the United Nations General Assembly on children,
7. Concerned also about the close link between terrorism, organized crime, trafficking in 
drugs and precious minerals and the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, and 
stressing the urgency of international efforts and cooperation aimed at combating this 
trade simultaneously from both a supply and demand perspective,
8. Reaffirming our respect for and commitment to international law and the purposes 
and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, including the sovereign 
equality of States, territorial integrity, the peaceful resolution of international disputes, 
non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States,
9. Reaffirming the inherent right to individual or collective self-defence in accordance 
with
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations,
10. Reaffirming also the right of each State to manufacture, import and retain small 
arms and light weapons for its self-defence and security needs, as well as for its capacity 
to participate in peacekeeping operations in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations,
11. Reaffirming the right of self-determination of all peoples, taking into account the 
particular situation of peoples under colonial or other forms of alien domination or for­
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eign occupation, and recognizing the right of peoples to take legitimate action in accor­
dance with the Charter of the United Nations to realize their inalienable right of self- 
determination. This shall not be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action that 
would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity 
of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the prin­
ciple of equal rights and self-determination of peoples,
12. Recalling the obligations of States to fully comply with arms embargoes decided by 
the United Nations Security Council in accordance with the Charter of the United Na­
tions,
13. Believing that Governments bear the primary responsibility for preventing, combat­
ing and eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects and, 
accordingly, should intensify their efforts to define the problems associated with such 
trade and find ways of resolving them,
14. Stressing the urgent necessity for international cooperation and assistance, including 
financial and technical assistance, as appropriate, to support and facilitate efforts at the 
local, national, regional and global levels to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit 
trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects,
15. Recognizing that the international community has a duty to deal with this issue, and 
acknowledging that the challenge posed by the illicit trade in small arms and light weap­
ons in all its aspects is multi-faceted and involves, inter alia, security, conflict prevention 
and resolution, crime prevention, humanitarian, health and development dimensions,
16. Recognizing also the important contribution of civil society, including non­
governmental organizations and industry in, inter aha, assisting Governments to pre­
vent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its as­
pects,
17. Recognizing further that these efforts are without prejudice to the priorities accorded 
to nuclear disarmament, weapons of mass destruction and conventional disarmament,
18. Welcoming the efforts being undertaken at the global, regional, subregional, national 
and local levels to address the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its as­
pects, and desiring to build upon them, taking into account the characteristics, scope 
and magnitude of the problem in each State or region,
19. Recalling the Millennium Declaration and also welcoming ongoing initiatives in the 
context of the United Nations to address the problem of the illicit trade in small arms 
and light weapons in all its aspects,
20. Recognizing that the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in 
Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Na­
tions Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, establishes standards and 
procedures that complement and reinforce efforts to prevent, combat and eradicate the 
illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects,
21. Convinced of the need for a global commitment to a comprehensive approach to 
promote, at the global, regional, subregional, national and local levels, the prevention, 
reduction and eradication of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its 
aspects as a contribution to international peace and security,
22. Resolve therefore to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and 
light weapons in all its aspects by:
(a) Strengthening or developing agreed norms and measures at the global, regional 
and national levels that would reinforce and further coordinate efforts to prevent, 
combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its as­
pects;
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(b) Developing and implementing agreed international measures to prevent, combat 
and eradicate illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in small arms and light weap­
ons;
(c) Placing particular emphasis on the regions of the world where conflicts come to an 
end and where serious problems with the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of 
small arms and light weapons have to be dealt with urgently;
(d) Mobilizing the political will throughout the international community to prevent 
and combat illicit transfers and manufacturing of small arms and light weapons in all 
their aspects, to cooperate towards these ends and to raise awareness of the character 
and seriousness of the interrelated problems associated with the illicit manufacturing 
of and trafficking in these weapons;
(e) Promoting responsible action by States with a view to preventing the illicit export, 
import, transit and retransfer of small arms and light weapons.
II. Preventing, com bating and eradicating the illicit trade in  sm all arms and
light weapons in  all its aspects
l. We, the States participating in this Conference, bearing in mind the different situa­
tions, capacities and priorities of States and regions, undertake the following measures 
to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all 
its aspects:
At the national level
2. To put in place, where they do not exist, adequate laws, regulations and administra­
tive procedures to exercise effective control over the production of small arms and light 
weapons within their areas of jurisdiction and over the export, import, transit or retrans­
fer of such weapons, in order to prevent illegal manufacture of and illicit trafficking in 
small arms and light weapons, or their diversion to unauthorized recipients.
3. To adopt and implement, iji the States that have not already done so, the necessary 
legislative or other measures to establish as criminal offences under their domestic law 
the illegal manufacture, possession, stockpiling and trade of small arms and light weap­
ons within their areas of jurisdiction, in order to ensure that those engaged in such ac­
tivities can be prosecuted under appropriate national penal codes.
4. To establish, or designate as appropriate, national coordination agencies or bodies 
and institutional infrastructure responsible for policy guidance, research and monitoring 
of efforts to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weap­
ons in all its aspects. This should include aspects of the illicit manufacture, control, traf­
ficking, circulation, brokering and trade, as well as tracing, finance, collection and de­
struction of small arms and light weapons.
5. To establish or designate, as appropriate, a national point of contact to act as liaison 
between States on matters relating to the implementation of the Programme of Action.
6. To identify, where applicable, groups and individuals engaged in the illegal manufac­
ture, trade, stockpiling, transfer, possession, as well as financing for acquisition, of illicit 
small arms and light weapons, and take action under appropriate national law against 
such groups and individuals.
7. To ensure that henceforth licensed manufacturers apply an appropriate and reliable 
marking on each small arm and light weapon as an integral part of the production proc­
ess. This marking should be unique and should identify the country of manufacture and 
also provide information that enables the national authorities of that country to identify
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the manufacturer and serial number so that the authorities concerned can identify and 
trace each weapon.
8. To adopt where they do not exist and enforce, all the necessary measures to prevent 
the manufacture, stoclqriling, transfer and possession of any unmarked or inadequately 
marked small arms and light weapons.
9. To ensure that comprehensive and accurate records are kept for as long as possible on 
the manufacture, holding and transfer of small arms and light weapons under their ju ­
risdiction. These records should be organized and maintained in such a way as to ensure 
that accurate information can be promptly retrieved and collated by competent national 
authorities.
10. To ensure responsibility for all small arms and light weapons held and issued by the 
State and effective measures for tracing such weapons.
11. To assess applications for export authorizations according to strict national regula­
tions and procedures that cover all small arms and light weapons and are consistent with 
the existing responsibilities of States under relevant international law, taking into ac­
count in particular the risk of diversion of these weapons into the illegal trade. Likewise, 
to establish or maintain an effective national system of export and import licensing or 
authorization, as well as measures on international transit, for the transfer of all small 
arms and light weapons, with a view to combating the illicit trade in small arms and light 
weapons.
12 To put in place and implement adequate laws, regulations and administrative proce­
dures to ensure the effective control over the export and transit of small arms and light 
weapons, including the use of authenticated end-user certificates and effective legal and 
enforcement measures.
13. To make every effort, in accordance with national laws and practices, without preju­
dice to the right of States to re-export small arms and light weapons that they have pre­
viously imported, to notify the original exporting State in accordance with their bilateral 
agreements before the retransfer of those weapons.
14. To develop adequate national legislation or administrative procedures regulating the 
activities of those who engage in small arms and light weapons brokering. This legisla­
tion or procedures should include measures such as registration of brokers, licensing or 
authorization of brokering transactions as well as the appropriate penalties for all illicit 
brokering activities performed within the State's jurisdiction and control.
15. To take appropriate measures, including all legal or administrative means, against 
any activity that violates a United Nations Security Council arms embargo in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations.
16. To ensure that all confiscated, seized or collected small arms and light weapons are 
destroyed, subject to any legal constraints associated with the preparation of criminal 
prosecutions, unless another form of disposition or use has been officially authorized 
and provided that such weapons have been duly marked and registered.
17. To ensure, subject to the respective constitutional and legal systems of States, that 
the armed forces, police or any other body authorized to hold small arms and light 
weapons establish adequate and detailed standards and procedures relating to the man­
agement and security of their stocks of these weapons. These standards and procedures 
should, inter alia, relate to: appropriate locations for stockpiles; physical security meas­
ures; control of access to stocks; inventory management and accounting control; staff 
training; security, accounting and control of small arms and light weapons held or 
transported by operational units or authorized personnel; and procedures and sanctions 
in the event of thefts or loss.
18. To regularly review, as appropriate, subject to the respective constitutional and legal 
systems of States, the stocks of small arms and light weapons held by armed forces, po­
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lice and other authorized bodies and to ensure that such stocks declared by competent 
national authorities to be surplus to requirements are clearly identified, that pro­
grammes for the responsible disposal, preferably through destruction, of such stocks are 
established and implemented and that such stocks are adequately safeguarded until dis­
posal.
19. To destroy surplus small arms and light weapons designated for destruction, taking 
into account, inter alia, the report of the Secretaiy-General of the United Nations on 
methods of destruction of small arms, light weapons, ammunition and explosives 
(S/2000/1092) of 15 November 2000.
20. To develop and implement, including in conflict and post-conflict situations, public 
awareness and confidence-building programmes on the problems and consequences of 
the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, including, where ap­
propriate, the public destruction of surplus weapons and the voluntary surrender of 
small arms and light weapons, if possible, in cooperation with civil society and non­
governmental organizations, with a view to eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and 
light weapons.
21. To develop and implement, where possible, effective disarmament, demobilization 
and reintegration programmes, including the effective collection, control, storage and 
destruction of small arms and light weapons, particularly in post-conflict situations, 
unless another form of disposition or use has been duly authorized and such weapons 
have been marked and the alternate form of disposition or use has been recorded, and to 
include, where applicable, specific provisions for these programmes in peace agree­
ments.
22. To address the special needs of children affected by armed conflict, in particular the 
reunification with their family, their reintegration into civil society, and their appropri­
ate rehabilitation.
23. To make public national laws, regulations and procedures that impact on the preven­
tion, combating and eradicating of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all 
its aspects and to submit, on a voluntary basis, to relevant regional and international or­
ganizations and in accordance with their national practices, information on, inter alia,
(a) small arms and light weapons confiscated or destroyed within their jurisdiction; and
(b) other relevant information such as illicit trade routes and techniques of acquisition 
that can contribute to the eradication of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons 
in all its aspects.
At the regional level
24. To establish or designate, as appropriate, a point of contact within subregional and 
regional organizations to act as liaison on matters relating to the implementation of the 
Programme of Action.
25. To encourage negotiations, where appropriate, with the aim of concluding relevant 
legally binding instruments aimed at preventing, combating and eradicating the illicit 
trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, and where they do exist to ratify 
and fully implement them.
26. To encourage the strengthening and establishing, where appropriate and as agreed 
by the States concerned, of moratoria or similar initiatives in affected regions or subre­
gions on the transfer and manufacture of small arms and light weapons, and/or regional 
action programmes to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and 
light weapons in all its aspects, and to respect such moratoria, similar initiatives, and/or 
action programmes and cooperate with the States concerned in the implementation 
thereof, including through technical assistance and other measures.
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27. To establish, where appropriate, subregional or regional mechanisms, in particular 
trans-border customs cooperation and networks for information-sharing among law en­
forcement, border and customs control agencies, with a view to preventing, combating 
and eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons across borders.
28. To encourage, where needed, regional and subregional action on illicit trade in small 
arms and light weapons in all its aspects in order to, as appropriate, introduce, adhere, 
implement or strengthen relevant laws, regulations and administrative procedures.
29. To encourage States to promote safe, effective stockpile management and security, in 
particular physical security measures, for small arms and light weapons, and to imple­
ment, where appropriate, regional and subregional mechanisms in this regard.
30. To support, where appropriate, national disarmament, demobilization and reinte­
gration programmes, particularly in post-conflict situations, with special reference to the 
measures agreed upon in paragraphs 28 to 31 of this section.
31. To encourage regions to develop, where appropriate and on a voluntary basis, meas­
ures to enhance transparency with a view to combating the illicit trade in small arms and 
light weapons in all its aspects.
At the global level
32. To cooperate with the United Nations system to ensure the effective implementation 
of arms embargoes decided by the United Nations Security Council in accordance with 
the Charter of the United Nations.
33. To request the Secretary-General of the United Nations, within existing resources, 
through the Department for Disarmament Affairs, to collate and circulate data and in­
formation provided by States on a voluntary basis and including national reports, on im­
plementation by those States of the Programme of Action.
34. To encourage, particularly in post-conflict situations, the disarmament and demobi­
lization of ex-combatants and their subsequent reintegration into civilian life, including 
providing support for the effective disposition, as stipulated in paragraph 17 of this sec­
tion, of collected small arms and light weapons.
35. To encourage the United Nations Security Council to consider, on a case-by-case ba­
sis, the inclusion, where applicable, of relevant provisions for disarmament, demobiliza­
tion and reintegration in the mandates and budgets of peacekeeping operations.
36. To strengthen the ability of States to cooperate in identifying and tracing in a timely 
and reliable manner illicit small arms and light weapons.
37. To encourage States and the World Customs Organization, as well as other relevant 
organizations, to enhance cooperation with the International Criminal Police Organiza­
tion (Interpol) to identify those groups and individuals engaged in the illicit trade in 
small arms and light weapons in all its aspects in order to allow national authorities to 
proceed against them in accordance with their national laws.
38. To encourage States to consider ratifying or acceding to international legal instru­
ments against terrorism and transnational organized crime.
39. To develop common understandings of the basic issues and the scope of the prob­
lems related to illicit brokering in small arms and light weapons with a view to prevent­
ing, combating and eradicating the activities of those engaged in such brokering.
40. To encourage the relevant international and regional organizations and States to fa­
cilitate the appropriate cooperation of civil society, including non-governmental organi­
zations, in activities related to the prevention, combat and eradication of the illicit trade
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in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, in view of the important role that civil 
society plays in this area.
41. To promote dialogue and a culture of peace by encouraging, as appropriate, educa­
tion and public awareness programmes on the problems of the illicit trade in small arms 
and light weapons in all its aspects, involving all sectors of society.
III. Im plem entation, international cooperation and assistance
1. We, the States participating in the Conference, recognize that the primary responsibil­
ity for solving the problems associated with the illicit trade in small arms and light 
weapons in all its aspects falls on all States. We also recognize that States need close in­
ternational cooperation to prevent, combat and eradicate this illicit trade.
2. States undertake to cooperate and to ensure coordination, complementarity and syn­
ergy in efforts to deal with the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its as­
pects at the global, regional, subregional and national levels and to encourage the estab­
lishment and strengthening of cooperation and partnerships at all levels among interna­
tional and intergovernmental organizations and civil society, including non­
governmental organizations and international financial institutions.
3. States and appropriate international and regional organizations in a position to do so 
should, upon request of the relevant authorities, seriously consider rendering assistance, 
including technical and financial assistance where needed, such as small arms funds, to 
support the implementation of the measures to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit 
trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects as contained in the Programme 
of Action.
4. States and international and regional organizations should, upon request by the af­
fected States, consider assisting and promoting conflict prevention. Where requested by 
the parties concerned, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Na­
tions, States and international and regional organizations should consider promotion 
and assistance of the pursuit of negotiated solutions to conflicts, including by addressing 
their root causes.
5. States and international and regional organizations should, where appropriate, coop­
erate, develop and strengthen partnerships to share resources and information on the il­
licit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects.
6. With a view to facilitating implementation of the Programme of Action, States and in­
ternational and regional organizations should seriously consider assisting interested 
States, upon request, in building capacities in areas including the development of appro­
priate legislation and regulations, law enforcement, tracing and marking, stockpile man­
agement and security, destruction of small arms and light weapons and the collection 
and exchange of information.
7. States should, as appropriate, enhance cooperation, the exchange of experience and 
training among competent officials, including customs, police, intelligence and arms 
control officials, at the national, regional and global levels in order to combat the illicit 
trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects.
8. Regional and international programmes for specialist training on small arms stockpile 
management and security should be developed. Upon request, States and appropriate 
international or regional organizations in a position to do so should support these pro­
grammes. The United Nations, within existing resources, and other appropriate interna­
tional or regional organizations should consider developing capacity for training in this 
area.
9. States are encouraged to use and support, as appropriate, including by providing rele­
vant information on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, Interpol's Interna­
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tional Weapons and Explosives Tracking System database or any other relevant database 
that may be developed for this purpose.
10. States are encouraged to consider international cooperation and assistance to exam­
ine technologies that would improve the tracing and detection of illicit trade in small 
arms and light weapons, as well as measures to facilitate the transfer of such technolo­
gies.
11. States undertake to cooperate with each other, including on the basis of the relevant 
existing global and regional legally binding instruments as well as other agreements and 
arrangements, and, where appropriate, with relevant international, regional and inter­
governmental organizations, in tracing illicit small arms and light weapons, in particular 
by strengthening mechanisms based on the exchange of relevant information.
12. States are encouraged to exchange information on a voluntary basis on their national 
marking systems on small arms and light weapons.
13. States are encouraged, subject to their national practices, to enhance, according to 
their respective constitutional and legal systems, mutual legal assistance and other 
forms of cooperation in order to assist investigations and prosecutions in relation to the 
illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects.
14. Upon request, States and appropriate international or regional organizations in a po­
sition to do so should provide assistance in the destruction or other responsible disposal 
of surplus stocks or unmarked or inadequately marked small arms and light weapons.
15. Upon request, States and appropriate international or regional organizations in a po­
sition to do so should provide assistance to combat the illicit trade in small arms and 
light weapons linked to drug trafficking, transnational organized crime and terrorism.
16. Particularly in post-conflict situations, and where appropriate, the relevant regional 
and international organizations should support, within existing resources, appropriate 
programmes related to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex­
combatants.
17. With regard to those situations, States should make, as appropriate, greater efforts to 
address problems related to human and sustainable development, taking into account 
existing and future social and developmental activities, and should fully respect the 
rights of the States concerned to establish priorities in their development programmes.
18. States, regional and subregional and international organizations, research centres, 
health and medical institutions, the United Nations system, international financial insti­
tutions and civil society are urged, as appropriate, to develop and support action- 
oriented research aimed at facilitating greater awareness and better understanding of 
the nature and scope of the problems associated with the illicit trade in small arms and 
light weapons in all its aspects.
IV. Follow-up to the United N ations Conference on the Illicit Trade in  Sm all 
Arms and Light W eapons in All Its Aspects
1. We, the States participating in the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in 
Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, recommend to the General Assembly 
the following agreed steps to be undertaken for the effective follow-up of the Confer­
ence:
(a) To convene a conference no later than 2006 to review progress made in the im­
plementation of the Programme of Action, the date and venue to be decided at the 
fifty-eighth session of the General Assembly;
(b) To convene a meeting of States on a biennial basis to consider the national, re­
gional and global implementation of the Programme of Action;
3 8 i
(c) To undertake a United Nations study, within existing resources, for examining the 
feasibility of developing an international instrument to enable States to identify and 
trace in a timely and reliable manner illicit small arms and light weapons;
(d) To consider further steps to enhance international cooperation in preventing, 
combating and eradicating illicit brokering in small arms and light weapons.
2. Finally, we, the States participating in the United Nations Conference on the Illicit 
Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects:
(a) Encourage the United Nations and other appropriate international and regional 
organizations to undertake initiatives to promote the implementation of the Pro­
gramme of Action;
(b) Also encourage all initiatives to mobilize resources and expertise to promote the 
implementation of the Programme of Action and to provide assistance to States in 
their implementation of the Programme of Action;
(c) Further encourage non-governmental organizations and civil society to engage, as 
appropriate, in all aspects of international, regional, subregional and national efforts 
to implement the present Programme of Action.
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Acronyms
AJIL American Journal of International Law
AML/CTF Anti-money laundering /  Counterterrorist finance
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
APG Asia/Pacific Group Against Money Laundering
ARS Alternative remittance systems
Art. Article
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ATS Amphetamine-type stimulants
AUC Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia
BCCI Bank of Commerce and Credit International
BICC Bonn Center for Conversion
CDI Center for Defense Information
CETS Council of Europe Treaty Series
CFATF Caribbean Financial Action Task Force
CHIPS Clearing House for International Payments System
CIA US Central Intelligence Agency
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
CITES Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
CMO Comprehensive Multidisciplinary Outline of Future Activities in
Drug Abused Control
CND UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs
CoE Council of Europe
COMTRADE UN Commodity Trade Statistics Database
CSIS Center for Strategic and International Studies
CTR Cash Transaction Reports
DALY Disability-adjusted life years
DDA United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs
DDR Disarmament, demobilisation and Reintegration
DEA US Drug Enforcement Administration
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
EAG Eurasia Group on combating money laundering and financing of ter­
rorism
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ECOSOC UN Economic and Social Council
ECOWAS Economic Community of Western African States
ECPAT End Child Prostitution in Asian Tourism
EEC European Economic Community
e.g. exempli gratia [for example]
Endiama Empresa Nacional de Diamantes de Angola
ESAAMLG Eastern and Southern African Anti-Money Laundering Group
ETS European Treaty Series
FARC Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
FATF Financial Action Task Force
f.e. for example
FIU Financial Intelligence Unit
FinCEN US Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network
FMNLF Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front
FSRB FATF-Style Regional Bodies
GAFISUD Grupo de Action Financiera International sobre lavado de dinero de
America del Sur (FSRB covering South America)
GAO Government Accountability Office
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GBP British Pound Sterling
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GIABA Groupe Inter-gouvememental d’Action contre le Blanchiment en
Afrique (FSRB covering Africa)
GRIP Groupe de recherche et d'information sur la paix et la securite
GSN Global Survival Network
ha Hectare
HIV Human immunodeficiency virus
HM Her Majesty’s
HRD Hoge Raad voor Diamant [Antwerp High Diamond Council]
HSBC Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited
IANSA International Action Network on Small Arms
ICBL International Campaign to Ban Landmines
ICJ International Court of Justice
IDMA International Diamond Manufacturers Association
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i.e. id est [that is]
IFAC International Federation of Accountants
IL International Law
IMF International Monetary Fund
IMoLin UN International Money Laundering Information Network
INCB International Narcotics Control Board
Interpol International Criminal Police Organization
IPE International Political Economy
IR International Relations
ISS South African Institute for Security Studies
Kg Kilogramme
KP Kimberley Process
KPCS Kimberley Process Certification Scheme
Lit Litera
LoN League of Nations
LSD Lysergic acid diethylamide
LLTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MANPAD Man-portable air defence systems
MDMA Methylenedioxymethamphetamine
MENAFATF Financial Action Task Force for the Middle East and North Africa
Moneyval CoE Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money
Laundering Measures
MPLA Movimento Popular para a Libertagao de Angola
NAFTA North American Free Trade Association
NCCT Non-cooperative countries and territories
NGO Non-governmental organization
NISAT Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms
No Number
NRA National Rifle Association
NZZ Neue Ziircher Zeitung
OAS Organisation of American States
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation in Europe
OGBS Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors
OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
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OPEC Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PAC Partnership Africa Canada
Para Paragraph
PCOB Permanent Central Opium Board
PDD Presidential Decision Directive
PoA Program of Action
RoC Republic of Congo (Congo-Brazzaville)
RUF Revolutionary United Front
SADC Southern African Development Community
SALW Small Arms and Light Weapons
SAS Small Arms Survey
SSRC Social Science Research Council
STR Suspicious transaction reports
Swift Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication
TCE Transaction cost economics theory
THC Ag-tetra hydro-cannabinol
TI Transparency International
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
UNAMSIL United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNDCP UN International Drug Control Programme
UNESCOR Unite Nations Economic and Social Council Resolution
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
UNHRC United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNITA Uniao National para a Independencia Total de Angola
UNIDIR United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNSC United Nations Security Council
UNTS United Nations Treaty Series
US United States, interchangeably used for United States of America
USA United States of America
US$ US Dollars
VCLT Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties
WFDB World Federation of Diamond Bourses
WHO
WTO
World Health Organisation 
World Trade Organisation
387
References
Abbott, Kenneth W. 2000. The Nafta and the Legalization of World Politics: A Case 
Study. International Organization 54 (3):5i9-48.
Abbott, Kenneth W., Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and 
Duncan Snidal. 2000. The Concept of Legalization. International Organization 
5 4  (3 ):4 0 1 -4 1 9 -
Abbott, Kenneth W., and Duncan Snidal. 1998. Why States Act through Formal Interna­
tional Organizations. The Journal o f Conflict Resolution 42 (1)13-32.
Abbott, Kenneth W., and Duncan Snidal. 2000. Hard and Soft Law in International 
Governance. International Organization 54 (3)1421-456.
Abbott, Kenneth W., and Duncan Snidal. 2004. Pathways to International Cooperation. 
In The Impact o f International Law on International Cooperation: Theoretical 
Perspectives, edited by E. Benvenisti and M. Hirsch. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
AJIL. 2001. Un Conference on Illicit Trade in Small Arms. The American Journal o f In­
ternational Law  95 (4):801-903.
Allison, Graham, and Philip Zelikow. 1999. Essence o f Decision. Explaining the Cuban 
Missile Crisis. 2nd ed. New York: Longman.
Alter, Karen J. 1998a. Who Are the "Masters of the Treaty?": The European Govern­
ments and the European Court of Justice. International Organization 52 
(l):i2 i- l4 7 .
American Museum of Natural Histoiy. 2005. The Nature o f Diamonds 2004 [cited 30 
May 2005]. Available from http://www.amnh.org/exhibitions/diamonds/ 
types.html.
Anderson, Erin, and David C. Schmittlein. 1984. Integration of the Sales Force: An Em­
pirical Examination. Rand Journal o f Economics 15 (3):385~395.
Andreas, Peter, and Eva Bertram. 1992. From Cold War to Drug War. In Paradigms 
Lost: The Post Cold War Era, edited by C. Hartman and P. Vilanova. London: 
Pluto Press.
Annan, Kofi A. 1999. Facing the Humanitarian Challenge: Towards a Culture of Preven­
tion (UN/SG/2358).
Apter, David Ernest. 1997. Politcial Violence in Analytical Perspective. In The Legitimi­
zation o f Violence, edited by D. E. Apter. New York, NY: New York University 
Press.
Ashworth, Andrew. 2003. Principles o f Criminal Law. 4th ed. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
388
Atkins, Andrew. 1997. The Economic and Political Impact of the Drug Trade and Drug 
Control Policies in Bolivia. In Latin America and the Multinational Drug
Trade, edited by E. Joyce and C. Malamud. New York, NY: St. Martin's Press.
Aust, Anthony. 2000. M odem Treaty Law and Practice. New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press.
Bagley, Bruce M. 1988. Colombia and the War on Drugs. Foreign Affairs 67:70-92.
Bagley, Bruce M. 1992. Myths of Militarization: Enlisting Armed Forces in the War on 
Drugs. In Dmg Policy in the Americas, edited by P. H. Smith. Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press.
Baker, Estella. 2003. The Legal Regulation of Transnational Organised Crime. In Trans­
national Organised Crime: Perspectives on Global Security, edited by A  Ed­
wards and P. Gill. London and New York, NY: Routledge.
Balakrishnan, S., and B. Wemerfelt. 1986. Asset Specificity, Firm Heterogeneity, and 
Capital Structure. Strategic Management Journal 7:347-359.
Ballentine, Karen, and Heiko Nitzschke. 2005. The Political Economy of Civil War and 
Conflict Transformation: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict 
Management.
Ballentine, Karen, and Jake H. Sherman, eds. 2003. The Political Economy o f Armed 
Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Barnard, Chester. 1938. The Functions o f the Executive. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni­
versity Press.
Barro, Robert, and David Gordon. 1983. A Positive Theory of Modem Policy in a Natural 
Rate Model. Journal o f Political Economy 91:589-610.
Barzel, Yoram. 1997. Economic Analysis o f Property Rights. 2nd edition ed. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Basedau, Matthias. Context Matters -  Rethinking the Resource Curse in Sub-Saharan 
Africa May 2005 [cited. Available from http://www.duei.de/iak/de/content/ 
aktuelles/pdf/WPiBasedau.pdf.
Bassiouni, M. Cherif, and Francois Thony. 1999. The International Dmg Control System. 
In International Criminal Law, edited by M. C. Bassiouni. Ardsley, N.Y.: Trans­
national Publishers.
Bawn, Kathleen. 1995. Political Control Versus Expertise: Congressional Choices About 
Administrative Procedures. American Political Science Review 89 (i):62-73.
Beare, Margaret E. 2005. Critique o f a Compliance-Driven Enforcement Strategy: 
Money Laundering and the Financial Sector 2001 [cited 15 June 2005]. Avail­
able from http://www.transparency.ca/Reports/
BankingEthicsPaper_MargaretBeare.PDF.
389
Beare, Margaret E., and Stephen Schneider. 1990. Tracing o f Illicit Funds: Money 
Laundering in Canada. Ottawa: Ministry of the Solicitor General of Canada.
Becker, David C. 2005. Morphing War: Counter-Narcotics, Counter-Insurgency, and 
Counter-Terrorism Doctrine in Colombia 2004 [cited February 11 2005]. Avail­
able from http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2004solic/beck.pdf.
Bentham, Mandy. 1998. The Politics o f Drug Control. Basingstoke and London: Macmil­
lan Press.
Berdal, Mats. 2003. How 'New' Are 'New Wars' ? Global Economic Change and the 
Study of Civil Wars. Global Governance 9 (4):477~502.
Bewley-Taylor, David R. 1999. The United States and International Drug Control, 1907- 
1997. London and New York: Pinter.
Bierley, James L. 1963. Law o f Nations. 6th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Biting the Bullet. 2005. International Action on Small Arms 2005: Examining Imple­
mentation of the Un Program of Action.
Block, Alan A. 1992. Failures at Home and Abroad: Studies in the Implementation of 
U.S. Drug Policy. In War on Drugs: Studies in the Failure o f U.S. Narcotic Pol­
icy, edited by A. W. McCoy and A. A. Block. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Blum, Jack A., Michael Levi, R.Thomas Naylor, and Phil Williams. 1998. Financial Ha­
vens, Banking Secrecy and Money Laundering, edited by U. N. O. o. D. C. a. C. 
Prevention. Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs Control and Crime Preven­
tion.
Boaz, David. 1991. The Consequences of Prohibition. In The Crisis in Drug Prohibition, 
edited by D. Boaz. Washington, DC: Cato Institute.
Bobrow, David B., and John S. Dryzek. 1987. Policy Analysis by Design. Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press.
Boemer, Christopher S., and Jeffrey T. Macher. 2001. Transaction Cost Economics: An 
Assessment of Empirical Research in the Social Sciences.
Bolkcom, Christopher , Andrew Feickert, and Bartholomew Elias. 2004. Homeland Se­
curity: Protecting Airliners from Terrorist Missiles. Washington, DC: Congres­
sional Research Service.
Braithwaite, John, and Peter Drahos. 2000. Global Business Regulation. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair 
Smith. 1999. Policy Failure and Political Survival. Journal o f Conflict Resolution 
43:147-161.
Business Day. 2002. DRC Loses $800 to Diamond Fraud. Business Day, 28 October.
390
Buvik, A., and G. John. 2000. When Does Vertical Coordination Improve Industrial Pur­
chasing Relationships? Journal o f Marketing Research 64 (4) 152-64.
Calhoun, Herbert L. 2001. Small Arms and Light Weapons: Can They Be Controlled? 
U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda: An Electronic Journal o f the U.S. Department o f  
State 6 (2): 8-14.
Camdessus, Michel. 2005. Money Laundering: The Importance o f International Coun­
termeasures February 10 1998 [cited January 5 2005]. Available from 
http://www.imf.0rg/extemal/np/speeches/1998/021098.htm.
Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 2004. Conflict Diamond Process 
Enters Key Phase. Canada World View, Winter/Spring.
Cao, Lan. 2004. The Transnational and Sub-National in Global Crimes. Berkeley Jour­
nal o f International Law  22 (i):59-97-
Capdevila, Gustavo. 2005. Drugs: UN Board Sounds Alarm About Internet's Role in 
Trafficking 2002 [cited January 10 2005]. Available from h ttp :// 
www.globalpohcy.org/globaliz/special/2002/0227dmgs.htm.
Carr, Edward Hallett. 1946. The Twenty Years' Crisis: 1919-1939. 2nd ed. London: 
Macmillan.
Cassella, Stefan D. 2004. Bulk Cash Smuggling and the Globalization of Crime: Over­
coming Constitutional Challenges to Forfeiture under 31 U.S.C. § 5332. Berkeley 
Journal o f International Law  22 (1).
Cater, Charles. 2003. The Political Economy of Conflict and Un Intervention: Rethinking 
the Critical Cases of Africa. In The Political Economy o f Armed Conflict: Beyond 
Greed and Grievance, edited by K. Ballentine and J. Sherman. Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner.
Chayes, Abram, and Antonia Handler Chayes. 1993. On Compliance. International Or­
ganization 47:175-205.
Chayes, Abram, and Antonia Handler Chayes. 1995. New Sovereignty : Compliance 
with International Regulatory Agreements. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer­
sity Press.
Chinkin, Christine. 2003. Normative Development in the International Legal System. In 
Commitment and Compliance : The Role o f Non-Binding Norms in the Interna­
tional Legal System, edited by D. Shelton. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
CIA. 2005. The World Factbook Central Intelligence Agency, December 16, 2004 2004 
[cited January 11 2005]. Available from http://www.cia.gov/cia/
publications/factbook/index.html.
CIA. 2005. Lesotho 14 June 2005 2005a [cited 20 June 2005]. Available from 
http://www.cia.g0v/cia/publicati0ns/factb00k/ge0s/lt.html#Ec0n.
391
CIA. 2005. Liberia 1 November 2005b [cited 4 November 2005]. Available from 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/li.html.
Clutterbuck, Richard. 1995. Drugs, Crime and Corruption: Think the Unthinkable. Bas­
ingstoke and London: Macmillan Press.
Coase, Ronald H. 1937. The Nature of the Firm. Economica 4:386-405.
Collier, Paul. 2000. Rebellion as a Quasi-Criminal Activities. Journal o f Conflict Resolu­
tion 44 (6):839-853.
Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 1998. On the Economic Causes of Civil War. Oxford 
Economic Papers 50:563-573.
Connor, Steve. 1991. Cocaine 'First Used 2,000 Years Ago'. The Independent, 16 June, 9.
Cook, Nicolas. 2001. Diamonds and Conflict: Policy Proposals and Background. Wash­
ington, DC: Congressional Research Service (CRS).
Cook, Philip J., and James A. Leitzel. 1998. Gun Control. In The New Palgrave Diction­
ary o f Economics and the Law, edited by P. Newman. London and Basingstoke: 
MacMillan References Limited.
Cooper, Neil. 2002. State Collapse as Business: The Role of Conflict Trade and the 
Emerging Control Agenda. Development and Change 33 (5):935-955.
Cortright, David, and George A. Lopez, eds. 2000. The Sanctions Decade: Assessing Un 
Strategies in the 1990s. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Council of Economic Advisors. 2000. Economic Report of the President. Washington, 
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Cragin, Kim, and Bruce Hoffman. 2003. Arms Trafficking and Colombia. Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND.
Crossette, Barbara. 2001. Effort by U.N. To Cut Traffic in Arms Meets a U.S. Rebuff. The 
New York Times, July 10,8.
Cuellar, Mariano-Florentino. 2004. The Mismatch between State Power and State Ca­
pacity in Transnational Law Enforcement. Berkeley Journal o f International 
Law  22 (i):15-58.
DDA. 2005. Small Arms and Light Weapons 2005 [cited October 10 2005]. Available 
from http://disarmament.un.org/cab/salw.html.
Deloitte Research Financial Services. 2005. Retail Is in the Detail: How Financial Insti­
tutions Can
Grow Revenue in the 21st Century November 24 2003 [cited Januaiy 3 2005]. Available 
from http: /  /  www.ineumconsulting.com/portail/liblocal/docs/2_Pubhcations/ 
Retail_is_in_the_detail.pdf.
392
Dietrich, Michael. 1993. Transaction Costs ... And Revenues. In Transaction Costs, Mar­
kets and Hierarchies, edited by C. Pitelis. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Diver, Colin S. 1983. The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules. The Yale Law 
Journal 93 (1):65-109.
Dixit, Avinash K. 1996. The Making o f Economic Policy. A  Transaction-Cost Politics 
Perspective. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Donnelly, Jack. 1992. The United Nations and the Global Drug Control Regime. In Drug 
Policy in the Americas, edited by P. H. Smith. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Downs, George W., David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom. 1996. Is the Good News 
About Compliance Good News About Cooperation? International Organization 
5 0  (3 ):3 7 9 -4 0 6 .
Dworkin, Ronald. 1986. Law's Empire, Fontana Master guides. London: Fontana Press.
Dyer, Jeffrey H. 1996. Does Governance Matter? Keiretsu Alliances and Asset Specificity 
as Sources of Japanese Competitive Advantage. Organization Science 7 (6):649- 
666.
Eckstein, Harry. 1975. Case Study and Theory in Political Science. In Handbook o f Po­
litical Science: Strategies o f Inquiry, edited by F. I. Greenstein and N. W. 
Polsby. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing.
Eddy, Paul, Hugo Sabogal, and Sara Walden. 1988. The Cocaine Wars. New York, NY: 
W. W. Norton & Company.
Edwards, Adam, and Peter Gill. 2003. After Transnational Organised Crime? The Poli­
tics of Public Safety. In Transnational Organised Crime : Perspective on Global 
Security, edited by A. Edwards and P. Gill. London and New York, NY: 
Routledge.
Eggertsson, Thrainn. 1990. Economic Behavior and Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Epstein, David, and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1999. Delegating Powers: A  Transaction Cost 
Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers. Cambridge, MA: 
Cambridge University Press.
European Commission. 2001. Small Arms and Light Weapons: The Response of the 
European Union. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities.
European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction. 2005. Public Spending on 
Drugs in the European Union During the 1990s 2003 [cited February 20 2005]. 
Available from http://www.emcdda.eu.int/?nnodeid=i345.
European Union. 1998. EU Joint Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons. In Official 
Journal o f the European Communities.
393
Evans, John L. 1997a. International Efforts to Contain Money Laundering. Mexico City: 
Bankers Club.
Evans, Peter. 1997b. The Eclipse of the State? Reflections on Stateness in an Era of 
Globalization. World Politics 50 (1).
Farer, Tom. 2000. Shaping Agendas in Civil Wars. In Greed and Grievance: Economic 
Agendas in Civil Wars, edited by M. Berdal and D. M. Malone. Boulder, CO; 
London: Lynne Rienner.
FATF. 1990. Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering 1. Paris: Financial Ac­
tion Task Force.
FATF. 2005. Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering Condemns New In­
vestment Law in Seychelles Financial Action Task Force, February 11996 [cited 
January 19 2005]. Available from http://wwwi.oecd.org/fatf/pdf/PR-
19960201_en.pdf.
FATF. 2005. Basic Facts About Money Laundering Financial Action Task Force, Octo­
ber 9 2003a [cited January 4 2005]. Available from http://wwwi.oecd.org/ 
fatf/MLaundering_en.htm.
FATF. 2005. FATF Decides to Impose Counter-Measures on Myanmar Financial Action 
Task Force, November 3 2003b [cited January 25 2005]. Available from 
http: / /wwwi.oecd.org/fatf/pdf/PR-2003H03_en.PDF.
FATF. 2003c. The Forty Recommendations, edited by F. A. T. F. o. M. Laundering. 
Paris: Financial Action Task Force.
FATF. 2005a. Annual and Overall Review of Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories. 
Paris: FATF.
FATF. 2005b. Annual Report 2004-2005.
FATF. 2005. Calendar o f Events Financial Action Task Force, January 11 2005c [cited 
January 27 2005]. Available from http://www.fatf-gafi.org/Events_en.htm.
Fearon, James D. 1997. Signalling Foreign Policy Interest: Tying Hands Versus Sinking 
Costs. Journal o f Conflict Resolution 41 (i):68-90.
Felbab-Brown, Vanda. 2005. The Coca Connection: The Impacts o f Illicit Substances on 
Militarized Conflicts 2004 [cited January 21 2005]. Available from 
http://web.mit.edu/polisci/students/vfelbab-brown/coca_connection.pdf.
Ferejohn, John A., and Barry R. Weingast, eds. 1997. The New Federalism: Can the 
States Be Trusted? Stanford: Hoover Institution Press.
Financial Times. 2005. Compliance Costs of Following the Money. Financial Times, 
June 10,18.
FinCEN. 1998. Fincen Further Streamlines Exemption Process. Washington, DC: Finan­
cial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN).
394
Finnemore, Martha, and Stephen J. Toope. 2001. Alternatives to “Legalization”: Richer 
Views of Law and Politics. International Organization 55 (3):743-758.
Fiorina, Morris P. 1982. Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Ad­
ministrative Process? Public Choice 39:33-66.
Franck, Thomas M. 1990. The Power o f Legitimacy among Nations. New York, NY: Ox­
ford University Press.
Fraser, John. 2004. Congo Seeks to Regain Role in Gem Trade. Business Day, 20 July.
Friman, H. Richard, and Peter Andreas. 1999. Introduction: International Relations and 
The Illicit Global Economy. In The Illicit Global Economy and State Power, ed­
ited by H. R. Fridman and P. Andreas. Lanham, Maryland and Oxford: Rowman 
& Littlefield.
Fuller, Jim. 1996. Global Cooperation Vital in Addressing Drug Concerns. Global Issues, 
July, 1-5.
Galanter, Marc. 1981. Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous 
Law. Journal o f Legal Pluralism 19:1-47.
Galeotti, Mark. 2001. Underworld and Upperworld: Transnational Organized Crime and 
Global Society. In Non-State Actors in World Politics, edited by D. Josselin and 
W. Wallace. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Garland, D. 1999. Govemmentability and the Problem of Crime. In Governable Places: 
Reading on Govemmentability and Crime Control, edited by R. Smandych. Al­
dershot: Ashgate.
Gberie, Lansana. 2004. Diamonds without Maps: Liberia, the UN, Sanctions and
the Kimberley Process. Ottawa: Partnership Africa Canada.
Gely, Rafael, and Pablo T. Spiller. 1990. A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court 
Statutory Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases. 
Journal o f Law, Economics and Organization 6 (2): 263-300.
George, Alexander L., and Timothy J. McKeown. 1985. Case Studies and Theories of Or­
ganizational Decision Making. Advances in Information Processing in Organi­
zations 2:21-58.
Georgiev, Dencho. 1993. Politics or Rule of Law: Deconstruction and Legitimacy in In­
ternational Law. European Journal o f International Law  4 (i):i-i4.
Gilardi, Fabrizio. 2002. Policy Credibility and Delegation to Independent Regulatory 
Agencies: A Comparative Empirical Analysis. Journal o f European Public Policy 
9 (61:873-893.
Gillard, Emanuela-Chiara. 2000. What's Legal? What's Illegal? In Running Guns: The 
Global Black Market in Small Arms, edited by L. Lumpe. London: Zed Books.
395
Gilmore, William C. 1992. International Efforts to Combat Money Laundering. Cam­
bridge: Grotius Publications.
Gilmore, William C. 1999. Dirty Money: The Evolution o f Money Laundering Counter­
measures. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing.
Global Witness. 1998. A Rough Trade: The Role of Companies and Governments in the 
Angolan Conflict. London: Global Witness.
Global Witness. 2000. Conflict Diamonds: Possibility for the Identification, Certification 
and Control of Diamonds. London: Global Witness,.
Global Witness. 2005. The Kimberley Process Gets Some Teeth: The Republic o f Congo 
Is Removed from  the Kimberley Process fo r  Failing to Combat the Trade in 
Conflict Diamonds 9 July 2004a [cited 30 May 2005]. Available from 
http: / / www.globalwitness.org/press_releases/display2.php?id=248.
Global Witness. 2004b. Same Old Story: Natural Resources in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo. London.
Godson, Roy. 2003. Transnational Crime, Corruption and Security. In Grave New  
World: Security Challenges in the Twenty-First Century, edited by M. E. Brown. 
Georgetown: Georgetown University Press.
Gold, M., and M. Levi. 1994. Money Laundering in the UK: An Appraisal o f Suspicion- 
Based Reporting. London: The Police Foundation.
Goldstein, Judith. 1996. International Law and Domestic Institutions: Reconciling North 
American "Unfair" Trade Laws. International Organization 50 (4):54i-564.
Goldstein, Judith, Miles Kahler, Robert O. Keohane, and Anne-Marie Slaughter. 2000. 
Introduction: Legalization and World Politics. International Organization 54
(3 ):3 8 5 -3 9 9 -
Goldstein, Judith, and Lisa L. Martin. 2000. Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and 
Domestic Politics: A Cautionary Note. International Organization 54 (3):603- 
632.
Goodin, Robert E. 1996. Institutions and Their Design. In Theories o f Institutional De­
sign, edited by R. E. Goodin. Cambridge and New York, NY: Cambridge Univer­
sity Press.
Goreux, Louis. 2001. Conflict Diamonds. In Africa Region Working Paper Series No. 13. 
Washington, DC: The World Bank.
Gruber, Lloyd. 2000. Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise o f Supranational 
Institutions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Guaqueta, Alexandra. 2003. The Colombian Conflict: Political and Economic Dimen­
sions. In The Political Economy o f Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Griev­
ance, edited by K. Ballentine and J. Sherman. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
396
Gulati, Ranjay, and Harbir Singh. 1998. The Architecture of Cooperation: Managing Co­
operation Costs and Appropriation Concerns in Strategic Alliances. Administra­
tive Science Quarterly 43:781-814.
Guzman, Andrew. 2003. The Design of International Agreements. Unpublished manu­
script.
H.M. Treasury. 2005. Full Regulatory Impact Assessment: Money Laundering Regula­
tions 2003 HM Treasury, November 26 2003 [cited January 20 2005]. Available 
from http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/4B7/B5/fullriamlro3_80.pdf.
Hart Ezell, Virginia. 2002. Small Arms: Dominating Conflict in the Twenty-first Century. 
The Brown Journal o f World Affairs IX (i):305-3io.
Hart, Paul't, Eric K. Stem, and Bengt Sundelius. 1997. Beyond Groupthink : Political 
Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy-Making. Ann Arbor: University of Michi­
gan Press.
Hasenclever, Andreas, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger. 1996. Interests, Power, 
Knowledge: The Study of International Regimes. Mershon International Studies 
Review  40:177-228.
Hasenclever, Andreas, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger. 1997. Theories o f Interna­
tional Regimes. Edited by S. Smith, Cambridge Studies in International Rela­
tions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Haug, M aria, Martin Langvandslien, Lora Lumpe, and Nicholas Marsh. 2002. Shining 
a Light on Small Arms Exports: The Record of State Transparency. Geneva: 
Small Arms Survey.
Hawkins, Darren, David A. Lake, Daniel Nielson, and Michael J. Tiemey. 2004. States, 
International Organizations, and Principal Agent Theory. Unpublished manu­
script.
Heifer, Laurence R., and Anne-Marie Slaughter. 1997. Toward a Theory of Effective Su­
pranational Adjudication. Yale Law Journal 107 (2):273~39i.
Helleiner, Eric. 2002. The Politics of Global Financial Regulation: Lessons from the 
Fight against Money Laundering. In International Capital Markets: Systems in 
Transition, edited by J. Eatwell and L. Taylor. Oxford; New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press.
Henisz. 2000. The Institutional Environment for Multinational Investment. Journal o f 
Law, Economics and Organization 16 (21:334-364.
Hirsch, Moshe. 2004. Compliance with International Norms. In The Impact o f Interna­
tional Law on International Cooperation: Theoretical Perspectives, edited by E. 
Benvenisti and M. Hirsch. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hochschild, Adam. 1999. King Leopold'S Ghost: A  Story o f Greed, Terror, and Heroism 
in Colonial Africa. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
397
Hoekman, Bernard M., and Michel M. Kostecki. 2001. The Political Economcy o f the 
World Trading System. The WTO and Beyond. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hoffmann, Stanley. 1968. International Law and the Control of Force. In The Relevance 
o f International Law , edited by K. W. Deutsch and S. Hoffmann. Cambridge, 
MA: Schenkman Publishers.
Horn, Murray. 1995. The Political Economy o f Public Administration: Institutional 
Choice in the Public Sector. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Horn, Murray J., and Kenneth A. Shepsle. 1989. Commentary on 'Administrative Ar­
rangements and the Political Control of Agencies': Administrative Process and 
Organizational Form as Legislative Responses to Agency Costs. Virginia Law 
Review 75:499-508.
Horvitz, Leslie Alan. 1994. U.S. Gamble May Pay Off in High Stakes Crime Battle - Con­
troversy over FBI Assistance to Foreign Governments to Fight Organized Crime. 
Insight on the News, 25 July.
Huber, John D., and Charles R. Shipan. 2002. Deliberate Discretion? The Institutional 
Foundations o f Bureaucratic Autonomy. Edited by M. Levi, Cambridge Series in 
Comparative Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hughes, D ., Lesley Griffiths, and J. V. McHale. 1997. Do Quasi-Markets Evolve? Institu­
tional Analysis and the NHS. Cambridge Journal o f Economics 21:259-276.
Humphreys, Macartan. 2005. Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution: Un­
covering the Mechanisms. Journal o f Conflict Resolution 49 (4):5o8-537.
Ikle, Fred Charles. 1964. How Nations Negotiate. New York, Evanston, and London: 
Harper & Row.
Inglis, Brian. 1975. The Forbidden Game: A  Social History o f Drug. New York, NY: 
Charles Scribner's Sons.
Interpol. 2005. Funds Derived from  Criminal Activities 6 September 2005 [cited 30 
September 2005]. Available from http://www.interpol.org/Pubhc/ 
FinancialCrime/MoneyLaundering/default.asp.
Janis, Irving Lester. 1983. Groupthink : Psychological Studies o f Policy Decisions and 
Fiascos. 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Jean, F., and J.C. Rufin. 1996. Economies De Guerres Civiles. Paris: Hachette.
Jervis, Robert. 1975. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press.
John, G., and B.A. Weitz. 1988. Salesforce Compensation: An Empirical Investigation of 
Factors Related to Use of Salary Versus Incentive Compensation. Journal o f 
Marketing Research 26:1-14.
398
Johnston, Douglas M. 1997. Consent and Commitment in the World Community: The 
Classification and Analysis o f International Instruments. New York: Transna­
tional Publishers.
Joyce, Elizabeth. 1999. Transnational Criminal Enterprise: The European Perspective. 
In Transnational Crime in the Americas, edited by T. Farer. London: Routledge.
Kahler, Miles. 2000. Legalization as Strategy: The Asia-Pacific Case. International Or­
ganization 54Q (3 ):5 4 9 “5 7 i-
Kaldor, Mary. 1999. New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in the Global Era. Cam­
bridge: Polity Press.
Kalyvas, Stathis. 2001. ’New' and ’Old' Wars: A Valid Distinction? World Politics 54 
(i):99-n8.
Keck, Otto. 1993. The New Institutionalism and the Relative Gains Debate. In Interna­
tional Relations and Pan-Europe: Theoretical Approaches and Empirical Find­
ings, edited by F. R. Pfetsch. Munster: Lit Verlag.
Keefer, Philip, and David Stasavage. 1998. When Does Delegation Improve Credibility? 
Central Bank Independence and the Separation of Powers. In Working Papers 
Series 98-18. Oxford: Centre for the Study of African Economies.
Keegan, John. 1993. A History o f Warfare. New York, NY: Knopf.
Keen, David. 1998a. The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars. In Adelphi Pa­
per. New York: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Oxford Univer­
sity Press.
Keen, David. 1998b. The Economic Functions o f Violence in Civil Wars, Adelphi Paper 
320. Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute of Security 
Studies.
Kellerhals, Merle D. Jr. 2004. Un Small Arms Conference a Success, Us Official Says 21 
August 2001 [cited April 29 2004]. Available from http://usembassy.state.gov/ 
islamabad/wwwhoio82ioi.html.
Keohane, Robert O. 1982. The Demand for International Regimes. International Or­
ganization 36 (2):325-355.
Keohane, Robert 0 . 1984. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Po­
litical Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Keohane, Robert O. 1989a. International Institutions and State Power: Essays in In ­
ternational Relations Theory. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Keohane, Robert 0 .1989b. Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World Politics. 
In International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Rela­
tions Theory, edited by R. O. Keohane. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
399
Keohane, Robert O., Andrew Moravcsik, and Anne-Marie Slaughter. 2000. Legalized 
Dispute Resolution: Interstate and Transnational. International Organization 
5 4  (3 ):4 5 7 -4 8 8 .
Killias, Martin. 1993. Gun Ownership, Suicide, and Homicide: An International Perspec­
tive. In Understanding Crime: Experiences o f Crime and Crime Control, edited 
by A. del Frate, U. Zvekic and J. J. M. van Dijk. Rome: UNICRI.
Kimberley Process. 2005. Final Communique 2003 [cited 30 May 2005]. Available from 
http://www.kimberleyprocess.com:8o8o/site/www_docs/plenary_meetingsi3/ 
isun_city_final_communique.pdf.
Kimberley Process. 2005. Final Communique 2004 [cited 30 May 2005]. Available from 
http: / /www.kimberleyprocess.com:8o8o/site/www_docs/plenary_meetings2o/ 
gatineaufinalcommunique.pdf.
Kimberley Process. 2005. The Kimberley Process 2005a [cited 30 May 2005]. Available 
from http://www.kimberleyprocess.com:8o8o/site/?name=home.
Kimberley Process. 2004. Kimberley Structure 2005b [cited 30 May 2004]. Available 
from http://www.ldmberleyprocess.com:8o8o/site/?name=structure.
King, Charles. 1997. Ending Civil Wars. Edited by 1. 1, f. S. Studies., Adelphi Paper 308. 
Oxford; New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
King, Gary , Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1994. Designing Social Inquiry. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Klare, M.T. 1995. Light Weapons Diffusion and Global Violence in the Post-Cold War 
Era. In Light Weapons and International Security, edited by J. Singh. New 
Delhi: Pugwash and the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis.
Klare, Michael T. 2001. Resource Wars: The New Landscape o f Global Conflict. New 
York, N.Y.: Metropolitan Books.
Klare, Michael T., and Rachel Stohl. 2005. Small Arms and Light Weapons: "the Crisis 
in International Security" March 2003 [cited September 12005]. Available from 
http: / / www.smallarmsnet.org/ issues /  themes /klarestohl.pdf.
Klein, Benjamin, Robert G. Crawford, and Armen A. Alchian. 1978. Vertical Integration, 
Appropriable Rents and the Competitive Contracting Process. Journal o f Law 
and Economics 21 (2)12^7-326.
Klein, Eckart. 1997. Die Intemationalen Organisationen Als Volkerrechtssubjekte. In 
Volkerrecht, edited by W. Graf Vitzhum. Berlin and New York, NY: Walter de 
Gruyter.
Klein, S., L. Frazer, and V.J. Roth. 1990. A Transaction Cost Analysis Model of Channel 
Integration in International Markets. Journal o f Marketing Research 27 (196- 
208).
400
Knight, Frank Hyneman. 1921. Risk, Uncertainty and Profit. Boston, MA and New York, 
NY: Houghton Mifflin.
Koh, Harald H. 1995. A World Transformed. Yale Law Journal 20 (vii).
Koh, Harold H. 1996. Transnational Legal Process. Nebraska Law Review 75 (1).
Kopp, Pierre. 2003. Political Economy o f Illegal Drugs, Studies in Crime and Econom­
ics. London and New York, NY: Routledge.
Koremenos, Barbara. 2001. Loosening the Ties That Bind: A Learning Model of Agree­
ment Flexibility. International Organization 55 (2):289-325.
Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal. 2001. The Rational Design of 
International Institutions. International Organization 55 (4)1761-799.
Krasner, Stephen D. 1983. Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as In­
tervening Variables. In International Regimes, edited by S. D. Krasner. Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press.
Krasner, Stephen D. 1985. Structural Conflict: The Third World against Global Liberal­
ism. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Krasner, Stephen D. 1991. Global Communications and National Power: life on the 
Pareto Frontier. World Politics 43:336-366.
Krasner, Stephen D. 1993. Sovereignty, Regimes, and Human Rights. In Regime Theory 
and International Relations, edited by V. Rittberger. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Kratochwil, Friedrich V., and John Gerard Ruggie. 1986. International Organization: A 
State of the Art on an Art of the State. International Organization 40:753-775.
Kuksa, Vitaly. 2005. Ukraine and the FAFT: From Sanctions to Cooperation (N0.9 
(484)) Zerkalo Nedeli, March 12 2004 [cited January 15 2005]. Available from 
http : / / www.mirror-weekly.com/nn/show/ 484/45793/.
Kuriyan, Vinod. 2005. Botswana Won't Force Beneficiation Said Pres. Mogae Rapaport 
News, 24 May 2005 [cited 30 May 2005]. Available from h ttp :// 
www.diamonds.net/news/newsitem.asp?num=i23i4.
Kytomaki, Elli, and Yankey-Wayne. 2004. Implementing the United Nations Pro­
gramme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons: Analysis of Reports Sub­
mitted by States in 2003. Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Re­
search.
Laitner, Sarah. 2005. New Diamond Centres Seek to Take Shine Off Antwerp. Financial 
Times, May 26, 20.
Lake, David A -1996. Anarchy, Hierarchy, and the Variety of International Relations. In­
ternational Organization 50 (i):i-33-
401
Lake, David A. 1999. Entangling Relations: American Foreign Policy in Its Century. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Lake, David A. 2000. Global Governance: A Relational Contracting Approach. In Global­
ization and Governance, edited by A. Prakash and J. A. Hart. London and New 
York, NY: Routledge.
Lake, David A., and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2005. Delegation to International Agencies 
September 13 2004 [cited May 12005].
Landes, William M., and Richard A. Posner. 1975. The Independent Judiciary in an In- 
terest-Group Perspective. Journal o f Law and Economics 18 (3): 875-901.
Le Billion, Phillippe. 2001. Angola's Political Economy of War: The Role of Oil and Dia­
monds, 1975 - 2000. African Affairs 100:54 - 80.
Le Billion, Phillippe. 2003. Getting It Done: Instruments of Enforcement. In Natural 
Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions, edited by I. Bannon and P. 
Collier. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
Le Billion, Phillippe, Jake Sherman, and Marcia Hartwell. 2002. Controlling Resource 
Flows to Civil Wars: A Review and Analysis of Current Policies and Legal In­
struments. Bellagio: International Peace Academy.
Le Billon, Philippe. 2001. Angola's Political Economy of War: The Role Fo Oil and Dia­
monds 1975-2000. African Affairs 100:55-80.
Lee, Rensselaer W. III. 1985/86. The Latin American Drug Connection. Foreign Policy 
61 (Winter): 142-59.
Lee, Rensselaer W. III. 1999. Transnational Organized Crime: An Overview. In Transna­
tional Crime in the Americas: An Inter-American Dialogue Book, edited by T. 
Farer. New York and London: Routledge.
Levi, Michael. 1991. Customer Confidentiality, Money Laundering, and Police Bank Re­
lationships: English Law and Practise in a Global Environment London: Police 
Foundation.
Levy, Brian, and Pablo T. Spiller. 1996. A Framework for Resolving the Regulatory Prob­
lem. In Regulations, Institutions, and Commitment: Comparative Studies o f  
Telecommunications, edited by B. Levy and P. T. Spiller. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Levy, Marc A. 1993. European Acid Rain: The Power of Tote-Board Diplomacy. In Insti­
tutions fo r  the Earth: Sources o f Effective International Environmental Protec­
tion, edited by P. M. Haas, R. O. Keohane and M. A. Levy. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press.
Lijphart, Arend. 1971. Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method. The American 
Political Science Review 65 (3) .-682-693.
402
Lipson, Charles. 1984. International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs. 
World Politics 37:1-23.
Lipson, Charles. 1991. Why Are Some International Agreements Informal? International 
Organization 45 (4):495"538.
Lipson, Michael. 2004. Transaction Cost Estimation and International Regimes: Of 
Crystal Balls and Sheriffs Posses. International Studies Review 6:1-20.
Llewellyn, Karl. 1931. What Price Contract? An Essay in Perspective. Yale Law Journal
4 0 :7 0 4 -751.
Lumpe, Lora, Sarah Meek, and R.T. Naylor. 2000. Introduction to Gun-Running. In 
Running Guns: The Global Black Market in Small Arms, edited by L. Lumpe. 
London and New York, NY: Zed Books.
Luttwak, Edward N., and Stuart Koehl. 1991. The Dictionary o f Modern War. New York, 
NY: Harpercollins.
Lutz, Ellen, and Kathryn Sikkink. 2000. International Human Rights Law and Practice 
in Latin America. International Organization 54 (3):633-659.
MacDonald, Scott B., and Bruce Zagaris. 1992. Introduction: Controlling the Interna­
tional Drug Problem. In International Handbook on Drug Control, edited by S. 
B. MacDonald and B. Zagaris. Westport, CT; London: Greenwood Press.
Machiavelli, Niccolo. 1970. The Discourses. Translated by L. J. Walker. Harmondsworth: 
Penguin.
Majone, Giandomenico. 1997. Independent Agencies and the Delegation Problem: Theo­
retical and Normative Dimensions. In Political Institutions and Public Policy, 
edited by B. Steunberg and F. van Vught. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publish­
ers.
Malamud-Goti, Jaime. 1992. Reinforcing Poverty: The Bolivian War on Cocaine. In The 
War on Drugs: Studies in the Failure o f U.S. Narcotics Policy, edited by A. W. 
McCoy and A. A. Block. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Malanczuk, Peter. 1997. Akehurst's Modem Introduction to International Law. 7I1 re­
vised ed. ed. London and New York, NY: Routledge.
Maltz, A. 1993. Private Fleet Use: A TC Approach. Transportation Journal 32:46-53.
Martin, Lisa L. 1993. Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanc­
tions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Martin, Tim. 2005. Chair Report - Forth Quarter December 2004 [cited 30 May 2005]. 
Available from http://www.kimherleyprocess.com:8o8o/site/www_docs/ 
chairsi/ chair4quarterreport.pdf.
Masten, Scott E., James W. Jr. Meehan, and Edward A. Snyder. 1991. The Costs of Or­
ganization. Journal o f Law, Economics and Organization 7 (i):i-25.
403
Mathiak, Lucy, and Lora Lumpe. 2000. Government Gun-Running to Guerrillas. In 
Running Guns: The Global Black Market in Small Arms, edited by L. Lumpe. 
London and New York: Zed Books.
Max Planck Institute. 2005. Card Index o f Treaties 2004 [cited January 10 2005]. 
Available from http://www.virtual-institute.de/en/bibl/evertrag.cfm.
MBendi. 2005. World: Mining - Diamond Mining 21 January 2004 [cited 30 May 
2005].
McAllister, William B. 2000. Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century: An Interna­
tional History. London; New York, NY: Routledge.
McCall Smith, James. 2000. The Politics of Dispute Settlement Design: Explaining Le­
galism in Regional Trade Pacts. International Organization 5 4  ( i ):137- i 8 o .
McCoy. 1992. History o f the Southeast Asia Drug Trade.
McCoy, Alfred W., and Alan A. Block. 1992. U.S. Narcotics Policy: An Anatomy of Fail­
ure. In War on Drugs: Studies in the Failure o f U.S. Narcotics Policy, edited by 
A. W. McCoy and A. A. Block. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
McCubbins, Mathew D., Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast. 1987. Administrative Proce­
dures as Instruments of Political Control. Journal o f Law, Economics and Or­
ganization 3 (2): 243 - 277.
McCubbins, Mathew D., Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast. 1989. Structure and Process, 
Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of 
Agencies. Virginia Law Review 75:431-482.
McCubbins, Mathew D., and Talbot Page. 1993. A Theory of Congressional Delegation. 
In Congress: Structure and Policy, edited by M. D. McCubbins and T. Sullivan. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
McCubbins, Mathew D., and Thomas Schwartz. 1984. Congressional Oversight Over­
looked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms. American Journal o f Political Science
28:165-179.
McDowell, John. 2001. The Consequences of Money Laundering and Financial Crime. 
Economic Perspectives 6 (2): 6-8.
McMillan, John, and Christopher M. Woodruff. 1999. Dispute Prevention without 
Courts in Vietnam. Journal o f Law, Economics and Organization 15 (33:637- 
658.
McNollgast. 1987. Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control. Jour­
nal o f Law, Economics and Organization 3 (23:243-279.
Mearsheimer, John J. 1994-1995. The False Promise of Institutions. International Secu­
rity 19 (3):5-49-
404
Mellor, William. 2004. At the Mercy of World's Biggest Debt-Collector. The New Zea­
land Herald.
Metropolitan Police. 2005. 419 Fraud /A dvance Fee Fraud 2005 [cited September 10 
2005]. Available from http://www.met.poHce.uk/fraudalert/419.htm.
Milgrom, Paul, and John Roberts. 1992. Economics, Organization and Management. 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Miller, Garry. 2000. Above Pobtics: Credible Commitment and Efficiency in the Design 
of Pubbc Agencies. Journal o f Public Administration Research and Theory 
10:289-327.
Milner, Helen V. 1997. Interests, Institutions and Information: Domestic Politics and 
International Relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Milner, Helen V., B. Peter Rosendorff, and Edward D. Mansfield. 2004. International 
Trade and Domestic Pobtics: The Domestic Sources of International Trade 
Agreements and Institutions. In The Impact o f International Law on Interna­
tional Cooperation: Theoretical Perspectives, edited by E. Benvenisti and M. 
Hirsch. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mitchell, Ronald B., and Patricia M. Keilbach. 2001. Situation Structure and Institu­
tional Design: Reciprocity, Coercion, and Exchange. International Organization 
5 5  (4 ):8 9 1 -9 1 7 -
Mitsilegas, Valsamis. 2003. Countering the Chameleon Threat of Dirty Money: 'Hard' 
and 'Soft' Law in the Emergence of a Global Regime against Money Laundering 
and Terrorist Financing. In Transnational Organized Crime: Perspectives on 
Global Security, edited by A. Edwards and P. Gill. London and New York: 
Routledge.
Moe, Terry M. 1990a. PoHtical Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story. Journal o f 
Law, Economics and Organization 6 (Special issue):2i3-254.
Moe, Terry M. 1990b. The Politics of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of Pubbc Bu­
reaucracy. In Organization Theory, edited by O. E. Williamson. New York: Ox­
ford University Press.
Moe, Terry M. 1991. Pobtics and the Theory of Organization. Journal o f Law, Economics 
and Organization 7 (Special): 106-129.
Molander, Roger C., David A. Mussington, and Peter A. Wilson. 1998. Cybercrime and 
Money Laundering: Problems and Promise, edited by C. T. Institute. Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
Montague, Dena. 2002. Stolen Goods: Coltan and Conflict in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo. SAISReview  XXII (i):103-ii8.
Monteverde, Kirk, and David Teece. 1982. Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical Inte­
gration in the Automobile Industry. Bell Journal o f Economics 13:206-213.
405
Moravcsik, Andrew. 1993. Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Lib­
eral Intergovemmentalist Perspective. Journal o f Common Market Studies 31
(4 ):4 7 3 - 5 2 4 .
Moravcsik, Andrew. 2000. The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delega­
tion in Postwar Europe. International Organization 54 (23:217-252.
Morgenthau, Hans J. 1953. Politics among Nations: The Struggle fo r  Power and Peace. 
New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf.
Morrill, Cameron, and Janet Morrill. 2003. Internal Auditors and the External Audit: A 
Transaction Cost Perspective. Managerial Auditing Journal 18 (63:490-504.
Morris-Cotterill, Nigel. 2000. How Not to Be a Money Launderer. 2nd ed. London: 
Silkscreen.
Morrison, Stephen J. 2004. Personal Communication on 23 March.
Morrow, James D. 2000. Alliances: Why Write Them Down? Annual Review o f Political 
Science 3:63-83.
Muggah, H.C.R. 2001. Globalisation and Insecurity: The Direct and Indirect Effects of 
Small Arms Availability. IDS Bulletin 32 (23:70-78.
Munck, Gerardo L. 2004. Tools for Qualitative Research. In Rethinking Social Inquiry: 
Diverse Tools, Shared Standards, edited by H. E. Brady and D. Collier. Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Myers, Joseph. 2001. International Standards and Cooperation in the Fight against 
Money Laundering. Economic Perspectives 6 (23:9-10.
Nadelmann, Ethan A. 1990. Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in In­
ternational Society. International Organization 44 (43:503-526.
National Security Council. 2000. International Crime Threat Assessment. Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government.
Naylor, R.T. 1995a. From Cold War to Crime War: The Search for a New 'National Secu­
rity' Threat. Transnational Organized Crime 1 (4):37-56.
Naylor, R.T. 1995b. The Structure and Operation of the Modem Arms Black Marekt. In 
Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, edited 
by J. Boutwell and e. al. Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sci­
ences.
North, Douglass C., and Barry Weingast. 1989. Constitutions and Commitment: The 
Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century Eng­
land. Journal o f Economic History 49 (43:803-832.
Nussbaum, Martha, and Amartya Sen. 1993. The Quality o f Life. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press.
406
NZZ. 2005a. Grosster Drogenfund in Der Geschichte Kolumbiens. Neue Ziircher 
Zeitung, 13 May.
NZZ. 2005b. Neues Waffengesetz Bleibt Auf Langer Bank: Bundesrat Will Schengen- 
Abstimmung Abwarten. Neue Ziiricher Zeitung, 11 March.
O’Ferrall, MoRory More. 2004. Conflict Diamonds 2002 [cited August 112004].
OAS. 2005. Inter-American Convention against the Manufacture and Illicit Trafficking 
o f Firearms, Explosives and Related Materials July 2005 [cited 30 October 
2005]. Available from http://www.021s.org/juridico/english/sigs/a-63.html.
Office of National Drug Control Policy. 2001. The Economic Costs of Drug Abuse in the 
United States: 1992-1998. Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President. 
Office of National Drug Control Policy.
Office of the President of the Republic. 1989. The Fight against the Drug Traffic in Co­
lombia. Bogota: Imprenta National De Colombia.
Olson, Mancur. 1971. The Logic o f Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory o f 
Groups. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Orogun, Paul. 2004. "Blood Diamonds" and Africa's Armed Conflicts in the Post-Cold 
War Era. World Affairs 166 (3): 151-162.
OSCE. 2000. Osce Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons. Vienna: Organization 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe.
Oxfam, and Amnesty International. 2005. Shattered Lives: The Case fo r  Tough Interna­
tional Arms Control 2003 [cited October 10 2005]. Available from 
http: /  /  www.oxfam.org.uk/ what_we_do/issues/conflict_disasters/downloads/s 
hattered_eng_full.pdf.
Palan, Ronen. 2003. Sovereign Markets, Virtual Places, and Nomad Millionaires. 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Perl, Raphael Francis. 1992. The United States. In International Handbook on Drug 
Control, edited by S. B. MacDonald and B. Zagaris. Westport, CT; London: 
Greenwood Press.
Porteous, Samuel D. 2000. Targeted Financial Sanctions. In Greed & Grievance: Eco­
nomic Agendas in Civil Wars, edited by M. R. Berdal and D. Malone. Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Pravda. 2005. Russia's Deletion from  FATF "Black List" to Raise Its Credibility Pravda, 
June 13 2002 [cited January 17 2005]. Available from http://english.pravda.ru/ 
economics/2002/o6/i3/30302.html.
President's Commission on Organized Crime. 2001. The Cash Connection: Organized 
Crime, Financial Institutions, and Money Laundering. New York: Books for 
Business.
407
Price, Tracey Mitchell. 2003. The Kimberley Process: Conflict Diamonds, Wto Obliga­
tions, and the Universality Debate. Minnesota Journal o f Global Trade 12 (i):i- 
69.
Przeworski, Adam, and Henry Teune. 1970. The Logic o f Comparative Social Inquiry. 
Malabar, FL: Krieger Publishing.
Quirk, Peter J. 1996. Macroeconomic Implications of Money Laundering. In IMF Work­
ing Paper. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
Ragin, Charles C., Dirk Berg-Schlosser, and Gisele de Meur. 1998. Political Methodol­
ogy: Qualitative Methods. In A New Handbook o f Political Science, edited by R.
E. Goodin and H.-D. Klingemann. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Raine, Linnea P . , and Frank J. Cilluffo, eds. 1994. Global Organized Crime: The New  
Evil Empire. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS).
Rao, P.K. 2003. The Economics o f Transaction Costs: Theory, Methods and Applica­
tions. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
Raustiala, Kal. 2000. Compliance and Effectiveness in International Regulatory Coop­
eration. Case Western Reserve Journal o f International Law  32:387-439.
Raustiala, Kal. 2002. Police Patrols, Fire Alarms and the Review of Treaty Commit­
ments.
Raustiala, Kal. 2004. Form and Substance in International Agreements. Los Angeles, 
CA.
Reed, John. 2005a. Diamond Bill Threatens to Undermine De Beers' Global Supremacy. 
Financial Times, 9 September, 11.
Reed, John. 2005b. Real Diamonds May Not Be Forever. Financial Times, 28 May, 6.
Reinicke, Wolfgang H., and Jan Martin Witte. 2000. Independence, Globalization, and 
Sovereignty: The Role of Non-Binding International Legal Accords. In Commit­
ment and Compliance : The Role o f Non-Binding Norms in the International 
Legal System , edited by D. Shelton. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Reno, William. 1995. Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone. Cambridge: Cam­
bridge University Press.
Reuter, Peter , and Carol Petrie, eds. 1999. Transnational Organized Crime : Summary 
o f a Workshop. Washington D.C.: National Academy Press.
Rittberger, Volker, and Bernhard Zangl. 2004. International Organization: Polity, Pol­
icy and Politics. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Robinson, Jeffrey. 1994. The Laundrymen: Inside the World’s Third Largest Business. 
London: Simon and Schuster.
408
Rolley, Robin. 1992. United Nations' Activities in International Drug Control. In Inter­
national Handbook on Drug Control, edited by S. B. MacDonald and B. Zagaris. 
Westport, CT; London: Greenwood Press.
Root, Hilton L. 1994. The Foundation o f Privilege: Political Foundations o f Markets in 
Old Regime France and England. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Roox, Gilbert. 2002. Belgian Expert Describes Complexity of African Diamond, Arms 
Traffic. De Standaard, January 5.
Rosendorff, B. Peter, and Helen V. Milner. 2001. The Optimal Design of International 
Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape. International Organization 55
(4 ):8 2 9 -8 5 7 .
Ross, Michael. 2003. Oil, Drugs, and Diamonds: The Varying Roles of Natural Resources 
in Civil Wars. In The Political Economy o f Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and 
Grievance, edited by K. Ballentine and J. Sherman. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
S.S. Lotus (France vs. Turkey) PCU. 1927.
Sail, Alioune. 2005. Techniques for Combating Arms Proliferation in West Africa: Legal 
Aspects. In Combating the Proliferation o f Small Arms and Light Weapons: 
Handbook fo r  the Training o f Armed and Security Forces, edited by A. Ayissi 
and I. Sail. Geneva: UNIDIR.
Savona, Ernesto. 1996. Money Laundering, the Developed Countries and Drug Control: 
The New Agenda. In European Drug Policies and Enforcement, edited by N. 
Dorn, J. Jepsen and E. Savona. Basingstoke and London: Macmillan Press.
Savona, Ernesto U. 1999. European Money Trails. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic 
Publishers.
Schachter, Oscar. 1977. The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding International Agreements. 
The American Journal o f International Law  71 (2):296-304.
Schelling, Thomas C. i960. The Strategy o f Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer­
sity Press.
Schermers, Henry G., and Niels M. Blokker. 1995. International Institutional Law: 
Unity within Diversity. 3rd ed. Cambridge, MA: Kluwer Law International.
Schroeder, William R. 2001. Money Laundering. FBI Law Enforcement Journal 70
(5 ):i-9 -
Senate Special Committee on Illegal Drugs. 2003. Cannabis: Report of the Special 
Committee on Illegal Drugs. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Severin, Christin. 2005. Doppelmoral Londons in Der Geldwascherei November 22, 
2004 2004 [cited January 2 2005]. Available from http://www.nzz.ch/2004/11/ 
24/wi/page-articleAoEMM.html.
409
Shannon. 2000. Norms Are What States Make of Them: The Political Psychology of 
Norm Violation. International Studies Quarterly 44 (2):293-3i6.
Shelanski, Howard A., and Peter G. Klein. 1995. Empirical Research in Transaction Cost 
Economics. Journal o f Law, Economics, and Organization 11.
Shelton, Dinah. 2000. Law, Non-Law and the Problem of ’Soft Law'. In Commitment 
and Compliance: The Role o f Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal 
System, edited by D. Shelton. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Shepsle, Kenneth A. 1991. Discretion, Institutions, and the Problem of Government 
Commitment. In Social Theory fo r  a Changing Society, edited by P. Bourdieu 
and J. S. Coleman. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Sheptycki, James William Edward. 2000. Policing the Virtual Launderette: Money 
Laundering and Global Governance. In Issues in Transnational Policing, edited 
by J. W. E. Sheptycki. London and New York: Routledge.
Sheptycki, James William Edward. 2003. Global Law Enforcement as a Protection 
Racket: Some Sceptical Notes on Transnational Organised Crime as an Object of 
Global Governance. In Transnational Organised Crime: Perspectives on Global 
Security, edited by A. Edwards and P. Gill. London and New York, NY: 
Routledge.
Simma, Bruno. 1988. A Hard Look at Soft Law. American Society o f International Law  
Proceedings 82.
Simmons, Beth A. 2000. International Efforts against Money Laundering. In Commit­
ment and Compliance : The Role o f Non-Binding Norms in the International 
Legal System, edited by D. Shelton. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Simmons, Beth A. 2002. Capacity, Commitment, and Compliance: International Institu­
tions and Territorial Disputes. Journal o f Conflict Resolution 46 (6):829-8s6.
Simon, Herbert Alexander. 1957. Models o f Man: Social and Rational. New York: John 
Wiley.
Simon, Herbert Alexander. 1976. Administrative Behavior: A  Study o f Decision-Making 
Processes in Administrative Organization. 3rd ed. New York: Free Press.
Sislin, John, and Frederic S. Pearson. 2001. Arms and Ethnic Conflict. Lanham, Md: 
Rowman and Littlefield.
Slaughter, Anne-Marie. 1997. The Real New World Order. Foreign Affairs 76 (5): 183-
197.
Slaughter, Anne-Marie. 2004a. International Law and International Relations Theory: A 
Prospectus. In The Impact o f International Law on International Cooperation : 
Theoretical Perspectives, edited by E. Benvenisti and M. Hirsch. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
4 io
Slaughter, Anne-Marie. 2004b. A New World Order. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton 
University Press.
Small Arms Survey. 2001. Small Arms Survey 2001: Profiling the Problem. Oxford: Ox­
ford University Press.
Small Arms Survey. 2002. Small Arms Survey 2002: Counting the Human Cost. Ox­
ford: Oxford University Press.
Small Arms Survey. 2003. Small Arms Survey 2003: Development Denied. Oxford: Ox­
ford University Press.
Small Arms Survey. 2004. Small Arms Survey 2004: Rights at Risk. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Smandych, R., ed. 1999. Governable Places: Reading on Govemmentability and Crime 
Control. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Smillie, Ian, Lansana Gberie, and Ralph Hazleton. 2000. The Heart of the Matter: Sierra 
Leone, Diamonds & Human Security. Ottawa: Partnership Africa Canada.
Smith, Alastair. 1998. International Crises and Domestic Politics. American Political 
Science Review  92 (3):623-638.
Smith, Chris. 1999a. Areas of Major Concentration in the Use and Traffic of Small Arms. 
In Small Arms Control: Old Weapons, New Issues, edited by J. Dhanapala, M. 
Donowaki, S. Rana and L. Lumpe.
Smith, Derek C. 1995. Beyond Indeterminacy and Self-Contradiction in Law: Transna­
tional Abductions and Treaty Interpretation in U.S. V. Alvarez-Machain. Euro­
pean Journal o f International Law  6 (1).
Smith, Peter H., ed. 1992. Drug Policy in the Americas. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Smith, Peter H. 1999b. Semiorganized International Crime: Drug Trafficking in Mexico. 
In Transnational Crime in the Americas, edited by T. Farer. London: Routledge.
Snidal, Duncan. 1985. Coordination Versus Prisoners' Dilemma: Implications for Inter­
national Cooperation and Regimes. American Political Science Review 79:923- 
942.
SSRC. 2005. Program on Global Security & Cooperation, Law & International Rela­
tions Series, Small Arms Workshop Minutes 9 February 2002 [cited 28 May 
2005]. Available from
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/source_documents/Regional%2ofora/Other% 
2ofora/SSRC%2ominutes.pdf.
Steel, Billy. 2005. Money Laundering: The Future [personal website]. 2004 [cited Janu­
ary 25 2005]. Available from http://www.laundryman.u-net.com/
page13_future.html.
411
Stein, Arthur A. 1983. Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World. 
In International Regimes, edited by S. D. Krasner. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univer­
sity Press.
Steinbruner, John. 1974. The Cybernetic Theory o f Decision: New Dimensions o f Politi­
cal Analysis. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Stessens, Guy. 2000. Money Laundering: A  New International Law Enforcement 
Model. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Stohl, Rachel. 2005. United States Weakens Outcome o f Un Small Arms and Light 
Weapons Conference Arms Control Association, September 2001 [cited 10 Au­
gust 2005]. Available from http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_09/ 
stohlsepto i.asp?print.
Stohl, Rachel. 2005. Fighting the Illicit Trafficking of Small Arms. SALS Review (Win­
ter/Spring).
Stone, Randall. 2002. Lending Credibility: The International Monetary Fund and Teh 
Post-Communist Transition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Stott, Noel. 2005. Curbing Small Arms Proliferation: Progress in Africa. Focus on Arms 
in Africa 4 (i):i-4.
Swart, Lucia. 2005. Illegal Gun Pool Growing News24, 26 October 2005 [cited October 
30 2005]. Available from http://www.news24.com/News24/South_Affica/ 
News/o„2-7-i442_i823434,oo.html.
Tallberg, Jonas. 2002. Delegation to Supranational Institutions: Why, How, and with 
What Consequences? West European Politics 25 (1): 23-46.
Tamm, Ingrid J. 2002. Diamonds in Peace and War: Severing the Conflict-Diamond 
Connection, edited by W. P. Foundation. Cambridge, MA: World Peace Founda­
tion.
Thatcher, Mark. 2002. Delegation to Independent Regulatory Agencies: Pressures, 
Functions and Contextual Mediation. West European Politics 25 (i):i25-i47.
The Economist. 2004. The Cartel Isn't for Ever. The Economist, July 17, 67-69.
The Economist. 2005. Drugs in Latin America: Battles Won, a War Still Lost. The 
Economist, February 12th, 49-50.
Thony, J.-F. 1996. Processing Financial Information in Money Laundering Matters: Fi­
nancial Intelligence Units. European Journal o f Crime, Criminal Law and 
Criminal Justice 4 (3):257-282.
Thoumi, Francisco E. 1999. The Impact the Illegal Drug Industry on Colombia. In 
Transnational Crime in the Americas: An Inter-American Dialogue Book, ed­
ited by T. Farer. New York, NY and London: Routledge.
412
Thoumi, Francisco E. 2003. Illegal Drugs, Economy and Society in the Andes. Washing­
ton, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
U.S. Department of State. 2005. International Narcotics Control Strategy Report Bu­
reau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, March 2002 2001 
[cited January 23 2005]. Available from http://www.state.gOv/g/inl/rls/ 
nrcrpt/200i/rpt/8487.htm.
U.S. Department of State. 2005. International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 
March 2005 [cited 10 May 2005]. Available from http://www.state.gOv/g/inl/ 
rls/nrcrpt/2005/voli/pdf/index.htm.
UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms. 1997. Report of the Panel of Gov­
ernmental Experts on Small Arms. New York, NY: UNGA.
UNODC. 2003. Global Illicit Drug Trends. Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime.
UNODC. 2005. The Commission on Narcotic Drugs: Its Mandate and Functions United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2004a [cited February 23 2005]. Available 
from http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/cnd_mandate.html.
UNODC. 2004b. World Drug Report 2004 Volume 1: Analysis. Vienna: United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime.
UNODC. 2005. Monthly Status o f Treaty Adherence 1 January 2005a [cited 30 May 
2005]. Available from http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/
treaty_adherence.html#i988.
UNODC. 2005. Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing o f and Trafficking in Fire­
arms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, Supplementing the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 2005b 
[cited October 30 2005]. Available from http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/ 
crime_cicp_signatures_firearms .html.
UNODC. 2005c. World Drug Report 2005. Oxford; New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press.
US Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration. 1993. Coca Cultivation 
and Cocaine Processing. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice.
US General Accounting Office. 2002. International Trade: Critical Issues Remain in De­
terring Conflict Diamond Trade. Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Of­
fice.
US State Department. 2005. Background Paper: U.S. Policy and Programs on Destroy­
ing Excess Small Arms 2 June 2001 [cited October 20 2005].
van Evera, Stephen. 1997. Guide to Methods fo r  Students o f Political Science. Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press.
413
Vertzberger, Yaacov. 1990. The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cogni­
tion, and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking. Stanford: Stanford Uni­
versity Press.
Vines, Alex. 2005. Combating Light Weapons Proliferation in West Africa. International 
Affairs 81 (2):34i-36o.
Walker, Gordon, and David Weber. 1984. A Transaction Cost Approach to Make-or-Buy 
Decisions. Administrative Science Quarterly 29:373-391.
Walker, John. 2005. Measuring the Extent o f International Crime and Money Launder­
ing 1999 [cited 16 June 2005]. Available from http://www.ozemail.com.au/ 
~bomi82o/Budapest.html.
Walker, William O. III. 1992. International Collaboration in Historical Perspective. In 
Drug Policy in the Americas, edited by P. H. Smith. Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press.
Wallensteen, Peter, and Margareta Sollenberg. 1995. After the Cold War: Emerging Pat­
terns of Armed Conflict. Journal o f Peace Research 32 (3).
Walters, John P. 2002. The Myth of 'Harmless' Marijuana. Washington Post, 1 May, 
A25.
Waltz, Kenneth Neal. 1979. Theory o f International Politics. Reading, MA: Addision- 
Wesley.
Webb-Vidal, Andy. 2005. Us Seeks Colombian Help on Drugs. Financial Times, Febru­
ary 24,10.
Weber, Katja. 1997. Hierarchy Amidst Anarchy: A Transaction Costs Approach to Inter­
national Security Cooperation. International Studies Quarterly 41 (2):32i-340.
Weber, Katja. 2000. Hierarchy Amidst Anarchy: Transaction Costs and Institutional 
Choice. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Weil, Prosper. 1983. Towards Relative Normativity in International Law? The American 
Journal o f International Law  77 (3):4i3-442.
Weiss, Edith Brown. 2004. Rethinking Compliance with International Law. In The Im ­
pact o f International Law on International Cooperation, edited by E. Benvenisti 
and M. Hirsch. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Weitzman, Hal. 2005. Us Help for Anti-Drug Efforts Shifts Funding from Peru to Bo­
livia. Financial Times, February 14,10.
Wezeman, Pieter D. 2003. Conflicts and Transfers of Small Arms. Stockholm: Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute.
Whitaker, Ben. 1987. The Global Connection: The Crisis o f Drug Addiction. London: 
Jonathan Cape.
414
White, David. 2005a. A Test Case for the Recovery of Failed States. Financial Times, 
February 14, 2.
White, David. 2005b. A Test Case for the Recovery of Failed States. Financial Times, 
February 14,1-2.
Widener, S.K., and F.H. Selto. 1999. Management Control Systems and Boundaries of 
the Firm: Why Do Firms Outsource Internal Auditing Activities? Journal o f  
Management Accounting Research 11:45-73.
Williams, Phil. 2001. Crime, Illicit Markets, and Money Laundering. In Managing 
Global Issues: Lessons Learned, edited by P. J. Simmons and C. de Jonge 
Oudraat. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Williamson, Oliver Eaton. 1975. Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Im ­
plications. New York, NY: Free Press.
Williamson, Oliver Eaton. 1985. Economic Institutions o f Capitalism. New York: Free 
Press.
Williamson, Oliver Eaton. 1986. Economic Organization. Brighton: Wheatsheaf.
Williamson, Oliver Eaton. 1991. Strategizing, Economizing, and Economic Organization. 
Strategic Management Journal 23:75-94.
Williamson, Oliver Eaton. 1996. The Mechanisms o f Governance. New York: Oxford 
University Press.
Williamson, Oliver Eaton. 1998. Opportunistic Behaviour in Contracts. In The New Pal­
grave Dictionary o f Economics and the Law, edited by P. Newman. London and 
Basingstoke: Macmillan References.
Wray, Henry R. 1994. Money Laundering: The Volume of Currency
Transaction Reports Filed Can and Should Be Reduced. In Committee on Banking, 
Housing and Urban Affairs
United States Senate. Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office,.
Wright, Laura. 2001. Conflict Stones. Geotimes, 10 January.
WTO. 2005. Agreement Reached on WTO Waiver fo r  "Conflict Diamonds" 26 February 
2003 [cited 30 May 2005].
Yarbrough, Beth V., and Robert M. Yarbrough. 1990. International Institutions and the 
New Economics of Organization. International Organization 44 (2):235-259.
Yarbrough, Beth V., and Robert M. Yarbrough. 1992. Cooperation and Governance in 
International Trade : The Strategic Organizational Approach. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press.
Yin. 1994. Case Study Research: Design and Methods. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
415
Young, Oran R. 1983. Regime Dynamics: The Rise and Fall of International Regime. In 
International Regimes, edited by S. D. Krasner. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press.
Zagaris, Bruce. 1992. Money Laundering: An International Control Problem. In Interna­
tional Handbook on Drug Control, edited by S. B. MacDonald and B. Zagaris. 
Westport, Connecticut; London: Greenwood Press.
Zagaris, Bruce, and Scott Ehlers. 2001. Drug Trafficking & Money Laundering. Foreign 
Policy in Focus 6 (18): 1-4.
Zimring, Franklin E. 1995. Reflections on Firearms and the Criminal Law. Journal o f 
Criminal Law and Criminology 86 (i):i-9.
Zingales, Luigi. 1998. Corporate Governance. In The New Palgrave Dictionary o f Eco­
nomics and the Law , edited by P. Newman. London and Basingstoke: Macmillan 
Reference Limited.
